§ III. On the End

28. • An end in general is that for the sake of which something is done.

It is twofold, namely the end of the work, that is, the end intrinsic to the work itself and toward which the work tends per se; and the end of the worker, that is, extrinsic to the work, and toward which the agent directs his intention at will, or which the agent has set before himself ¹. We must speak only about this latter end, since it alone is properly called the end.

¹ These two ends sometimes fall into the same thing, sometimes one is added to the other, sometimes, with the intrinsic end of the work set aside, one alone directs the act extrinsically.

Now that end is 1. intermediate or ultimate, according as it is referred to another end, or the will rests in it; - 2. positively ultimate, or negatively ultimate, according as it is intended or not intended with the exclusion of another end; - 3. primary or secondary, according as it is the totally motive cause of the act, or only partially impulsive. Again the ultimate end can be explicitly or implicitly intended, according as the agent is moved expressly or only virtually by an end of this kind.

I say 1. A human act takes true morality from the end. The reason is that the end can express an order of conformity and deformity to right reason. Thus it is conformable to right reason not only to give alms, but also to give it unto the remission of sins; just as likewise it is repugnant to right reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to make oneself drunk.

I say 2. He sins who acts for the sake of delight alone ². The reason is that he acts inordinately, perverting the order of things instituted by the author of nature. For according to the order instituted by the author of nature, delight is on account of operation, and not vice versa: namely, delight is like salt and a certain condiment, which serves to entice to actions of life necessary or useful. Therefore delight is only a means for carrying out actions more easily, better, and more constantly, but not the ultimate end of the action. For thus St. Thomas: The divine intellect, which is the institutor of nature, appended delights for the sake of operations. I-II, q. 4, art. 2.

² It is one thing to act for the sake of delight, another to act for the sake of delight alone. This latter positively excludes a further end of the work; but this exclusion of an end is inordinate, and indeed not only in desiring delight, but also in an act of any virtue whatever; because even an act of virtue, if it is exercised in such a way, or so stopped in itself, that the higher or ultimate end is positively excluded, by that very fact will already become vicious.

But that first thing involves no inordination of this kind. For first, delight, as St. Thomas says (Against the Gentiles, book 3, ch. 26, no. 6), is good and to be desired if it follows a good operation; and it is proper to the virtue of temperance to moderate the use of delightful things, and indeed to draw back from those things which are against reason, but not from those which are convenient according to reason (see St. Thomas, II-II, q. 141, art. 1, ad 1). But then the further end is not excluded, except perhaps negatively only. But a negative exclusion of the end does not vitiate the act; for it is not necessary for the honesty of an action to think about the further end, or even about the intrinsic end of the work. Therefore, that someone may honestly take delight from play, or food, or rest, it is in no way necessary that he think about the end, whether intrinsic or further, of play, or food, or rest; but it is sufficient that he apprehend the action as consonant with right reason, or also that he find nothing in it contrary to the order of reason; since, as St. Thomas has it (Supplement, q. 49, art. 4), from the same thing some act has that it is not evil in the genus of morals, and that it is good, because no act is indifferent.

From this the reason plainly comes forth why propositions VIII and IX concerning the work of marriage or the act of eating on account of pleasure alone were deservedly proscribed by Innocent XI. For they labor under an intrinsic vice on account of the predicate alone, which positively excludes any other ends, unto which actions of this kind are ordered. For otherwise, that someone is enticed and moved to the work by an appetite for delight, just as also to labor by hope of reward or wages, is consonant with the order of nature, as St. Thomas has it in the cited place. Compare the Salmanticenses (On Marriage, ch. 3, no. 33), Viva (On Proposition VIII of Innocent XI, no. 6), Duarte (Exposition of Condemned Propositions, no. 162), Roncaglia (On Marriage, q. II, ch. 1, q. 2, resp. 2), Pontius (On Marriage, book X, ch. 8, no. 6), Azor (part I, book 2, ch. 5, q. 4), etc.

