How a motive changes an act

If the object of the action be good, and the extrinsic end of the agent be good also, the action will have a twofold merit. And so there is a twofold merit in giving an alms to relieve distress for the love of God. On the other hand, a grievously sinful motive corrupts and makes an otherwise good action grievously wrong. It turns the agent altogether away from God, his last end. And so it would be a mortal sin to give an alms to a poor woman in order to seduce her.

Even a venially sinful motive, if it be the whole or the primary motive for the action, corrupts the whole act and makes it venially sinful; for then a bad object is sought by good means indeed, but the means are infected with the purpose to which they are prostituted. And so one who preaches merely out of vanity commits a venial sin.

If, however, an end be only venially sinful, and be not the whole or primary motive of the agent, the resulting action will be partly good and partly evil. We suppose that the object is good, a partial motive or motives are also good; in this case a partial and secondary bad motive, which is only venially sinful, cannot corrupt the whole action. One who preaches principally out of obedience, but more willingly because his vanity is flattered, performs an action which is substantially good, but which is infected with a slight defect.

A good motive gives its own moral quality to an indifferent action and makes it good. And so I do an act of charity by depriving a man of a knife with which he was threatening to commit suicide, while the same action done with a view to making the knife my own would be theft.

There is a controversy among theologians as to whether the purpose or intention with which an action is performed can make an action unjust, which, apart from that intention, is not so.

Would a man, for example, be guilty of an act of injustice towards his enemy, and bound to make restitution to him, if he committed a crime, foreseeing and intending that it should be imputed to his enemy, who would be punished for it? Of course he is guilty of a grave sin by giving way to such an act of hatred, and if by any means he procures the false accusation of his enemy he is also guilty of injustice by causing his undeserved punishment. But supposing the false accusation, though foreseen, was in no way procured by him, but was brought about by other causes, would his intention make him guilty of injustice towards his enemy and bound to make restitution to him ? Many theologians affirm that it would,¹ but seeing that the false accusation is indeed occasioned by the crime, but not caused by it, it would seem that the bad intention of the man who committed the crime was incapable of supplying the . causal connection between the crime and the false accusation. The intention alone cannot change the nature of the external action. But if this be so, he is not the effective cause of the injury done to his enemy, and he is not bound to make restitution to him, A good intention certainly cannot make a bad action good. It is not lawful to tell a lie even to save another’s life, according to the teaching of Innocent III. Evil must not be done that good may come of it. This is the teaching of Holy Scripture and of the Catholic Church, nor have Jesuits any other doctrine different from that of the Church. Father Dasbach promised to give anyone two thousand florins who would prove in open court that the Jesuits had ever taught that the end justifies the means, Count Paul von Hoensbroech undertook to do so, but he failed in his suit when it was tried at Cologne in the spring of 1905.² Here we must touch upon a question which has raised a good deal of controversy among divines, and which still divides them. Some, following the great St Augustine, hold that it is a venial sin to eat and to perform other operations of our animal nature for the sake of the pleasure which they give us. Others, on the contrary, hold that the sensible pleasure which accompanies the satisfaction of our animal appetites is good, inasmuch as it is natural and intended by the Author of nature, and so to perform actions which are not wrong in themselves from the motive of pleasure cannot be sinful. If it were not for the sake of the pleasure afforded by eating and by other animal functions many men would abstain from them altogether through disgust. The imperious Stimulus of our fleshly appetites and their satisfaction is required for the preservation and increase of the human race. These satisfactions of our animal nature must indeed be ruled and moderated by right reason, the norm of human conduct. If they are thus moderated, they are conformable to man’s nature, they are in right order and morally good. This seems to be the teaching of St Thomas;³ it is the commoner opinion among modern theologians, nor is it involved in the condemnation of the eighth and ninth propositions condemned by Innocent XI on March 2, 1679.⁴

¹ Lugo, De Justitia, disp. 8, n. 75.

² Civilta Cattolica, Oct. 7, 1905, p. 3.

³ Cont. Gent. 3, c. 9, n. 1; Summa, 2-2, q. 141, a. I, ad I.

⁴ V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 2, n. 505.

Having considered human acts and the passions, we now pass to a consideration of the principles from which acts proceed proximately. These principles are, first, the faculties, powers or forces of the soul (such as the intellect, will, sense, appetite, and vegetative powers); and, secondly, the habits which permanently modify the faculties. For some faculties may be turned in various directions, either favorably or unfavorably, as regards their ends, and it is the stable bent given to a faculty that is called a habit. Thus, the intellect may be directed towards its end, which is truth, by the habit of knowledge; or away from that end by the habit of ignorance. Likewise, the will may be directed towards or away from its end, which is good, by virtue or vice. The faculties are treated in Psychology, but the habits, since they turn the faculties towards good or evil, must be considered in Moral Theology, as well as in philosophy.

3. Human acts take moral goodness or malice from the end. For the end can be considered as a circumstance and as the object of a human act. If the end is considered as a circumstance, it can, not otherwise than the other circumstances, state an order of conformity or deformity to reason. Thus it is conformable to reason not only to give alms, but also to give them in satisfaction for sins; just as it is repugnant to reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to become drunk. Therefore, as circumstances give goodness or moral malice to a human act, so also does the end. And as circumstances of themselves give only accidental goodness and malice, so also does the end. But if the end is considered as object, then human acts take species from the end as from an object, and therefore from it they take not only moral goodness or malice, but also from it they take essential moral goodness or malice.

5. “The end is the object of the will, but not of the other powers. Whence as to the act of the will, the goodness which is from the object does not differ from the goodness which is from the end, as in the acts of the other powers, except perhaps accidentally, according as an end depends on an end and a will on a will;” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 2 ad 1; namely when several ends subordinated of themselves and willed are together, as when someone wills healing medicine on account of going into military service, on account of victory, the formal goodness of the object, for example being healthy, differs from the goodness of another end, for example military service; and when the will of one end, for example adultery, depends on the will of another end, for example theft, as when someone wishes to commit adultery so that he may steal, the malice also of the object, for example adultery, differs from the malice of the end, for example theft. But each is accidental; for it happens to an end that it is subordinated to another, and it also happens to the will that it depends on another; otherwise this would belong to every end and every volition. Cajetan, in the cited place. Moreover a human act is human insofar as it is voluntary. But in a voluntary act a twofold act is found: the interior act of the will and the exterior act. Each of these has its proper object. “But the end is properly the object of the will. But that about which the exterior action is concerned is its object. Therefore, just as the exterior act receives species from the object about which it is concerned, so the interior act of the will receives species from the end as from its proper object. But that which is on the part of the will stands as formal to that which is on the part of the exterior act, because the will uses the members for acting as instruments, nor do exterior acts have the character of morality except insofar as they are voluntary. And therefore the species of a human act is considered formally according to the end, but materially according to the object of the exterior act. Whence the Philosopher says that he who steals in order to commit adultery is, speaking of himself, more adulterer than thief.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6.

6. Now a commanded act can be considered according to itself and taken specificatively, and it can be considered formally and reduplicatively as commanded. If it is considered in the first way, it takes its essential and specific goodness or malice from the object, and accidental goodness or malice from the end. The extrinsic end of the one operating comes to the act already constituted in its species from its proper object. And it is altogether accidental to such an act, considered according to itself, that it be ordered to such an end. Thus the volition of giving alms, commanded by penance, primarily and immediately regards the honorableness of almsgiving or mercy, but only secondarily and mediately the honorableness of penance. If the commanded act is taken in the other way, i.e. formally and reduplicatively as commanded, it has its essential species from the end, because the commanding act and the commanded act are considered one act, whose principal object is then the end which each regards.

