I. On the Notion, Division, Legitimacy, and Necessity of Ownership

I. Notion. Ownership is a right which is concerned with a thing already bound to someone; but what that right imports depends on the species of ownership which is had, as will be clear from what is to be said under II. The ownership of which we speak is also called ownership of property, or low or base ownership; and it is distinguished from high or eminent ownership, or ownership of jurisdiction, of which we shall speak in the scholion.

II. Division. Ownership is divided into full or perfect ownership, and non-full or imperfect ownership.

1. Full or perfect ownership is the strict right of disposing of a thing in any way not prohibited by law, with others excluded. It is said: of disposing in any way, that is, of using the thing, or applying it to one's own operation; of enjoying the thing, that is, of receiving the fruits of the thing; of consuming or destroying the thing; likewise of retaining, throwing away, giving, exchanging, or selling the thing. Therefore full ownership regards the substance, use, and fruits of the thing.

2. Non-full or imperfect ownership is ownership which is destitute of one or several of the rights enumerated above. Moreover it is called:

a) Direct, or radical, or naked, insofar as it comprises only the substance of the thing.

b) Indirect, or useful, insofar as it regards only the use or only the fruits.

III. Legitimacy.¹ An individual man has the right of acquiring ownership. This is established against Communists and Socialists, insofar as at least many of them contend that all things, or at least productive movable goods (capital) and immovable goods, must be abolished as private possessions and transferred to particular societies, whether economic (syndicates) or political (municipalities), or to the universal society (the State). The proposition is proved first from Sacred Scripture, which manifestly signifies that ownership of many things can be acquired by an individual. Thus Deuteronomy: "You shall not covet your neighbor's wife, not his house, not his field, not his maidservant, not his ox, not his ass, and all things that are his."² Add those passages in which theft,³ that is, the violation of the ownership which belongs to one's neighbor, is condemned.

Ecclesiastical documents are added.

Thus, for example, Leo XIII: "But that God gave the earth to the whole human race for use and enjoyment cannot in any way be an obstacle to private possessions. For God is said to have given the earth to the human race in common, not because He wished its dominion to be promiscuous among all, but because He assigned no part to anyone for possession, leaving the delimitation of private possessions to the industry of men and the institutions of peoples."⁴ Again: "For since the right of possessing goods privately has been given not by human law but by nature, public authority can abolish not the right itself, but only moderate its use and compose it with the common good."⁵ Pius XI teaches the same.⁶

There is added the constant use of all peoples.

There are added reasons which confirm the proposition. For first, the individual man enjoys a right of providing for himself and for his family, not only for the present but also for the future; and he cannot do this unless he makes several things his own, so that he can dispose of them according to his will. Nor should one object that the means of sustenance are to be received from the commonwealth; for since nature tends toward the perfect, existence itself brings with it the right of continuing existence independently of another. Indeed, since man and the family are prior to the commonwealth, "he must have had by nature this right of his to protect life and body before any State had come together."⁷ Secondly, the proposition is deduced from the fact that private ownership is necessary for the good of society, as we shall soon see.

Objection. An individual man has the right of acquiring ownership only insofar as the State leaves that right intact.

Resp. The State cannot take away that right, but at most limit it: both because the State, as destined to the good of citizens, can protect the rights of individuals, and at most moderate them, rather than extinguish them;⁸ and because private ownership, as we shall say, is morally necessary.

Corollary. The use of the right of acquiring ownership is lawful. This is deduced first from Sacred Scripture, in which renunciation of private ownership is taught to pertain only to perfection,⁹ and salvation is said to have come to Zacchaeus, who retained half of his goods.¹⁰ Secondly, it would be useless for a right to be granted if the use of the right were prohibited. Finally, it is clear from the necessity of private ownership, now to be proved.

¹ Cf. Horvath, Eigenthumsrecht nach dem hl. Thomas v. Aquin; Schweigman, De eigendomsphilosophie van Hugo de Groot.

² Deut. 5:21.

³ For example, Luke 19:8.

⁴ Encyclical Rerum novarum (May 15, 1891), n. 6.

⁵ Encyclical cited.

⁶ Encyclical Quadragesimo anno (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1931, p. 193).

⁷ Encyclical Rerum novarum, n. 35.

⁸ "Always the very natural right of privately possessing goods must remain intact and inviolable, since the commonwealth cannot take it away; for man is older than the commonwealth." Thus Pius XI in the Encyclical Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931.

⁹ Matt. 19:16; Mark 10:17; Luke 18:18.

¹⁰ Luke 19:8.

