On the Moral Virtues

1048. Through the theological virtues and the virtue of religion, we tend directly toward God, our last end; through the moral virtues, our actions are rightly disposed concerning those things which are toward the end, namely duties toward ourselves and neighbor. We have already said above, n. 585, that moral virtues, insofar as they are natural, can be defined as acquired habits by which we are disposed to acting; and insofar as they are supernatural, that they are divinely infused, exercised under the influence of supernatural grace, and ultimately ordered to a supernatural end. Likewise it has been said, n. 587, that all these virtues can be referred to four, which are called cardinal, namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47-170, who discusses these virtues splendidly before others; and his Commentators, among whom John of St. Thomas; Billuart, Tract. de Prudentia, Fortitudine, etc.; the Wurzburg theologians, Appendix de Virt. cardinalibus (t. IV, ed. 1883, Paris); Lequeux, De Virtutibus, diss. II; Pesch, Praelectiones, t. IX, n. 1-292; Lehmkuhl, t. I, n. 682-735. - Cf. ascetical authors, such as Schram; Alvarez de Paz; Rodriguez; Olier, Introduction a la vie et aux vertus chretiennes; Scaramelli; Philippus a SS. Trinitate; Gaudier, de Perfect. vitae spiritualis; Gay, De la vie et des vertus chretiennes; Ribet, Les Vertus et les Dons, Paris, Lecoffre, 1901; especially St. Francois de Sales, Introduction, Amour de Dieu, Sermons et Lettres.

Prudence directs all our acts to the honest good, whether toward ourselves or toward others; justice inclines us to render to another what is owed to him; fortitude and temperance directly help us to fulfill duties toward ourselves (above, n. 589). - Since justice, on account of the manifold rights and duties which it embraces, demands a fuller exposition, we discuss it in a special Treatise; therefore it remains to speak of the three virtues, prudence, fortitude, and temperance, yet briefly, since a fuller exposition of these virtues is found among ascetical theologians.

1049. 1. Definition. Prudence (in Greek, phronesis), which is often called wisdom, is a virtue directing the intellect so that, in individual operations, we may discern what is honest and conducing to the end. Accordingly here there is no question of merely human prudence, or cleverness, which pursues only the useful, but of that which orders our acts to the last end, and especially of supernatural prudence.

(a) Prudence primarily perfects the intellect, namely practical reason; and it is, as it were, the director of morals, insofar as it disposes the mind to judging rightly concerning those things which conduce to the end, by pronouncing what is honest or base: for prudence which considers only what is useful is very imperfect, from what was said above, n. 44-47. From this it is clear that its object is very broad, since it embraces all human actions capable of morality.

(b) Yet it differs from the science of morals; for the latter is concerned with universal good and the general rules of ethics, while the former applies the universal principles of morals to individual actions, pronouncing what in this or that circumstance is honest. - Nor, however, is it the same as conscience (above, n. 350-351): for conscience is considered as a faculty, or as an act by which we judge concerning the liceity of acts; while prudence is the virtue perfecting conscience itself and inclining it to judge rightly concerning the honesty of actions.

1050. 2. The elements by which it is constituted. Prudence primarily supposes a natural faculty of judging rightly (bon sens, common sense), and, as regards supernatural things, the light of faith by which right reason is perfected and illuminated. It consists especially in three elements, which are necessary for rightly choosing means to the end: consultation, by which we diligently inquire concerning all the means and their utility and honesty; judgment of mind, by which practical reason, all things having been weighed, rightly pronounces concerning the honesty and opportuneness of this or that means; precept, by which reason commands those acts which it has already declared necessary or useful for the end.

1051. (A) The first act of prudence is solicitous consultation, or investigation, by which we seriously and attentively think about the various means which can conduce to the intended end, about their honesty and opportuneness, not only in general, but with all adjuncts attended to.² Toward obtaining this more efficaciously, five things especially serve:

² This indeed is done, according to St. Thomas (II-II, q. 51, a. 2), under the influence of eubulia, which is a virtue annexed to prudence.

(a) Memory of past things, insofar as these can help for judging rightly concerning present things. For since for the most part at least the same means, employed in the same circumstances, produce the same effects, from past things we can often judge how one must act in present adjuncts. Wherefore history has deservedly been called the teacher of men, and the method which they call of observation, or experience, is held by moderns as the best directress of life. Therefore the prudent man considers those things which are far off, so that from them he may learn what must be done here and now.

(b) Understanding of present things; for, past things having been considered, it is also necessary that the present operation be attentively inspected, both in its nature and in its circumstances; and not only on the surface, but intimately; and not under one respect only, but under diverse respects. For since there is question of the honesty of some action not in general, but in the concrete, all adjuncts being posited, all these things must be attended to, so that the action to be placed here and now may be good under every respect. For it belongs to prudence wisely to adapt the general principles of morals, which are immutable in themselves, to all circumstances of places, times, and persons.

(c) Providence of future things: for the honesty of an act does not depend only on its nature, but also on its effects, whether as regards the agent or as regards others; therefore these, insofar as human frailty permits, must be foreseen, so that from them the honesty or opportuneness of the action to be placed here and now may be judged.

1052. (d) Docility in taking the counsel of others: for since the judgment of very many is worth more than the judgment of one, to rely exclusively on our own wisdom is not without folly; therefore the prudent man will frequently, solicitously, and reverently take the counsels of others, especially of elders and prudent men; he will inquire with them concerning the matter to be done, will lend an attentive ear to their reasons, and will not despise their judgment: "Prudence," says St. Thomas,³ "consists about particular operable things, in which, since there are infinite diversities, all things cannot be sufficiently considered by one man, nor in a short time, but through length of time. Hence in those things which pertain to prudence, man especially needs to be instructed by others, and especially by elders, who have obtained sound understanding concerning the ends of operable things." Yet the counselor must be chosen cautiously, a prudent and upright man, who cares for the good of others, and not solely for his own advantage.⁴

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 49, a. 3.

⁴ Concerning which Ecclesiasticus wrote excellent things, 37:7-29.

(e) Prayer to God, according to that saying:⁵ "And in all these things beseech the Most High, that He direct thy way in truth." For, even in natural matters, it is expedient that we humbly ask from the Father of lights, who is the best counselor, what we ought to do; but in matters regarding the supernatural end, this is necessary, since only by supernatural light can we find the way of salvation.

⁵ Ecclus. 37:19.

