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Discord
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Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Diss. III, Pt. IV, Sect. II, Ch. II, Article III. On Certain Other Sins Against Charity Toward Neighbor
II. Discord is a dissent of wills concerning a good which we ought to will from charity. It is a grave sin from its genus, that is, grave or light according as it concerns a good necessarily or not necessarily to be pursued (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 37, a. 1).
McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology
Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 8. The Sins Against P…, Introduction · Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 8. The Sins Against P…, Discord · Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 9. The Sins Against B…, The Commandments of Charity Introduction
Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 8. The Sins Against P…, Introduction
(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 37-42.)
The following sins are opposed to the peace of charity: (a) discord, which is opposed to peace in wills; (b) contention or quarreling, which is opposed to peace in words; (e) schism, war, fights and sedition, which are opposed to peace in works.
Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 8. The Sins Against P…, Discord
Discord
Discord.—As here understood, discord is a disagreement in the wills of two or more persons in matters pertaining to the divine good, or the good of the neighbor, and concerning which charity requires that they be in agreement.
(a) Discord is a disagreement in wills, that is, in wishes and desires. Hence, it is not the same as difference of opinion (see 1197), which is a disagreement in judgments.
(b) It is about matters in which agreement is necessary, that is, in which the law of God requires that all wish the same things, and have but one heart and soul. Thus, discord differs from disagreement about matters of supererogation. Examples: Titus and his wife are at variance, because Titus is unwilling to give any alms. Balbus and his wife are at variance, because she wishes him to give away in alms more than is strictly necessary. In the first husband there is discord, but not in the second.
(c) Discord is opposed to the divine good, or the good of the neighbor. Thus, it differs from a disagreement with another who is attacking the divine good or the good of the neighbor. The standard of concord is the divine will, and he only of the persons at variance is discordant who is not in harmony with the divine will.
(d) Discord is confined to those matters in which charity calls for agreement. If it be some other virtue that demands unanimity (e.g., justice), the disagreement is not discord in the special sense now employed, Thus, he whose will refuses consent to the command of a superior is disobedient; he whose will refuses to pay the debt due a creditor is dishonest.
There are two kinds of discord: (a) intentional discord, which is the act of one who knowingly and purposely contradicts in a matter about which charity requires that he agree;
(b) unintentional discord, which is a disagreement between persons, who both intend the divine good or the good of the neighbor, but who are divided in opinion as to what that good here and now requires.
Sinfulness of Intentional Discord
Sinfulness of Intentional Discord.—(a) From its nature, this species of discord is a mortal sin, since it directly excludes charity. Hence, those who are guilty of discord shall not obtain the kingdom of heaven (Gal, v. 21). (b) From the lack of sufficient reflection or consent, the first impulses towards discord are not mortal sins.
Sinfulness of Unintentional Discord
Sinfulness of Unintentional Discord.—(a) From its nature, this kind of discord is not opposed to charity, nor is it sinful; for the concord of charity consists in a union of wills, not in a union of opinions. Thus, the disagreement between Paul and Barnabas about John Mark (Acts, xv. 39) was not sinful, although the difference of judgment indicated their human limitations. (b) From its circumstances, this kind of discord may be sinful, as when it is caused by culpable ignorance in matters of faith, or is carried on with obstinacy.
By whom is the sin of discord committed? (a) It is committed sometimes by one party only, as when one knowingly resists the will of another who wishes to perform a necessary act of charity. (b) It is committed at other times by both parties, as when each in defending his own good infringes knowingly on the charity due the other.
Is it lawful to promote divisions, when one’s purpose and the result will be good? (a) To promote division that takes away the concord of charity is never lawful, but a mortal sin: “There are six things the Lord hates, and a seventh which His soul detests, a sower of discord among brethren” (Prov., vi. 16, 19). (b) To promote division that takes away a concord of malice is lawful and praiseworthy. Thus, St. Paul introduced a dissension between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, who had been in agreement against him (Acts, xxiii. 6, 7). But the intention of the Apostle was to win the Pharisees to the defense of the Resurrection and of himself, not to incite the Sadducees to a denial of the Resurrection, and so there was no question of his using evil means for a good end.