7. Therefore human acts take moral goodness or malice from the end because, insofar as they are acts, they receive species from the end as from an object. And this can also be shown otherwise. For human acts can be considered after the manner of actions and after the manner of passions, because through them man moves himself and is moved by himself. But action obtains species from the principle of acting, while passion obtains species from the term of motion. And thus heating as action is nothing other than a certain motion proceeding from heat; heating as passion is nothing other than motion toward heat; and a definition manifests the account of species. For indeed each thing obtains species according to act, and not according to potency; and therefore motion, which is distinguished through action and passion, insofar as it is action, takes species from the act which is the principle of acting; but insofar as it is passion, it takes species from the act which is the term of motion. Moreover “acts are called human insofar as they proceed from a deliberate will, but the object of the will is good and end. And therefore it is manifest that the principle of human acts, insofar as they are human, is the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3. For the end is not only an end, but also the object of the will, and through this is in the place of form, which is the principle of acting. But the end is the object of the will, and is the reason of acting for it, precisely insofar as it is end; for it is that which is sought of itself; and thus the end is good, and “good has the character of end.” St. Thomas, ibid. a. 4 ad 1. “The motive and object of the will is the end... the end, although it is not of the substance of the act (namely of the commanded act), is nevertheless the most principal cause of the act (aforesaid), insofar as it moves the agent to act. Whence also the moral act most of all has species from the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 7. a. 4, body and ad 2. “The end is first in the intention of reason, according to which the species of moral acts are taken.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 7 ad 2. “The end, according as it is prior in intention, according to this pertains to the will. And in this way it gives species to the human or moral act.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3 ad 2. “And similarly (the end) is the term of the same (acts). For that at which the human act is terminated is that which the will intends as an end.” Namely, the human act is from the end, and is to the end: from the end as action; to the end as passion; from the end as object, the intrinsic form of the act, the principle of the act by which the will acts; to the end as the term of the act, for the sake of which it acts. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3.

8. Therefore human acts, besides the absolute and intrinsic goodness or malice which they have from their proper object, have goodness or malice from the end on which they depend. “For the disposition of things in goodness and in being is the same. For there are certain things whose being does not depend on another. And in these it suffices to consider their being itself absolutely. But there are certain things whose being depends on another, whence it is necessary that they be considered by consideration toward the cause on which they depend. But just as the being of a thing depends on the agent and the form, so the goodness of a thing depends on the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4; q. 72. a. 3.

And hence this is understood: good and end are convertible, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 2 ad 2. For whatever the will wills and does, it wills and does as good and for the sake of good.

9. Whether the intention of an extrinsic end can intrinsically change the nature of the exterior work? — R. Some affirm it; others deny it. The opinion of the latter seems to us alone true. The reason is: 1.º because nature cannot be changed; 2.º because the intention of the one operating adds nothing to the work, indeed it does not even touch it, since it is entirely extrinsic to it. Therefore our good intention cannot make an evil work good, nor can our evil intention make what is good evil, nor transfer what is evil intrinsically into another species of malice. But this does not prevent, as is clear, that where the question concerns an object indifferent of itself, the extrinsic end of the one operating can give moral goodness or malice. For this is not to change the intrinsic nature of the exterior work itself, but to determine its intrinsic indifference insofar as it is a human work; and this determination in morals is only from intention. And thus, although the depraved intention of a judge to harm the guilty person cannot intrinsically change the nature of a just sentence and constitute it an unjust causing of damage, nevertheless the intention of taking another’s property determines the taking itself, according as someone takes another’s thing so that he may preserve it for the owner, or so that he may take it for himself and steal it. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 584, 636. — Therefore if someone without force and fraud, but from hatred, or even so that he may harm another, impedes him from the attainment of a good to which he has no right, for example if someone impedes a testator from leaving an inheritance to someone who has no right to it, he is by no means bound to restitution. For he sins either only against charity, or even against justice, but affectively only, not effectively. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 584.

10. Whether an act is good if it has a twofold end, one good and the other evil? — R. 1.º In the affirmative, if the evil end has itself merely antecedently or consequently, that is, merely precedes the whole act or is added to the act already preexisting, or even if it has itself merely concomitantly, that is, influences nothing in the being of the act itself but is only joined to it. The reason is that then it is wholly extrinsic to the act constituted in its whole being. For it is not the reason on account of which of the act itself, but is only the reason, for example, of a certain simple complacency which precedes, accompanies, or follows the deliberate act. But this simple complacency can exercise its influence without infecting the act, so that someone may be moved more easily to a good act, for example if alms were proposed to someone as contributing to eternal life, and to this were joined a simple complacency over the esteem to be had thence among men. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7. Sometimes, in carrying out a good work, a certain sense and imperfect affection touches someone’s soul, although in no way is it the end which he proposes to himself. Whatever of fault is found in this, the goodness of the work which someone does does not perish on that account. — 2.º In the negative, if the evil end has itself truly causatively and influences the substance of the act. The reason is that then someone wills the good at least inadequately under the aspect of evil, which is to will evil. “In order that the will be good, it is required that it be of the good under the aspect of good, i.e. that it will the good and on account of the good.” St. Thomas, q. 19. a. 7 ad 3. — Except unless the end is only lightly evil. The reason is that then the only lightly evil end influences not the substantial being itself of the act, but only the accidental being of the act, and therefore the whole substance of the act remains good. And thus almsgiving will be good, even if a slight ostentation has crept into that act and has truly influenced it. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4 ad 3; De Malo, q. 2. a. 4 ad 2; Suarez, D. 8, S. 1, n. XIV ff. The question concerns, as is clear, an exterior act which is one in the genus of nature and multiple in the genus of morals. “If one act is taken as it is in the genus of morals, it is impossible that it be good and evil by moral goodness and malice; yet if it is one by unity of nature and not by unity of morals, it can be good and evil.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 6.

31. • YOU WILL ASK 2. Whether all actions, that they may be morally good, ought to be informed by the motive of charity?

I answer. No. For acts elicited from the motive of other virtues are good per se, as are acts of Faith, Hope, etc. This is also clear from the Council of Trent, session 14, ch. 4, where it is declared that attrition is a gift of God and disposes the penitent to justification. Likewise session 6, canon 31, where it is said: If anyone shall say that the justified man sins while he works well with a view to eternal recompense, let him be anathema.

YOU WILL ASK 3. Whether all our actions, that they may be honest, ought to be referred to God from a supernatural motive, or one apprehended through Faith?

I answer. No. For otherwise all the works of unbelievers would be sins, which doctrine has been condemned by the Church.

YOU WILL ASK 4. Whether all our actions ought to be referred to God, according to the words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 10. 31: Do all things unto the glory of God?

I answer. Concerning the obligation, which is drawn from the cited text, of referring actions to God, the obscure and often entangled opinions of certain more recent authors being set aside, the common doctrine of the ancients is altogether to be preferred, which is contained in these headings.

And first indeed, the words of Paul, from the common opinion of the Doctors, pertain to the virtue of charity, and, no otherwise than the precept of charity, can be taken both in a negative and in an affirmative sense.

If they are taken in a negative sense, they signify: Do nothing against God ⁵; and thus, according to the opinion of all, indeed from the very nature of the matter, they contain a precept, namely of not sinning. Nevertheless this precept does not give species to sin, because sins take their species not from a general virtue or law, but from special precepts, for example, not killing, not blaspheming.

⁵ See St. Thomas, 2, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 7, and St. Bonaventure, 2, Dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, ad 1.

But if the words of Paul are understood in an affirmative sense, the Doctors dissent somewhat among themselves, and they neither explain them in the same way nor attribute the same force to them.

For some, with St. Bonaventure, judged that through those words Paul insinuates that individual actions, or at least individual series of actions subordinated among themselves, be referred to God actually, or by an actual relation. Nevertheless at the same time they contended that Paul there had handed down no precept, but a mere counsel. - See St. Bonaventure, 2, dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, ad 1 and ad 6.

