General Principles

None but an intellectual being endowed with intellect and will can own property. For such alone, or persons as distinct from things, are the subjects of rights; persons alone can freely dispose of objects which are necessary or useful for the attainment of man’s destiny. Persons alone can suffer a formal injury by the wilful violation of their rights against their will, and so they alone are capable of having rights and holding property.

God, who is the Creator of all things, is also their universal Lord and Master. He can do what he pleases with his own; however he may treat his creatures, they cannot complain of God’s injustice toward them. He is bound only by the laws of his own infinite Goodness and Wisdom.

Other pure spirits whom God has created might conceivably have rights of ownership, but as they have no use for material things with which we are specially concerned, we need not further consider them in this connection.

All men, even imbeciles, who will never have the use of reason, and infants still unborn, are subjects of rights and capable of holding property. For they all require many things for their support, preservation, and defence, for the perfect development of all their faculties, mental and bodily, and for the orderly and secure attainment of their end. As, then, they are under the obligation of striving for the attainment of their end, and they have the right to do so, they have also the right to the necessary means. This reasoning is not invalidated by the incapacity of infants and imbeciles to use their faculties and administer their property. Their rational nature gives them their rights; their capacity to use them is not a necessary condition of their existence. A man who is asleep retains his rights, though he cannot then exercise them. Besides, whatever defect there might be in the title of infants and imbeciles to the rights of men is supplied by the provisions of positive law, which confers rights of property independently of the knowledge or acceptance of the owner.

Inasmuch as man is a social animal, and develops his faculties in the society of his fellows, whose help he constantly needs, nature herself has given him the right to form private societies, companies, or corporations, for the furtherance of common ends, independently of that larger public society which we call the State, and to which all belong. As Leo XIII teaches: “‘ Private societies, then, although they exist within the State, and are severally part of the State, cannot nevertheless be absolutely and as such prohibited by the State. For to enter into a society of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State is bound to protect natural rights, not to destroy them; and if it forbid its citizens to form associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own existence; for both they and it exist in virtue of the like principle—namely, the natural tendency of man to dwell in society.¹

The State, of course, has the right of control over such societies as are founded for civil purposes, and they are subject to the just laws which the State may make in their regard. English law acknowledges both corporations aggregate, consisting of more than one person united for the purpose of pursuing a common end, and corporations sole, consisting of but one person like the sovereign or the rector of a church. A corporation is a moral entity, a fictitious person, with rights of its own, distinct from the rights of the physical persons who compose it. As far as property is necessary for the attainment of its end, a corporation has the right of ownership, though this right is subject to the control and regulation of the supreme authority. Leo XIII in his encyclical on labour warmly approves of workmen forming their own unions and societies for the defence of their rights and the furtherance of their welfare.

¹ Encyclical on the Condition of Labour, May 15, 1891.

I. Notion. Ownership is a right which is concerned with a thing already bound to someone; but what that right imports depends on the species of ownership which is had, as will be clear from what is to be said under II. The ownership of which we speak is also called ownership of property, or low or base ownership; and it is distinguished from high or eminent ownership, or ownership of jurisdiction, of which we shall speak in the scholion.

II. Division. Ownership is divided into full or perfect ownership, and non-full or imperfect ownership.

1. Full or perfect ownership is the strict right of disposing of a thing in any way not prohibited by law, with others excluded. It is said: of disposing in any way, that is, of using the thing, or applying it to one's own operation; of enjoying the thing, that is, of receiving the fruits of the thing; of consuming or destroying the thing; likewise of retaining, throwing away, giving, exchanging, or selling the thing. Therefore full ownership regards the substance, use, and fruits of the thing.

2. Non-full or imperfect ownership is ownership which is destitute of one or several of the rights enumerated above. Moreover it is called:

a) Direct, or radical, or naked, insofar as it comprises only the substance of the thing.

b) Indirect, or useful, insofar as it regards only the use or only the fruits.

III. Legitimacy.¹ An individual man has the right of acquiring ownership. This is established against Communists and Socialists, insofar as at least many of them contend that all things, or at least productive movable goods (capital) and immovable goods, must be abolished as private possessions and transferred to particular societies, whether economic (syndicates) or political (municipalities), or to the universal society (the State). The proposition is proved first from Sacred Scripture, which manifestly signifies that ownership of many things can be acquired by an individual. Thus Deuteronomy: "You shall not covet your neighbor's wife, not his house, not his field, not his maidservant, not his ox, not his ass, and all things that are his."² Add those passages in which theft,³ that is, the violation of the ownership which belongs to one's neighbor, is condemned.

Ecclesiastical documents are added.