It is confirmed from proposition 8 condemned by Innocent XI, which sounds thus: To eat and drink unto satiety on account of pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can lawfully enjoy its own acts. - Nevertheless this disorder is not grave per se, and therefore does not exceed venial sin; because ordinarily the ultimate end ³ is not excluded, not even implicitly, unless there is question of those of whom the Apostle says, Phil. 3. 19: Whose God is their belly.

³ The Author understands the ultimate end of human life, not the intrinsic end of those works about which the discussion is held. Moreover, that ultimate end is excluded through any grave sin, which the Author deservedly supposes in those whose God, as the Apostle says, is the belly.

29. You Will Resolve. - 1. Every election of an evil means is evil, but not conversely is every election of a good means good. Thus no one is praised because he abstains from drink out of avarice; but he must be held guilty who steals money in order to give alms.

2. He who chooses an honest means for an honest end posits an act of twofold honesty ⁴, if each honesty is intended. Likewise he is guilty of twofold malice who chooses an evil means for an evil end, for instance if someone steals money in order to make himself drunk.

⁴ ** St. Alphonsus (On Human Acts, no. XXXVIII), after Collet (On Human Acts, ch. 6, art. 2, sect. 2, conclusion 3), writes that this doctrine is common among theologians, with Vasquez alone excepted. But this exception of Vasquez is a mere hallucination of Collet, who here did not have accurately before his eyes the distinctions and conclusions of the schools. Namely, so that in the case there be a twofold goodness of the act, it is necessary that the means be loved not only because it is useful for the end, but also because it is good in itself. To this pertain those words of Becanus (On Human Acts, ch. 4, q. 3, no. 6): When the object of election, which is good per se, is not loved in any way on account of itself, but only on account of the end, then the goodness of the object does nothing to the matter. But when it is loved both on account of itself, insofar as it is good per se, and on account of the end, insofar as it is useful for obtaining that end, then the goodness of the object remains with the goodness of the end. For this reason the Author adds that phrase: If each honesty is intended. And to this Vasquez pertains (On I-II, disp. 51, ch. 3, no. 13; which place Collet alleges), where he says: When someone choosing a work of one virtue from the intention of the end of another virtue is then not allured by the goodness of the virtue of which that matter is, and chooses that work only as useful for the end, it is effected that that election has only the goodness of the end.

But to avoid Collet's hallucinations, even where a twofold honesty or goodness in reality comes to the act, the doctrine of the school must be inspected, which Suarez expresses thus (On I-II, treatise 3, disp. 6, sect. 2, no. 2): It can happen that an honest object is not indeed willed on account of its own honesty, yet its honesty is willed in itself and per se on account of another end.....; for one good can be useful for another not only by reason of its matter, but also by reason of its honesty; and then indeed the honesty of one object or act can be loved in itself, although it is not loved precisely on account of itself, but on account of another end. And soon the same Suarez says (ibid., no. 3): Concerning an act of this kind almost all also agree that it has essential and first goodness from the end, but not from the material object nor from its honesty. Thus St. Thomas can be taken (3 Against the Gentiles, ch. 138), where he signifies that abstinence done from vow has, besides the goodness of temperance, also the goodness of religion: indeed that it is more praiseworthy from the vow than from abstinence.

From these things someone could conclude with Collet that according to Suarez a twofold goodness is denied in an act of temperance. But theologians do not so speak, although they call one goodness essential, the other accidental. Thus also Vasquez (cited disp. 51, ch. 2): If however the means has from itself proper goodness... even if the election had proper goodness from the means, nevertheless it would take also the species of another goodness from the end, so that that goodness would be primary and substantial, insofar as it is election, but that which it would have from the means according to itself would be secondary to it and as it were accidental.

3. He who employs an evil means for a good end contracts only the malice of the means, for example, if someone lies to free his neighbor from danger. Likewise conversely, he who employs an honest means for an evil end contracts only the malice of the end.

4. He who employs an indifferent means for a good or evil end contracts only the goodness or malice of the end. Thus, for example, if you undertake a journey in order to show the way to a pilgrim, you have only the merit of the end; likewise if you sing in order to cause annoyance to another, you have only the guilt of the end. But in confession it is not necessary to declare the circumstance of means of this kind, as is clear.