The Origin of Discord
The Origin of Discord.—(a) The disagreement with the will of a neighbor arises from envy. For he who considers the excellence of his neighbor as a lessening of his own excellence, is inclined to contradict the wishes of the neighbor, even if he recognizes them as good. (b) The preference of one’s own will and persistence in it are due to pride and vainglory. For he who unduly desires his own excellence or fame does not wish to yield to others or change his purposes. He feels that, even though he is in the wrong, he must not take what he regards as a position of inferiority.
Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 9. The Sins Against B…, The Commandments of Charity Introduction
The prohibitions of uncharitableness are as follows: (a) against hatred: “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart” (Lev, xix. IT); (b) against sloth: “Bow down thy shoulder and hear her (wisdom), and be not grieved with her bands” (Ecclus., vi. 26); (c) against envy: “Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another” (Gal., v. 26), (d) against discord: “Speak the same things and let there be no schisms among you” (I Cor., i. 10); and (e) against scandal: “Put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother’s way” (Rom., xiv. 13).
Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology
Vol. I, On Sins and Virtues, V. On the Capital Vices · Vol. III, On the Sacraments in General, IV. On the Subject of the Sacraments
Vol. I, On Sins and Virtues, V. On the Capital Vices
What are the daughters of pride and vainglory? "Those vices which of themselves are apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. The daughters of pride are three: 1. Presumption, which is an inordinate appetite of undertaking something above one's powers. It is commonly only venial. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 130, a. 1; q. 134, a. 2 ad 4; q. 21, a. 4. Nevertheless it becomes mortal if it brings grave harm, e.g., if someone presumes to obtain ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the office of physician, etc., without due knowledge. But insofar as presumption is a special sin, opposed to theological hope, it is always a mortal sin, unless imperfection of act excuses. 2. Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of dignity and honor not owed, or in an undue way and by an undue means. It is per se a venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 131, a. 1. But it becomes mortal by reason of the matter from which; or by reason of the means by which; or by reason of the end for which honor is sought; or by reason of the harm which is inflicted on one's neighbor. 3. Vainglory, namely the desire of empty glory, whose end is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. It is per se a venial sin. It is often mortal per accidens, as was just said concerning ambition. But to perform even sacred things on account of vainglory, e.g., to preach, does not exceed venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, aa. 3, 4; q. 162, a. 7; L. 66. Pusillanimity corresponds by opposition to the three daughters of pride, by which someone, distrusting himself too much, refuses honors, glory, or an office for which he is worthy. It is venial from its genus; and it becomes mortal if you refuse that to which you are bound under mortal sin. L. 67.
Moreover, the daughters of vainglory, which St. Thomas constitutes as a capital vice, are assigned thus by the same Holy Doctor, 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. A man can tend to the manifestation of his own excellence in two ways: "in one way directly, either by words, and thus there is boasting; or by deeds, and thus, if they are true things having some admiration, there is presumption of novelties, which men are accustomed to admire more; but if they are false, thus there is hypocrisy. In another way someone strives to manifest his own excellence indirectly, by showing himself not to be less than another, and this in four ways. First indeed as to the intellect, and thus there is pertinacity, by which a man cleaves too much to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe a better opinion. Second as to the will, and thus there is discord, while he does not wish to depart from his own will so that he may agree with others. Third as to speech, and thus there is contention, when another by words quarrels noisily against another. Fourth as to deed, and thus there is disobedience, namely while someone does not wish to execute the precept of a superior." And thus these vices are fittingly called the daughters of vainglory.