Thus, for example, Leo XIII: "But that God gave the earth to the whole human race for use and enjoyment cannot in any way be an obstacle to private possessions. For God is said to have given the earth to the human race in common, not because He wished its dominion to be promiscuous among all, but because He assigned no part to anyone for possession, leaving the delimitation of private possessions to the industry of men and the institutions of peoples."⁴ Again: "For since the right of possessing goods privately has been given not by human law but by nature, public authority can abolish not the right itself, but only moderate its use and compose it with the common good."⁵ Pius XI teaches the same.⁶

There is added the constant use of all peoples.

There are added reasons which confirm the proposition. For first, the individual man enjoys a right of providing for himself and for his family, not only for the present but also for the future; and he cannot do this unless he makes several things his own, so that he can dispose of them according to his will. Nor should one object that the means of sustenance are to be received from the commonwealth; for since nature tends toward the perfect, existence itself brings with it the right of continuing existence independently of another. Indeed, since man and the family are prior to the commonwealth, "he must have had by nature this right of his to protect life and body before any State had come together."⁷ Secondly, the proposition is deduced from the fact that private ownership is necessary for the good of society, as we shall soon see.

Objection. An individual man has the right of acquiring ownership only insofar as the State leaves that right intact.

Resp. The State cannot take away that right, but at most limit it: both because the State, as destined to the good of citizens, can protect the rights of individuals, and at most moderate them, rather than extinguish them;⁸ and because private ownership, as we shall say, is morally necessary.

Corollary. The use of the right of acquiring ownership is lawful. This is deduced first from Sacred Scripture, in which renunciation of private ownership is taught to pertain only to perfection,⁹ and salvation is said to have come to Zacchaeus, who retained half of his goods.¹⁰ Secondly, it would be useless for a right to be granted if the use of the right were prohibited. Finally, it is clear from the necessity of private ownership, now to be proved.

¹ Cf. Horvath, Eigenthumsrecht nach dem hl. Thomas v. Aquin; Schweigman, De eigendomsphilosophie van Hugo de Groot.

² Deut. 5:21.

³ For example, Luke 19:8.

⁴ Encyclical Rerum novarum (May 15, 1891), n. 6.

⁵ Encyclical cited.

⁶ Encyclical Quadragesimo anno (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1931, p. 193).

⁷ Encyclical Rerum novarum, n. 35.

⁸ "Always the very natural right of privately possessing goods must remain intact and inviolable, since the commonwealth cannot take it away; for man is older than the commonwealth." Thus Pius XI in the Encyclical Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931.

⁹ Matt. 19:16; Mark 10:17; Luke 18:18.

¹⁰ Luke 19:8.

IV. Necessity. Private ownership is necessary for the good of society. For the good of society requires ordered and peaceful life together, and also solicitude for conserving and increasing goods. But common possession hinders ordered life together, since distinction is lacking by which each one cares for his own thing; it hinders peaceful life together, since disputes very easily arise both about the production and about the use of things; it hinders solicitude for conserving and increasing goods, since solicitude is usually had only for conserving and increasing one's own things (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 2). For the rest, however, observe:

1. Although private ownership and therefore some division of goods is legitimate and necessary, nevertheless not for that reason, as Pius XI teaches in the Encyclical Quadragesimo anno,¹ can every division of goods be approved, because not every distribution is apt by which the end intended by God may be obtained.

"The very immense multitude of proletarians on the one hand," says the Supreme Pontiff, "and on the other hand the most enormous riches of certain very wealthy persons, are an argument greater than every exception that riches so abundantly produced in this age of ours, which they call the age of industrialism, have not been rightly distributed and have not been equitably applied to the different classes of men."² Now this disordered distribution of goods is ascribed by Pius XI to the abuse of the so-called capitalistic system; hence:

Question. What does the Supreme Pontiff understand by the so-called capitalistic system or regime, and what judgment does he offer concerning the said system?

Resp. 1. By the capitalistic system or regime the Supreme Pontiff understands that system "by which generally for the common exercise of the economic thing, by some things are supplied, by others labor is supplied, as Leo XIII, using a felicitous combination of words, defined it in the Encyclical Rerum novarum, n. 15: neither capital can stand without labor, nor labor without capital."³

Resp. 2. The Supreme Pontiff teaches that this mode of economy "is not to be condemned" in itself, but that its abuse must be condemned. "And indeed it is not vicious by its own nature; but it violates right order when capital hires workers or the proletarian class for this end and under this condition, that business affairs, and therefore the whole economic thing, be turned according to its own will and advantage, with the human dignity of the workers, the social character of economy, and social justice itself and the common good contemned."⁴

2. But from the fact that the division of goods, such as it now is, is disapproved by the Supreme Pontiff, you should not deduce that disparity of fortunes is to be disapproved.

