Integral Parts

Integral Parts of Prudence.—The integral parts of prudence, considered as a cognitive virtue or as an index of the right means, are those acts which enable one to have knowledge and to acquire knowledge. (a) Thus, the acts requisite for the possession of knowledge about ways and means are the memory of the past and the understanding of the present situation. (b) The acts requisite for the acquisition of new knowledge are docility, by which one learns from others, and quickness of perception, by which one discovers for oneself.

The integral parts of prudence, considered as an operative or a preceptive virtue—that is, as the counsellor and director of life and behavior—are the acts without which one cannot make good use of knowledge as applied to conduct.

(a) Thus, knowledge of general principles must be applied to particular affairs, and this supposes that one knows how to reason correctly, how to infer the particular from the general, how to put facts together. Even those who are not skilled dialecticians have a certain amount of natural logic, and are able to make good use of data or premises in drawing conclusions about their obligations, and thus to make a prudent application of what they know.

(b) Knowledge gained through deliberation has to be effectually made use of; that is, the reason must impose its judgment carefully formed, must determine the line of action to be followed, must properly dispose the means in view of the end. This requires that a person should so direct his future acts as means to the end he has in view that they will be good in themselves (foresight or providence) and in their circumstances (circumspection), and that he will be guarded against external impediments that might hinder him, steering clear of both Scylla and Charybdis (caution): “The prudent man considereth his steps” (Prov., xiv. 15). Examples: Titus wishes to help the poor, and decides on certain methods of raising the money that are dishonest and disedifying. Balbus wishes to induce Caius to go to church, and therefore shows him marks of friendship, not reflecting that these acts of friendship, on account of the character of Caius, will arouse only haughtiness or suspicion. Claudius, in order to practise mortification, resolves on a fast, but also makes up his mind to visit certain friends who will try to make him break his resolution. Sempronius resolves to provide well for his family and also for certain deserving charities, but he fails to insure his property, to invest his money well and to make a will, with the result that neither his family nor the poor are provided for as he had intended. Titus lacked foresight, Balbus was not circumspect, Claudius and Sempronius were incautious.

1050. 2. The elements by which it is constituted. Prudence primarily supposes a natural faculty of judging rightly (bon sens, common sense), and, as regards supernatural things, the light of faith by which right reason is perfected and illuminated. It consists especially in three elements, which are necessary for rightly choosing means to the end: consultation, by which we diligently inquire concerning all the means and their utility and honesty; judgment of mind, by which practical reason, all things having been weighed, rightly pronounces concerning the honesty and opportuneness of this or that means; precept, by which reason commands those acts which it has already declared necessary or useful for the end.

1051. (A) The first act of prudence is solicitous consultation, or investigation, by which we seriously and attentively think about the various means which can conduce to the intended end, about their honesty and opportuneness, not only in general, but with all adjuncts attended to.² Toward obtaining this more efficaciously, five things especially serve:

² This indeed is done, according to St. Thomas (II-II, q. 51, a. 2), under the influence of eubulia, which is a virtue annexed to prudence.

(a) Memory of past things, insofar as these can help for judging rightly concerning present things. For since for the most part at least the same means, employed in the same circumstances, produce the same effects, from past things we can often judge how one must act in present adjuncts. Wherefore history has deservedly been called the teacher of men, and the method which they call of observation, or experience, is held by moderns as the best directress of life. Therefore the prudent man considers those things which are far off, so that from them he may learn what must be done here and now.

(b) Understanding of present things; for, past things having been considered, it is also necessary that the present operation be attentively inspected, both in its nature and in its circumstances; and not only on the surface, but intimately; and not under one respect only, but under diverse respects. For since there is question of the honesty of some action not in general, but in the concrete, all adjuncts being posited, all these things must be attended to, so that the action to be placed here and now may be good under every respect. For it belongs to prudence wisely to adapt the general principles of morals, which are immutable in themselves, to all circumstances of places, times, and persons.