Boasting is a certain vain proclamation of one's own excellence, and is per se venial if it is concerning good things; and it can be grave per accidens. If it is concerning lightly evil things, it is likewise per se light, grave per accidens, if, for example, it proceeds from a grave cause against God or neighbor. But if it is concerning gravely evil things, it is grave, because the approval of a work has the same species as the work, which therefore must be expressed in confession, at least when complacency concerning the same sin was joined with the boasting. At least when, etc.; because, if it was without that complacency, many hold that it is not necessarily to be explained. For any boasting concerning mortal sin, abstraction made from complacency in it, is of the same species, namely that someone glories in this, that he has offended God. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 112; L. 26, 66, 67; l. 3, n. 426; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 266 seqq.
Presumption of novelties, which is also called ostentation, if those deeds have nothing of admiration, is also per se venial. And thus it is light to be dressed in foreign garments, or to adorn oneself too much from lightness of mind, vanity, etc.; but grave if it is such as notably to corrupt morals. L. 66, 67. Presumption of novelties can be in opinions, in a mode of speaking, in a mode of acting, etc.
Hypocrisy, by which someone "does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy... is a mortal sin.... To simulate holiness from which one is deficient through mortal sin... is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes venial," according as it happens to oppose charity or not. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 111, a. 4. Likewise to simulate improbitity is a sin, and can be mortal. S. Th. ibid., a. 1; L. 66, 67.
Pertinacity. "Someone is called pertinacious who is imprudently holding, as if wholly tenacious." Hence pertinacity is opposed to perseverance; for the persevering person persists in his own opinion "according as he ought"; but the pertinacious person perseveres in it "more than he ought." And therefore it is a sin because of excess. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 138, a. 2.
Discord is a dissent of wills concerning the good which we ought to will from charity. Moreover, since certain goods can be owed to one's neighbor not only from charity, but also from justice, discord and dissent from the rendering of similar goods is opposed both to charity and to justice. Discord is per se from its genus a mortal sin. For it directly repugns to charity. But per accidens it can become venial, from the smallness of the owed good in the rendering of which we do not wish to consent. Indeed, sometimes it will be no sin, if it arises, namely, from a probable judgment, from which one person judges this, another that, for the honor of God and the utility of neighbor, and if the mode of dissenting is not opposed to charity. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 38; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 37.
Contention is the impugnation of truth with confidence of shouting. Contention is from its genus a mortal sin. The reason: because by charity we ought to will and communicate to others truth necessary or useful for the salvation of the soul, or even of the body; and therefore to impugn it, and to wish to defeat it, is opposed to the virtue of charity, and is from its genus a mortal sin. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 39; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 38.
Disobedience, properly and speaking per se, or formal disobedience, is had only when "someone contemns a precept, because moral acts have their species from the end. But when he does something against a precept, not on account of contempt of the precept, it is disobedience only materially, but formally pertains to another species of sin," according to various motives, e.g., to the species of theft, homicide, etc. Therefore disobedience by its nature is a grave sin. For not to obey the precepts of God and of Superiors is contrary to charity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 105, a. 1.
Vol. III, On the Sacraments in General, IV. On the Subject of the Sacraments
What intention is required in adults for receiving the individual sacraments? - In baptism and order there is required at least a habitual explicit will. The reason is that sacraments of this kind impose grave obligations to be fulfilled. But no one is judged to receive a grave obligation; rather, his positive will must be altogether clear. Lugo d. 9, n. 119, 127; L. 81, 82. The sacrament of baptism and of order is indeed invalidly conferred on those having only interpretative intention. Nevertheless Coninck, Sporer, Dicastillo, etc., apud Croix l. 6, p. 1, n. 168, and others judge that for receiving baptism an implicit intention contained in contrition or attrition had by the recipient suffices, or, as Lugo d. 9, n. 130 says, in the will of giving one's name to the Christian Religion, or, if he is ignorant of this, of doing whatever things are necessary for salvation, as La Croix has it, l.c. Cf. L. 82. This indeed can have place in urgent necessity, but baptism must then be conferred conditionally, and therefore repeated conditionally if time allows, unless there is certainty concerning a true and explicit intention not retracted. Cf. S. C. de P. F., March 30, 1898.