"The Socialists indeed agitate this," says Leo XIII, "but every contention against the nature of things is vain. For in men there are very many and very great natural differences: not all have equal talents, nor equal diligence, nor health, nor strength; and from these things an unequal fortune follows of itself by necessary difference. And this is plainly accommodated to the uses both of private persons and of the community: for common life needs varied ability for managing affairs and diverse offices; and men are especially impelled to fulfilling these offices by difference in each one's family property."⁵

3. But it is another question whether the use of each one's fortune is left to his own choice; this must be denied.

"Just possession of money," says Leo XIII again, "is distinguished from the just use of money. To possess private goods, as we saw a little before, is a natural right for man; and to use that right, especially in the society of life, is not only lawful, but plainly necessary for human life.⁶ But if one asks what sort of use of goods must be made, the Church indeed responds without any hesitation: as to this, man ought not to have exterior things as his own, but as common, namely so that he easily communicate them in the necessity of others." And Pius XI says: "Nor are a man's free revenues left in every way to his choice; namely those which he does not need for sustaining life conveniently and decorously. Indeed, Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers of the Church continually declare in the clearest words that the wealthy are held by the gravest precept of exercising almsgiving, beneficence, and magnificence."⁷

4. Therefore it is certain that the wealthy are bound to give alms. But again there is another question, how great the alms owed are; concerning this, note:

a) Each one, as already follows from what has been said, can first take care of himself and his family, and indeed live suitably to his state.

"Certainly no one," says Leo XIII, "is commanded to help others from that which pertains to the necessities of himself and of his own; indeed, not even to hand over to others what he himself needs for preserving what is suitable to his person and what is becoming: for no one ought to live unbecomingly,"⁸ that is, in such a way that he "could not pass his life suitably according to his own state and the affairs that occur" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 32, a. 6).⁹

b) It is lawful to spend superfluous things "so that the advantage of profitable work may be abundantly had, provided that that work is expended for acquiring goods truly useful."¹⁰

c) It remains to inquire to what extent truly superfluous goods, if they are not spent on profitable and useful works, are to be spent on good works. Now, with St. Alphonsus, we judge that in practice the obligation is satisfied if they are spent partly on pious works; this we explained in n. 534.

¹ Encyclical Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931.

² Encyclical cited.

³ Encyclical cited.

⁴ Encyclical cited.

⁵ Encyclical Rerum novarum, May 15, 1891.

⁶ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 2.

⁷ Encyclical Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931.

⁸ Encyclical cited.

⁹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 32, a. 6.

¹⁰ Encyclical Quadragesimo anno.

I. High ownership is the faculty of the prince of disposing of the goods of citizens, insofar as this is necessary or at least very useful for the common good. From the definition it is clear that high ownership is not ownership properly so called, but the power of jurisdiction. For ownership properly so called involves the faculty of disposing of a thing and its fruits for one's own advantage. But the prince cannot dispose of the goods of citizens so as to provide for his own good, but only so as to provide for the common good.

II. That high ownership belongs to the commonwealth follows from the fact that otherwise it would not be sufficiently equipped for attaining its end, which is the common good.

III. In order that the prince may dispose of the goods of citizens, there is required necessity or a great utility that is sufficiently common. For the commonwealth exists for the common good; moreover, by easily restricting the rights of individuals and families, rather than protecting them, it would harm the common good more than consult it.

Corollary. When necessity or great utility demands it, the commonwealth can deprive someone of some thing by way of expropriation, as it is called, in which case, however, the owner is to be rendered unharmed; likewise, by way of prescription, it can transfer the ownership of one person to another, and so forth. Nevertheless the high ownership of the civil State does not comprehend sacred things, nor temporal things which have been referred by ecclesiastical authority to a supernatural end.

IV. Annexed or akin to high ownership is the faculty of determining whose goods are, or will be, things belonging to no one, such as a treasure to be found; likewise goods not yet existing, such as the fruits of some thing. Now laws looking to this matter, as otherwise the obvious sense of the dispositions sufficiently signifies, are presumed to constitute true and strict rights. Make an exception if the nature of the thing suggests that the disposition of the law rather has the character of a penalty; in that case, before the sentence of a judge, obligation is lacking, but through the sentence of a judge the right is determined. We shall apply these things in their own place to different cases.

Question. Whether the commonwealth also enjoys the so-called right of colonization.

Resp. Colonization is distinguished as twofold, absolute and qualified. Absolute colonization is that by which an external region perfectly depends on a state of higher culture. Qualified colonization is that by which a society of higher culture subjects another to itself, insofar as subjection is necessary for fittingly distributing the goods of the other. Colonization differs from a protectorate or mandate, to which a foreign region is subject, as Egypt and Syria are with respect to Britain and France.