But others, more commonly with St. Thomas, teach that a precept is in reality contained in the words of the Apostle. But lest someone be carried from this into absurdities ⁶, it is plainly necessary to retain the integral doctrine of St. Thomas on this matter.

⁶ Notable was the fraud of the Jansenists, that they contended the words of Paul to be preceptive, alleging these things from St. Thomas (lecture 3 on Colossians, ch. 3): Some say that this is counsel; but this is not true; but they did not explain the Pauline sentence with St. Thomas, but with St. Bonaventure, where he says (2, Dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, ad 1): The Apostle admonishes... that we refer any work of ours to God: and concerning any work dividedly we can do this. From this, however, they concluded that sin is committed as often as any work is not actually referred to God. And since to refer works to God pertains to charity, among other things they inferred this also, that unbelievers and sinners, as being those who do not have charity, sin in every work.

Moreover not a few among the more recent, although they abhor this condemned error, nevertheless while they themselves also mingle the disparate interpretations of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure of the Pauline text into one thing, fall into another inconvenience. For on the one hand they call back the words of Paul with St. Thomas to a precept; but on the other hand they place the reason of this precept in that which St. Bonaventure required merely for the account of merit, namely that individual actions, or at least individual series of actions, be actually referred to God; and thus, while they establish that this actual relation of all works is obligatory, they bring the matter to this, that scarcely anyone can be found who, on account of this omitted relation of works to God, does not daily and everywhere stain himself with manifold guilt, as Gazzaniga in reality concluded (and indeed coherently) (On Human Acts, diss. 2, ch. 4, no. 87); and Collet adds (On Human Acts, ch. 6, art. 1, sect. 2) that there is not given invincible ignorance which perhaps excuses from this sin. Nor indeed do they sufficiently remedy this inconvenience by so restricting that obligation that it suffices daily, or several times in the day, as Collet says (in the cited place), or at least in the morning, to have referred works to God. For 1. this does not effect that individual actions or individual series of actions subordinated among themselves are actually referred to God according to the mind of St. Bonaventure, and thus that manifold guilt of omissions is absent; 2. since this actual relation is not distinguished from an act of perfect charity, they now infer an obligation hitherto unheard of in the schools, namely of eliciting an act of charity several times in the day or at least once in the morning daily. And from these things it is sufficiently clear that no reason for avoiding these inconveniences is at hand, unless either we deny with St. Bonaventure that a positive precept is contained in the words of Paul, or, if indeed we contend better with St. Thomas that a precept is uttered in them, we take also the explanation of the precept, as it is expounded in the text of the Author, from the same holy Doctor.

**And indeed it were to be wished that St. Alphonsus, who excellently wrote (Treatise on Human Acts, at the beginning): I think one must not depart from the sound doctrine of the Angelic Doctor where it can be had; for with him as guide in theological matters one walks with unoffending foot; it were to be wished, I say, that the holy Doctor in this question also had followed the Angelic Doctor rather than Collet, the continuator of Tournely. For, insisting on his footsteps, he writes (ibid., no. XLIV): Hence for practice we gather: It is necessary several times in the day, at least in the morning, generally to offer to God all one's acts, so that thus the precept of the Apostle may be fulfilled, at least with the virtual intention of doing all things unto the glory of God. The most manifest sense of these words is, namely, that to fulfill the precept of the Apostle it is necessary that several times in the day, at least in the morning, all actions be actually offered to God, so that thus all daily actions and words may thereafter be referred to the glory of God at least by virtual intention. Whence he adds: For the actual relation of all words or works into an honest good is not required, which would be an unbearable burden, and a thing entangled with six hundred scruples, but the virtual suffices, as we have said.

In the preceding edition of this Compendium, care was taken to soften this opinion of the holy Doctor in some way. But VV., both in St. A. (pages 114, 115) and in V. (pages 127-134), took this as an insult cast upon the holy Doctor. They object against it 1. that the Doctors who stand for the obligation of a daily relation of acts are in no way to be counted among those who demand an actual relation of all actions, and 2. that they in no way affirm that an act of charity must be elicited daily: all of which are beside the matter, because the question here is not what other Doctors have said; and besides they rest on a false supposition, as though the alleged Doctors (if you except Collet) defend the obligation of a daily relation. That would be to the point which VV. then added, namely that St. Alphonsus wished to signify not that to which we are held, but merely what is expedient and congruous, to have wished to signify. But this is very difficult, and too alien from likelihood. For 1. when he says: Hence for practice it is concluded, etc., he surely wishes to draw a consequence from those things which he had set forth, namely that the words of the Apostle contain a precept, not however a mere counsel. Therefore the consequence necessarily regards the thing commanded, not the thing of counsel; otherwise he would have said nothing at all about that which it most interests us to know and which the connection of the discourse demanded, namely to what we are held by force of that precept. 2. Granted, the word it is necessary is sometimes taken for that which is merely useful and congruous. Thus, for example, we say that for leading life in a Christian manner it is necessary that a suitable time be granted to pious meditation, examination of conscience, etc. But not so in the present matter. For here the discussion is expressly about fulfilling a precept, that is, about the obligation which the precept necessarily imposes, and which it is necessary to furnish in order that satisfaction be made to the precept. Therefore the word it is necessary here necessarily signifies the necessity which obligation imposes. Nor is it strange that this word, according to the diverse matter of the question, has a diverse sense. Thus if you say that it is necessary that Mass be heard daily, and the Holy Eucharist be received every eight days or at least every month, this will have been said very well if the discussion is about fostering piety, etc.; but badly if this is about fulfilling the precepts of the Church, which command both that Mass be heard on feast days and that the Holy Eucharist be received at paschal time.

Therefore we shall certainly say that the industrious zeal of VV. for protecting the doctrine of the holy Doctor is commendable. But perhaps zeal of this kind will not be most acceptable to the holy Doctor whenever it departs from the boundaries of truth.

Therefore St. Thomas, having made a distinction between actual relation, namely that by which a work is actually directed to God, and virtual relation, namely when the force of the first ordering or relation remains in the actions that follow, establishes:

1. That the actual relation, by which individual actions, even taken distributively, are actually ordered to God, is not of precept, but of counsel ⁷.

⁷ Thus St. Thomas in the same text which the Jansenists fraudulently truncated (lecture 3 on Colossians, ch. 3): Some say that this is counsel; but this is not true. But it must be said that it is not necessary that all things be referred to God actually. And elsewhere (2, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 7): If (the sentence of Paul) is understood affirmatively... in such a way that actual ordering to God is actually joined to each of our actions, it can be understood in two ways, either distributively or collectively. If distributively, this is the sense: whatever action you do, it is better if you actually order it to God; and thus it is counsel. But if it is taken collectively, this is the sense: so do all your works that there be none of them which you do not actually order to God; and this is neither precept nor counsel, but the end of the precept, to which one arrives through the fulfillment of the precept: for thus the Saints in the fatherland refer their acts to God.

2. That the virtual relation of all works is of precept ⁸. For this, however, two things are required and suffice: first indeed on the part of the work, that it be morally honest, or infected by no stain of mortal or venial sin. The other on the part of the agent, that he at some time has elicited, and has not retracted by grave fault, an act of charity by which man orders himself and all his things to God as ultimate end ⁹.

⁸ Thus St. Thomas (I-II, q. 100, art. 10, ad 2): It is contained under the precept of charity that God be loved from the whole heart; to which it pertains that all things be referred to God; and therefore man cannot fulfill the precept of charity unless all things also are referred to God. And again (Disputed Questions On Virtues, q. 2, art. 11, ad 2): That all things be referred to God virtually pertains to the perfection of charity, to which all are held. And ibid., ad 3: To refer all things virtually to God falls under the precept of charity, since this is nothing else than to have God as ultimate end.