30. Questions. - YOU WILL ASK 1. Whether any evil end corrupts the whole goodness of the act?

I answer 1. A gravely evil end always entirely infects the act, however good the object may be in itself. For that act can be good in no part, since the agent, by sinning mortally, totally recedes from God.

I answer 2. A lightly evil end also corrupts the whole act, if it is the total end, or at least the primary end, of the agent. For if it is total, it encompasses the whole object, and therefore infects the whole, because the agent, by an evil end, wills the good under the aspect of evil, and therefore, as it is willed by him, it is evil. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, art. 7. - This is also clear from the words of Christ, Matt. 6. 23: If thy eye is wicked, thy whole body will be dark. Hence the gifts of Cain, although good in themselves, displeased God as proceeding from an evil end.

But if a twofold end is had, and the evil one is primary, it must be resolved in the same way, because that act is still chosen so that it may be an instrument for evil, and therefore it is vitiated substantially.

I answer 3. But if a lightly evil end is merely secondary, more probably it does not corrupt the whole act, which will be partly good, partly evil. The reason is that that act retains its goodness from the object; but the evil end holds itself only concomitantly, and does not influence the very substance of the action. If it were otherwise, fewer good acts would be found. - Billuart, diss. 4, art. 4. - Gerdil, On Human Acts, and others commonly.

31. • YOU WILL ASK 2. Whether all actions, that they may be morally good, ought to be informed by the motive of charity?

I answer. No. For acts elicited from the motive of other virtues are good per se, as are acts of Faith, Hope, etc. This is also clear from the Council of Trent, session 14, ch. 4, where it is declared that attrition is a gift of God and disposes the penitent to justification. Likewise session 6, canon 31, where it is said: If anyone shall say that the justified man sins while he works well with a view to eternal recompense, let him be anathema.

YOU WILL ASK 3. Whether all our actions, that they may be honest, ought to be referred to God from a supernatural motive, or one apprehended through Faith?

I answer. No. For otherwise all the works of unbelievers would be sins, which doctrine has been condemned by the Church.

YOU WILL ASK 4. Whether all our actions ought to be referred to God, according to the words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 10. 31: Do all things unto the glory of God?

I answer. Concerning the obligation, which is drawn from the cited text, of referring actions to God, the obscure and often entangled opinions of certain more recent authors being set aside, the common doctrine of the ancients is altogether to be preferred, which is contained in these headings.

And first indeed, the words of Paul, from the common opinion of the Doctors, pertain to the virtue of charity, and, no otherwise than the precept of charity, can be taken both in a negative and in an affirmative sense.

If they are taken in a negative sense, they signify: Do nothing against God ⁵; and thus, according to the opinion of all, indeed from the very nature of the matter, they contain a precept, namely of not sinning. Nevertheless this precept does not give species to sin, because sins take their species not from a general virtue or law, but from special precepts, for example, not killing, not blaspheming.

⁵ See St. Thomas, 2, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 7, and St. Bonaventure, 2, Dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, ad 1.

But if the words of Paul are understood in an affirmative sense, the Doctors dissent somewhat among themselves, and they neither explain them in the same way nor attribute the same force to them.

For some, with St. Bonaventure, judged that through those words Paul insinuates that individual actions, or at least individual series of actions subordinated among themselves, be referred to God actually, or by an actual relation. Nevertheless at the same time they contended that Paul there had handed down no precept, but a mere counsel. - See St. Bonaventure, 2, dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, ad 1 and ad 6.

But others, more commonly with St. Thomas, teach that a precept is in reality contained in the words of the Apostle. But lest someone be carried from this into absurdities ⁶, it is plainly necessary to retain the integral doctrine of St. Thomas on this matter.

⁶ Notable was the fraud of the Jansenists, that they contended the words of Paul to be preceptive, alleging these things from St. Thomas (lecture 3 on Colossians, ch. 3): Some say that this is counsel; but this is not true; but they did not explain the Pauline sentence with St. Thomas, but with St. Bonaventure, where he says (2, Dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, ad 1): The Apostle admonishes... that we refer any work of ours to God: and concerning any work dividedly we can do this. From this, however, they concluded that sin is committed as often as any work is not actually referred to God. And since to refer works to God pertains to charity, among other things they inferred this also, that unbelievers and sinners, as being those who do not have charity, sin in every work.