The question regards an unwilling region; for nothing prevents subjection from being constituted by a free contract. Now:

I say first. Absolute colonization is opposed to the right of a foreign region, as is clear.

I say second. Qualified colonization seems lawful; for each state has some right to the goods of the world, since they have been created for the human race. Hence if some uncultivated nation altogether neglects the riches of its region, and impedes other nations from their use and exchange, and refuses and prohibits social life, its subjection in a qualified sense seems lawful.

Corollary I. Colonization established solely for the sake of profit and dominion is not legitimately constituted. From this, however, it does not follow that colonizations constituted in this way must be dissolved at once; for by this manner of acting the colonies would be reduced by rampant communism and other commonwealths into a much worse state, indeed even into extreme misery. Besides, it could have happened that subjection, at first tolerated by unwilling persons, has now been legitimated by free consent.

Corollary II. The duty belongs to the colonizing state of procuring, in its own way, the riches of the region, profitable cultivation, and the goods of the Christian faith for the subject nation.

The Chief Kinds or Ways of Occupation.—(a) Animals.—Domestic animals (e.g., dogs, cats) may not be occupied, even though they have strayed from their owner; tamed animals (e.g., bees, pigeons, songbirds) may be occupied only when they have recovered their liberty; wild animals (e.g., birds, foxes, fishes, hares, etc., at large) may not be occupied, unless they are kept in a small enclosure from which they cannot escape.

(b) Land and Plants. These may be occupied only when they have no present owner.

(c) Treasure-trove.—This is a deposit of precious movables hidden away so long ago that it is impossible to discover the owner. According to natural law it may be occupied by the finder, but the civil law sometimes decides that the find must be divided with the owner of the place or with the government.

(d) Lost Property.—This embraces those movables which an owner has recently parted with, through accident or forgetfulness, without any intention of giving up his ownership of them, and which are now easily findable, although their owner is not known. The finder is obliged to make reasonable efforts to find the owner. If he neglects to make these efforts, proportionate to the worth of the found article, and is convinced that he might have found the owner, he is considered by some theologians to be a possessor in bad faith and bound to reserve the article for the owner or turn it over to the poor or to pious causes. Having made the effort unsuccessfully, according to natural law, he may use the article as his own. The prescriptions of civil law as to the time interval before he may begin to use the article must be observed.

(e) Abandoned Goods.—According to natural law one may occupy goods voluntarily relinquished by the owner (e.g., an old automobile left by the roadside), but the civil law sometimes awards certain classes of goods (e.g., immovables) to the State.

(f) Vacant Goods.—According to natural law the goods of one who died without heirs may be occupied; but under the civil law they usually devolve to the State, whether they be movables or immovables.

Unauthorized Use of Another’s Funds.—What is the guilt of one who uses for his own purposes the money of another entrusted to him for other purposes?

(a) There is no theft, for it is supposed that the purpose of the user is to make only a temporary loan of the money.

(b) There is an act of injustice, if the permission of the owner cannot be presumed; for the rights of an owner are violated when one converts his property to uses displeasing to him. Thus, if the prospect is that the owner may never get his money back or that he will lose profits by the use made of it, the guilt of unjust damage is incurred, at least in intention (e.g., a depositary uses a deposit to buy stocks on margin, or a company official makes an unauthorized loan instead of investing the amount for the company’s benefit).

(c) There is no sin, if the permission of the owner can be reasonably presumed; for to him who willingly consents no injury is done. Thus, if one who is managing the funds of another has the chance to make a large amount of money today by using those funds for himself but cannot get in touch with the owner, the latter’s consent can be presumed, if he will suffer no present loss and it is absolutely certain that his funds will be returned tomorrow. But on account of the risk that is ordinarily present, this case would be rare.

What is ownership? - Among the three species of justice, as has already been said, commutative justice alone is strictly and properly justice altogether. For in legal justice there is lacking distinction toward another; for every citizen is part of the community. But in distributive justice there is lacking right strictly so called; for in the distribution of common goods, toward obtaining a part of them, there is given only mere dignity, and in no way property. But since commutative justice is exercised only between private persons, and renders to each one what is his own proper thing, hence it alone is strictly and properly justice altogether, and it is chiefly treated in this treatise. But since commutative justice regards equality of thing to thing, it is concerned only with the right of property, which is customarily called property and ownership.

