Insensibility

III. Opposed Vices. By defect there is opposed impatience, by which someone indulges sorrow more than is fair, and which is accustomed to lead to complaints, anger, etc.; by excess, insensibility, by which someone is moved less by evils, whether his own or another's, than right reason prescribes.

III. Opposed Vices. By excess there is opposed insensibility, by which someone refuses to place pleasurable acts where reason prescribes it (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 142, a. 1); by defect there is opposed intemperance, by which someone would seek pleasurable actions prohibited either in themselves, or as to manner, or as to time, or as to degree.

Sins Opposed to Fortitude.—(a) Number.—The vices opposed to fortitude are four, two of excess and two of defect, according as fear and confidence are not regulated as to time, place, manner and other circumstances in the way of moderation. He who fears when or as he should not, is timorous (e.g., one who kills himself because he fears the hardships of life, one who neglects religion out of human respect); he who does not fear when or as he should, is insensible (e.g., one who exposes himself to peril of death for the sake of excitement). He who does not dare when or as he should, is cowardly (e.g., a superior who does not correct as he should); he who dares when or as he should not, is foolhardy (e.g., a superior who corrects when there is no chance of a good result).

(b) Malice.—These sins per se are venial, since excess or defect in emotions, which in themselves are indifferent, is not a serious disorder. But they become mortal if they lead to grave evil (e.g., if from fear of persecution one becomes a pagan), or to grave danger (e.g., if from foolhardiness one exposes oneself to death or mutilation). Insensibility and foolhardiness are caused by pride or vainglory, by contempt for life or for the strength of others. Timidity and cowardice diminish culpability, though they do not remove it.

The Vices Opposed to Temperance.—(a) The vice of deficiency has been called insensibility, and consists in an unreasonable dislike of the inferior sensible pleasures, which makes one unwilling to use them when and as reason commands. Thus, the Stoics and Manichees believed that material joys are intrinsically evil, and there have been fanatical advocates of teetotalism (e.g., the Aquarians) and of purity (e.g., the Puritans who would not permit a man to kiss his wife on Sunday, the prudish and censorious who fear or suspect evil without reason, the Pharisees who think they are defiled if a sinner speaks to them, the misogynists who disapprove of marriage). The sin is venial per se, since it does not submit to passion; but it may be mortal on account of some circumstance, as when the marriage debt is unjustly refused or necessary nourishment is not taken. This vice is rarer than its opposite, and it must not be confused with austerity, which for the sake of a spiritual good foregoes some lawful but unnecessary sensible enjoyment.

(b) The vice of excess is immoderation, which includes gluttony and impurity. This is the most disgraceful of sins, because the most unworthy of a rational being; it enslaves man to pleasures of which the lower animals are capable; unlike other vices, it contains in itself nothing of intelligence, industry, generosity, and nothing that would at all liken it to virtue. The lowest depths of degradation are reached when immoderation is brutish even in its manner, as when one is gluttonous of human flesh or desirous of sodomitic pleasure. Immoderation is called by Aristotle a “childish sin,” because, as a child is eager for pleasures and will follow them unduly unless instructed and trained, so also an immoderate person thinks only of his appetite, and will go from bad to worse unless he accepts the discipline of reason. But the child is excusable, while the immoderate man should know better. Immoderation is worse than timidity; for, while the former seeks selfish delight and acts with willing unrestraint, the latter seeks self-preservation and is under some external menace.

What is fortitude, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Fortitude is the virtue which moderates and strengthens the soul against grave dangers, especially of death. - No precept per se of this virtue is given, but only by reason of some special precept to be fulfilled, e.g., even martyrdom to be undergone, lest faith be denied. But whether and when there is an obligation of observing the law even with danger to life was said in the treatise on Laws, and is explained in the individual treatises, when it is asked whether it is licit to do something at least to avoid death. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 140.