(c) Providence of future things: for the honesty of an act does not depend only on its nature, but also on its effects, whether as regards the agent or as regards others; therefore these, insofar as human frailty permits, must be foreseen, so that from them the honesty or opportuneness of the action to be placed here and now may be judged.

1052. (d) Docility in taking the counsel of others: for since the judgment of very many is worth more than the judgment of one, to rely exclusively on our own wisdom is not without folly; therefore the prudent man will frequently, solicitously, and reverently take the counsels of others, especially of elders and prudent men; he will inquire with them concerning the matter to be done, will lend an attentive ear to their reasons, and will not despise their judgment: "Prudence," says St. Thomas,³ "consists about particular operable things, in which, since there are infinite diversities, all things cannot be sufficiently considered by one man, nor in a short time, but through length of time. Hence in those things which pertain to prudence, man especially needs to be instructed by others, and especially by elders, who have obtained sound understanding concerning the ends of operable things." Yet the counselor must be chosen cautiously, a prudent and upright man, who cares for the good of others, and not solely for his own advantage.⁴

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 49, a. 3.

⁴ Concerning which Ecclesiasticus wrote excellent things, 37:7-29.

(e) Prayer to God, according to that saying:⁵ "And in all these things beseech the Most High, that He direct thy way in truth." For, even in natural matters, it is expedient that we humbly ask from the Father of lights, who is the best counselor, what we ought to do; but in matters regarding the supernatural end, this is necessary, since only by supernatural light can we find the way of salvation.

⁵ Ecclus. 37:19.

1053. (B) The second act of prudence is judgment: for when all things have been diligently investigated, it remains that practical reason bear judgment concerning them, by pronouncing what, all things having been weighed, is honest and opportune. For this there is required first of all the faculty of judging rightly; but besides, immunity from prejudices and passions, which easily turn the mind away from the right path of truth; deliberate consideration of all motives and circumstances, so that it may be discerned which of the various means devised conduces more efficaciously to the end; finally a firm pronouncement of judgment, so that the mind not remain uncertain.⁶

⁶ For performing this, St. Thomas asserts that there are two virtues which are joined to prudence: synesis, or right sense (bon sens), by which we judge rightly concerning things to be done according to common rules; and gnome, or perspicacity, by which we judge rightly concerning the same things beyond common rules.

1054. (C) The third act of prudence is precept, by which practical reason not only pronounces what must be done, but commands it: for it is not enough to take counsel and to judge, but it is necessary to operate; but operation proceeds from the command of reason, which, after it has judged what is good and what is evil in such adjuncts, says to the will: this must be done by you.

An act of this kind is the principal one, according to St. Thomas:⁷ "And because this act is nearer to the end of practical reason, hence it is that this is the principal act of practical reason, and consequently of prudence..."

⁷ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 8.

For rightly commanding, there is especially required solicitude, which strenuously urges the execution of those things which are to be done: for if it was necessary to deliberate slowly, it is necessary to operate quickly, nor is that to be put off until tomorrow which can and ought to be done today.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 48 and 49.

23. There are eight principal parts of prudence required for its perfect act, of which five pertain to prudence insofar as it is cognitive, namely memory of past things, understanding of present things, docility, shrewdness, reason; and three insofar as it is preceptive: foresight, circumspection, and caution. This can be shown as follows:

For prudence there is required:

A. insofar as it is cognitive: a) right cognition of things to be done, namely 1. memory of past things; and 2. understanding of present things; b) acquisition of cognition, for which there is necessary 3. docility for learning from others; and 4. shrewdness or sagacity, that is, one's own and swift conjecturing for the discovery of means; c) use of cognition, namely 5. reason, which from known things judges unknown things.

B. insofar as it is preceptive, there is required: 6. foresight, by which it orders what according to itself befits the end; 7. circumspection, by which it orders what according to circumstances befits the end; and 8. caution, by which it orders what befits the end against extrinsic impediments.