1053. (B) The second act of prudence is judgment: for when all things have been diligently investigated, it remains that practical reason bear judgment concerning them, by pronouncing what, all things having been weighed, is honest and opportune. For this there is required first of all the faculty of judging rightly; but besides, immunity from prejudices and passions, which easily turn the mind away from the right path of truth; deliberate consideration of all motives and circumstances, so that it may be discerned which of the various means devised conduces more efficaciously to the end; finally a firm pronouncement of judgment, so that the mind not remain uncertain.⁶

⁶ For performing this, St. Thomas asserts that there are two virtues which are joined to prudence: synesis, or right sense (bon sens), by which we judge rightly concerning things to be done according to common rules; and gnome, or perspicacity, by which we judge rightly concerning the same things beyond common rules.

1054. (C) The third act of prudence is precept, by which practical reason not only pronounces what must be done, but commands it: for it is not enough to take counsel and to judge, but it is necessary to operate; but operation proceeds from the command of reason, which, after it has judged what is good and what is evil in such adjuncts, says to the will: this must be done by you.

An act of this kind is the principal one, according to St. Thomas:⁷ "And because this act is nearer to the end of practical reason, hence it is that this is the principal act of practical reason, and consequently of prudence..."

⁷ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 8.

For rightly commanding, there is especially required solicitude, which strenuously urges the execution of those things which are to be done: for if it was necessary to deliberate slowly, it is necessary to operate quickly, nor is that to be put off until tomorrow which can and ought to be done today.

1055. 3. Concerning the various species of prudence. Prudence assumes various names, and is distributed into various species, according to the various objects about which it is concerned. It is customarily called personal prudence, or monastic, by which a man governs himself; domestic, or economic, by which someone rightly orders whatever regards the good of the family; social, or political, when it regards the common good of the state; military, when it is concerned with military affairs, etc. But in all these, the same essential elements which we have described are found; but those things which are particular to each species are set forth in various treatises.

1056. 4. Concerning the vices opposed to prudence. From this one is given to understand what the vices opposed to prudence are. Certain ones are directly opposed to this virtue, namely by defect; others indirectly, insofar as they have a false likeness with it.

(A) The vices which are directly opposed to this virtue are called by the common name of imprudence; but because prudence consists in three principal acts, above, n. 1050, three vices likewise are customarily distinguished: precipitation, which omits consultation; inconsideration, which harms judgment; negligence and inconstancy, which are opposed to precept.

(a) Precipitation consists in this, that a man, neglecting the various means of inquiry which are at hand, acts before he considers; wherefore he is borne toward acting, not from the dictate of reason, but from the impulse of prejudice or passion. When precipitation arises from contempt of the directing rule, it is properly called rashness, and is a graver sin.

(b) Inconsideration consists in this, that someone despises or neglects diligently to weigh all those things which are required so that he may bear an equitable judgment; for thus he exposes himself to the danger of judging badly concerning those things which are here and now to be done, and therefore of acting badly.

(c) Negligence is the defect of a prompt will in executing the judgment of reason, or in commanding those things which have been judged necessary or useful. Akin to this vice is inconstancy, which, without sufficient reason, withdraws from a good proposal already elicited: it arises for the most part from the impulse of passions which resist the good proposal, and little by little induce a man to change his counsel, and therefore to leave those things which had already been wisely begun.

In all these things, a grave sin is committed if someone acts in such a way that he contemns divine rules; but if he acts without contempt, and without detriment to those things which are of the necessity of salvation, it is a venial sin.¹

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 1.

1057. (B) To the virtue of prudence there are opposed, by a false likeness, prudence of the flesh, craftiness, and excessive solicitude for future things.

(a) Prudence of the flesh, which seeks ways of living according to the desires of corrupt nature, and therefore tends to an end which is not truly good, but apparent. Concerning this the Apostle says:² "For the prudence of the flesh is death; but the prudence of the spirit is life and peace. Because the wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither can it be. And they who are in the flesh cannot please God."

² Rom. 8:6-8.

(b) Craftiness, which is not necessarily concerned with an evil end, but uses simulated and fallacious means for attaining the intended end, whether good or evil. It is, as it were, a practical lie, and is opposed to Christian simplicity. Exteriorly it is manifested by deceit and fraud, of which there is treatment where Contracts are discussed, n. 630.

(c) Excessive solicitude for future things, which is vicious when it preoccupies a man outside the opportune time, or in an immoderate way. Christ reproves this as a defect of trust in God:³ "Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat, nor for your body, what you shall put on... Behold the birds of the air, for they neither sow, nor do they reap, nor gather into barns; and your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not you of much more value than they?" St. Thomas explains this more fully,⁴ by setting forth that this excessive solicitude is illicit in three ways: if we seek temporal things as an end, - or if we so set our heart upon temporal things that we are drawn back from spiritual things, which we ought more principally to serve, - or if we fear that, by doing what we ought, necessary things may fail us, which is opposed to divine providence: "Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you."⁵

³ Matt. 6:25-26.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 6.

⁵ Matt. 6:33.

These sins indeed are grave when the last end is constituted in creatures, or when means gravely culpable in themselves are assumed.

1058. 1. The excellence of prudence. (A) Scripture praises prudence many times, which it often calls wisdom, especially in the books of Proverbs, Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus.

Thus in Proverbs:⁶ "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom, and who aboundeth in prudence. The purchasing thereof is better than the merchandise of silver, and her fruit than the first and purest gold... Possess wisdom, possess prudence... Take hold on her, and she shall exalt thee; thou shalt be glorified by her when thou shalt embrace her: she shall give to thy head increase of graces, and protect thee with a noble crown." - Likewise in Wisdom,⁷ prudence is described as the directress of our life, and the fountain of all goods, to be preferred to all riches. - Wherefore Ecclesiasticus exhorts young men that from youth they receive prudence, and cultivate the same up to old age.⁸

⁶ Prov. 3:13-14; 4:5-9.

⁷ Wis. 6-9.

⁸ Ecclus. 6:18-37.

The Fathers teach no less clearly that prudence is the charioteer and fountain of the other virtues, so that without it it is impossible to cultivate the other virtues: for it chooses the means by which the other virtues can grow.⁹

⁹ St. Ambrose, De officiis, l. I, c. 27, P.L., XVI, 60; St. Augustine, De moribus eccl., l. I, c. 15, P.L., XXXII, 1322; St. Gregory the Great, Moral., l. II, c. 49, P.L., LXXV, 592.