Moreover not a few among the more recent, although they abhor this condemned error, nevertheless while they themselves also mingle the disparate interpretations of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure of the Pauline text into one thing, fall into another inconvenience. For on the one hand they call back the words of Paul with St. Thomas to a precept; but on the other hand they place the reason of this precept in that which St. Bonaventure required merely for the account of merit, namely that individual actions, or at least individual series of actions, be actually referred to God; and thus, while they establish that this actual relation of all works is obligatory, they bring the matter to this, that scarcely anyone can be found who, on account of this omitted relation of works to God, does not daily and everywhere stain himself with manifold guilt, as Gazzaniga in reality concluded (and indeed coherently) (On Human Acts, diss. 2, ch. 4, no. 87); and Collet adds (On Human Acts, ch. 6, art. 1, sect. 2) that there is not given invincible ignorance which perhaps excuses from this sin. Nor indeed do they sufficiently remedy this inconvenience by so restricting that obligation that it suffices daily, or several times in the day, as Collet says (in the cited place), or at least in the morning, to have referred works to God. For 1. this does not effect that individual actions or individual series of actions subordinated among themselves are actually referred to God according to the mind of St. Bonaventure, and thus that manifold guilt of omissions is absent; 2. since this actual relation is not distinguished from an act of perfect charity, they now infer an obligation hitherto unheard of in the schools, namely of eliciting an act of charity several times in the day or at least once in the morning daily. And from these things it is sufficiently clear that no reason for avoiding these inconveniences is at hand, unless either we deny with St. Bonaventure that a positive precept is contained in the words of Paul, or, if indeed we contend better with St. Thomas that a precept is uttered in them, we take also the explanation of the precept, as it is expounded in the text of the Author, from the same holy Doctor.

**And indeed it were to be wished that St. Alphonsus, who excellently wrote (Treatise on Human Acts, at the beginning): I think one must not depart from the sound doctrine of the Angelic Doctor where it can be had; for with him as guide in theological matters one walks with unoffending foot; it were to be wished, I say, that the holy Doctor in this question also had followed the Angelic Doctor rather than Collet, the continuator of Tournely. For, insisting on his footsteps, he writes (ibid., no. XLIV): Hence for practice we gather: It is necessary several times in the day, at least in the morning, generally to offer to God all one's acts, so that thus the precept of the Apostle may be fulfilled, at least with the virtual intention of doing all things unto the glory of God. The most manifest sense of these words is, namely, that to fulfill the precept of the Apostle it is necessary that several times in the day, at least in the morning, all actions be actually offered to God, so that thus all daily actions and words may thereafter be referred to the glory of God at least by virtual intention. Whence he adds: For the actual relation of all words or works into an honest good is not required, which would be an unbearable burden, and a thing entangled with six hundred scruples, but the virtual suffices, as we have said.

In the preceding edition of this Compendium, care was taken to soften this opinion of the holy Doctor in some way. But VV., both in St. A. (pages 114, 115) and in V. (pages 127-134), took this as an insult cast upon the holy Doctor. They object against it 1. that the Doctors who stand for the obligation of a daily relation of acts are in no way to be counted among those who demand an actual relation of all actions, and 2. that they in no way affirm that an act of charity must be elicited daily: all of which are beside the matter, because the question here is not what other Doctors have said; and besides they rest on a false supposition, as though the alleged Doctors (if you except Collet) defend the obligation of a daily relation. That would be to the point which VV. then added, namely that St. Alphonsus wished to signify not that to which we are held, but merely what is expedient and congruous, to have wished to signify. But this is very difficult, and too alien from likelihood. For 1. when he says: Hence for practice it is concluded, etc., he surely wishes to draw a consequence from those things which he had set forth, namely that the words of the Apostle contain a precept, not however a mere counsel. Therefore the consequence necessarily regards the thing commanded, not the thing of counsel; otherwise he would have said nothing at all about that which it most interests us to know and which the connection of the discourse demanded, namely to what we are held by force of that precept. 2. Granted, the word it is necessary is sometimes taken for that which is merely useful and congruous. Thus, for example, we say that for leading life in a Christian manner it is necessary that a suitable time be granted to pious meditation, examination of conscience, etc. But not so in the present matter. For here the discussion is expressly about fulfilling a precept, that is, about the obligation which the precept necessarily imposes, and which it is necessary to furnish in order that satisfaction be made to the precept. Therefore the word it is necessary here necessarily signifies the necessity which obligation imposes. Nor is it strange that this word, according to the diverse matter of the question, has a diverse sense. Thus if you say that it is necessary that Mass be heard daily, and the Holy Eucharist be received every eight days or at least every month, this will have been said very well if the discussion is about fostering piety, etc.; but badly if this is about fulfilling the precepts of the Church, which command both that Mass be heard on feast days and that the Holy Eucharist be received at paschal time.