IV. Necessity. Private ownership is necessary for the good of society. For the good of society requires ordered and peaceful life together, and also solicitude for conserving and increasing goods. But common possession hinders ordered life together, since distinction is lacking by which each one cares for his own thing; it hinders peaceful life together, since disputes very easily arise both about the production and about the use of things; it hinders solicitude for conserving and increasing goods, since solicitude is usually had only for conserving and increasing one's own things (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 2). For the rest, however, observe:

1. Although private ownership and therefore some division of goods is legitimate and necessary, nevertheless not for that reason, as Pius XI teaches in the Encyclical Quadragesimo anno,¹ can every division of goods be approved, because not every distribution is apt by which the end intended by God may be obtained.

"The very immense multitude of proletarians on the one hand," says the Supreme Pontiff, "and on the other hand the most enormous riches of certain very wealthy persons, are an argument greater than every exception that riches so abundantly produced in this age of ours, which they call the age of industrialism, have not been rightly distributed and have not been equitably applied to the different classes of men."² Now this disordered distribution of goods is ascribed by Pius XI to the abuse of the so-called capitalistic system; hence:

Question. What does the Supreme Pontiff understand by the so-called capitalistic system or regime, and what judgment does he offer concerning the said system?

Resp. 1. By the capitalistic system or regime the Supreme Pontiff understands that system "by which generally for the common exercise of the economic thing, by some things are supplied, by others labor is supplied, as Leo XIII, using a felicitous combination of words, defined it in the Encyclical Rerum novarum, n. 15: neither capital can stand without labor, nor labor without capital."³

Resp. 2. The Supreme Pontiff teaches that this mode of economy "is not to be condemned" in itself, but that its abuse must be condemned. "And indeed it is not vicious by its own nature; but it violates right order when capital hires workers or the proletarian class for this end and under this condition, that business affairs, and therefore the whole economic thing, be turned according to its own will and advantage, with the human dignity of the workers, the social character of economy, and social justice itself and the common good contemned."⁴

2. But from the fact that the division of goods, such as it now is, is disapproved by the Supreme Pontiff, you should not deduce that disparity of fortunes is to be disapproved.

"The Socialists indeed agitate this," says Leo XIII, "but every contention against the nature of things is vain. For in men there are very many and very great natural differences: not all have equal talents, nor equal diligence, nor health, nor strength; and from these things an unequal fortune follows of itself by necessary difference. And this is plainly accommodated to the uses both of private persons and of the community: for common life needs varied ability for managing affairs and diverse offices; and men are especially impelled to fulfilling these offices by difference in each one's family property."⁵

3. But it is another question whether the use of each one's fortune is left to his own choice; this must be denied.

"Just possession of money," says Leo XIII again, "is distinguished from the just use of money. To possess private goods, as we saw a little before, is a natural right for man; and to use that right, especially in the society of life, is not only lawful, but plainly necessary for human life.⁶ But if one asks what sort of use of goods must be made, the Church indeed responds without any hesitation: as to this, man ought not to have exterior things as his own, but as common, namely so that he easily communicate them in the necessity of others." And Pius XI says: "Nor are a man's free revenues left in every way to his choice; namely those which he does not need for sustaining life conveniently and decorously. Indeed, Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers of the Church continually declare in the clearest words that the wealthy are held by the gravest precept of exercising almsgiving, beneficence, and magnificence."⁷

4. Therefore it is certain that the wealthy are bound to give alms. But again there is another question, how great the alms owed are; concerning this, note:

a) Each one, as already follows from what has been said, can first take care of himself and his family, and indeed live suitably to his state.

"Certainly no one," says Leo XIII, "is commanded to help others from that which pertains to the necessities of himself and of his own; indeed, not even to hand over to others what he himself needs for preserving what is suitable to his person and what is becoming: for no one ought to live unbecomingly,"⁸ that is, in such a way that he "could not pass his life suitably according to his own state and the affairs that occur" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 32, a. 6).⁹

b) It is lawful to spend superfluous things "so that the advantage of profitable work may be abundantly had, provided that that work is expended for acquiring goods truly useful."¹⁰

c) It remains to inquire to what extent truly superfluous goods, if they are not spent on profitable and useful works, are to be spent on good works. Now, with St. Alphonsus, we judge that in practice the obligation is satisfied if they are spent partly on pious works; this we explained in n. 534.

¹ Encyclical Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931.

² Encyclical cited.

³ Encyclical cited.

⁴ Encyclical cited.

⁵ Encyclical Rerum novarum, May 15, 1891.

⁶ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 2.

⁷ Encyclical Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931.

⁸ Encyclical cited.

⁹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 32, a. 6.

¹⁰ Encyclical Quadragesimo anno.