⁹ Thus St. Thomas (2, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 6): Nor yet is it necessary that an actual intention ordering to the ultimate end be always joined to any action which is directed to some proximate end; but it suffices that at some time all those ends be actually referred to the ultimate end; as happens when someone thinks of directing himself wholly to the love of God: for then whatever he orders to himself will be ordered to God.

3. As to the time of eliciting this act of charity, by which man orders himself and all his things to God, nothing is specially commanded beyond that which is commonly accustomed to be handed down in the schools concerning the precept of eliciting an act of charity at some time ¹⁰, where the precept of charity is treated.

¹⁰ St. Thomas (in the cited place): And if it is asked when it is necessary to refer an act to the ultimate end, this is nothing else than to ask when it is necessary for the habit of charity to go forth into act: because whenever the habit of charity goes forth into act, there is made an ordering of the whole man to the ultimate end, and consequently of all those things which are ordered to him as goods to himself.

Moreover, this doctrine will borrow light from the following questions, which, these principles of St. Thomas having been set down beforehand, are easily solved.

122. Principle 2. The extrinsic end or the end of the worker can a) render an action indifferent from the object good or evil; b) render an action good from the object more or less good, indeed even evil; c) render an action evil from the object more or less evil, but never good.

Each part is proved and explained.

To a) Walking is an action indifferent from the object; nevertheless it is rendered morally good if, for example, it is exercised from religious obedience or because of reasonable care of health. The same action is rendered evil if it is done because of an evil end, for example, because of vanity, because of culpable curiosity, etc. But the reason is that those ends are intended insofar as they agree or disagree with the norm of morality, and therefore cause (and indeed primarily) either the goodness or the malice of an objectively indifferent action.

To b) An action good from the object is almsgiving; he who does this action from a vow performs a work more good. For besides an act of the virtue of mercy and charity, he also performs an act of the virtue of religion. Therefore that action has at the same time two goodnesses, one essential, the other accidental.⁵⁷ Thus the common doctrine of theologians, which Vasquez alone contradicts.⁵⁸ - But a difficulty exists in explaining the influence of an evil end upon a work good from the object. A distinction is needed: an evil end can be the total, sole, and adequate cause why a work good from the object is chosen, for example, to give alms to a poor man solely in order to turn him away from the faith or to induce him into sin; or it can be a partial cause, so that the good work is chosen also because of its own honesty, for example, someone sincerely wishes to relieve the misery of a poor man, but at the same time intends vainglory from the giving of alms. The difference between each influence of an evil end is this: in the first case the good work is a pure means and instrument for obtaining an evil end; but in the other case the good work is not a pure means, but truly a partial and intermediate end.⁵⁹ With this distinction premised, I say:

⁵⁷ Cf. Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 4, a. 3, § 4.

⁵⁸ Comm. in I-II, disp. 51, c. 3.

⁵⁹ The Angelic Doctor seems to call this diverse influence of the end preceding and concomitant (consequent) intention. "Intention can stand in two ways toward the will: in one way as preceding; in another way as concomitant. Intention precedes the will causally when we will something because of the intention of some end; and then the order to the end is considered as a certain reason for the goodness of the very thing willed, for example, when someone wills to fast because of God; for fasting has the character of good from the very fact that it is done because of God.... But intention follows the will when it accedes to a pre-existing will; for example, if someone wills to do something and afterward refers that to God; and then the goodness of the first will does not depend on the following intention except insofar as the act of the will is reiterated with the following intention" (S. theol. I-II, q. 19, a. 7 according to the Leonine edition).

123. The moral goodness of an action good from the object is totally destroyed by an end which is the adequate and sole cause of the action, but not by an end alone which is the non-adequate and non-total cause of the action. This is also expressed thus by some theologians: an evil extrinsic end, if it is primary and adequate, destroys the objective goodness of the action; but if it is a secondary end and an inadequate motive of acting, it makes an action otherwise good from the object not totally evil.

The first part of this proposition is admitted by almost all. In this sense also St. Paul says:⁶⁰ "A little leaven corrupts the whole lump." For by the leaven can be understood a depraved intention which is the total cause of a human action. - But the intrinsic reason of this doctrine is obvious. For a man choosing a work good from the object solely for obtaining an evil end in no way seeks the honesty of that work, but uses it as the sole means and instrument for obtaining his depraved end; this certainly is against the right norm of morality, and therefore is intrinsically evil.

The other part of the proposition⁶¹ today is most commonly admitted by almost all theologians; nevertheless there were theologians of great name who taught that even an inadequate depraved end destroys the whole objective goodness of the action, for example, the Salmanticenses,⁶² John of St. Thomas,⁶³ Gonet,⁶⁴ and others. Although these authors cite St. Thomas⁶⁵ for their opinion, nevertheless the proposition defended above seems more conformable to the mind of the Angelic Doctor. Here are the words of St. Thomas:⁶⁶ "Nothing prevents an action having one of the aforesaid goodnesses from lacking another. And according to this it happens that an action which is good according to its species or according to circumstances is ordered to an evil end, and conversely. Yet an action is not good simply unless all goodnesses concur, because any singular defect causes evil; but good is caused from an integral cause." The Angelic Doctor speaks still more explicitly in another place:⁶⁷ "When someone wills to give alms because of empty glory (behold the total and adequate cause!), here there is one act of the will; and this whole act is evil, although not everything in it has malice; for one particular defect suffices for something to be called evil simply. But it is true that if he were to will this, namely, to give alms, as a certain thing not in order to such an end (behold the inadequate and secondary cause!), that act of the will would be good, and it would be another act of the will from that by which he wills empty glory." From these words of St. Thomas the intrinsic reason of the proposed doctrine is also clear. For alms in this case are not chosen as a means for obtaining empty glory, but are truly intended as something honorable in itself. Therefore they retain their objective goodness, although through another act the intention of empty glory is extrinsically joined to them.

The proposed opinion is confirmed from the inconveniences which would otherwise arise: if a light disorder of the end destroyed the whole goodness of an action otherwise good, scarcely any good action would be performed even by holy men. For "there are very few works even among holy men watching attentively to which in this life either some due circumstance is not lacking, or into which some evil things are not mixed, for example, of empty glory, self-love, excessive complacency.... Thus there are very few penitents whose penance some excess or defect does not accompany; very few superiors who in corrections do not suffer some excess of zeal or anger; very few preachers who, although led by zeal for the glory of God, are not moved amid the applause of hearers by the tickling of some complacency." Thus rightly Billuart,⁶⁸ who treats this question very well, clearly, and succinctly before many authors who hand down this certainly difficult matter both diffusely and confusedly. Therefore it is established that one action can be virtually multiple and therefore at the same time be good and evil under a diverse head, namely, good from the object, evil from a circumstance or end, provided, however, that the evil end is not the adequate and total cause of the action.

Some authors, such as Lehmkuhl,⁶⁹ Noldin,⁷⁰ Marc-Raus,⁷¹ Schindler,⁷² think that the whole work is vitiated if the partial end is gravely evil; for it would be impossible that an action by which man is totally turned away from God should be pleasing. But these things seem to be said illogically and are not sufficiently proved. For even if the partial end is lightly evil, that part of the action which proceeds from this end is not pleasing to God. For example, empty glory joined with the giving of alms is certainly not pleasing to God; and yet these authors teach that this giving of alms has a twofold morality: one good from the object, the other evil from empty glory. Wherefore it seems more probable that absolutely no partial end, provided that it is truly partial and inadequate, destroys the objective goodness of an action.^72a For example, if someone sincerely and principally wishes to assist at the sacrifice of the Mass, but at the same time secondarily during Mass to lust shamefully after a woman seen, he does indeed commit a mortal sin against chastity because of the depraved secondary desire, but his assistance at Mass itself has not been made totally evil. - Nor should anyone say that by such assistance a man merits nothing except hell; for merit is one thing, moral goodness another; and however devoutly a man existing in mortal sin assists at Mass, he merits no eternal reward before God. But it has been condemned in Baius and Jansenius to assert that sinful man is unable to do morally good works.⁷³

⁶⁰ 1 Cor. 5:6.