Ownership is: the moral power of disposing at will of some corporeal thing as one's own, unless nevertheless it is prohibited by law, agreement, or the will of a testator. "Moral power," and thus it is distinguished from physical power; moral power, and therefore legitimate. "Of disposing of a thing," and thus it is distinguished from jurisdiction, which is also called ownership of jurisdiction, so that it may be distinguished from ownership of property: for jurisdiction is the moral power of governing; nor is it exercised immediately over a thing, but over a subject person. "Corporeal," because of incorporeal things one does not have ownership, but rather a right. "At will," that is, by selling, donating, or even destroying without cause, which although otherwise prohibited, because God permits ownership to each one only for this purpose, that it may serve his own necessity and utility and that of his own people, nevertheless does not violate the right of another and is not against commutative justice. "As one's own," for ownership properly is a right in the thing, and not precisely a right to the thing, which tends to that right and is perfected and completed by it. Much less is ownership mere possession of a thing. "Unless prohibited by law": by natural law, if one cannot dispose of his own thing without injury to anyone; by positive law, and thus alienation of their things is not permitted to minors except from a just cause and with certain solemnities observed, though in this case ownership is not taken away, but only its use is impeded. "By agreement": this would be, for example, if it were agreed between seller and buyer that the buyer is not to use the thing bought except after a certain day. "By the will of a testator": this would be, for example, if the testator had bequeathed a farm to someone on this condition, that he not use it except after a year. C. I. 436; C. G. 544; C. H. 348; C. A. 353, 354; C. B. 903; C. He. 641; C. L. 2167 ff.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66; Gousset 673; E. M.

142. Thesis: Only an intellectual nature is capable of having dominion.

For he alone is capable of dominion who can morally dispose of some thing and suffer injustice: for this is clear from the very notion of right, which is a moral and inviolable power of having something, etc. But only an intellectual nature can morally dispose of some thing, since moral faculty necessarily supposes intellect and will; likewise only such a nature can suffer injustice: for no one suffers injury unless he is unwilling reasonably, and he cannot be unwilling who lacks will and reason. - Hence brute animals do not properly have rights, and without injury properly so called they can be harmed or killed; nevertheless man owes it to himself and to the natural order that he not injure or destroy animals without sufficient reason: he can indeed use them, but not abuse them.

143. Corollary. From this it is asked whether the insane and little children lacking the use of reason are capable of dominion.

If natural right alone is inspected, the matter is not without difficulty: for these, since they are radically endowed with reason, seem capable of dominion; but moreover it is not clearly conceived how especially he who never has had the use of reason, or will have it, can obtain true and proper dominion, since he can perform no moral act, not even the acceptance of goods.

But civil law, as it flourishes among most Nations, has composed the matter equitably, by establishing that there inheres in little children and the insane a right of dominion, but that the administration of the goods which they possess must be exercised by tutors or curators. And rightly indeed; for, on the one hand, these are subject to human necessities and are capable of a certain radical dominion; on the other hand, since they are incapable of administering their own goods, the administration of goods is to be committed to those who enjoy the use of reason. A law of this kind, as just and determinative of the right of property, obliges in conscience; and therefore those sin against justice who usurp the goods of the insane or of infants.

These things being posited, we shall treat of those whose dominion is restricted or subject to special difficulties.

Physical and Moral Persons. I. Here on earth, all men and only men are capable of dominion and rights. Public authority can restrict this capacity on account of the common good.

II. Men, however, can be considered either as individuals or as several conspiring toward an end. From that very conspiring there arises a new unity, and therefore a new being, not indeed physical, but one which reason knows and which, through the various rights and offices consequent upon its constitution, enters the moral order. But insofar as this being is a subject of right, it also becomes, in the juridical sense, a true person, which is called juridical or moral.

The conspiring itself can have an origin either voluntary or necessary.

And we know that, by natural divine Providence, i.e. with nature as guide, it came to be that men coalesced into perfect societies of the temporal order, which from Nature itself borrow an inviolable existence and rights for pursuing their end. These are civil societies as such; they are also States, or political powers, independent from the citizens or members, and furnished with all rights which are necessary on account of the common good.

But within perfect Society itself, smaller societies are connaturally formed, whose origin must be referred to the free consent of citizens, not to political authority. Those which, on account of their end or means, are illicit or dangerous can be prohibited or destroyed by political authority; but, contrary to what the liberal school contended, they are neither created by the State nor do they obtain from the State the right of existing with necessary means. That right flows immediately from the very right of physical persons. Formal recognition of them can add protection and rights; but even before that recognition they exist as true persons. Yet because they can more easily than individual men become harmful, and because the faculty of providing for the common good cannot be renounced by the State, there is a more frequent cause and a more frequent use of prohibitions by which liberty of acting or possessing is contained within narrower limits for moral persons.