There is a twofold act of fortitude, to attack and to sustain: to attack distinguished and arduous things; to sustain adversities. For the act of attacking two things are required. The first is preparation of soul, namely that someone have a prompt soul for undertaking great things, which magnanimity provides. The other regards execution of the work, namely that someone not fall short in the execution of those things which he began magnanimously, which magnificence provides. For the act of sustaining two things also are required. The first is that by the difficulty of imminent evils the soul not be broken through sadness, and fall away from its greatness; and for this patience is posited, by which someone bears evils with an even soul, without disturbance of sadness. The other is that from long-lasting suffering of difficult things man not be wearied up to the point that he desists; and for this perseverance is posited.

R. To the second. These four virtues, magnanimity, magnificence, patience, perseverance, are integral parts of fortitude if they are concerned with dangers of death; but they are potential parts of fortitude if they are concerned with lesser dangers. But fortitude does not have subjective parts, because it is not divided into many virtues differing in species, since it concerns a very special matter, namely dangers of death, which are all of the same genus, although some are greater than others.

R. To the third. Timidity, fearlessness, and audacity are opposed to fortitude. Timidity is a vice exceeding in fearing; for it fears what one ought not, when one ought not, or more than one ought, whence one does not dare to attack when reason dictates, or as it dictates. If it stands in itself, it is a light sin; but if it impels to sin, it will be grave or light according to the condition of that to which it impels. - Fearlessness is a vice deficient in fearing; for one does not fear when he ought to fear, or the things that ought to be feared. It is not a sin distinct from that to whose danger someone exposes himself; for it is a sin only insofar as it is the cause of that, tacitly containing consent to that danger.

Audacity is that which rashly casts itself into dangers. Rashly, namely without just reason. It is a sin according to the account of the evil and danger to which one exposes himself.

Presumption, ambition, vainglory, pusillanimity are opposed to magnanimity. - Presumption is excessive confidence in one's own powers, by which it happens that someone undertakes something, or is prepared to undertake something, above his powers. It is a deadly sin when it occurs with danger or injury of another, as the presumption of a physician, judge, confessor; or when it proceeds from error against the faith, as the presumption of heretics. Outside these cases it is almost always a venial sin. Ambition is an inordinate appetite of honor, by desiring more honor than is fitting. It is a light sin, unless honor is desired either with injury and harm of another, or from a gravely illicit thing, or in a gravely illicit mode or end. Vainglory is desire of vain glory. Vain, if glory is sought from simulated excellence or reputation, if greater than is fitting, or from an illicit thing, or among those who cannot judge rightly about things, or by referring it to an undue end. Per se it is a venial sin, nor does it become a mortal sin except by reason of another sin, which is sometimes involved in its effect. Pusillanimity is a sin by which someone from smallness of soul does not attempt those things which are commensurate with his natural virtue. It is grave or light according to the goods from which he recedes.

Small-magnificence and consumption or excessive profusion are opposed to magnificence. - Small-magnificence is the vice by which man falls short of the proportion which ought to be between expense and work. Consumption or excessive profusion is the vice by which someone exceeds the said proportion, namely so that he spends more than is proportioned to the work. Each is per se a light sin; it can be grave by reason of scandal, or notable harm then following to others, or by another extrinsic reason, e.g., of a vow, testament, etc., by which someone is bound to that magnificent work and ought to be contained within due expenses.

Insensibility and impatience are opposed to patience, but softness and pertinacity to perseverance. - Insensibility is had when someone is touched by no evils, neither his own nor those of neighbors. It is a sign either of brutish stupidity or of inhuman hardness. Insensibility or hardness is rarely a mortal sin; certainly per se it is only venial. - Impatience is had when someone grieves too much, or even from grief departs from the right. Impatience per se is only a venial sin, because it is only an excess in grief, or in a movement of anger, expressed by an external sign; nevertheless it can be deadly by reason of scandal or of the evil which someone does from impatience. - Softness is if someone easily recedes from good because of certain difficulties which he cannot sustain; for that is called soft which easily yields to one touching it. But it is manifest that fear of dangers impels more gravely than desire of pleasures; and the desire itself of pleasures moves more strongly than sadness concerning the lack of pleasure withdraws, because lack of pleasure is a pure defect. And therefore he is properly called soft who recedes from good because of sadness caused by the defect of delights, as if yielding to a weak mover. This is a grave sin in a venereal matter or in another matter of great moment, to which someone is bound by law, precept, vow, or oath; but it is light in a light matter. Pertinacity is perseverance in one's own opinion more than one ought; and it is venial or mortal according to the gravity of the matter, e.g., if someone is unwilling to embrace the Catholic religion lest he seem inconstant; if a Prince is unwilling to revoke pernicious laws. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 123 seqq.; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Fortit.