1059. (B) Reason shows the same thing. For prudence helps and perfects all virtues, so that without it the others cannot subsist. (a) For every moral virtue ought to hold a middle way between two extremes; thus liberality subsists as a mean between prodigality and avarice. But it belongs to prudence to prescribe to the virtues what the mean to be held between extremes is, since, from what was said, it inquires and judges concerning all things in order to the end, and solicitously determines what is honest. (b) Besides, so that a man may act well, he ought to know not only what he should do, but also how he should do it; but it belongs to prudence to define, after attentive consideration of all the circumstances, what the better means are for attaining the end, and how these can opportunely be employed.

Wherefore a man destitute of prudence is deservedly compared to a ship lacking a pilot, which is driven hither and thither by the impulse of winds and waves, and at length is forced to perish by shipwreck. On the contrary, prudence is called the moderator and charioteer of the virtues, the orderer of affections and teacher of morals, since it directs all our acts safely to the port of salvation.

1060. 2. Means of progressing in prudence. These can be gathered from what was said concerning the elements in which prudence consists, n. 1050.

(a) First of all, since God is the author of all wisdom, prudence must be earnestly asked from Him: for He Himself assigned us the end, and also the means opportune for attaining it; therefore when we do not know what must be done, it is necessary to implore the divine light: "But as we know not what we ought to do, we have only this left, that we direct our eyes to Thee."¹⁰ In the book of Wisdom (IX), a very beautiful prayer is found for obtaining wisdom, or prudence.

¹⁰ 2 Par. 20:12.

(b) Since prejudices and passions, especially pleasure, cloud the mind, and hinder it from attentive and sincere consideration of motives consonant with reason, it is altogether necessary that we renounce prejudices and conquer passions; otherwise reason, disturbed and blinded, will not bear judgment according to equity and honesty, but according to the vicious propensities of corrupt nature.

(c) Before you bear judgment, attentively consider and weigh all motives, all circumstances, and the effects probably going to follow from your action, both as regards yourself and as regards others; and concerning all these things judge in order to eternity, as if you were soon to die and to render account of your action to the supreme judge. - Nor should you rely on your own prudence, but "do nothing without counsel, and after the deed thou shalt not repent"¹¹... "Always seek counsel from a wise man."¹² By these and other means of this kind, you will progress in prudence.

¹¹ Ecclus. 32:24.

¹² Tob. 4:19.

1061. 1. Definition. Fortitude (andreia), of which there is question here, is fortitude of mind, and can be defined: the virtue by which the will is so strengthened that it does not desist from pursuing the arduous good, neither because of difficulties, nor even because of the danger of death.¹

¹ This is the definition of fortitude, insofar as it is a cardinal virtue. Sometimes, however, by this name is designated that constancy by which we strive to overcome ordinary difficulties which are accustomed to occur in the exercise of all virtues: this is not a special virtue.

Fortitude, like the other moral virtues, is both natural and supernatural, according as it pursues an arduous natural or supernatural good, and indeed by natural or supernatural means.

(a) The object of this virtue is the arduous moral good, or that which bears before it a special difficulty. Every good indeed is arduous in some way; but when special difficulties and great dangers occur, especially the danger of death,² the special virtue of fortitude is required for overcoming all these. Hence the chief act of this virtue is martyrdom undertaken for God, of which there is treatment in the Treatise on Baptism, n. 42-44.

² The Scholastics, after Aristotle, held that fortitude especially shines forth in that genus of death which threatens in war, because then the common good of the fatherland is preferred to a private good; but St. Thomas (II-II, q. 122, a. 1) notes that under the name of war come all attacks which someone sustains on account of truth and justice. Cicero, moreover (De offic., lib. I, 22), deservedly says: "Although most men think military affairs greater than civil ones, this opinion must be diminished... But truly, if we wish to judge, many civil affairs have arisen greater and more renowned than military ones."

1062. (b) The subject of this virtue is commonly said to be the irascible appetite: for this is concerned with the arduous good, and uses anger duly moderated for overcoming difficulties; for it pertains to anger to leap upon obstacles and conquer them. Nevertheless it seems to us that fortitude exists primarily in the will, and secondarily in the irascible appetite; for here there is question of pursuing the honest good, which is properly the object of the will, but not of the useful or sensible good, which is the object of the lower appetite. Therefore the virtue of fortitude resides primarily in the will, which deliberately and firmly adheres to the honest good. But because difficulties and dangers often stand in the way, which frighten not only the will but also the lower appetite, it is necessary that fortitude secondarily influence the irascible appetite, for strengthening it against vain fears, and exciting it to approach arduous things strenuously.

1063. (c) The act of fortitude is chiefly twofold: to endure and to attack: to endure, that is, to stand immovably in dangers and tolerate the gravest torments with an unconquered soul;³ to attack, that is, strenuously to do arduous and dangerous things. - Generally to endure, other things being equal, is more difficult and more meritorious than to attack: for he who endures already feels imminent dangers, while he who attacks has them as future; moreover, to endure imports length of time, while to attack can be from a sudden movement; but it is more difficult to remain immovable for a long time than to be borne by a sudden movement toward something arduous.⁴

³ Horace expressed this elegantly (Odes, III, 3, 8): "The just man and tenacious of purpose is not shaken in his solid mind by the ardor of citizens commanding perverse things, nor by the face of a threatening tyrant... If the shattered world should fall upon him, the ruins will strike him undaunted."

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 123, a. 6.

1064. 2. The various degrees of fortitude. (a) The first consists in the restraint and mortification of passions. This is true fortitude; for if those are called strong who tame wild beasts and conquer the enemies of the fatherland, they surely must be judged stronger who so restrain and govern anger, lust, and cupidity that they use these not for evil, but for strenuously working good: "The patient man is better than the valiant: and he that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh cities."⁵ - Especially to be praised are those who, despising the vain judgments of men, are never deterred from duty by the mockeries of others.

⁵ Prov. 16:32.

(b) The second degree, which surpasses the first, is this: that, for the spiritual or bodily good of neighbor, they expose liberty, reputation, and their own life to probable danger. The Apostle excelled by this fortitude, who, for the salvation of souls, often exposed himself to diverse dangers, "in perils of waters, in perils of robbers, in perils from his own nation, in perils from the Gentiles, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils from false brethren."⁶ Today the same fortitude is exercised not only by missionaries who preach the Gospel among remote peoples, but also by laymen and priests who, among Christian nations, invincibly defend the orthodox faith against rising unbelievers and politicians, with risk of reputation, goods, and even liberty.

⁶ 2 Cor. 11:26.

1065. (c) They attain the third degree who, in sudden cases, tolerate horrible evils with a strong and unconquered soul. For he who could not prepare himself against rushing evils by previous meditation, and sustains all things undaunted, shows that he has acquired the habit of fortitude by long exercise.