Historically, however, the laws which ordered the new affairs of France at the end of the eighteenth century were very hostile to societies which associated persons of the same art or profession, or intended a non-economic end; while, on the contrary, they began to favor greatly societies of things, or industrial and mercantile societies. But that intolerance toward personal societies, which hostile inclinations toward the Catholic Church and therefore toward religious Congregations nourished, could not endure for long; and, with unequal speed, for example under the name of syndicates, from the middle of the nineteenth century societies of persons began to be publicly recognized. At the same time lucrative societies have abused persons and things not a little; and now, increasing constantly in extension and wealth, they have become so powerful that they have seemed able to decide about war and peace and to make public authority itself subject to them.

Present civil laws. At present, for every association and destination of things to a special end, even philanthropic or religious, the laws of Holland, of the United States of North America, and of England are most convenient; corporate law has been developed most of all in Germany.

• Although the German Code, art. 21, for the juridical capacity of societies which do not pursue an economic end, requires only inscription in the register of the Amtsgericht (inferior tribunal), nevertheless by article 81 of the introductory law the laws of the States are confirmed by which the law alone can confer the same capacity on religious associations. The more liberal Code of Austria, art. 26, regularly confers on lawful societies the same rights by which singular persons enjoy. For the rest, the Codes of Latin law do not agree in this matter. After the Code of France, which seems completely to ignore juridical persons, the Codes of Spain, art. 35; of the Mexican republic, art. 39; of Portugal, art. 33, require the intervening authority of law in order that a moral person come to be; while the civil Code of Switzerland, art. 52, exempts ecclesiastical and family foundations, and all honorable associations which do not pursue gain as their end, from inscription in the commercial registers which is necessary for societies which have profit as their end, in order that they become juridical persons; and art. 54 sanctions the principle of the capacity of these persons. The Code of the Brazilian republic, art. 16, is content with inscription in the public registers in order that civil or religious associations be constituted and be moral persons. The recent Belgian law of 27 July 1921 now procures great facility for obtaining civil personality ¹, while France so arranged the law of 1 July 1901 on the liberty of associations that by force of that law very many religious were punished with exile.

It is helpful to compare briefly the liberal regime of Holland with the regime of France. In Holland, the juridical constitution of the Church is sanctioned by art. 168 of the Fundamental Law itself. But the law of 22 Apr. 1855 reserved to a special law the recognition of a moral person which wished to exist indefinitely or for at least thirty years; but below thirty years, royal approval of the statutes suffices, which can be denied only for reasons of the common good, to be expressed in the decree itself. Wherefore most associations are constituted by this more level way for 29 years and 11 months; when that space has elapsed, they are again confirmed. Thus religious houses exist civilly. But those ecclesiastical associations which pertain more intimately to the organic constitution of the Catholic Church borrow their juridical character from the law of 10 Sept. 1853. The laws of the Church and the ordinations of bishops concerning these associations obtain civil firmness as legitimate statutes. But as to capacity, moral persons of themselves are equated to physical persons; nevertheless they cannot have usufruct beyond 30 years, and certain of them, e.g. churches and religious institutions, need royal approval in order to accept legacies and donations. Cf. Duynstee, op. c., n. 25-40. - In France, however: a) undeclared associations are not a moral person; but alongside them a certain society, as existing in fact, has been admitted by judges; b) declared associations can receive no donation, no legacy, but only assessed contributions of members; c) associations instituted because of or on the occasion of the war, if they have been permitted, can receive, besides the contributions of members, also liberal gifts; d) associations which have been declared "publicly useful" (d'utilité publique) must be erected by decree; then they have full faculty of acquiring by gratuitous title; e) associations of religious congregations (congréganistes) are forbidden to exist without the authority of law. The law by which they are permitted defines in what way they must exist; f) syndical associations can freely have every kind of possessions and acquisitions ². - Recently also, as legitimate for ecclesiastical goods, there have been recognized diocesan associations, concerning which there is the encyclical letter of the Supreme Pontiff Maximam gravissimamque, 18 Jan. 1924. - We omit lucrative societies, which continue to enjoy protected liberty.

Therefore civil society still must be purified more fully of the errors of the liberals who contended: a) that moral persons can be created and suppressed by the State alone; b) that while everything which is not prohibited is lawful to physical persons, moral persons can do only what has been conceded to them; c) that associations which go beyond an economic end must be regarded as dangerous and suspect; d) that the goods of an extinct moral person can be usurped by the treasury.

Furthermore, of itself, not only by public power but also by private agreement, certain goods can be devoted to a definite end, for so long a time or in perpetuity, that that universality of things seems to imitate a person in some way.