In confirmation, extreme unction, and the Eucharist, a habitual implicit will suffices, which is less rightly called interpretative, and which consists in this, that someone has had a general intention, and has not retracted it, of applying those things which are necessary and useful for his salvation; or of living and dying in the Catholic religion, with the helps of the same religion; or, a fortiori, of receiving all the sacraments in life and at death. The reason is that these sacraments bring many advantages and no disadvantage. But all are judged to wish to receive advantages. Hence both confirmation and extreme unction can be conferred conditionally on a dying person deprived of his senses. Ritual, de Extr. unct. § 6; L. 82. But if he in reality had never thought of receiving them, they would have to be altogether repeated.
For penance there is required either actual or at least virtual intention; nor therefore does habitual intention suffice. The reason is that in this sacrament the acts of the penitent are required for the matter, and these indeed cannot be had without at least virtual will of receiving the sacrament.
L. 82. - Likewise for matrimony at least virtual intention is required. For "since each spouse is not only receiving, but also minister of the sacrament, in each of them there is certainly required that intention which is demanded in the ministers of the other sacraments." L. 82.
Fr. Lehmkuhl, ed. 11, n. 66, requires for the Eucharist, besides the case of viaticum, an expressed habitual intention. Yet ordinarily it is not only virtual, but even actual. The reason, he says, is that "in the general will of living a Christian life there is in no way contained the will of receiving the sacred Eucharist so many times and at such a time." - But if, besides the case of viaticum, it is a question of the Eucharist to be received from obligation, certainly that general will also implicitly contains this. And if that general will is conceived more determinately, namely of applying all the means constituted by God as necessary and useful for salvation, certainly this will would also implicitly include the Eucharist to be received from mere devotion. Finally, if the general will of dying in a Christian manner includes the will of receiving the sacraments of the Church at the point of death, why does the general will of living a Christian life not include the will of receiving Christ's sacraments during life? "Wherefore," the same Fr. Lehmkuhl concludes, "an adult to whom, besides the case of viaticum, the Holy Eucharist were given without his knowledge, would indeed receive it materially, but not with fruit." - But consequently to the things which have just been noted: if in the case of Viaticum the aforesaid adult would receive the sacred Eucharist sacramentally and with fruit, also outside that case he would receive it sacramentally and with fruit, if namely, as was said, he has its will at least implicitly.
Tanquerey
Vol. II, On the Theological Virtues…, On the Virtue of Charity
I. Concerning Discord and Contention.
- Notion. (a) Discord is the dissent of wills concerning a good in which, by charity, we are bound to agree. Therefore two things are required for discord: a dissent of wills, and not of the intellect alone; and a dissent concerning a necessary good, or one about which we are bound to agree. For if it concerns free opinions, and does not exceed the limits of moderation, it is not a sin.3 For the most part it arises from pride, by which we love our own judgment and our own will more than is just.
3 Such was, very probably, the disagreement between Paul and Barnabas (Acts 15:35-40).
(b) From discord contention often arises, that is, an inordinate battle of words, or altercation, by which truth is attacked, or is defended with excessive acrimony. This, moreover, is frequently increased from vain glory, by which each of those contending strives to gain victory over the other. Sometimes also it arises from immoderate nationalism, by force of which certain persons, fostering love of their own nation more than is just, despise and pursue with hatred peoples of another stock, after the manner of pagans; for thus contentions are sown between foreigners and citizens, indeed even among citizens themselves who differ in stock.
Sometimes contentions are had in a religious matter, and schism arises, by which certain Catholics of their own accord withdraw from the unity of the Church. But since the unity of the Church consists in two things, namely, in the connection of members with one another, and again in the order of all members to one head, namely Christ and His vicar on earth, those are called schismatics who refuse to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff, or to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him.4
4 St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 39, a. 1.
- Malice. Discord and contention, in those things in which we are bound to agree, are mortal sins from their genus; moreover schism is a most grave sin not only against charity, but also against the obedience due to the Church.