(d) But they ascend to the fourth degree who willingly and lovingly undergo martyrdom for Christ, as St. Ignatius the martyr underwent it, who, writing to the Romans, said: "Would that I may enjoy the beasts which are prepared for me, which I also pray may be swift for my destruction and punishments!" - Few indeed today suffer martyrdom properly so called; but the peace of the Church has its own martyrs: for those who, for Christ and the salvation of souls, spend all things and themselves, sustain all things, attack all things, daily ready to give their life for their sheep, can truly, although not in the strict sense, be called martyrs.

1066. 3. Concerning the vices opposed to fortitude. There are two chief ones: (a) Timidity, or cowardice, which does not endure strongly enough, by fearing where one must not fear, or more than is fitting. To fear those things which are deservedly to be feared, and in the way in which they are to be feared, for example sin or hell, is not timidity; nor is it illicit to flee evils, from the toleration of which no good comes, all things having been diligently weighed. But to consent to vain fears, and from this to neglect duties, is the sin of timidity, whose gravity depends on various circumstances, especially on the gravity of the duty omitted. - In our days that fear which is called human respect must carefully be avoided, by force of which so many Christians omit their religious duties, lest perhaps they displease others.

(b) Excessive daring, or rashness, which is an excess in attacking the arduous good, which is not fitting, or when it is not fitting, or in a manner in which it is not fitting. It arises from contempt of life or of other goods, - from pride, which trusts too much in its own powers, - from boasting, which desires to show its own powers, - or from a certain stupidity of soul. The sin committed from this head must be judged both from the cause from which it arises and from the effects which it induces; for example, he sins gravely who, without cause, exposes himself to grave danger.⁷

⁷ To these vices is generally added fearlessness, which does not fear when one ought to fear (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 126, a. 1-2); but almost the same can be said of it as of rashness.

1067. To attack and to endure are the two offices of fortitude, from what was said above, n. 1063; for fulfilling these more easily, certain virtues are joined to fortitude: namely magnanimity and magnificence, which are ordered to attacking great things; patience and constancy, which regard enduring harsh things. These must be discussed separately.

1. Magnanimity is promptness of soul for performing great acts of virtues, namely those which are worthy of great honors.

(A) It differs from ambition, which attacks great things on account of human honors; for the magnificent man wills to work those things which are great before God, because it befits a rational creature to intend not only those things which are common, but also those which are excellent. He despises riches, pleasures, honors of this world, and breathes after heavenly things. He indeed intends great honors, but such as are conferred by God: "And therefore he is not lifted up by great honors, because he does not reckon them above himself, but rather despises them... and similarly he is not broken by dishonors, but despises them, as things which he reckons are brought upon him unworthily."⁸

⁸ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 129, a. 2, ad 3.

Wherefore true magnanimity is not opposed to humility, as the Angelic Doctor excellently declares:⁹ "In man there is found something great, which he possesses from the gift of God; and some defect, which belongs to him from the infirmity of nature. Therefore magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things according to the consideration of the gifts which he possesses from God; thus if he has great virtue of soul, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue... But humility makes a man account himself little, according to consideration of his own defect." - And so the magnanimous man relies not so much on his own powers as on divine help, and places his trust especially in God.

⁹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 129, a. 3, ad 4.

1068. (B) To this virtue there is opposed, by excess, presumption, and by defect, pusillanimity.¹⁰

¹⁰ Two others are commonly enumerated, ambition and empty glory; but of these there was treatment above, where the capital vices were discussed, n. 515-516.

(a) Presumption is the sin by which someone attacks that which is far beyond his powers; for example, he who undertakes the offices of judge, confessor, pastor, etc., for the fulfilling of which he is altogether unequal, from defect of knowledge, prudence, and other virtues; or he who, existing in the state of imperfect virtue, at once tries to do the greatest works. Let Peter be an example, who, trusting too much in himself, was ready to die for Christ, and soon at the voice of a maidservant denied the Master. (b) Pusillanimity is a disposition of soul by which someone flees those things which, all circumstances being considered, he could and ought to do; thus he who, frightened by difficulties and not sufficiently trusting in divine help, flees offices proposed to him by superiors,¹¹ or does not fulfill the duties of his own state from empty fear.

¹¹ Accordingly there is no question here of him who, for the sake of humility, declines offices and honors, but of him who is frightened by difficulties and lacks trust in God.

For judging the malice of sins arising from this double vice, attention must especially be paid to the gravity of the effects which follow from them.

1069. 2. Magnificence seems to be a certain part of magnanimity, and inclines one to do great things through great expenses, for example, in constructing splendid churches, or erecting colleges, universities, monasteries, when the good of the Church or the fatherland demands this.

To this virtue two vices are opposed: (a) excessive sumptuousness, when someone makes great expenses in matters of slight moment; this indeed is irrational, especially when works very necessary for the honor of God and the good of the faithful are neglected; (b) parvificence, which in great matters wills to make only small expenses, so that the works which are undertaken remain very unbecoming.

1070. 3. Patience is the virtue which so moderates sadness arising from present evils that, because of it, the will is not moved away from good, but rather is confirmed in it. Therefore this is not insensibility, or apathy, of which the Stoics boasted, and which in reality is a vice. The patient man feels pain in the body and sadness in the soul, but moderates both, and does not allow them to proceed beyond the limits of reason; for he remembers the words of Paul:¹ "Tribulation worketh patience; and patience trial; and trial hope; and hope confoundeth not."

¹ Rom. 5:3-5. Cf. St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, ch. 3; Olier, Introduction, ch. 9.

Various degrees are distinguished in patience: (a) to bear with an equal soul the loss of riches, reputation, health, parents, and friends, even when these things happen to us without our fault; (b) to bear those things which are repaid by the ungrateful for benefits received; (c) to sustain all these things not only patiently, but with joy, like the apostles, who "went rejoicing from the presence of the council, because they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus."²

² Acts 5:41.

To this virtue is opposed impatience, by which someone grieves too much and from sorrow withdraws from what is right, for example, by complaining bitterly about God and men, and for that reason seeking consolation in pleasures or in idleness. - Impatience is in itself a venial sin, but it can become grave if someone deliberately murmurs gravely against God and divine ordinances, or from this commits lethal sins.