Thus far concerning civil society. But religious society, or the Church, by the positive will of Christ its founder has been so constituted that all its rights, for dispensation, have been committed to Peter and his successors.

Hence, independently of the members of the Church, the Church and the Holy See, from the divine ordination itself, have the character of a moral person (c. 100, § 1); while the rights of lesser societies in the Church exist dependently upon hierarchical power. Moreover this dependence can assume various forms, so that it can be more or less open and explicit. But the discipline of today, by force of c. 100, § 1, is that "the other inferior moral persons in the Church receive that [character of a moral person] either from the prescription of the law itself or from a special concession of the competent ecclesiastical Superior given by formal decree for a religious or charitable end."

By the prescription of the law itself religious Institutes and religious houses are persons.

Canonical law distinguishes collegiate moral persons (or persons composed of persons) and non-collegiate ones, such as benefices and universals of things applied to a definite end.

Nothing further would have to be said in this chapter, unless the peculiar condition of certain persons, of itself or by positive law, gave place to a peculiar regime which affects the capacity of acquiring and disposing. They are children under family power, wives, clerics, and religious. But the cause of the peculiar regime is one thing for the first two classes of persons, another for the latter two.

¹ Loi sur les associations sans but lucratif. Cf. on that law the annotations of R. D. Ferdinand Claeys Bouuaert^†.

² Cf. Colin and Capitant, I, p. 953.

171. God alone has universal, absolute, independent, and principal dominion over all created things, insofar as He is their first principle of creation and conservation (Ps. XXIII, 1; Wis. XII, 16).

He cannot abdicate this dominion, nor communicate it to any creature, nor exempt any creature from it, because He cannot communicate its title, nor can anyone be exempted from Him. But to the intellectual creature, created to His image, He communicates a particular and relative dominion, subordinated to His universal dominion, just as also He communicates the power of acting under the supreme cause. Hence the dominion which belongs to man has been conferred on him in order to other men; but not in order to God Himself, who alone is always and remains the essential and absolute lord of all things, to whom all will render an account of their dominion.

On earth every man and only man is of himself capable of dominion.

172. Only a being of intellectual nature is capable of right and dominion. - And thus not only the individual is understood, but also a collection of men, which makes a moral person. - It is proved:

He alone is capable of dominion who can morally dispose of some thing as his own, and suffer injustice. But:

1. intellectual nature alone can morally dispose of some thing as its own, because to every intellectual nature and to it alone there belongs the foundation of dominion, namely, intellect and will, through which it has the power of disposing at will of its own acts, and consequently of external things;

2. likewise it alone can suffer injustice: for no one suffers injury unless he is reasonably unwilling; but he who lacks intellect and will cannot be unwilling in this way: for he is unwilling who by will wishes to retain his right concerning the thing, or to obligate others not to take it away.

Therefore intellectual nature alone is capable of dominion.

Brute animals are incapable of this will, as also of the use of dominion, for which it is required to refer one thing to another, which belongs to reason; and therefore properly they do not have rights. Moreover, they are subjected to rational beings as to their end, and consequently as to all things which serve them as means to this end. Whence they can be injured or killed without injury properly so called. Yet man owes it to himself and to the natural order not to injure or destroy animals without a reasonable cause or sufficient reason.

173. For radical dominion and strict right the use of reason is not required, but rational nature suffices. - For although for the actual use or formal exercise of right and dominion the use of reason is required, nevertheless it is not required for habitual dominion, which is immediately founded not in act, but in rational powers ordered to act.

Hence children and the insane possess internal goods; moreover, the common good demands that external goods at once be bound to them (for example, on account of their necessities), so that they may remain proper to them; - on the contrary, a right for which the use of reason is necessarily required cannot belong to them, for example, the right of contracting. And therefore civil law acknowledges their right, but establishes that the administration of goods is to be exercised by curators or tutors.

174. Matter To Be Treated. - The right of dominion is circumscribed by positive law, and therefore it can happen that someone becomes incapable of right in several matters, or that power in him is restricted. Hence we shall speak of those who are not fully capable of dominion, namely: 1. of children under paternal power; 2. of wives; 3. of authors and inventors; 4. of secular clerics; 5. of religious; 6. of moral persons.

600. • The subject of dominion is the owner of some thing, or he whose some thing is.

