Morals of the Church
Library › Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology › Volume I › Book I. On the General Principles of the Christian Life › Treatise III. On Those Things which Dispose Toward Human Acts, or on Habits › Dissertation I. On Virtues › Part II. On Virtues in Particular › Section II. On Supernatural Moral Virtues › Chapter II. On Supernatural Moral Virtues in Particular › Article IV. On Temperance

Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

§ I. On Temperance in General

432.

I. Notion of Temperance. Finally, the fourth and last cardinal virtue in order of dignity is temperance. Indeed, "according to the commonality of its signification ... it is not a special virtue, but a general one; because the name temperance signifies a certain tempering, that is, moderation, which reason places in human operations and passions; and this is common in every moral virtue" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 141, a. 2). But "if temperance is considered antonomastically, according as it restrains the appetite from those things which most allure man, in this way it is a special virtue" (St. Thomas, cited place). Now temperance, which is a special cardinal virtue, can be defined: a moral virtue inclining man to moderate the pleasure of touch and taste in the conservation of the species and of the individual. It is said:

  1. The pleasure of touch, that is, that pleasure which by its nature is joined to actions of conserving the species and the individual.

  2. The pleasure of taste, that is, that pleasure which tends to increase the former, for example the pleasure of the flavor of food or drink (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 141, a. 5).

Temperance

433.

II. Object of Temperance. 1. The remote material object is inclinations which serve for the conservation of the species, and things which contribute to the conservation of the individual; the proximate material object is constituted by the acts by which the species is propagated and the individual preserved.

  1. The remote formal object is the reason of debt by which we do not go forward in the use of these things beyond the measure prescribed by right reason; the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in moderating the pleasure of touch and taste in relation to acts of conserving the species and the individual.

Temperance

434.

III. Opposed Vices. By excess there is opposed insensibility, by which someone refuses to place pleasurable acts where reason prescribes it (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 142, a. 1); by defect there is opposed intemperance, by which someone would seek pleasurable actions prohibited either in themselves, or as to manner, or as to time, or as to degree.

TemperanceInsensibility