1. Lessius notes that not all proceed from diverse habits. Caution, circumspection, foresight, and understanding are acts of prudence, because they are intrinsically included in prudent judgment and execution; memory, reason, docility, and shrewdness are only required for acquiring prudence, or for the perfection of acquired prudence.

24. Insofar as it is cognitive, five things are required for prudence:

a) right cognition of particular and contingent operable things, namely,

1. recollection or memory of past things (souvenir du passé; herinnering), especially of those things which someone has experienced: for concerning contingent operable things we can be directed only from those things which ordinarily and in the majority of cases happen; but these things we do not know except by experience (q. 49, a. 1); "whence from past things we must take, as it were, an argument concerning future things, and therefore memory of past things is necessary for taking counsel well concerning future things" (ad 3); likewise

2. understanding or right cognition of present things (sens du présent; begrip, doorzicht, verstandigheid), whether of necessary things (that is, universal principles) or of contingent things, especially of the particular thing presently to be done (a. 2);

b) acquisition of cognition, which

3. happens from others by learning through discipline; to receive this, docility (docilité d'esprit; leerzaamheid) is required: for "particular operable things, in which there are, as it were, infinite diversities, cannot all be sufficiently considered by one man, nor within a brief time, but through length of time. Whence in those things which pertain to prudence, man especially needs to be instructed by others, and chiefly by the aged... (nor is there anyone who suffices for himself in all things, ad 3) ...But this pertains to docility, that someone be receptive of discipline in a good way" (a. 3);

4. likewise it happens through one's own discovery, to which sagacity or shrewdness pertains (promptitude de l'esprit; vlugheid, scherpzinnigheid, vindingsvermogen), that is, good conjecturing, especially for the discovery of means, chiefly where one must act unexpectedly (a. 4). For example, "when someone, seeing certain persons made friends, by conjecturing thinks that they are enemies of the same man" (ad 1);

c) use of cognition, namely,

5. reason (raison déductive; goede redeneering), that is, good reasoning, which from all the aforesaid known things rightly proceeds to knowing and judging other things (a. 5).

1. Or otherwise, according to Tully. Three things are required for prudence: 1. foresight of future things, to which circumspection and caution pertain; 2. understanding of present things, to which reason, docility, and shrewdness look; 3. memory of past things (q. 48, ad 1).

2. Hence it is clear that those who have many experiences are generally more prudent than those who do not have so long an experience.

3. This perspicacity occurs from natural aptitude and also from exercise.

25. Three things, moreover, are required by prudence insofar as it is preceptive, by applying cognition to the work:

a) that, by looking ahead into the future, it may rightly order what according to itself befits the due end, and this is done by

1. foresight (prévoyance; vooruitzicht), which regards "contingent future things insofar as they are orderable to the end of human life," and "imports... a certain respect of something distant, to which those things which occur in the present are to be ordered" (a. 6). But solicitude (zorgvuldigheid) pertains to foresight of future things (q. 48, ad 5);

b) that it attend to the circumstances of the affair, which can render it evil or inopportune, and this is done by

2. circumspection (omzichtigheid): "Because prudence is concerned with singular operable things in which many things concur, it happens that something considered according to itself is good and suitable to the end, which nevertheless from certain concurrent things is rendered either evil or not opportune for the end: just as to show signs of love to someone, considered according to itself, seems suitable for alluring his soul to love; but if pride or a suspicion of flattery should happen in his soul, this will not be suitable for the end. And therefore circumspection is necessary for prudence, namely so that man compare that which is ordered to the end with those things which surround it" (a. 7), in which there is a special difficulty (ad 3);

c) that it avoid extrinsic impediments which can impede the good, and this is

3. caution (précaution; behoedzaamheid), for example, lest damage be incurred, such as adverse health, lest the neighbor be offended, lest one be exposed to an occasion of sin, etc. (a. 8).

2. Foresight is the principal part of prudence (I, q. 22, a. 1). Cajetan explains how it agrees with prudence, how it does not agree, how it is a part of prudence, and how it is prudence itself. Several understand foresight to be mere cognition of future events, but this is not according to the mind of St. Thomas.

