Section — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
§ 3. On the End
Preliminary Note. Already above, n. 15 sqq., we have sufficiently treated of the notion and divisions of the end. The end which is here counted as the third principle of morality is not the intrinsic end of any work, since this coincides with the moral object,53 concerning which there was discussion above, n. 111 sqq.; but it is the extrinsic end or the end of the worker. For example, the act of praying has for the end of the work and at the same time for its moral object the veneration of God, from which therefore it takes its primary morality, indeed also its moral specification. But the same act of praying can be produced from a motive of penance and mortification. Then an accidental extrinsic end, or the end of the worker, accedes, which adds a new morality to the act of praying.54
53 Cf. 2, dist. 36, a. 5 ad 5.
54 The intrinsic end is also called the proximate end, the specifying end, the extrinsic form of the act; but the extrinsic end is also called the remote end, the end not specifying, but only moving. These locutions indeed are not so clear and therefore are better avoided.
121. Principle 1. The extrinsic end or the end of the worker is also a source of morality.
Proof 1. The extrinsic end or the end of the worker is a moral circumstance, which is expressed by the word "why." But moral circumstances are sources of morality, as was proved above, n. 116 sqq. Therefore.
Proof 2. The extrinsic end or the end of the worker is the motive, indeed sometimes the sole motive, inducing one to act. But the motive of an action either agrees or disagrees with right reason and the eternal law, and therefore has a special morality. Therefore the extrinsic end gives some morality to the act.
Proof 3. Christ warns:55 "Take heed that you do not your justice before men, to be seen by them; otherwise you shall not have a reward of your Father." - From these words it is clear that the extrinsic end of vainglory disfigures works of justice and therefore gives them a new morality.56
55 Matt. 6:1.
56 St. Thomas distinguishes a fourfold goodness in a human act: 1. physical goodness; for every act is some being; 2. specific goodness, which arises from the moral object of the act; 3. accidental goodness, which arises from moral circumstances; 4. goodness of the end, which arises from a good extrinsic end (S. theol. I-II, q. 18, a. 4).
122. Principle 2. The extrinsic end or the end of the worker can a) render an action indifferent from the object good or evil; b) render an action good from the object more or less good, indeed even evil; c) render an action evil from the object more or less evil, but never good.
Each part is proved and explained.
To a) Walking is an action indifferent from the object; nevertheless it is rendered morally good if, for example, it is exercised from religious obedience or because of reasonable care of health. The same action is rendered evil if it is done because of an evil end, for example, because of vanity, because of culpable curiosity, etc. But the reason is that those ends are intended insofar as they agree or disagree with the norm of morality, and therefore cause (and indeed primarily) either the goodness or the malice of an objectively indifferent action.
To b) An action good from the object is almsgiving; he who does this action from a vow performs a work more good. For besides an act of the virtue of mercy and charity, he also performs an act of the virtue of religion. Therefore that action has at the same time two goodnesses, one essential, the other accidental.57 Thus the common doctrine of theologians, which Vasquez alone contradicts.58 - But a difficulty exists in explaining the influence of an evil end upon a work good from the object. A distinction is needed: an evil end can be the total, sole, and adequate cause why a work good from the object is chosen, for example, to give alms to a poor man solely in order to turn him away from the faith or to induce him into sin; or it can be a partial cause, so that the good work is chosen also because of its own honesty, for example, someone sincerely wishes to relieve the misery of a poor man, but at the same time intends vainglory from the giving of alms. The difference between each influence of an evil end is this: in the first case the good work is a pure means and instrument for obtaining an evil end; but in the other case the good work is not a pure means, but truly a partial and intermediate end.59 With this distinction premised, I say:
57 Cf. Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 4, a. 3, § 4.
58 Comm. in I-II, disp. 51, c. 3.
59 The Angelic Doctor seems to call this diverse influence of the end preceding and concomitant (consequent) intention. "Intention can stand in two ways toward the will: in one way as preceding; in another way as concomitant. Intention precedes the will causally when we will something because of the intention of some end; and then the order to the end is considered as a certain reason for the goodness of the very thing willed, for example, when someone wills to fast because of God; for fasting has the character of good from the very fact that it is done because of God.... But intention follows the will when it accedes to a pre-existing will; for example, if someone wills to do something and afterward refers that to God; and then the goodness of the first will does not depend on the following intention except insofar as the act of the will is reiterated with the following intention" (S. theol. I-II, q. 19, a. 7 according to the Leonine edition).