(A) Scripture often reproves discord as altogether contrary to the Christian spirit, and gravely sinful. For Paul, hearing that there were contentions among the Corinthians, beseeches them to put these away, and to live in concord and peace: "Now I beseech you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you; but that you be perfect in the same mind and in the same judgment."5 Those who indulge in discords are still carnal:6 "For whereas there is among you envying and contention, are you not carnal, and walk according to man?" For God hates dissensions:7 "For God is not of dissension, but of peace." Elsewhere he enumerates contentions and quarrels among lethal sins.8 Wherefore he exhorts Timothy to avoid contentions, as useless and harmful:9 "Do not contend in words: for it is useful for nothing, except for the subversion of the hearers."
5 1 Cor. 1:10.
6 1 Cor. 3:3.
7 1 Cor. 14:33.
8 Gal. 5:20.
9 2 Tim. 2:14.
- (B) Tradition frequently inculcates the same. Among the Fathers, let Cyprian be heard, who before the rest commends concord, and strictly reproves discords or schisms:10 "For God commands that men be peaceful and concordant and unanimous in His house, and as He made us by the second birth, so He wills those reborn to persevere; that we who have begun to be sons of God may remain in the peace of God, and that those to whom there is one spirit may also have one mind and sense. Thus God does not receive the sacrifice of one dissenting, and commands the one returning from the altar first to be reconciled to his brother, so that by peaceful prayers God also may be appeased. Our peace and fraternal concord, and a people united from the unity of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, is a greater sacrifice to God... But one discordant and dissenting and not having peace with his brethren, according to what the blessed Apostle and sacred Scripture testify, even if he should be killed for the name of Christ, will not be able to escape the crime of fraternal dissension."
10 St. Cyprian, De oratione Dominica, c. 23-24, P. L., IV, 535-536. He develops the same more fully in the book De Unitate Ecclesiae, P. L., IV, 493-520.
(C) Reason itself dictates that nothing is more contrary to the Christian spirit, nothing more harmful to individuals or to the Church itself, than discords, contentions, or schisms. For Christ wills that His disciples be one as He Himself is one with the Father:11 "Holy Father, keep them in Thy name, whom Thou hast given Me, that they may be one as We also are"; but dissensions destroy this moral unity. On the other hand, one of the notes of the Catholic Church, one of the causes which bring strength and consolation to it, is the perfect unity of its members; therefore those who sow discords and contentions among Catholics, by that very fact perform a diabolical work, tearing up the foundations of the Church itself and diminishing its strength; for Christ testifies:12 "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand." Therefore those gravely sin who knowingly scatter the seeds of discords and schisms.
11 John 17:11.
12 Matt. 12:25; cf. Luke 11:17.
- Remedy. In order to avoid dissensions of this kind, which have introduced so many and so great evils into the Church of God, two things especially are to be done: (a) we ought to pass over those things of slight moment which tend to cause dissensions, and, on the contrary, attentively consider all those things which bind us by a manifold and sweet bond; concerning these hear the Apostle:13 "Careful to keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace. One body and one spirit, as you are called in one hope of your calling. One Lord, one faith, one baptism. One God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in us all." And truly, when there are so many motives for loving neighbors as brothers, would it not be foolish to break the bond of charity because of certain slight differences which exist between us and them? (b) Since the chief cause of discords is disordered love of self, we ought to cultivate humility and meekness, and thus root out the very roots of dissensions. To the same point the Apostle says: "I therefore, a prisoner in the Lord, beseech you that you walk worthy of the vocation in which you are called, with all humility and meekness, with patience, supporting one another in charity14... If therefore there be any consolation in Christ, if any comfort of charity, if any fellowship of the spirit, if any bowels of commiseration, fulfill my joy, that you be of one mind, having the same charity, being unanimous, thinking the same thing; let nothing be done through contention, nor through vain glory, but in humility, each esteeming others better than themselves; each one not considering the things that are his own, but those that are of others."15 These words indeed preach charity and humility together so sweetly and strongly that they need no commentary.