Therefore we shall certainly say that the industrious zeal of VV. for protecting the doctrine of the holy Doctor is commendable. But perhaps zeal of this kind will not be most acceptable to the holy Doctor whenever it departs from the boundaries of truth.

Therefore St. Thomas, having made a distinction between actual relation, namely that by which a work is actually directed to God, and virtual relation, namely when the force of the first ordering or relation remains in the actions that follow, establishes:

1. That the actual relation, by which individual actions, even taken distributively, are actually ordered to God, is not of precept, but of counsel ⁷.

⁷ Thus St. Thomas in the same text which the Jansenists fraudulently truncated (lecture 3 on Colossians, ch. 3): Some say that this is counsel; but this is not true. But it must be said that it is not necessary that all things be referred to God actually. And elsewhere (2, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 7): If (the sentence of Paul) is understood affirmatively... in such a way that actual ordering to God is actually joined to each of our actions, it can be understood in two ways, either distributively or collectively. If distributively, this is the sense: whatever action you do, it is better if you actually order it to God; and thus it is counsel. But if it is taken collectively, this is the sense: so do all your works that there be none of them which you do not actually order to God; and this is neither precept nor counsel, but the end of the precept, to which one arrives through the fulfillment of the precept: for thus the Saints in the fatherland refer their acts to God.

2. That the virtual relation of all works is of precept ⁸. For this, however, two things are required and suffice: first indeed on the part of the work, that it be morally honest, or infected by no stain of mortal or venial sin. The other on the part of the agent, that he at some time has elicited, and has not retracted by grave fault, an act of charity by which man orders himself and all his things to God as ultimate end ⁹.

⁸ Thus St. Thomas (I-II, q. 100, art. 10, ad 2): It is contained under the precept of charity that God be loved from the whole heart; to which it pertains that all things be referred to God; and therefore man cannot fulfill the precept of charity unless all things also are referred to God. And again (Disputed Questions On Virtues, q. 2, art. 11, ad 2): That all things be referred to God virtually pertains to the perfection of charity, to which all are held. And ibid., ad 3: To refer all things virtually to God falls under the precept of charity, since this is nothing else than to have God as ultimate end.

⁹ Thus St. Thomas (2, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 6): Nor yet is it necessary that an actual intention ordering to the ultimate end be always joined to any action which is directed to some proximate end; but it suffices that at some time all those ends be actually referred to the ultimate end; as happens when someone thinks of directing himself wholly to the love of God: for then whatever he orders to himself will be ordered to God.

3. As to the time of eliciting this act of charity, by which man orders himself and all his things to God, nothing is specially commanded beyond that which is commonly accustomed to be handed down in the schools concerning the precept of eliciting an act of charity at some time ¹⁰, where the precept of charity is treated.

¹⁰ St. Thomas (in the cited place): And if it is asked when it is necessary to refer an act to the ultimate end, this is nothing else than to ask when it is necessary for the habit of charity to go forth into act: because whenever the habit of charity goes forth into act, there is made an ordering of the whole man to the ultimate end, and consequently of all those things which are ordered to him as goods to himself.

Moreover, this doctrine will borrow light from the following questions, which, these principles of St. Thomas having been set down beforehand, are easily solved.

32. • YOU WILL ASK 5. What relation of the work to God is required and suffices that it be morally honest ¹¹?