123. The moral goodness of an action good from the object is totally destroyed by an end which is the adequate and sole cause of the action, but not by an end alone which is the non-adequate and non-total cause of the action. This is also expressed thus by some theologians: an evil extrinsic end, if it is primary and adequate, destroys the objective goodness of the action; but if it is a secondary end and an inadequate motive of acting, it makes an action otherwise good from the object not totally evil.
The first part of this proposition is admitted by almost all. In this sense also St. Paul says:60 "A little leaven corrupts the whole lump." For by the leaven can be understood a depraved intention which is the total cause of a human action. - But the intrinsic reason of this doctrine is obvious. For a man choosing a work good from the object solely for obtaining an evil end in no way seeks the honesty of that work, but uses it as the sole means and instrument for obtaining his depraved end; this certainly is against the right norm of morality, and therefore is intrinsically evil.
The other part of the proposition61 today is most commonly admitted by almost all theologians; nevertheless there were theologians of great name who taught that even an inadequate depraved end destroys the whole objective goodness of the action, for example, the Salmanticenses,62 John of St. Thomas,63 Gonet,64 and others. Although these authors cite St. Thomas65 for their opinion, nevertheless the proposition defended above seems more conformable to the mind of the Angelic Doctor. Here are the words of St. Thomas:66 "Nothing prevents an action having one of the aforesaid goodnesses from lacking another. And according to this it happens that an action which is good according to its species or according to circumstances is ordered to an evil end, and conversely. Yet an action is not good simply unless all goodnesses concur, because any singular defect causes evil; but good is caused from an integral cause." The Angelic Doctor speaks still more explicitly in another place:67 "When someone wills to give alms because of empty glory (behold the total and adequate cause!), here there is one act of the will; and this whole act is evil, although not everything in it has malice; for one particular defect suffices for something to be called evil simply. But it is true that if he were to will this, namely, to give alms, as a certain thing not in order to such an end (behold the inadequate and secondary cause!), that act of the will would be good, and it would be another act of the will from that by which he wills empty glory." From these words of St. Thomas the intrinsic reason of the proposed doctrine is also clear. For alms in this case are not chosen as a means for obtaining empty glory, but are truly intended as something honorable in itself. Therefore they retain their objective goodness, although through another act the intention of empty glory is extrinsically joined to them.
The proposed opinion is confirmed from the inconveniences which would otherwise arise: if a light disorder of the end destroyed the whole goodness of an action otherwise good, scarcely any good action would be performed even by holy men. For "there are very few works even among holy men watching attentively to which in this life either some due circumstance is not lacking, or into which some evil things are not mixed, for example, of empty glory, self-love, excessive complacency.... Thus there are very few penitents whose penance some excess or defect does not accompany; very few superiors who in corrections do not suffer some excess of zeal or anger; very few preachers who, although led by zeal for the glory of God, are not moved amid the applause of hearers by the tickling of some complacency." Thus rightly Billuart,68 who treats this question very well, clearly, and succinctly before many authors who hand down this certainly difficult matter both diffusely and confusedly. Therefore it is established that one action can be virtually multiple and therefore at the same time be good and evil under a diverse head, namely, good from the object, evil from a circumstance or end, provided, however, that the evil end is not the adequate and total cause of the action.
Some authors, such as Lehmkuhl,69 Noldin,70 Marc-Raus,71 Schindler,72 think that the whole work is vitiated if the partial end is gravely evil; for it would be impossible that an action by which man is totally turned away from God should be pleasing. But these things seem to be said illogically and are not sufficiently proved. For even if the partial end is lightly evil, that part of the action which proceeds from this end is not pleasing to God. For example, empty glory joined with the giving of alms is certainly not pleasing to God; and yet these authors teach that this giving of alms has a twofold morality: one good from the object, the other evil from empty glory. Wherefore it seems more probable that absolutely no partial end, provided that it is truly partial and inadequate, destroys the objective goodness of an action.72a For example, if someone sincerely and principally wishes to assist at the sacrifice of the Mass, but at the same time secondarily during Mass to lust shamefully after a woman seen, he does indeed commit a mortal sin against chastity because of the depraved secondary desire, but his assistance at Mass itself has not been made totally evil. - Nor should anyone say that by such assistance a man merits nothing except hell; for merit is one thing, moral goodness another; and however devoutly a man existing in mortal sin assists at Mass, he merits no eternal reward before God. But it has been condemned in Baius and Jansenius to assert that sinful man is unable to do morally good works.73
60 1 Cor. 5:6.