13 Eph. 4:3-6.
14 Eph. 4:1-2.
15 Phil. 2:1-4.
Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis
Vol. I, Special Moral Theology, Treatise: On Divine Charity, Fourth Part: On Sins Oppos…, Third Question: On Sins Opposed to Peace
S. Th. II-II, q. 37-42.
954. Sins against private peace. - To peace, which is an effect of charity, several sins are opposed. To private peace there is opposed:
- In the heart, discord, which is directly contrary to concord or union of wills, and is a dissension of wills (not only of intellects) concerning the good of God or neighbor which from charity we ought to will, namely, concerning a necessary good about which we are bound to consent.
Discord happens in two ways: a) in itself, when someone knowingly and from intention dissents from the good of God or neighbor in which he ought to consent, and thus it is a mortal sin from its genus because it is contrary to charity; b) accidentally, when the intention of some persons is toward a good which pertains to the honor of God or the utility of neighbor, but one judges this to be good, while another has a contrary opinion, and such discord, which is rather of opinions and intellects than of wills, is not against charity nor a sin, unless it is with error concerning those things which are of the necessity of salvation, or exceeds the limits of moderation so that pertinacity is unduly applied. - Discord arises from vainglory, because we love our own will and our own judgment more than is right.
- From discord often is born contention, which is an altercation of words by which one contradicts another inordinately, either by attacking the truth, or by defending it in an undue mode, for example, with too much acrimony. In the first case it is a mortal sin from its genus, namely, in matter of great moment: of faith, morals, justice, etc.; in the second case it is only venial, unless it generates grave scandal. It likewise arises from vainglory, by which each of those contending strives to carry off victory over the other.
- From discord and contention sometimes is born strife, which is a fight of hands among private persons, by which, with souls inflamed by anger, one strives to strike or injure another. It is a mortal sin from its genus in the aggressor; yet if it does not exceed measure, as also a very light fight, it is venial. In one defending himself there is no sin, if he does not exceed the limits of moderation; if he exceeds a little, it is venial; if much, mortal, for example, if without necessity someone rises up to injure another gravely. - It arises from anger.
955. Sins against public peace. - To public peace, or peace of a multitude, there are opposed:
- To the peace of the Church, schism, which is the voluntary separation of oneself from the unity of the Church, the profession of faith being retained, or the voluntary separation of a baptized person from the Catholic Church. It is committed in two ways, for "the unity of the Church is attended in two things, namely, a) in the connection of the members of the Church with one another..., and b) again in the order of all the members to one head... And therefore they are called schismatics 1. (perfectly) who refuse to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff (with rebellion, so that they pertinaciously refuse to obey precepts), and 2. who refuse to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him" (in doctrine, worship, sacraments). From this it is clear that it is a most grave and mortal sin from its whole genus. Nevertheless it is less grave than infidelity, which is against God himself according as he is in himself the first truth upon which faith rests, while schism is against the unity of the Church, which is a participated good and less than God himself. And although charity is nobler than faith, the sin which is opposed against the secondary good of charity, namely, the good of neighbor, is less than infidelity, because the good of neighbor is less than the object of faith, which is God himself.
- To the peace of a civil multitude, both a) illicit war; and b) sedition, which is a tumult or aggressive war by which one part of the commonwealth unjustly rises up against another, or against the legitimate prince, in which latter case it is called rebellion. It is a sin so much graver as the common good (namely, the peace and unity of society) excels a private good; whence it is mortal from its whole genus.
These sins are also against justice, and are better considered in the treatise on Justice.
956. Observation. - External heretics are also schismatics, but not conversely, although nevertheless schism leads to heresy. Schismatics also are punished by the same ecclesiastical penalties as heretics. Moreover, concerning communication with schismatics and concerning cooperation with schism, one must speak similarly as for heresy (cf. treatise on Faith).