⁶¹ Cajetan, Comm. in I-II, q. 18, a. 8, and Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 4, a. 4, hold it.

⁶² Curs. theologicus tract. XI, De bonitate et malitia, disp. 6, dub. 1.

⁶³ Q. 21, disp. 9, a. 4. This author treats the matter clearly and profoundly.

⁶⁴ Clypeus: De act. hum. tr. 3, disp. 4, a. 1.

⁶⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 18, a. 5.

⁶⁶ Ibid. a. 4 ad 3.

⁶⁷ 2, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 4 ad 4. The Parma and Vives editions have a somewhat different but not so good reading. Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 12, a. 4.

⁶⁸ De act. hum. diss. 4, a. 4, § 2.

⁶⁹ Theol. mor. I, 100.

⁷⁰ De principiis n. 77.

⁷¹ Inst. mor. I, 306.

⁷² Lehrbuch der Moraltheol. I, 2. Abschn., § 3.

^72a Thus also Vermeersch, Theol. mor. I, n. 118.

⁷³ Cf. Billuart, l. c. obj. 4.

124. To c) An action evil from the object becomes more evil when an evil end accedes. Hence he who commits theft in order to have money for making himself drunk commits a greater sin than if he had committed theft alone. The reason is that here there is a twofold malice: one from the object, the other from the subjective end.

An action evil from the object, when a good end accedes, can indeed become less evil, but never totally good. Hence he who commits theft in order to give alms does indeed perpetrate a lesser sin, but a true sin. It is plain that this sin is lesser from the fact that there is a lesser affection toward evil, since the will does not seek it for its own sake, but from love of some true moral good. Wherefore St. Augustine⁷⁴ says: "He is worse who steals from coveting than he who steals from pity," and St. Thomas:⁷⁵ "The better the good intended is, the more the fault of the lie is diminished." But although sin is diminished from a good end, nevertheless it remains true sin, and indeed grave sin if grave fault stains the object. Wherefore the adage holds: A good end can never justify evil means. And therefore St. Paul⁷⁶ teaches: "And not (as we are slandered, and as some say that we say) let us do evil that good may come; whose damnation is just." St. Thomas says: "No evil done with a good intention is excused."⁷⁷ The scholastics, calling the appetite of the means election and the appetite of the end intention, are accustomed to express the proposed doctrine in this way: a good intention is vitiated by evil election; and an evil election is not made honorable by a good intention. Thus all Catholic authors teach. Cassian alone⁷⁸ seems to have asserted the contrary, whom a few others joined, teaching the liceity of an officious lie in a case of necessity.⁷⁹ Only with the greatest injury is the calumny brought against the Jesuits, as if they defended in doctrine and in practice the adage: "The end justifies the means." On the contrary, several non-Catholic authors expressly admit this principle; indeed all those who defend false doctrines concerning the supreme norm of morality must admit it. For if, for example, the supreme norm of morality is individual or social utility, then it can easily happen that a morally evil act, for example, an officious lie, serves utility more than the omission of this act.⁸⁰ But the intrinsic reason why it is never licit to choose an evil means for obtaining a good end is that otherwise man would approve and assume moral evil, which is certainly illicit.

Against this doctrine are objected both the words of Sacred Scripture and certain examples of the Saints. Sacred Scripture says: "If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome; but if thy eye be evil, thy whole body shall be darksome."⁸¹ Under the figure of the eye interpreters are accustomed to understand a good intention, so that the sense would be: If you have in your acts a depraved intention, all your acts are dark and morally evil; on the contrary, if you have a good intention, whatever you do is lightsome and morally good. It is answered that under the name of eye, intention cannot be understood in so unlimited a sense. The holy Fathers by the eye are accustomed to understand the heart; if it has been clean and free from desire of earthly things, the whole body of the remaining affections will be lightsome and immaculate. - Abraham, Jacob, Judith, and the midwives of Egypt are objected, who are reported to have employed lies for obtaining a good end; Moses is objected, who by his own authority killed the Egyptian; Samson, who committed suicide; St. Apollonia, who cast herself into the fire, etc. To these and similar deeds it is answered: either they must be explained so that they are no longer intrinsically evil; for example, the enumerated lies are not true lies, but mental restrictions; or, if this cannot be done, those men otherwise most worthy truly sinned by so acting, at least materially. For no man, however holy, is impeccable on this earth.⁸²

⁷⁴ Contra mendacium c. 8 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 529).

⁷⁵ S. theol. II-II, q. 110, a. 2.

⁷⁶ Rom. 3:8.

⁷⁷ Opusc. 4 (3), Expositio in duo praecepta caritatis et in decem legis praecepta, c. 6.

⁷⁸ Coll. 17 (Migne, Patr. lat. 49, 1062).

⁷⁹ Cf. below in the treatise on lying, II, n. 169.

⁸⁰ Cf. on this matter Cathrein, Moralphilosophie I 4, 326 sqq., where on p. 329 Jhering, Sigwart, Paulsen, Ziegler, and Gallwitz are cited for this false adage. - G. Ulrich writes in his work Verdienst und Gnade: "The necessary lie, the social and conventional lie, appear, when used with understanding, wholly unobjectionable; for always it is the end alone which hallows a means or makes it into injustice." Matthew Prior: "The end must justify the means, He only sins who ill intends" (The works of the English poets [London 1810] X, 155; cf. Tanquerey, Synops. theol. mor. de act. hum. 152).

⁸¹ Matt. 6:22-23.

⁸² Cf. Billuart, De act. hum. obj. 4, where other objections also are clearly solved.

158. Principle II. In order that an act be not evil but good, it is required that it be done for a due honorable end.

It is proved: man acting deliberately, in his human acts, ought to act as man, that is, according to the requirement and dignity of his nature as a rational being insofar as he is distinguished from brutes. But man differs from brutes a) in this, that he positively acts for an end as an end; and indeed b) for the end proper to himself, that is, for the good fitting to his nature, or the honorable. Therefore in all human acts he ought positively to intend an end, and indeed an honorable end. Hence:

1. Idle acts are evil (Mt. XII, 36), which are not so called because they have an evil end, but because they do not have a due end: for an idle person is one who does useless things which he ought not to do while he could, or even ought to, do other useful things. Acts placed solely because it pleases (or does not please) to act in this way are idle, as are acts omitted because they are not commanded; for they lack a good end. They are not idle but good if they are done for a good end, for example, for relief or moderate recreation.

2. Acts which are done solely on account of a useful good, resting in it, are evil, because it is not an end, since it is not appetible on account of itself but only on account of another; hence it is illicit to seek money or honor for its own sake.

3. Acts which are done principally on account of delectable good are evil. For God attached the chief delights as an effect to certain necessary or useful operations, on account of those operations themselves, lest man abstain from operating, but rather so that he would be enticed to operating; and other secondary delights as a better means for the understanding of things, the relief of weariness of the mind, and refreshment and recreation in rational life. Hence delights are intrinsically ordered to the placing of a work. Therefore it is not licit to intend delight as the principal end, but as secondary and subordinated, namely, on account of the honorable good either of the operation or of recreation: not indeed as a mere means for obtaining it, but as its effect on account of the cause, or as a help for placing the work more securely, pleasantly, and easily. In other words, to seek an operation for the sake of delight is to invert the due order of things. Hence theologians after St. Augustine say: it is not licit to enjoy what is to be used or to use what is to be enjoyed.