61 Cajetan, Comm. in I-II, q. 18, a. 8, and Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 4, a. 4, hold it.
62 Curs. theologicus tract. XI, De bonitate et malitia, disp. 6, dub. 1.
63 Q. 21, disp. 9, a. 4. This author treats the matter clearly and profoundly.
64 Clypeus: De act. hum. tr. 3, disp. 4, a. 1.
65 S. theol. I-II, q. 18, a. 5.
66 Ibid. a. 4 ad 3.
67 2, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 4 ad 4. The Parma and Vives editions have a somewhat different but not so good reading. Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 12, a. 4.
68 De act. hum. diss. 4, a. 4, § 2.
69 Theol. mor. I, 100.
70 De principiis n. 77.
71 Inst. mor. I, 306.
72 Lehrbuch der Moraltheol. I, 2. Abschn., § 3.
72a Thus also Vermeersch, Theol. mor. I, n. 118.
73 Cf. Billuart, l. c. obj. 4.
124. To c) An action evil from the object becomes more evil when an evil end accedes. Hence he who commits theft in order to have money for making himself drunk commits a greater sin than if he had committed theft alone. The reason is that here there is a twofold malice: one from the object, the other from the subjective end.
An action evil from the object, when a good end accedes, can indeed become less evil, but never totally good. Hence he who commits theft in order to give alms does indeed perpetrate a lesser sin, but a true sin. It is plain that this sin is lesser from the fact that there is a lesser affection toward evil, since the will does not seek it for its own sake, but from love of some true moral good. Wherefore St. Augustine74 says: "He is worse who steals from coveting than he who steals from pity," and St. Thomas:75 "The better the good intended is, the more the fault of the lie is diminished." But although sin is diminished from a good end, nevertheless it remains true sin, and indeed grave sin if grave fault stains the object. Wherefore the adage holds: A good end can never justify evil means. And therefore St. Paul76 teaches: "And not (as we are slandered, and as some say that we say) let us do evil that good may come; whose damnation is just." St. Thomas says: "No evil done with a good intention is excused."77 The scholastics, calling the appetite of the means election and the appetite of the end intention, are accustomed to express the proposed doctrine in this way: a good intention is vitiated by evil election; and an evil election is not made honorable by a good intention. Thus all Catholic authors teach. Cassian alone78 seems to have asserted the contrary, whom a few others joined, teaching the liceity of an officious lie in a case of necessity.79 Only with the greatest injury is the calumny brought against the Jesuits, as if they defended in doctrine and in practice the adage: "The end justifies the means." On the contrary, several non-Catholic authors expressly admit this principle; indeed all those who defend false doctrines concerning the supreme norm of morality must admit it. For if, for example, the supreme norm of morality is individual or social utility, then it can easily happen that a morally evil act, for example, an officious lie, serves utility more than the omission of this act.80 But the intrinsic reason why it is never licit to choose an evil means for obtaining a good end is that otherwise man would approve and assume moral evil, which is certainly illicit.
Against this doctrine are objected both the words of Sacred Scripture and certain examples of the Saints. Sacred Scripture says: "If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome; but if thy eye be evil, thy whole body shall be darksome."81 Under the figure of the eye interpreters are accustomed to understand a good intention, so that the sense would be: If you have in your acts a depraved intention, all your acts are dark and morally evil; on the contrary, if you have a good intention, whatever you do is lightsome and morally good. It is answered that under the name of eye, intention cannot be understood in so unlimited a sense. The holy Fathers by the eye are accustomed to understand the heart; if it has been clean and free from desire of earthly things, the whole body of the remaining affections will be lightsome and immaculate. - Abraham, Jacob, Judith, and the midwives of Egypt are objected, who are reported to have employed lies for obtaining a good end; Moses is objected, who by his own authority killed the Egyptian; Samson, who committed suicide; St. Apollonia, who cast herself into the fire, etc. To these and similar deeds it is answered: either they must be explained so that they are no longer intrinsically evil; for example, the enumerated lies are not true lies, but mental restrictions; or, if this cannot be done, those men otherwise most worthy truly sinned by so acting, at least materially. For no man, however holy, is impeccable on this earth.82
74 Contra mendacium c. 8 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 529).
75 S. theol. II-II, q. 110, a. 2.
76 Rom. 3:8.
77 Opusc. 4 (3), Expositio in duo praecepta caritatis et in decem legis praecepta, c. 6.
78 Coll. 17 (Migne, Patr. lat. 49, 1062).
79 Cf. below in the treatise on lying, II, n. 169.
80 Cf. on this matter Cathrein, Moralphilosophie I 4, 326 sqq., where on p. 329 Jhering, Sigwart, Paulsen, Ziegler, and Gallwitz are cited for this false adage. - G. Ulrich writes in his work Verdienst und Gnade: "The necessary lie, the social and conventional lie, appear, when used with understanding, wholly unobjectionable; for always it is the end alone which hallows a means or makes it into injustice." Matthew Prior: "The end must justify the means, He only sins who ill intends" (The works of the English poets [London 1810] X, 155; cf. Tanquerey, Synops. theol. mor. de act. hum. 152).