Concina, Compendium
Bk. III, Diss. IV, Chapter II — What is hatred of God, and of the Neighbor. On discord, contention, schism, and sedition
I. Hatred of God is twofold: one which is included in every sin; the other peculiar, which is described as an aversion from God, by which the will detests God insofar as he prohibits sins and inflicts punishments. This hatred of God is the gravest of all crimes, since it is opposed to the most excellent virtue of charity according to its primary act, namely the divine love. It is by its kind mortal, nor does it admit the excuse of parvity of matter; but it can turn out venial only from imperfect deliberation.
II. Hatred of the neighbor is an expressed malevolence, by which we wish him evil. It is by its kind deadly; yet it can become venial, both by parvity of matter and by imperfect deliberation — as if you wish a light evil to your neighbor, or if with imperfect deliberation you desire it for him.
III. It is licit to abominate the sinner, as sinner, according to Proverbs 29: The just abominate a wicked man. For then the sin is hated, not the man. For it is never licit to wish evil to a man, insofar as it is his evil, even with an inefficacious affection; nor is it licit to be saddened over his good, or to rejoice over his evil, as is plain from the proscribed thesis of Innocent XI recounted in the preceding chapter.
IV. Although it is never licit either to desire or to rejoice over the neighbor's evil, it is nevertheless licit, with an inefficacious affection, to wish some temporal evil to another, and to rejoice over it, insofar as this temporal evil conduces to his spiritual good — for instance, that he desist from sin, that he be called back to a better way — as St. Thomas teaches, on the third book, distinction 30, article 1, ad 4. For charity has an order, and each one ought to love himself more than another, and his kin more than strangers, and friends more than enemies, and the common good of many more than the good of one.
One can, without violating charity, wish some temporal evil to another, or rejoice if it should happen — not insofar as it is his evil, but insofar as it is an impediment of evils to another whom one is more bound to love, or to the Community, or to the Church. Similarly of his temporal evil, according as by the evil of punishment the evil of fault is frequently prevented. Hence it is licit to wish for victory in a just war, for the destruction of the Turks, for the common good of the Church or of the Principality; it is licit to wish that a punishment be inflicted by the judge on a malefactor, that he desist from inflicting harm on the Community or on a neighbor. Yet the utmost vigilance is needed in desires of this kind, however inefficacious, lest under the appearance of the common good the cupidity of private vengeance lie hidden. Similarly it is never licit to wish a lesser evil to oneself or to others in order to avoid a greater. Wherefore they gravely sin who deliberately desire death for themselves in order to avoid other troubles.
V. Question I. Is it a sin to speak ill of one's neighbor? Answer. He who with deliberate mind imprecates a grave evil upon his neighbor sins mortally. Weak women, and base men, frequently burst forth into these imprecations, and, to excuse themselves, allege the impulse of anger, as though anger were not a sin. That anger can at times forestall reason is true; but frequently, from a depraved habit and from grave negligence in restraining anger, women and men break forth into such curses. They often say, when their anger has cooled, that they are displeased at having hurled such curses; but this is not a sign that they did not sin: for when the anger has been poured out, the mind perceives the evil it has committed, and therefore is then displeased. Parish priests and Confessors, then, should instruct such persons, and show them the necessity of curbing the savage beast of anger: since their frequent curses flow from a depraved habit of becoming angry. But this wicked habituation does not excuse them, but accuses them. That Confessors may be able to discern whether they have offended gravely or lightly, let them weigh all the circumstances, the deliberation of mind, the scandal, the gravity of the evil wished, and the rest of that kind.
VI. Question II. What is discord? Answer. It is a dissension of wills from the divine good and the good of the neighbor, in which they ought to agree. It is opposed to concord, which unites hearts and wills. By its kind it is a mortal sin. For God, Proverbs 6, detests him who sows discord among brethren. It is required, however, that someone knowingly dissent from the good of God or of the Neighbor, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 37, art. 1. Wherefore there is no discord when one, in good faith, judges that this pertains to the honor of God and the utility of the Neighbor, and another judges otherwise. For this frequently happens even among the holier men themselves.