1071. 4. Constancy, or perseverance, is a virtue confirming the mind against fear of impending evils, and for overcoming difficulties which arise from the long exercise of virtue. - Therefore it regards future difficulties, while patience regards present evils; moreover, it is ordered to overcoming that special difficulty which generally proceeds from long practice of virtues: for many experience a certain fatigue and weariness from the fact that the same efforts must often be repeated; for overcoming this, the special virtue of constancy is desired. - Of how great a moment it is to cultivate this virtue is established from this, that only by often-repeated efforts, carried through to the end of life, is solid virtue acquired and the crown of justice obtained: "But he that shall persevere unto the end, he shall be saved."³

³ Matt. 10:22.

To this virtue there is opposed: (a) by defect, inconstancy, or softness of soul, which easily withdraws from a good proposal on account of occurring difficulties, or from weariness of duration; this disposition indeed arises partly from natural temperament, partly from the custom of indulging pleasures and from horror of difficulties; (b) by excess, or abuse, pertinacity, or inclination to persist in a proposal where right reason dictates that one must desist; for, although we ought to persevere in a proposal as long as it appears good to right reason, one must withdraw from it when it is certainly detected as having been undertaken from erroneous judgment, or when circumstances so change that what before was good and opportune now becomes evil or at least less good.

1072. Besides prayer, to which it is necessary to have recourse for all virtues, the chief means by which fortitude can be acquired or increased are these:

1. Frequent meditation on the fragility of temporal goods, when they are compared with eternal goods. For Christian fortitude arises first of all from the intimate persuasion that temporal evils are nothing in comparison with eternal ones; indeed, they become desirable when they are considered as means of obtaining or increasing eternal happiness. For then the Christian does not fear the evils of this world, nor flee arduous things, but rather embraces them, so that from this he may receive an unfading crown. Likewise he is not easily allured by the pleasures and honors of this world, but rather despises them as impediments by which he is kept from attaining eternal beatitude. Wherefore he is deterred from fulfilling duty neither by threats nor by flatteries, but undauntedly endures evils and attacks arduous things, so that he may securely attain his end.

2. Foresight of evils which can happen, so that we may be able to strengthen the will against them. For from long premeditation we prepare our soul against dangers: just as in war an unforeseen enemy easily oppresses the unprepared, so in spiritual combat we are easily overcome by enemies, if we are unprepared. But, on the contrary, dangers long foreseen become less terrible. The reason for this is that fear, against which fortitude is ordered, weakens our powers unless we resist it strenuously; but if we foresee the evils which can happen, and apprehend them not as harmful, but as useful for virtue and salvation, fear soon withdraws, and the will turns all its powers toward pursuing good, notwithstanding any dangers whatever.

1073. 3. The custom of acting strenuously in the lesser dangers occurring daily: for by this means the soul acquires the firmness necessary for strongly sustaining graver evils and manfully attacking more arduous things. Just as a soldier by daily exercise prepares himself for more arduous and dangerous things, so a Christian, by acting strongly in lesser things, becomes fit for greater things. Therefore those labor under presumption who desire to suffer or do grand things, and at the same time neglect lesser things: if they are weak in the least things, they cannot be strenuous in greater things: "He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in that which is greater: and he that is unjust in that which is little, is unjust also in that which is greater."⁴

⁴ Luke 16:10.

4. Fervent love for God adds the greatest powers to the will. For "love is strong as death,"⁵ and therefore renders the lover intrepid, fit for tolerating all adverse things strongly, and for performing the greatest arduous things manfully. If love of creatures inspires such fortitude in the hearts of mortals, as daily experience establishes, how much greater fortitude will pure love of God, love of the infinite good, inspire! This indeed can be illustrated by the example of Paul, who, from the fact that he burned with love of Christ, vehemently desired to suffer all things, to do all things on account of Christ: "Who then shall separate us from the charity of Christ? Shall tribulation? or distress? or famine? or nakedness? or danger? or persecution? or the sword?... But in all these things we overcome because of Him that hath loved us."⁶ - Wherefore it will help much frequently to consider the fortitude which the Savior exhibited throughout His whole life, and especially in the Passion, from the time when He began to agonize in the garden of Gethsemani up to the hour in which, dying, He cried out:⁷ "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" By this example the Apostles exhorted the faithful to tolerate all things strongly: "Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example, that you should follow His steps... Christ therefore having suffered in the flesh, be you also armed with the same thought."⁸ And in reality many Christians, adhering to the footsteps of the beloved Master, went rejoicing because they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for His name. But because today many Christians are desired who are endowed with unconquered fortitude, for defending and promoting the faith against innumerable enemies, it is necessary that an ardent love of Christ be inspired in the souls of the young, by which, being inflamed, they may be able strenuously and cheerfully to fight for the Christian faith.

⁵ Cant. 8:6.

⁶ Rom. 8:35-37; let the whole passage be read.

⁷ Matt. 27:46.

⁸ 1 Pet. 2:21; 4:1.

1074. As fortitude moderates the irascible appetite, strengthening it against arduous things, so temperance moderates the concupiscible appetite, restraining the inordinate love of pleasurable things. Here therefore temperance is treated, not as it is a general virtue moderating all human operations and passions, but insofar as it is a special virtue restraining sensible pleasures.

1075. 1. Definition. Temperance is a virtue so restraining the appetite for sensible pleasures, especially of taste and touch, that on account of them the will does not withdraw from good, but rather is confirmed in it.

(a) For understanding this, it must be known that pleasure was annexed by the Author of nature to our operations, for this end, that we might operate more easily and so tend toward our end. No pleasure is evil in itself, but it must be regarded as a means instituted by God for attaining some end. Therefore to will pleasure on account of the end predetermined by God is not evil, but honorable (above, n. 157); but it is evil to act on account of pleasure alone, without any relation to the end. It belongs to temperance so to moderate pleasure that it is sought, not for itself, but for an honorable end, and therefore without any excess.

(b) Among the pleasures of the senses, there are two which attract most men more vehemently, namely, pleasures in food and drink, which are ordered to the conservation of the individual, and venereal pleasures, which are ordered to the conservation of the human species. Therefore temperance chiefly tends to moderate these. St. Thomas explains this thus:¹ "And because pleasure follows upon a natural operation, some pleasures are the more vehement in proportion as they follow upon operations that are more natural. But the operations by which the nature of the individual is conserved through food and drink, and the nature of the species through the union of male and female, are most natural to animals; and therefore temperance is properly concerned with pleasures of food and drink, and with venereal pleasures."

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 141, a. 4.

1076. 2. The general rule of temperance. For rightly ordering pleasures of this kind, right reason, enlightened by faith, proposes a double rule: one proximate, which is taken from the necessities of this life; the other remote, which is the attainment of supernatural beatitude.