81 Matt. 6:22-23.
82 Cf. Billuart, De act. hum. obj. 4, where other objections also are clearly solved.
125. Principle 3. Man is bound to set before himself in all his actions an honorable end, which at least implicitly is referred to God; but it is not licit to act for pleasure alone.
The stated principle responds to the question: what intention is necessary in the agent so that his works may be good? But the proposed doctrine holds a middle place between two other extremes.
The first extreme doctrine requires that all human acts be referred actually or at least virtually to God. Baius, Jansenius, and their followers, thinking that human nature was thoroughly corrupted through original sin, taught that man must always actually refer his actions to God; otherwise he follows his vitiated nature and therefore sins. For according to these authors there is nothing intermediate between heavenly charity and vitiated cupidity. From this false doctrine it follows that all works of infidels and the impious, since they do not refer their actions to God, are sins. This indeed St. Pius V condemned: "All the works of infidels are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices."83 St. Alphonsus seems to have taught that a virtual relation to God is necessary in our acts.84 Nevertheless there are those who explain the mind of the holy Doctor otherwise.85
The other extreme opinion teaches that for the honesty of an act it suffices that it be done according to the prescriptions of reason and be apprehended and sought as such. Therefore the act remains good, even if the will intends not an honorable good or a motive of virtue, but delectation (not evil in itself) or convenience, without thinking of a further end. Thus Noldin,86 who for this opinion of his cites Ballerini, Genicot, Pesch, and others; indeed he calls this opinion today common among authors.
In practice this controversy does not seem to be of great moment, and therefore the faithful are not to be disturbed concerning the morality of their acts, provided that they follow the dictate of their own conscience; but theoretically speaking, the opinion requiring an actual relation of acts to the ultimate end is too rigid and today obsolete. Indeed even a virtual relation of our acts is not to be urged in this sense, as if it were a true sin if a man did not elicit an explicit resolve, for example, every morning, of doing all things for the glory of God. For such an obligation is not established. But the last opinion does not seem to be sufficiently safe unless it is explained in a sound sense.
It is proved. 1. From propositions condemned by Innocent XI on March 2, 1679: "It is licit to eat and drink to satiety without necessity for pleasure alone, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its acts" (prop. 8). - "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free of every fault and venial defect" (prop. 9).87 Therefore, even in objectively licit acts, it is necessary to intend something other than pleasure; or the end of the will cannot be pleasure alone, although that pleasure does not directly conflict with reason. For it cannot be said that to eat for pleasure alone without detriment to health directly conflicts with natural reason, if one abstracts from the ordination of the Creator.
2. From Sacred Scripture. For the Lord says:88 "But I say unto you, that every idle word that men shall speak, they shall render an account for it in the day of judgment." But if an idle word is evil, a fortiori an idle work is evil; and therefore St. Jerome89 exclaims: "If an account is rendered for idle words, how much more for works!" - But a word and work are called idle not because they have an evil end, for then they would no longer be idle, but evil, but because they are not ordered to their connatural end. Hence even boys are called idle, not because they do nothing or something evil, but because they do not do those things which they ought, for example, by playing uselessly. Moreover, an ultimate end has been appointed for man by the Creator, toward which he must tend by all his acts.90 Therefore whatever man does, he must refer to that end; not indeed actually and explicitly, but implicitly, insofar as he perceives every act as fitting right reason and the eternal law. Certainly the Creator joined some special delectation to certain actions, for example, to actions of eating, drinking, generating, etc., with this intention, that men would perform more fervently and more perfectly these actions so necessary for individual and social life; but this delectation is not the end, but only a means to the end. Therefore he who seeks pleasure as the end and not as a means acts against the intention of the Creator and therefore sins. Hence it follows that man cannot positively intend and seek delectation in such a way that the proper motive and reason for willing the action is the convenience itself or the delectation itself, without it being necessary to think of a further honorable end.