What is temperance, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Temperance is the virtue which moderates concupiscence and delight of sensible goods, especially in the delights of taste and touch, of which some regard conserving the individual, others conserving the species. Insensibility and intemperance are opposed to temperance. The former consists in this, that someone flees delight so much that he therefore omits even those things which are necessary for the conservation of nature. But the latter is the sin of excessive concupiscence. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141 seqq.; Quodl. 12, a. 22.

R. To the second and third. The integral parts of temperance are shamefacedness and honorableness. Through shamefacedness someone flees shamefulness contrary to temperance. Through honorableness someone loves the beauty of temperance. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143; q. 144; q. 145.

The subjective parts of temperance are: Abstinence, which moderates delight in the use of foods and non-intoxicating drink; and gluttony is opposed to it, cf. 329. - Sobriety, which moderates delight in the use of drink able to intoxicate; and drunkenness is opposed to it, cf. 332. - Chastity, which moderates according to right reason the principal delight of coitus itself; and lust is opposed to it, cf. 325. Modesty, which moderates surrounding delights, for instance in kisses, touches, embraces, looks. Sometimes, however, one is put for the other. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 146 seqq.

The potential parts of temperance are: Continence, which contains man in the good of reason against the pleasures of touch, especially venereal pleasures; and incontinence is opposed to it, which impels toward those delights and yields to them. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 155, 156. Meekness, which moderates the passion of anger according to right reason; and anger is opposed to it by excess, cf. n. 341 seq.; by defect, lack of anger, which does not stir up anger when it is required by charity or justice, by correcting and punishing. It does not have malice diverse from that of the omitted office to be fulfilled from charity or justice. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 158. Clemency, which is proper to Superiors, inclines one to impose lesser punishments than by right he could, because of kindness toward neighbor and the decorum of a Superior. Cruelty is opposed to it by excess, which from harshness of soul exacts punishments beyond measure; but by defect, excessive lenity, which mitigates punishments beyond measure or remits them altogether. Cruelty is distinguished from savagery, according to which someone in inflicting punishments does not consider any fault of the one who is punished, but only this, that he delights in the torment of men. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 159.

Modesty, by which someone moderates his internal and external motions and the arrangement of his things, by a measure fitting to him. Hence under modesty the following four virtues are numbered. Humility, which moderates the motions of the soul toward lofty things, and inclines us to profess our lowliness by internal and external signs. To humility is opposed by excess pride, cf. n. 321 seq.; and by defect excessive abjection of self, which inclines to immoderate self-abjection. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 160 seqq. Studiousness, which moderates the zeal of knowing according to the dictate of right reason. To it by excess is opposed curiosity, by which someone is impelled to applying superfluous diligence of knowing, from affection for knowledge alone. But by defect negligence is opposed to it, by which someone omits to acquire owed knowledge. Curiosity and negligence per se are light, per accidens grave, for instance if the former impels you to extort a secret from another, the latter incites a confessor to omit the study of Moral Theology. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 166 seqq.

Modesty of manners, which moderates the external gestures and motions of the body according to the norm of reason, so that namely they agree with the person, both in himself and considered with all circumstances of things. To modesty of manners is opposed by excess petulance, by which a foreign mode is assumed, not agreeing with one's own condition, or an overly common mode is shown; but by defect rusticity of manners, which does not preserve a fitting mode. Each is per se light. A species of modesty of manners is eutrapelia, which imposes due mode on games and places. By excess and by defect one can also sin in play, by scurrility and excessive austerity. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 168. Modesty of dress moderates the arrangement of external things according to the prescription of reason. For it is fitting that in human society each one wear clothing convenient to his own condition. Likewise by excess and by defect one can sin in this matter, which per se is only light. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 169.