VII. Question III. What is contention? Answer. It is an altercation of words for impugning the truth; or it is an impugning of the truth with a confidence of clamor, as the Angelic Doctor says, II-II, q. 38, art. 1, where he opportunely adds: But if contention is called an impugning of falsity with a due measure of acrimony, then contention is praiseworthy. Acrimony must never be poured out upon persons, but only, with due sparingness, upon errors. This acrimony is like a seasoning, which must be used with great prudence and moderation, especially in vocal disputations. For when men dispute with mutual words, if they clamor with an immoderate outcry of voices, if they rub each other with mutual wit, the disputation easily ends in criminal contention, because the persons are present. But when errors are refuted in writing, often the authors of the errors are either dead or absent; therefore there is no danger of culpable contention. Hence it is that the mildest Fathers — Augustine, Bernard, and others — often used a style sprinkled with wit. For the reader is wearied by a cold reading; but, on the contrary, writing seasoned with a moderate pepper of acrimony sharpens his palate.
VIII. Question IV. What is Schism? Answer. It is a deliberate separation from the unity of the Church. Now he is separated from the Church who refuses either to communicate with her members, or to render due obedience to the Roman Pontiff, her visible head. Not every disobedient man is a schismatic, because pertinacity can be lacking. But every schismatic is disobedient; just as every heretic is a schismatic, but not conversely. Yet in practice these two crimes, schism and heresy, are scarcely separated, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 39, art. 1, ad 3.
IX. Question V. What is sedition? Answer. It is an aggressive war of one part of the Commonwealth against another part, or against its own Prince. It is by its kind a mortal sin, because it is gravely adverse to peace, to unity, and to the common good. Of war and duel I shall treat in explaining the fifth precept.
Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V
Tr. I, Disputation XIV: On Discor…, Question I: What discord is, and what kind of sin
DISCORD is a dissension of wills concerning the divine good, or the neighbor's good, which each is bound by Charity to will. The Angelic Doctor says the same, p. p. Centil. sect. 18., where he describes it thus: It is a will fleeing the judgment of wisdom, dissenting from what is said by others.
THEREFORE it is a mortal sin of its genus; for it is opposed to Christian peace, which is an act of Charity. Hence Galatians 5. names it among the works of the flesh, of which it is said: Those who do such things shall not possess the kingdom of God, and Proverbs 6: The seventh his soul detesteth, etc. He that soweth discords among brethren, as the Angelic Doctor shows in speculo animae, cap. 1.
MOREOVER it is the offspring of Pride, as St. Gregory teaches, 31. moral. cap. 31., and St. Thomas art. 2., St. Bonaventure loco cit.; often also of Envy, as St. Thomas says ad 2. It begets many evils, as is said, Matthew 12: Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate. Where Jerome: As small things grow by concord, so the greatest crumble by discord, as St. Bonaventure reports, citing the place soon after.
WHENCE the Holy Fathers, as gathered by St. Bonaventure in Pharetra, Lib. 3. cap. 22., gravely reprehend it, chiefly St. Gregory in the Register, lib. 6. indic. 15. cap. 166., and Lib. 1. indic. 9. cap. 78., and Lib. 10. indic. 10. cap. 37., and Lib. 1. moral. cap. 4., and Lib. 22. cap. 6., and in Pastor. part. 3. cap. 1. admonit. 23. and 24., and Lib. 2. Dialog. cap. 3., and homil. 38. in Evang.; St. Jerome epist. 14., and on cap. 12. Matth., and on Michaeam, Lib. 2. cap. septimo; St. Augustine serm. 56. de verbis Domini, epist. 13. ad Macedon, and Lib. 9. confess. cap. 8.; St. Ambrose de Virginitate, Lib. 2. at the end; St. Isidore in Synon. cap. 8., and de summo bono, Lib. 3. cap. 51.; St. Chrysostom homil. 16. in Matthaeum; St. Bernard epist. 78. and serm. 71. in Cantica; the Gloss on 1 John, 3.; Boethius de Consol. Lib. 5. prosa 5. at the end. Hence he describes it wondrously in sermons.
The Angelic Doctor also brings many things from the Scriptures in Bibliis pauperum, cap. 50.