(a) According to the first rule, all pleasurable things which come into man's use must be referred to some necessity of life as to their end. For this reason, first of all, we must cut off all pleasures which stand in the way of honorable good, or prevent some present or future duty from being fulfilled. Moreover, one must act not on account of pleasure itself, but on account of an honorable, necessary, or truly useful end. Thus, with respect to food and drink, it is lawful to take whatever is necessary or truly useful for preserving life and health, and also for rightly performing the operations of the mind. And the same must be said of other pleasures.

(b) But the second rule, which is more perfect, demands that those pleasures be cut off which do not serve the good of the soul; for example, that only so much food and drink be taken as is fitting for exercising virtues; and therefore that one abstain from food and drink insofar as this is necessary for taming the body and its vicious propensities: "They that are Christ's have crucified their flesh, with the vices and concupiscences."²

² Gal. 5:24.

Augustine hands down both rules thus: "Therefore the temperate man has, in mortal and fleeting things of this kind, a rule of life confirmed by both Testaments, that he love none of them, think none of them to be sought for its own sake, but use them for the necessity of this life and of duties, insofar as is enough, with the modesty of one using, not with the affection of one loving."³ - And elsewhere: "For hunger and thirst are certain pains; they burn and, like a fever, kill, unless the medicine of nourishment comes to their aid. Since this medicine is at hand from the consolation of Thy gifts, in which earth and water and heaven serve our infirmity, calamity is called delights. This hast Thou taught me, that I should approach food to be taken as medicines are taken. But while I pass to the quiet of satiety from the trouble of need, in that very passage the snare of concupiscence lies in wait for me... These temptations I strive daily to resist, and I invoke Thy right hand for my salvation."⁴

³ St. Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae, l. I, c. 21, n. 39, P. L., XXXII, 1328.

⁴ St. Augustine, Confessions, l. X, c. 31, P. L., XXXII, 797.

1077. 3. The species of temperance. Temperance, insofar as it preserves moderation in food, is called abstinence; insofar as it preserves the same in drink, it is called sobriety; but insofar as it does this in venereal matters, it is named chastity; to this is referred pudicity, the guardian of chastity, which moderates pleasures in kisses, touches, and embraces.⁵ - To abstinence is opposed gluttony; to sobriety, drunkenness; to chastity, lust. Concerning the first two vices we have already spoken above, n. 538-555; concerning lust, the treatment will be given in the Treatise on Chastity.

⁵ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 143, a. un.

1078. Temperance properly so called is concerned with sensible pleasures; but to it are annexed virtues which restrain even spiritual pleasures. Among these are counted: humility, which moderates the interior movements of hope and boldness; meekness, which restrains the movements of anger tending to revenge; modesty, which moderates bodily movements.⁶

⁶ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 143, a. un. There also the holy Doctor counts continence, which restrains the interior movements of carnal concupiscence; but this belongs to chastity, concerning which elsewhere.

1079. (A) The genuine concept. Humility is a virtue which checks the inordinate appetite for one's own excellence, and inclines a man to acknowledge his own lowliness according to truth.

³ St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, ch. 4-7; Olier, Introduction, ch. 5; the pious author of the work Formation a l'humilite, Paris, 1902.

(a) I say according to truth; for there are some who think humility consists in fictitiously exaggerating our defects, or diminishing our endowments, and in fleeing every honor and glory. This indeed is false; for true virtue cannot be an enemy of truth. It does indeed repress the inordinate appetite for one's own excellence, according to what was said above, n. 514; but it by no means forbids us gladly to acknowledge the natural and supernatural goods which God has bestowed on us: to be unwilling to acknowledge them is not humility, but ingratitude. - Nor likewise is it forbidden to seek some honor or glory, provided it be sought with God, according to His good pleasure and according to our merits. Thus Christ said of Himself:⁸ "I have glorified Thee on the earth... And now glorify Thou Me, O Father, with Thyself, with the glory which I had, before the world was, with Thee." Nor otherwise did the Blessed Virgin say:⁹ "For behold from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed, because He that is mighty hath done great things to me." Paul indeed says: "Let no man therefore glory in men";¹⁰ but before this he had said: "He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord";¹¹ and he himself expected the crown of justice "which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day."¹²

⁸ John 17:4-5.

⁹ Luke 1:48-49.

¹⁰ 1 Cor. 3:22.

¹¹ 1 Cor. 1:31.

¹² 2 Tim. 4:8.

1080. (b) But in order that we may estimate ourselves and our endowments according to truth, to God first of all must be attributed whatever proceeds from Him. Now the Apostle testifies that all natural and supernatural endowments which are in us are from God:¹³ "What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received?" - We do indeed have good works and merits; but these must be attributed primarily to God, although they are truly ours, since we have existence, faculties, the power of meriting, and the divine help necessary for merit only from the Lord; therefore concerning these we can glory only in the Lord, and the chief part of the glory must be rendered back to God. - Moreover we have sinned, and under this title we deserve ignominy and confusion before God and men.

¹³ 1 Cor. 4:7.

1081. (c) If we compare ourselves with our neighbor, we ought first to admire and esteem the gifts, both natural and supernatural, granted to him by God: if greater gifts are seen in him than in us, we ought gladly to acknowledge his superiority. Furthermore, if he has committed lesser sins than we have, he is worthy of lesser ignominy, and under this title it is necessary to confess that we ourselves are inferior. But because we are prone to magnify our own endowments and to diminish the qualities of others, equity demands that we guard ourselves in our judgments against this unjust propensity. Nor must this be passed over: often there are hidden defects in us and hidden qualities in others, so that it is not lawful, on account of manifest things alone, to prefer oneself to others; therefore the neighbor is wisely presumed to be better than he appears: "In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves."¹⁴

¹⁴ Phil. 2:3.

To the point Augustine says:¹⁵ "This also must be considered, that there is no man who cannot have some good which thou dost not yet have, even if it lies hidden, in which without doubt he can be superior to thee. This thought avails for crushing and taming pride, lest thou think that, because certain goods of thine stand out and appear, therefore another has none hidden, and perhaps goods of greater weight by which, while thou dost not know it, he surpasses thee."

¹⁵ St. Augustine, Quaestiones 83, q. 71, n. 5, P. L., XL, 82.

1082. (B) Concerning the chief acts of humility. (a) The humble man acknowledges himself to be nothing before God: for just as a little drop of water is said to be nothing when compared with the ocean, so our being, compared with the divine, can be held as nothing: "All nations are before Him as if they had no being at all, and are counted to Him as nothing, and vanity."¹⁶ Moreover he confesses that whatever good is in him ultimately proceeds from God, in the sense explained above, n. 1080.