1. Contra Gentiles III, c. 26, n. 7.

4. A fortiori, acts which are done solely on account of delight, resting in it, are evil, both because delectable good ought to be appetized on account of the honorable end, as was said under 3), and because animals act for delight alone, resting in it: but man in all things ought to follow the rule of reason, and therefore seek delight insofar as reason dictates that it is proportioned and fitting to his nature, and thus it already becomes an honorable good. Therefore to seek delight for its own sake is to pervert the order.

Whence propositions 8 and 9 were condemned by Innocent XI:

1. "To eat and drink even to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health; because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its own acts."

2. "The conjugal act exercised for pleasure alone altogether lacks every fault and venial defect."

Hence:

a) Acts which are done on account of any delight whatever are evil, if another end is excluded.

b) Acts which procure sensible delight are of themselves indifferent, and therefore are evil if they are not referred at least implicitly to honorable good; otherwise, namely, the lower powers, because from their nature they do not tend to honorable good but to delight alone, do not serve the higher powers, but on the contrary reason and will serve lower delight, which is an inversion of order.

c) On the contrary, they are good if from the circumstances or from the custom of acting the honorable end of necessity or utility is sufficiently known, and this is at least implicitly intended: thus one who, without explicitly thinking, at the ordinary hour goes to the place of recreation.

d) A fortiori, acts which procure spiritual delight from an honorable good are good: for this by its nature is connected with honorable good, which therefore is implicitly intended.

The aforesaid evil acts, by which the due end is excluded only in affection or affectively, of themselves are only lightly evil, because the disordered use of a thing not illicit is not a grave disorder. If, however, someone also effectively wished to impede the due end, it could be grave.

159. Principle III. The due intermediate end or ultimate end in a certain respect is any honorable good whatever, because this is conformed to rational nature; but the due simply ultimate end is the supreme Good or God. Hence:

1. In order that an act be good, we cannot positively exclude God, whether explicitly, or implicitly by loving a creature above all things or preferring it to God.

2. But we ought not in every act tend expressly to God; it suffices implicitly, insofar as every participated honorable good from its nature is ordered and tends to the supreme good (cf. propositions 16 and 38 of Baius condemned).

3. Sometimes, however, there is a precept of explicitly tending (or converting oneself) to God through charity; but he who loves God above all things by that very fact refers implicitly to God all things which can be referred to him.

1. Cf. I-II, q. 19, a. 9 and 10; q. 21, a. 4; q. 100, a. 10, ad 2.

But if a sinner omits this, he sins by omission at the moment when the precept urges; yet other works which are done at this moment or afterward will not therefore be sinful, because the omission is not a true circumstance influencing and affecting those works themselves, but only merely accompanies them, unless nevertheless they were its occasion. Otherwise it would have to be said that all the works of infidels are sins; likewise works performed with a view to eternal reward or done from fear of hell would be evil, which has been condemned by the Church.

Prop. 16 of Hus; prop. 22, 35, 38, 40 of Baius; prop. 15 condemned by Alexander VIII; prop. 45 and 59 of Quesnel; prop. 23 of Pistoia; Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 31; sess. 14, c. 4.

4. There is no other precept of explicitly referring all works, or even each single work, to God. But the words of the Apostle (I Cor. X, 31) can be understood either of counsel; or negatively, of the obligation of doing nothing against the glory of God, and of doing nothing which is not referable to God; in other words, of doing nothing except honorable works which are implicitly referred to God; or positively, of an act of charity which implicitly orders the whole following life to God as to the ultimate end.

Yet it should be noted that not all things can be referred to God even by one who has charity: namely, acts which are not proportioned to the glory of God, such as venial sins, and many indifferent acts, for example, walking, eating, etc.; these of themselves are not proportioned to the end of God's glory and of themselves conduce nothing to God's honor, and therefore, that they may be done on account of God, they must first be referred to an honorable end proportioned to them, for example, to health, to sustenance, etc.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19.

162. Principle I. The goodness and malice of the interior act properly and per se depends upon its object. For moral good and evil are per se and properly differences of an act of the will as moral, just as truth and falsity are differences of reason, because good per se pertains to the will as truth pertains to reason. Hence the will morally good and evil differ according to moral species. But an act properly and per se has moral species from the object proposed by reason, as was proved. Therefore goodness and malice in acts of the will properly and per se depend upon the object.

163. Principle II. The goodness and malice of the interior act depends upon the object alone.

Thus St. Thomas, whom Fr. Lehu explains almost as follows, Phil. Mor. et Soc. I, n. 182: "The sense is not that circumstances and the end are altogether irrelevant to the morality of interior acts, which would be altogether false... (for the circumstances of intensity or duration have value for the increase of goodness and malice, q. 20, a. 4)... Thus therefore it must be understood...: The interior act receives morality immediately only from the object, that is, from the willed thing; and in this the interior act differs both from the exterior act and from the human act considered in its integrity, which receive their morality from object, circumstances, and end as from three disparate and independent sources; whence there can be an exterior act good from the object and evil from circumstances or end. But there cannot be an interior act good from the object and evil from a circumstance: 'supposing that the will is of the good, no circumstance can make it evil' (q. 19, a. 2, ad 2)... For, 'when it is said that someone wills some good when he ought not or where he ought not, this can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that this circumstance is referred to the willed thing. And thus the will is not of the good: because to will to do something when it ought not to be done is not to will the good. In another way, so that it is referred to the act of willing; and thus it is impossible that someone will the good when he ought not, because man always ought to will the good; unless perhaps per accidens insofar as someone, by willing this good, is impeded from then willing some due good. And then evil does not arise from this, that someone wills that good, but from this, that he does not will another good. And similarly one must speak of the other circumstances.'

"Therefore an evil circumstance will make the willed thing evil, that is, the object of the will, and only by means of the object will it render the interior act evil, which does not happen in the exterior act. Therefore we assert: the morality of an elicited act depends immediately upon the object alone."

It is proved: the principle in each genus is something one and simple. But the principle of the goodness and malice of all human acts is from the act of the will, and this of itself has goodness from the object, as was said in the preceding number. Therefore the goodness and malice of the will is attended to according to the object alone and not from the accidents of circumstances.

1. The foundation of the argument is: the principle in each genus is per se, not per accidens, for everything which is per accidens is reduced to that which is per se as to a principle.

Therefore, since the end is the object of the will, in acts of the will the goodness which is from the object does not differ from the goodness which is from the end, except per accidens, if it happens that an end depends upon an end and a will upon a will (a. 2, ad 1), for example, if someone by one act wills medicine for health and health for the good of the republic, or if by a twofold act he wills adultery because he wills theft.

164. Corollary I. - The goodness and malice of the interior act, because it depends upon its object, therefore also depends upon those things upon which the goodness of the object depends:

1. Upon reason, because the object is proposed to the will through reason, which apprehends it as a good proportioned to the will; hence the proposing reason is the measure of the goodness of the will.

2. Upon the eternal law: for every effect depends more upon the first cause than upon the second cause, which does not act except through the power of the first cause. But that human reason shows us what is good and thus is the rule of our will, it has from the eternal law or divine reason, of which there is a participation in the created mind. Therefore the goodness of the will depends much more upon the eternal law than upon human reason.