The end of the precept is charity, through which we are induced to loving God and neighbor. Among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery seems especially to be opposed to love of neighbor, and therefore it is chiefly prohibited by the precepts of the Decalogue not only in deed, but also in heart, the sixth and ninth. - But virtues annexed to the virtue of temperance, as to their effects, can likewise rightly regard charity toward God and neighbor; as, for example, from anger, which is opposed to meekness, someone proceeds to blaspheming God, or to killing a man. And thus a precept is also present concerning these virtues, implicitly in the Decalogue, explicitly in other places of Scripture. As to the integral parts of temperance, shamefacedness and honorableness, cf. 1 Cor. 14:40; 1 Tim. 2:9. As to the subjective parts, abstinence, sobriety, chastity, cf. Num. 6:3; 1 Pet. 5:8; Col. 3:5. As to the potential parts, continence, clemency, meekness, modesty, humility, cf. Ecclus. 10:31; 30:24; Col. 3:12; 2 Tim. 2:24. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 170. Therefore the various precepts of the Decalogue contain precepts of moral virtues. But in the first precept, I am the Lord thy God, the precepts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, are also presuppositively and implicitly contained.

S. Th. II-II, q. 142.

941. To temperance by defect in pleasure there is opposed insensibility or stupor. - Insensibility is a very rare vice which turns away from pleasures of touch in an undue way, so that one does not will to use them when, where, how, how much, etc., right reason dictates they are to be used.

It is a sin and vice, because it is contrary to the natural order and to the Creator, who set pleasures upon actions necessary for the life of man; whence right reason dictates that these are to be used as much as is necessary for preserving human life and the power for due offices, whether of the individual or of the species. Of itself it is venial; but mortal if from it someone omits something to which he is held under mortal sin, such as to render the conjugal debt, to take food necessary for life, etc.

It is no sin to abstain from these for an honest end, for example, health, penance, contemplation of divine things, etc., but according to right reason and without excess, so that it does not harm the fulfillment of duties (a. 1).

942. To temperance by excess in pleasure there is opposed intemperance. - Intemperance is a vice by which someone seeks pleasures of touch in an undue way and beyond measure, namely, where, when, how, etc., right reason does not dictate or more than it dictates (a. 2).

It is a sin, because it is opposed to virtue, insofar as it exceeds the mean of reason which temperance establishes in pleasures. Indeed it is most disgraceful: a) because it is concerned with pleasures common to us and the beasts, and therefore is most repugnant to the excellence of man; b) because in those pleasures less appears of the light of reason from which the beauty of virtue comes, and therefore it is more repugnant to the beauty of man (a. 4).¹

¹ Cf. q. 145, a. 2.

943. Observation. - Intemperance is a graver sin than timidity, because it is more voluntary (a. 3), or than insensibility, because it recedes more from temperance.

TWO Vices are opposed to this Virtue. One by defect, and is called Insensibility; the other by excess, and is called Intemperance. So St. Thomas art. 1. and 2., from Aristotle 2. Eth. cap. 7.

FOR since Temperance stands in the mean in regard to those things that serve life according to the sense of touch, of food, etc., it can fail on one side, if one be insensible, as was that Xenocrates, who was called a log; and Carneades, who did not eat, forgetful of himself, unless his wife opportunely threw food into his mouth.

BY excess, however, one sins if one gives too much attention to the delectations of touch and taste, more than is necessary.

INTEMPERANCE is truly called a childish vice by St. Thomas here and Aristotle 3. Eth. last cap.: for like children it intentures itself in sordid concupiscence; and because, like children, it grows into obstinacy if not curbed; Hence Eccl. 30: A remiss son will become headstrong. Thirdly, because it must be coerced by discipline, as children are corrected.

MOREOVER Intemperance is a disgraceful vice, because it inclines man to brutal delectations. But of these proper vices there will be a discussion place by place.