¹⁶ Isa. 40:17.

(b) He further confesses himself to be a sinner, and under this title to be worthy of contempt, especially if he has sinned lethally (above, n. 463).

(c) He judges himself unworthy of all the gifts of God, and of himself unfit for every good work, especially supernatural work. For since by sin he has offended God, he has incurred His wrath and indignation, and therefore is unworthy of His benefits. On the other hand, by his own powers, without divine concurrence, he can do nothing good, especially in the supernatural order, according to that saying:¹⁷ "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God."

¹⁷ 2 Cor. 3:5; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 161, a. 6, ad 1.

1083. (d) He is not puffed up in prosperity, nor cast down in adversities; for he knows that prosperous events, and also adverse ones, are wisely ordered by God according to His good pleasure, and do not ultimately depend on us. Wherefore with all his powers he indeed strives to act well, so as to please God: if things turn out prosperously, he returns praises to God; if unfortunately, he patiently bears the humiliation taken from this: "I know both how to be humbled, I know also how to abound..."¹⁸ "In all things we suffer tribulation, but are not distressed; we are straitened, but are not destitute; we suffer persecution, but are not forsaken; we are cast down, but we perish not."¹⁹ Indeed he receives humiliations gladly, as means for obtaining grace and glory from God: "And do ye all insinuate humility one to another; because God resisteth the proud, but to the humble He giveth grace. Be you humbled therefore under the mighty hand of God, that He may exalt you in the time of visitation; casting all your solicitude upon Him, for He hath care of you."²⁰

¹⁸ Phil. 4:12.

¹⁹ 2 Cor. 4:8-9.

²⁰ 1 Pet. 5:5-7.

1084. (e) Wherefore, impelled by love of truth, he does not desire to be made great or to be praised by others, judging that this belongs not to himself but to God, from whom all good things proceed: for a picture or statue does not deserve praise, but the artist. Therefore if he sees himself honored by others, he does not keep the honor for himself, but refers it to God, to whom alone are honor and glory: "Not to us, O Lord, not to us; but to Thy name give glory."¹ - Where the will of God and an undertaken duty do not demand the contrary, he flees honors and chooses the lowest place. For Christ taught this by word and example:² "The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them; and they that have power over them are called beneficent. But you not so: but he that is the greater among you, let him become as the younger; and he that is the leader, as he that serveth. For which is greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? Is not he that sitteth at table? But I am in the midst of you as he that serveth." When, by force of office and duty, he must receive honors, he is not puffed up by them, but receives them as one bearing the place of God.

¹ Ps. 113:1.

² Luke 22:25-27; cf. John 13:15-16; Matt. 23:12.

(f) Indeed, since he is conscious of his own lowliness and of the sins which he has committed, he sincerely desires, as far as lies in him, to be despised by others; for he desires to be esteemed by others as he knows himself to be according to truth. Yet prudence often demands that we not disclose our defects to others, lest perhaps we lose that good esteem which we need for rightly fulfilling our duties.

1085. (g) The saints, comparing themselves with others, generally judge themselves more vile and worse than all; for this is the character of humility, to look in ourselves upon the defects which proceed from us, and in others upon the endowments which are from God. Wherefore they leave the better things to others, but seek the baser things for themselves. - Yet the truly humble man generally does not vilify himself by words, nor deliberately seek to be vilified by others; but he is silent concerning himself, loving to be unknown and to be counted as nothing. Besides, as St. Thomas says,³ "in the exterior acts of humility, as also in the acts of the other virtues, due moderation must be employed, lest they be able to turn to the detriment of another."

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 161, a. 3, ad 3.

1086. (C) Concerning the excellence of humility. (a) Some so extol humility that they seem to prefer it to the other virtues. This, however, is not agreeable to truth. For certainly the theological virtues, by which we tend directly to God, are more excellent; more excellent is the virtue of religion, by which we profess the excellence of God and render Him due worship. It is also commonly taught that prudence is more excellent than humility, because it is more universal and necessary. But it seems more excellent than the other moral virtues. For humility subjects man to the order of reason and to the divine law with respect to all things, while other virtues do so only with respect to some special matter;⁴ for he who is humble by that very fact gladly acknowledges the supreme dominion of God, and is prepared to obey Him in all things. Moreover it is of no little profit for the practice of the theological virtues, because it removes pride, which most harms these virtues.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 161, a. 5.

(b) In truth humility is deservedly held as the foundation of many virtues, their mother and nurse, insofar as it is necessary for acquiring and retaining them.

To the point Augustine says:⁵ "Dost thou wish to be great? Begin from the least. Dost thou think to construct a great building of height? First think of the foundation of humility. And how great a mass of building each one wills and disposes to place above, the greater the building will be, the deeper he digs the foundation... But because the summit is great, think of the foundation. What foundation, thou askest? Learn from Him, because He is meek and humble of heart. Dig this foundation of humility in thyself, and thou shalt come to the summit of charity." - For he who cultivates humility renounces inordinate love of self, which is the greatest impediment of Christian perfection; he easily subjects his mind to God through faith, charity, and obedience; and, since he judges himself inferior to others, he cultivates love toward the neighbor without difficulty; the same can be said of many other virtues.

⁵ St. Augustine, Sermo 69, n. 2, P. L., XXXVIII, 441 sq.

Therefore it is of the greatest importance to cultivate humility assiduously, either by taming pride through the means explained above, n. 519, or by eliciting the acts described above, n. 1082.

1087. Meekness is a virtue which moderates anger according to right reason. It is born from humility and fortitude: for since the chief cause of anger is inordinate love of oneself, bearing with difficulty injuries received from others, he is easily meek who humbly acknowledges that he is worthy of many injuries on account of the sins which he has committed. On the other hand, for restraining anger, the greatest fortitude is required.

⁶ St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, ch. 8-9; Olier, op. cit., ch. 10.

(A) Meekness tempers anger especially in two ways: (a) it forbids us to be angry without sufficient cause; for anger is ordered to repelling evil, and therefore it is lawful only insofar as it is necessary for repelling some evil; (b) it prevents anger, when it is legitimate, from passing beyond just limits, lest, for example, it arise too quickly or last too long, or exceed as to mode.

But the perfectly meek not only temper anger, but generally abstain from it, even when it is otherwise legitimate. Christ indeed counsels this when He says:⁷ "But I say to you not to resist evil; but if one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other. And if a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him."