Hence a twofold rule of human acts is distinguished: the first, fundamental and extrinsic, namely, divine reason by which God from eternity contemplates in his essence the order to be observed by creatures, namely, the essential relations of natures both to God their end and to one another; and the secondary, relative and intrinsic, namely, practical human reason insofar as it dictates that this order is to be observed. The first rule is objective and altogether remote; the other is twofold: for reason can be considered:

a) objectively, insofar as it is common to all men, and is a habitual light which is born to dictate in a universal mode which acts in general are good and which are evil (for example, it is good to praise God, evil to fornicate), and indeed is born to dictate the same thing in all and generally does dictate the same thing: thus it is law or the cognition of law;

b) subjectively, it can be considered insofar as it is proper to each one, and is the act by which someone judges in particular that such an act to be placed here and now in the individual is conformed or difform to law: it is the application of law to particular acts, which is called conscience and often varies in various men.

Reason considered objectively, although it is a nearer rule than the eternal law, nevertheless is more remote in relation to conscience, which is the altogether proximate and immediate rule.

Question 1. Does any bad end corrupt the whole goodness of an act?

Response. An end gravely bad always wholly infects an act, however good the object may be in itself. For that act can be good from no part, since the agent, by sinning mortally, totally recedes from God. But an end lightly bad also corrupts the whole act if it is the total end, or at least the primary end, of the agent. For if it is total, it embraces the whole object, and therefore infects the whole, because, as St. Thomas says, "the agent with a bad end wills the good under the aspect of evil, and therefore, insofar as it is willed by him, it is evil." But if a double end is had, and the bad end is primary, it must be resolved in the same way, because that act is still chosen so that it may be an instrument for evil, and therefore it is substantially vitiated. Finally, if an end lightly bad is merely secondary, more probably it does not corrupt the whole act, and therefore this act will be partly good, partly bad. The reason is that that act retains its goodness from the object; but the bad end behaves only concomitantly, and does not flow into the very substance of the action. If it were otherwise, fewer good acts would be found. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 19, art. 7. - Billuart, dissert. 4, art. 4.

Question 2. Are all our actions commanded to be referred to God by the words of the Apostle, I Cor. x, 31: "Do all things unto the glory of God"?

Response. Negatively, if there is question of an obligation of actually and explicitly referring all and each of our actions to the glory of God. The reason is not only that the aforesaid words can be taken, and in reality are taken by many Doctors, in a negative sense, insofar as they would mean: do nothing against God; but also because, if they are understood in an affirmative sense and at the same time concerning the actual reference of all our actions to God, they report a mere counsel and not a precept, which would be altogether impossible.

But if there is question of another reference besides actual and explicit reference, at times a sharp controversy has existed among theologians. Those who were called Augustinians, especially from among the Louvain theologians, said that an intention of this kind was necessary, which they called virtually explicit, and that it was commanded by the words of St. Paul, I Cor. x, 31, and Coloss. iii, 17. But indeed, while they thought thus, it could scarcely happen that they would not fall under the condemnation of proposition 25 of Michael Baius: "All the works of unbelievers are sins"; indeed they were to be accused of notable temerity, because, against the sense of the Church, they would condemn of sin very many works of innumerable faithful who operate without such an intention. For that reason their opinion was vehemently attacked by nearly all the other theologians. But these established: 1st, that through an act of charity elicited at due times, the obligation of directing all works universally to God as the ultimate end is sufficiently fulfilled; 2nd, that no law can be brought forth by which we are obliged to refer the same works to God in a more particular mode; 3rd, that, besides, a work honest from its object and vitiated by no depraved end and no bad circumstance, from itself, and therefore in the implicit intention of the one working, is referred by a certain necessary order to God, who is the source, rule, and end of the good and the honest.

"Who endures to praise all day? I suggest a remedy, from which you may praise God all day, if you wish. Whatever you do, do it well, and you have praised God. When you sing a hymn, you praise God: what does your tongue do, unless your conscience also praises? Have you ceased from singing a hymn, and do you go away to refresh yourself? Do not become drunk, and you have praised God. Do you go away to sleep? Do not rise to do evil, and you have praised God. Are you doing business? Do not commit fraud, and you have praised God. Do you cultivate a field? Do not stir up a lawsuit, and you have praised God. In the innocence of your works prepare yourself for praising God all day." St. Augustine, Enarratio in Ps. 34, serm. 11 (M. 36, c. 340). - Cf. St. Thomas, 2 dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5; 2 de Carit., art. 11, ad 2; and 2-2, q. 44, art. 4. - Perrone, de Caritate, cap. 5, art. 1, prop. 4. - Theol. Wirceb., de Act. hum., cap. 3, art. 3.

Question 3. Whether, just as there is not given an act in the individual indifferent in relation to natural honesty, so it can be said that no act is posited by a just man which is indifferent in relation to eternal life?

Response. Negatively. For in order that some act be meritorious of eternal life, it is required that it be supernatural; but it cannot be supernatural unless, besides the honesty of the work and the state of grace of the principle operating, there is also present some supernatural motive. This third condition being lacking, and no one will deny that it can be lacking, that work will be neither meritorious nor demeritorious. Besides, if some act were to be called meritorious of eternal life insofar as it proceeds from a just man, it would follow that every act which proceeds from a sinner is demeritorious, which can in no way be said. And this is the doctrine which is constantly and certainly handed down by St. Thomas in several places. Cf. Suarez, de Merito, lib. 12, cap. 7, nn. 2 and seq., and cap. 10, n. 15. - Mazzella, de Virt. Inf., prop. 55, nn. 1345 and seq.

In order to have a clear notion of what influence the intention has on the morality of an action, it may be worth while briefly to summarize St. Thomas’s doctrine on the point.

He first of all examines the human act in its totality,’ and teaches that it derives its moral quality from the object, the end, and the circumstances. The object is that about which the human faculty is engaged when the action is produced, or it is that which the faculty produces or does; it is the substance of the action considered in the abstract, and apart from its circumstances. Thus, in the act of theft, the object is the taking away of something which belongs to another, and if this be considered in relation to right reason, it is obvious that it is an act which is contrary to it; or theft is morally wrong because the object of the action is against right reason, which is the rule of human actions.

5 Collat. xvii., c. 17.

6 Dist. xl.

7 Sum. I-IL, q. 18.

The end, on which the morality of an action also depends, is the motive of the action, the reason why it is done. It is obvious from what has been said above that the moral quality of an act depends on its motive or on the intention with which it is done; it is bad to steal, it is worse to steal in order to be able to commit adultery, according to the well-worn illustration.

Finally, the circumstances which accompany an action give it its moral quality, as well as the object and the end. It is wrong to steal, but to steal the Church plate, or the pittance on which a poor man depends for the support of himself and his family is worse.’ To play in the field at the proper time is right, to play in church is wrong. After laying down these principles about the morality of human acts in general, St. Thomas considers in detail the morality of the two chief component parts of a complete and consummated act, the interior act of the will and the exterior act. When a theft is committed, the thief first of all determines to commit the crime, and then sets about its execution. The crime morally considered is one completed human action, but physically it is composed of many, both interior and exterior acts. The will determines upon the theft, and then sets the external faculties in action to accomplish it. We are chiefly concerned with the interior act of the will.

The will is set in motion by some object or end which it wishes to attain. Thus one may come to know of a case of distress, and natural good feeling prompts the desire to relieve it. The relieving of distress in the case is the object towards which the will tends, and which causes the will to form the intention of giving relief. This object, therefore, is the cause of the action of the will, it is the term from which the action starts, and it is the goal towards which the action is directed. And as all motion is specified by the term to which it is directed, so the motion of the will, which we call intention, receives its moral quality from the object or aim to which it tends. So the intention to relieve distress is an act of virtue, and an intention to do an injury is vicious. In other words, the morality of the intention depends upon the object or end in view.

When the will has formed the intention of relieving the case of distress, the next step is to discover the means. If the means are not at hand, it is necessary to work to obtain them, the work undertaken for so charitable a purpose will be colored by the object for which it is undertaken, and itself become an act of charity. The means are desired for the sake of the end, they become the object of the will because of their connection with the end, they therefore put on the moral quality of the end. In the same way, if the end be bad, means, though good in themselves, taken with a view to attain such an end, become corrupted and bad. And so to work in order to obtain money to indulge in debauchery is itself wrong and wicked.