26. Observation. - If the act is of great moment, it will not be perfectly prudent unless all the aforesaid conditions are present.

UNANIMOUSLY the Philosophers acknowledge that Prudence has certain parts; of which Aristotle 6. Ethic. cap. 8. and following. Cicero lib. 2. de Invent. August. lib. 83. qq. quaest. 61. Macrobius lib. 1. in somn. Scipionis, cap. 8. relates them; from these the S. Doctor everywhere lib. 5. Compend. Theol. cap. 34. And 3. p. Centileg. sectione 41. and the opusc. de quatuor virtutibus Cardinalibus.

The parts of Prudence are of THREE kinds. Some are integral, without which the perfect use of Prudence is not had: Others are subjective, in the manner in which species, subjected to a genus, are called subjective parts of the genus, as Man and Lion are parts of animal, because, namely, animal is predicated of them as of a subject. Others are potential parts of Prudence by similitude with the potential parts of the soul.

The Integral Parts of Prudence, which integrate it as it were in the manner in which members integrate a body, are eight. Memory, which is cognition of past things; Understanding, which is cognition of present things; Docility, which is cognition through another's instruction; Solertia, which is cognition through one's own discovery; nem; Ratio of this, is because it is cognition by the inference of one thing from another; Providence, which is the ordination of means to an end; Circumspection, which is the consideration of the circumstances of the business; Caution, which is a certain contrivance against those things which can stand in the way and be an impediment.

The perfect use of Prudence indeed depends on Memory, because it depends on experience; and this on many experiments, and experiments on many memories, as D. Thom. teaches quaest. 49. art. 1. ex Aristotle at the beginning of 1. Metaph.

It depends also on Understanding, which is the cognition of particulars with which Prudence is concerned, which cognition is from the intellect, partly through conversion to phantasms, partly also in the interior sense, or the cogitative power.

It DEPENDS on Docility, which Cicero praises Lib. 2. qq. Academ.; hence the S. Doctor defines it to be the power of instructing first oneself; then others.

It DEPENDS on Solertia, which is swift conjecture, as Aristotle teaches 6. Eth. cap. 9. and D. Thom. quaest. 49. art. 4.

It DEPENDS on reason, which is the cognition of one thing from another by inference; for Consultation, on which the decrees of Prudence depend, is altogether with ratiocination, as the Philosopher teaches 6. Eth. cap. 10. and D. Thomas art. 5.

It DEPENDS on Prudence, which is the ordination of suitable means to an end; for Prudence is concerned with things to be done on account of an end, as the S. Doctor explains in the places alleged, and D. Thom. art. 6.

It DEPENDS on Circumspection; for prudence is concerned with particular things to be done, good on every side, consonant with reason; but the goodness of human actions depends on the circumstances, as I showed prima secundae, Treatise 1. disput. 9. question 5. and 10.

It DEPENDS also on Caution, which is provision against contrary evils, which the S. Doctor calls the Prudence of discerning vices, bearing the appearance of virtues.

As to the subjective parts of Prudence, D. Thom. treats quaest. 50. It is divided into governing Prudence and the particular prudence of the one acting. Again, Gubernativa is divided into Legislative, which is in the Prince, or Republic; into Political, which is in subjects concerning the same good of the Kingdom, or city; into Oeconomical, which is concerning the domestic good; and Military, concerning which the good of the army is concerned. Of the Gubernativa the S. Doctor treats excellently de Eccl. Hierarchia. But particular prudence is one most special species.

The potential Parts of Prudence are three intellectual virtues adjoined, serving prudence, namely, EUBULIA, which is rightly counseltative, as you have 6. Eth. cap. 9. SYNESIS is rightly judgmental by common rules; and GNOMES, which is rightly judgmental in natural reason beyond the common rules, when these fail because of the circumstances of a particular case. See D. Thomas quaest. 51., easily declaring these.

Of these S. Bonaventure also treats in the places everywhere adduced here.