⁷ Matt. 5:39.

Concerning the means of restraining anger, and therefore of acquiring meekness, we have already spoken, n. 534-537.

1088. (B) Akin to this virtue is clemency, which inclines superiors to mitigate the punishment owed to offenders, insofar as justice permits, and therefore to spare when it is fitting. It arises from meekness and from a certain sweetness of affection, by which one recoils from everything that can sadden another;⁸ yet they differ from each other, insofar as clemency moderates exterior punishment, while meekness properly diminishes the passion of anger.⁹ To clemency are opposed cruelty and, by abuse, excessive leniency.

⁸ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 157, a. 2.

⁹ St. Thomas, ibid., a. 1.

1089. (A) Definition. Modesty is a virtue inclining man to preserve decorum in exterior things. - For man's exterior movements must be composed according to reason, insofar as they are subject to the command of the will; likewise clothing and bodily adornment ought to be ordered according to the laws of honorableness. The virtue of modesty performs both; the Greeks call it eutaxia and eutrapelia.

1090. (B) Various acts. (a) Therefore modesty first tempers the exterior movements of the body, so that nothing unbecoming is done.

The pagans wrote many things on this matter; among them Cicero:¹⁰ "Let posture, gait, sitting, reclining, countenance, eyes, and movement of the hands preserve that decorum. In these matters two things are especially to be fled: lest anything be effeminate or soft, and lest anything be harsh or rustic... Cleanliness is also to be employed, not offensive, nor too exquisite, only such as avoids boorish and inhuman negligence... The same rule must be observed in dress, in which, as in most things, moderation is best. But one must beware lest we use softer slownesses in walking... or in haste assume excessive swiftnesses, for when these happen the breath is moved, faces change, mouths are twisted, from which there is a great sign that constancy is not present... But in the voice let us follow two things, that it be clear, that it be pleasant."

¹⁰ Cicero, De officiis, I, 35-37.

Sacred writers likewise observe that from a man's exterior bearing his character is manifested:¹¹ "By the sight a man is known, and by the meeting of the countenance a sensible man is known; the attire of the body and the laughter of the teeth and the gait of a man declare concerning him."

¹¹ Eccli. 19:26-27.

But the Fathers hand down minute rules of modesty; among them St. Ambrose:¹² "Even in movement itself, gesture, and gait, modesty must be kept. For the habit of the mind is seen in the state of the body. Hence the hidden man of our heart is judged either lighter, or more boastful, or more troubled, or on the contrary more grave and constant and purer and more mature... There is also an approved gait, in which there is an appearance of authority and the weight of gravity, the trace of tranquility, yet in such a way that effort and affectation be absent, and the movement be pure and simple; for nothing feigned pleases... The voice itself should not be slack, not broken, sounding nothing feminine, such as many have been accustomed to imitate under the appearance of gravity, but preserving a certain form and rule and masculine substance. For this is to hold the beauty of living: to render to each sex and person what is fitting. This is the best order of gestures, this adornment accommodated to every action. But as I do not approve a somewhat soft and broken sound of voice or gesture of body, so neither do I approve what is boorish and rustic. Let us imitate nature: her image is the formula of discipline, the form of honorableness."

¹² St. Ambrose, De officiis, l. I, c. 18-19, P. L., XVI, 44-49.

In one word, in all movements of the body, whatever savors of affectation or rusticity must be avoided.

1091. (b) Modesty also moderates games, which are done for relaxing the mind.¹³ For since man, who for a long time applies himself to works, especially intellectual ones, is accustomed to experience fatigue, by which he is made unfit for labor, it is necessary that he restore his powers through rest and play. Yet in this some moderation is required, so that every excess may be avoided: first, whatever is base or harmful must be avoided; then, what is unbecoming in mode; nor must time be spent in prolonged games which ought to be spent on necessary things; likewise there are games which befit laymen, but not priests. Now the virtue which tempers these excesses is modesty, or eutrapely. Against it sin not only those who exceed, but also those who, unwilling ever to play, show themselves morose and difficult.

¹³ St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, ch. 31-32.

1092. (c) Finally modesty regards clothing and bodily adornment, and tends to this, that exterior equipment correspond to the person according to sex, state, place, time, and other circumstances of this kind. Thus those who are placed in dignities, or are richer, are clothed in more costly garments than others.

In this matter one sins by excess when adornment is beyond one's condition or received custom; when too much care and time are spent in adorning oneself, as happens to not a few women and to certain effeminate youths; when costly garments are deliberately worn for the sake of ostentation, on account of vain glory, for catching eyes and exciting admiration.

Yet garments should be clean, neat, and, according to each one's condition, decently and elegantly composed.¹

¹ St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, ch. 25.

On this occasion, it is asked whether it is lawful for women to adorn themselves so as to please men. - It is certainly unlawful to use lascivious adornment, which provokes others to lust: "And if indeed they adorn themselves with this intention, that they provoke others to concupiscence, they sin mortally; but if from a certain levity, or even from a certain vanity on account of a certain boasting, it is not always mortal sin, but sometimes venial."² - This intention being excluded, it is lawful for wives to adorn themselves so that they may please their husbands, and so foster conjugal love; the same is lawful for marriageable girls, so that they may more easily find a spouse. But those women who do not have husbands, nor wish to have them, cannot without sin desire to please men and to excite their concupiscence, since this is nothing other than to offer them an incentive to sin.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 2.

But some sin by defect, neglecting the care of the body, so that they give weariness or scandal to others; this is more unbecoming among those who, by force of office or duty, ought to enjoy the good esteem of others.

Therefore Christian men and women should cultivate simplicity and decorum at the same time, according to their state, not unmindful of these words of the Apostle:³ "In like manner women also in decent apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety, and not with plaited hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly attire; but as it becometh women professing godliness, with good works."

³ 1 Tim. 2:9.

1093. Let these few things concerning the cardinal virtues suffice for our purpose. If inquiry is made concerning their relative perfection, with St. Thomas⁴ we answer: "Among the other (that is, moral) virtues, prudence is the greatest, because it is the moderator of the others; and after this, justice, through which man is well disposed not only in himself, but toward another; and after this, fortitude, through which man, on account of good, despises dangers of death; and after this, temperance, through which man, on account of good, despises the greatest pleasures of bodily things." - Besides, since virtues of this kind are connected among themselves (n. 591), he who becomes perfect in one, by that very fact makes progress in the others; and thus the ascent from virtue to virtue is made easier.

⁴ St. Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae, De virtutibus, q. 5, a. 3.