And here we touch upon the celebrated question whether a good end justifies wrongful means. In the sphere of politics there is too much reason to suppose that the view that the end does justify the means is largely acted upon by statesmen of all parties and nationalities. Machiavelli, who has given his name to the theory, lays down the principle with the utmost candor:

A prince, therefore, is not obliged to have all the forementioned good qualities in reality, but it is necessary he have them in appearance; nay, I will be bold to affirm, that having them actually, and employing them upon all occasions, they are extremely prejudicial, whereas having them only in appearance, they turn to better account; it is honorable to seem mild, and merciful, and courteous, and religious, and sincere, and indeed to be so, provided your mind be so rectified and prepared that you can act quite contrary upon occasion. And this must be premised, that a prince, especially if he come but lately to the throne, cannot observe all those things exactly which make men be esteemed virtuous, being oftentimes necessitated for the preservation of his State to do things inhumane, uncharitable, and irreligious; and therefore it is convenient his mind be at his command, and flexible to all the puffs and variations of his fortune: Not forbearing to be good, whilst it is in his choice, but knowing how to be evil when there is a necessity. . . . Let a prince therefore do what he can to preserve his life, and continue his supremacy, the means which he uses shall be thought honorable, and be commended by everybody, because the people are always taken with the appearance, and event of things, and the greatest part of the world consists of the people: those few who are wise, taking place when the multitude has nothing else to rely upon.⁸

⁸ The Prince, c. 18.

More briefly, but perhaps still more to the point, he says in his Discourses on Livy:

And this ought to be considered and observed by every man whose office it is to advise for the good of his country; for where the safety of that is in question no other consideration ought to be coincident, as whether the way be just or unjust, merciful or cruel, honorable or dishonorable, but postponing all other respects, you are to do that which shall procure the safety of your country, and preservation of its liberty.⁹

⁹ Book III., c. 41.

It is by no means an uncommon thing to meet with an almost equally explicit approval of the doctrine that the end justifies the means in the daily press and in modern periodical literature. Such approvals are specially frequent in more or less appreciative accounts of the careers of such men as Bismarck and Rhodes. But Machiavellianism is not confined to politicians, nor of course did unscrupulousness first appear in the days of the crafty Florentine. As we have already seen there are traces of the doctrine that the end justifies the means in several writers of the early ages of the Church.

However, with a few obscure exceptions, theologians have constantly rejected the view. They point out with St. Thomas that an action is not morally good merely because the end or intention is good; it must be good in all particulars; Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu, was the axiom applied in the case. And so if a man steals in order to relieve a case of distress, he does wrong though his intention be never so praiseworthy. It is wrong to steal, and it remains wrong though the theft be committed with a good intention, and the otherwise good action of relieving distress is vitiated by the wrongful means employed to do it, for the will to relieve distress by robbery is a vicious will. As the Society of Jesus is constantly being attacked on this point, it may not be out of place to quote the words in which Vasquez, one of its greatest divines, sums up the doctrine which it has always taught:

In reply to the testimonies of the author of the Imperfect Work on Matthew and of Cassian, we say that these Fathers cannot be excused from the error into which they fell through ignorance; for they thought that a work otherwise evil by its nature could be made good by a good end. They seem, moreover, to understand this even if the nature of the object and of the other circumstances, from which the malice would otherwise arise, is not changed by the good end. For this reason Cassian defends it as lawful to lie for some honorable end and necessity; Augustine attacks this opinion at length in the book Against Lying to Consentius, especially chapter 7, where he also calls it heretical. Gratian also gathers many things against it, 22, q. 2; and it is manifestly contrary to Paul in Romans 3, where he condemns those who said, let us do evil that good may come, whose condemnation he says is just. Augustine therefore rightly teaches that all works which are known to be sins cannot be done well, even if they are done from an intention otherwise right; but other works, which are not sins in themselves, are made right by a right intention.

10 In I.-II. S. Thomæ, Disp. 68, c. 2.

Although a good intention cannot make a bad action good, yet it may sometimes so change the circumstances that the action is no longer forbidden. Thus, to take away a pistol from a would-be homicide in order to prevent him from committing a crime is a good action, while it would not be justifiable without good intention. Some authors, with Vasquez, on the same grounds defend the opinion that one may lawfully intend to kill an unjust assailant of life or limb in self-defense. All admit that it is lawful to kill the assailant in such a case, if this be necessary for self-defense; many theologians, however, with St. Thomas, teach that the object of the intention should be self-defense, and not the killing of one’s adversary. For directly to take away human life, even the life of a criminal, is only lawful when done by public authority; it is never permitted, they say, to private individuals. It is, however, lawful to defend oneself, and if in doing this the aggressor is slain, his death must be imputed to him, it was not directly intended. The point is somewhat fine, and perhaps not very practical, but certainly this view seems to be more in harmony with principles admitted by all theologians.

Another point much controverted among theologians is whether the intention can make an external act formally unjust, which without the intention would not be so. Thus theologians discuss the question whether a thief would be bound to compensate another who was accused of the theft committed by him, when the thief foresaw and intended that the other should be accused of the crime. All agree that he would be so bound, if in any way he procured the accusation of the other. The question concerns the case in which he did nothing to cause the imputation except to commit the crime. Similarly, would a man in foro conscientiae and before being condemned to do so by lawful authority, be obliged to make reparation to a neighbor who had been injured by falling into a man-trap, set in a retired corner where no one was likely to go, but with the intention that any one who did go there should be caught? Here it is conceded that there would be no obligation of making restitution for the injury done, if it had not been intended ; the question is whether the intention changes the case, and imposes the obligation.

It must be admitted that the intention to do harm to another is sinful, and that it is an internal sin against justice. For a desire or intention of doing evil is of the same species as the external act intended. But the obligation of making restitution does not arise from a merely internal act of injustice, it is created only by loss being effectively caused by the unjust action of another. That unjust action must have of itself the effect of causing harm; the harm must follow from it as from its efficient cause, not as from a mere occasion, otherwise there will be no obligation of making restitution. But the intention cannot give efficacy to an external act which it has not of itself. I may intend ever so much to do something, but unless I take effective means, the thing will never be done. The intention cannot change the objective nature of the means employed, and so it cannot make that an effective cause of injustice, which is not an effective cause without the intention. And so in both of the examples above, the answer should be in the negative.

Closely connected with this is another question as to whether he is bound to restitution who, in intending to do harm to one, through mistake does harm to another.

Although great names can be quoted for the opinion that there is no obligation of making restitution in such a case on the ground that no formal injury was caused to the person who suffered loss, that the injustice as regards him was involuntary; still, it would seem that this opinion is wrong; the intention does not change the nature of the external act. That act, as a matter of fact, causes harm; the agent has no right to put it; he foresees the harm that will be done; he is therefore bound in justice to abstain from the action, and if he does not do so, he is bound to repair the harm he has wilfully caused. The fact that he intended the injury for another does not weaken the effectiveness of his action, it does not cause it to be harmless, it does not then release him from the obligation of repairing the loss caused; it was sufficient to impose the burden of making restitution if the harm was foreseen. In such circumstances the injury is formal, although not intended as against this particular person; for whenever a man’s property is knowingly and unjustly destroyed, a formal injury is committed against him although the injury was intended for another. The thief rarely has any direct intention of injuring the man whose goods he steals; if he could only get the goods without injuring their owner he would in general be perfectly satisfied; he is very sorry for the inconvenience he causes, he does not desire it, but few would agree that these dispositions prevent the injury which he does the owner by taking his goods from being formal injustice.