Hence 1° to God alone belongs supreme and absolute, and therefore independent, dominion over created things, as Scripture cries out: The earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof, the world and all they who dwell in it.³ Indeed he can communicate this dominion to no one, because it depends on creation and conservation, from which God cannot abdicate himself. Yet this does not prevent God from being able to communicate particular dominion to rational creatures, according to that: but the earth he has given to the children of men.⁴

2° On earth every and only man is capable of dominion. It is proved. "He alone can have a right who is capable of suffering injury ... but he alone suffers injury who suffers it unwillingly; but he ought to be unwilling not indeed by a will by which he wishes a thing to be his, but by a will by which he wishes to retain right to the thing itself, or to obligate others not to take it away. But brutes cannot have such a will, since they can know neither moral obligation nor turpitude; therefore they cannot be unwilling, just as they cannot give permission or transfer dominion for the same reason, because, since they do not know moral right, they cannot yield their own right. ... Therefore only intellectual nature, which can know objects of this kind, is capable of having dominion."¹

3° Nor are infants incapable of dominion, nor even the insane; for the use of reason, of which they lack, is necessary only for disposing here and now of goods, or for the exercise of right (n. 589), but not for having dominion, which is founded in the nature of man and his powers, not in the actual exercise of the powers. (a) p. 475.

We must treat especially of the dominion 1° of children of a family, - 2° of wives, - 3° public and national dominion, - 4° of colleges or corporations, - 5° of the Church and clerics. But concerning the dominion of Religious it will be said below in the Treatise on States, where the vow of poverty is treated.

612. • Public dominion is called the dominion of the republic over all things destined to the public and common use of citizens. Thus each State has dominion over bridges, canals, and roads.

Over roads which we are accustomed to call national, namely those which were made by authority of the supreme assembly, Congress, through various States on account of the transmission of letters and documents, the easier passage of soldiers, and other uses common to the whole nation, authority belongs to the general government. But this authority should scarcely be called by the name of dominion, since each State is supreme and would bear with difficulty dominion in the true sense of the name exercised by the general assembly.¹

613. • It pleases one to call national dominion the public lands which namely the President, in the name of the Federated States, buys from the Indians by the right, as they call it, of pre-emption, with money or merchandise handed over for them. In this way it has happened that the Indian tribes have little by little withdrawn farther away; and these, each year, by a new cession of lands made for a very small price, easily supply the general treasury with a means of increasing the public treasure, by selling to new settlers the lands thus bought.²

614. • Not only physical persons (individuals), but also moral persons are capable of dominion. Among these colleges (corporations) obtain the chief place.

Definition. - "A corporation is a franchise possessed by one or more individuals, who subsist as a body politic under a special denomination, and are vested, by the policy of the law, with the capacity of perpetual succession, and of acting in several respects, however numerous the association may be, as a single individual." Therefore it differs from a contract of society or partnership (n. 1018).

615. Division. "Corporations are divided: 1° Into aggregate and sole. A corporation sole consists of a single person, who is made a body corporate and politic, in order to give him some legal capacities and advantages, and specially that of perpetuity, which, as a natural person, he cannot have. A bishop ... is given in the English books as an instance of a corporation sole; and he and his successors in perpetuity take the corporate property and privileges; and the word successors is generally necessary" (in the grant) "for the succession of property in a corporation sole.⁴ The corporations generally in use with us are aggregate;⁵ but there are instances also in this country of sole corporations.

2° Into religious and lay.¹

Lay corporations are again divided into eleemosynary and civil.²

Civil corporations ... are either public or private. Public corporations are such as are created by the government for political purposes, as counties, cities, towns, and villages. ... If the foundation be private, the corporation is private, however extensive the uses may be to which it is devoted by the founder, or by the nature of the institution."⁴

616. How they are created. - "With us they are created by authority of the legislature," and also de facto by that of the Congress,⁵ which has exercised it twice by the incorporation of a national bank.

617. The powers and capacities of corporations. - "The ordinary incidents to a corporation are: 1° To have perpetual succession, and, of course, the power of electing members in the room of those removed by death or otherwise. 2° To sue and be sued, and to grant" (except by will) "and to receive" (except also by will unless specially authorized by their charter) "by their corporate name. 3° To purchase and hold lands and chattels. 4° To have a common seal. 5° To make by-laws for the government of the corporation; this power, however, must be exercised within the limits of the charter, and in subordination to the Constitution and general law of the land, and the rights dependent thereon. 6° The power of amotion, or removal of members." But this power also must be exercised for good cause, and for some offence that has an immediate relation to the duties of the party as a corporator.

"It is now very generally the practice to specify, in the act or charter of the corporation, the powers and capacities with which it is intended to endow the corporation."⁶

618. Dissolution of corporations. - A corporation may be dissolved, 1° by statute; 2° by the natural death or loss of all the members, or of an integral part; 3° by surrender of its franchises; 4° by forfeiture of its charter through negligence or abuse of its franchises.

For Louisiana see "Civ. Code of Louis."²