¹¹ This question is necessary not only because of the Jansenists, who contend that the defect of relation to God from charity effects that all works of unbelievers and sinners are so many sins, but also because of certain opinions of Catholics who, incautiously having borrowed certain principles from Jansenian books, then, to avoid their erroneous consequences, came into certain absurd opinions. Thus, for example, Collet (On Human Acts, ch. 6, art. 1, sect. 2), lest from that doctrine which above (in the note to the preceding number) we said St. Alphonsus borrowed less cautiously from him, he conclude that unbelievers and sinners sin in every work, asserted by a twofold absurdity that those who do not have charity are not held by this precept of Paul, or certainly that satisfaction is made to this precept although works are referred to God not from charity, but from a certain reverence toward God. Others no less absurdly drew forth I know not what initial charity, by which works are referred to God; and they thought that the Jansenian error was sufficiently guarded against by affirming that from the defect of a relation of this kind only deliberate acts are infected by sin: as though indeed either the Jansenists, or those who disputed against them, had a question about indeliberate acts!

I answer 1. It ought to have aptitude so that it can be referred to God, namely, to contain no inordination of mortal or venial fault by which it is impeded from being referable to God ¹².

¹² St. Thomas (lecture 7 on 1 Cor., ch. 10, v. 31): This relation unto the glory of God is understood either in act, or in aptitude of referring, which is not only in good things, but also in indifferent things (namely, from the object).

I answer 2. It is not necessary that the work actually be directed to God, because the obligation of actually referring works to God is not distinguished from the precept of charity. But this, as being affirmative, does not oblige for always; and thus we are held actually to refer works to God only then when, as we said above, we are held by precept to an act of charity ¹³.

¹³ Thus St. Thomas (2, Dist. 41, q. 1, art. 2, ad 4): It must be said that we are not obliged to this, that any act actually be directed to that end into which faith alone can direct; because affirmative precepts do not oblige for always, although they always oblige. And therefore it is not necessary that an act of unbelievers which is not ordered to that end always be a sin; but only for that time at which they are held to refer their act to the ultimate end: namely, when they will be held to elicit an act of charity; concerning which one must altogether see what the same holy Doctor has, I-II, q. 89, art. 6. To this pertain those things which St. Thomas has to the same point, lecture 3 on Romans, ch. XIV: In an unbelieving man there is the good of nature together with unbelief. And therefore when some unbeliever does some good from the dictate of reason, not referring it to evil, he does not sin.

YOU WILL ASK 6. What relation of the work to God is required and suffices that the work be meritorious?

I answer with St. Thomas (On Charity, single question, art. 11, ad 2), that two things are required: 1. that man has ordered himself to God by an act of charity; 2. that the work be morally honest. Thus he: When someone orders himself to God as to an end, in all the things which he does on account of himself there remains the intention of the ultimate end, which is God: whence in all things he can merit, if he has charity. And elsewhere (On Evil, q. 2, art. 5, objection X): It is clear that he who has charity has ordered himself and all his things to God, to whom he adheres as to the ultimate end. Therefore whatever he orders either to himself or to whatever else of his own, he acts meritoriously, even if he does not actually think about God, unless he is impeded by some inordination of the act which is not referable to God: but this cannot be unless it is at least a venial sin. Hence, according to St. Thomas, in him who is in grace, no act is indifferent even as to the notion of merit: for either it is evil at least venially, and thus it is demeritorious; or it is morally good, and thus it will be meritorious. - St. Thomas, ibid. ¹⁴, and 2, dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, o.

¹⁴ Thus namely in the same place St. Thomas concludes: Therefore every act of one having charity is either meritorious or is sin, and none indifferent.

YOU WILL ASK 7. Whether for merit it is necessary to renew the intention more often, or actually to refer acts to the glory of God, for example, on individual days?