3. By the authority of doctors. The proposed opinion is by far the more common among doctors, and indeed not only among Thomists, but also among other theologians. Thus, besides St. Thomas,91 Cajetan,92 Billuart,93 Sylvius,94 Haine,95 Marc-Raus,96 Aertnys-Damen,97 Tanquerey,98 and many others hold it. - John Sanchez99 seems to have been the first who explicitly taught the contrary, writing: "If harm is absent, to eat and drink without necessity solely for seeking delectation, namely, because of the coolness of drink or the pleasantness of food, will by no means be against reason; but such eating or drinking is done freely so that the natural appetite may enjoy its acts. But to will that the appetite be delighted in its operations, which are not against reason, is in no way sin.... Therefore neither will it be right to condemn the sense of taste because it seeks food solely because of its delectation." It is deservedly doubted whether St. Bonaventure100 and certain Scotists101 are rightly alleged as patrons of the opinion of John Sanchez.
4. From reason. St. Thomas102 rightly teaches: "Delectation is because of operation, and not conversely." For delectation is as it were a certain salt and condiment which serves for the appetibility and better digestion of food. But just as it is unfitting to eat solely because of salt or condiment, so also it is a disorder to act because of pleasure alone. Wherefore it is indeed licit to act with delectation or even to intend delectation as an intermediate end with subordination to some further end; but it is never licit to act because of pleasure alone. For this reason St. Augustine says briefly but most truly: "It is not licit to use things to be enjoyed or to enjoy things to be used."103 Concerning delectation sought in foods St. Alphonsus notes:104 "Although someone approaching the table does not think about the conservation of life, but only about the delectation of food, he does not therefore sin, because he wills such delectation, at least virtually, because of the conservation of life; and thus he does not seek it inordinately."
83 Prop. 25 of Baius (Denz. n. 1025).
84 Here are the words of the holy Doctor: "Man is bound to refer all his acts to God when he acts with deliberation and because of some end. For the apostle says in 1 Cor. 10:31: Whether ... you eat, or drink, or whatever else you do: do all things for the glory of God. Therefore, if he refers it to God at least through virtual intention, the act will be good; if he does not refer it, it will be evil: therefore no act is indifferent.... Hence for practice we gather: one must often in the day, at least in the morning, generally offer to God all his acts, so that thus the precept of the apostle may be fulfilled, at least by the virtual intention of doing all things for the glory of God" (l. 5, tract. praeamb., n. 44).
85 Aertnys-Damen, Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 35, note; Vindiciae Alphonsianae P. 2, q. 1, t. 1, pp. 149-157, ed. 2.
86 Princ. Theol. mor. n. 88 sqq.
88 Matt. 12:36.
89 It is found among the apocryphal works of St. Jerome: Breviarium in Psalmos, Ps. 16 (Migne, Patr. lat. 26, 910).
90 Cf. above n. 20.
91 Contra gent. 3, c. 26; Suppl. q. 49, a. 6.
92 Comm. in I-II, q. 1, a. 6.
93 De act. hum. diss. 4, a. 6, and De ultimo fine diss. 1, a. 5.
94 Comm. in I-II, q. 100, a. 10.
95 Theol. mor. De act. hum. q. 59.
96 Inst. mor. I, n. 307.
97 Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 35.
98 De act. hum. 8, n. 203.
99 Select. disp. 2, n. 14; this work was placed on the Index on Dec. 6, 1642.
100 Comm. in 2, dist. 41, a. 1, q. 3.
101 Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theol. I, n. 170.
102 Contra gent. 3, c. 26.
103 What use and fruition are was said above, n. 34.
104 Theol. mor. l. 5, tract. praeamb., n. 44.
126. From what has been said it seems sufficiently proved that man in all his acts must tend toward an honorable end and mediately toward the ultimate end, that is, toward God. Hence the apostle warns: "Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do: do all things for the glory of God."105 By these words, authors commonly teach with St. Thomas105a and St. Alphonsus that not mere counsel, but a true precept is contained. And this precept is not hard; for it is not required that man explicitly refer all and each of his actions to God, but an implicit relation suffices, which is abundantly had if a man at due times elicits an act of faith and charity, which acts indeed are necessary for all men by necessity of means, as will be said below in the treatise on the theological virtues. In practice the faithful are indeed to be exhorted to elicit often the intention of doing all things for the glory of God, but they are not to be accused of having committed sin if they have not elicited this explicit intention. Hence inappropriately in some so-called "mirrors of conscience" or outlines of examination of conscience there is found the question: "Have you often elicited a good intention?" For it is not a sin if the faithful have not explicitly elicited a good intention of doing all things for God.
105 1 Cor. 10:31.
105a II Sent. Dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5 ad 7.