I answer. No. For it suffices that at some time all things be actually referred to the ultimate end, as happens when someone directs and orders himself wholly to God through an act of charity: for then whatever he orders to himself will be ordered to God, and the force of the first ordering remains in all following actions, just as also the force of the ultimate end remains in all things ordered to it. Thus St. Thomas, 2, dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 6 and 7. - Therefore so long as someone has not fallen from the state of grace, any actions of his, provided they are not sins ¹⁵, are meritorious, although he in no way renews the intention of directing works to God. Nevertheless it is an excellent counsel to renew this intention more often, both because these are so many acts of charity, and because in this way fervor of spirit is wonderfully stirred up and fostered.

¹⁵ Therefore St. Thomas (on ch. 3 of Isaiah, at the end), speaking of dancing games, has these things: Play according to itself is not evil; otherwise there would not be virtue in plays, which is called Eutrapelia..., but according as it is ordered to a diverse end and clothed with diverse circumstances it can be an act of virtue or of vice. For because it is impossible always to act in the active and contemplative life, therefore it is necessary sometimes to interpose joys amid cares, lest the soul be broken by too much severity, and so that man may devote himself more promptly to the works of the virtues. And if play is done with such an end, with other circumstances, it will be an act of virtue and can be meritorious, if it is informed by grace (namely, if the one playing is in the state of grace). But these circumstances seem to have to be observed in dancing play, that the person not be unbecoming, such as a cleric or religious: that it be at a time of joy, as on account of liberation, or at weddings, and things of this kind: that it be done with honest persons and with honest song, and that the gestures not be too wanton (namely, too free), and if there are any things of this kind. But if it is done to provoke wantonness, and according to other circumstances, it is clear that the act will be vicious.

And (ibid.) on the adornment of women: It must be said that adornment must be measured according to the mode and measure of the person, and the intention. For if women wear ornaments becoming according to their state and dignity, and hold themselves moderately in their deeds according to the custom of the country, it will be an act of the virtue of modesty, which places a mode in walking, standing, habit, and all exterior motions, and can be meritorious if it is with grace. Likewise if she does it so that she may decently please her husband, whom she has or ought to receive, and so that he may be drawn back from other women. But if they have ornaments more precious than becomes them, it will be arrogance; or deformed by the vice of luxury, if they do it to provoke desire of themselves.

And again (2, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5): Eating and drinking with the mode of temperance preserved, and playing for recreation with the mode of eutrapelia preserved, which holds the mean in play..., will be meritorious in him who has charity.

YOU WILL ASK 8. Whether, that actions may be meritorious, it is necessary to act from a supernatural motive, or at least to think about God?

I answer 1. These things indeed are necessary for acquiring grace or justification. For no one, as St. Thomas says (on Hebrews, ch. XI, lecture 2), can please God unless he approaches Him. But no one approaches God except through faith.

I answer 2. Just as it is not necessary that he who goes along a way think about the end at every step, so, for this, that the end of some action be God or charity, it is not necessary that, in doing that action, someone think about God and charity ¹⁶, but it suffices that previously, through an act of charity, all actions at some time have been ordered to the end which is God. - See St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, art. 6, ad 3; and 2, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, ad 4.

¹⁶ St. Thomas (On Evil, q. 2, art. 5, objection 10): For some act to be meritorious in one having charity, it is not required that it be actually referred to God, but it suffices that it be actually referred to some convenient end.

And 2, Dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, ad 4: For the end of some action to be God or charity, it is not necessary that in doing that action someone think about God or charity...; but it is necessary that previously there has been thought about the end, which is charity or God.

And On Evil, q. 9, art. 2: It sometimes happens that man does not actually order some act to God, while nevertheless that act of itself does not contain any inordination by reason of which it is not referable to God; and yet because the mind of man is habitually related to God as to an end (namely, it is in the state of grace), that act not only is not a sin, but also is a meritorious act.

Compare Cajetan (in commentary on I-II, q. 100, art. 10), Valentia (on I-II, disp. 8, q. 6, point 3), Becanus (On Grace, ch. 5, q. 1, no. 13), Montesinos (on I-II, q. 1, art. 4, question 1, no. 13), and Cardinal Aguirre (Theology of St. Anselm, disp. 130, no. 147), and also St. Francis de Sales (Treatise on the Love of God, part 2, book 6, ch. 8, alias book 12, ch. 8), from whom you will learn that these doctrines existed as common in Catholic schools.