Article I: On the Integral Parts

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 48 and 49.

23. There are eight principal parts of prudence required for its perfect act, of which five pertain to prudence insofar as it is cognitive, namely memory of past things, understanding of present things, docility, shrewdness, reason; and three insofar as it is preceptive: foresight, circumspection, and caution. This can be shown as follows:

For prudence there is required:

A. insofar as it is cognitive: a) right cognition of things to be done, namely 1. memory of past things; and 2. understanding of present things; b) acquisition of cognition, for which there is necessary 3. docility for learning from others; and 4. shrewdness or sagacity, that is, one's own and swift conjecturing for the discovery of means; c) use of cognition, namely 5. reason, which from known things judges unknown things.

B. insofar as it is preceptive, there is required: 6. foresight, by which it orders what according to itself befits the end; 7. circumspection, by which it orders what according to circumstances befits the end; and 8. caution, by which it orders what befits the end against extrinsic impediments.

1. Lessius notes that not all proceed from diverse habits. Caution, circumspection, foresight, and understanding are acts of prudence, because they are intrinsically included in prudent judgment and execution; memory, reason, docility, and shrewdness are only required for acquiring prudence, or for the perfection of acquired prudence.

24. Insofar as it is cognitive, five things are required for prudence:

a) right cognition of particular and contingent operable things, namely,

1. recollection or memory of past things (souvenir du passé; herinnering), especially of those things which someone has experienced: for concerning contingent operable things we can be directed only from those things which ordinarily and in the majority of cases happen; but these things we do not know except by experience (q. 49, a. 1); "whence from past things we must take, as it were, an argument concerning future things, and therefore memory of past things is necessary for taking counsel well concerning future things" (ad 3); likewise

2. understanding or right cognition of present things (sens du présent; begrip, doorzicht, verstandigheid), whether of necessary things (that is, universal principles) or of contingent things, especially of the particular thing presently to be done (a. 2);

b) acquisition of cognition, which

3. happens from others by learning through discipline; to receive this, docility (docilité d'esprit; leerzaamheid) is required: for "particular operable things, in which there are, as it were, infinite diversities, cannot all be sufficiently considered by one man, nor within a brief time, but through length of time. Whence in those things which pertain to prudence, man especially needs to be instructed by others, and chiefly by the aged... (nor is there anyone who suffices for himself in all things, ad 3) ...But this pertains to docility, that someone be receptive of discipline in a good way" (a. 3);

4. likewise it happens through one's own discovery, to which sagacity or shrewdness pertains (promptitude de l'esprit; vlugheid, scherpzinnigheid, vindingsvermogen), that is, good conjecturing, especially for the discovery of means, chiefly where one must act unexpectedly (a. 4). For example, "when someone, seeing certain persons made friends, by conjecturing thinks that they are enemies of the same man" (ad 1);

c) use of cognition, namely,

5. reason (raison déductive; goede redeneering), that is, good reasoning, which from all the aforesaid known things rightly proceeds to knowing and judging other things (a. 5).

1. Or otherwise, according to Tully. Three things are required for prudence: 1. foresight of future things, to which circumspection and caution pertain; 2. understanding of present things, to which reason, docility, and shrewdness look; 3. memory of past things (q. 48, ad 1).

2. Hence it is clear that those who have many experiences are generally more prudent than those who do not have so long an experience.

3. This perspicacity occurs from natural aptitude and also from exercise.

25. Three things, moreover, are required by prudence insofar as it is preceptive, by applying cognition to the work:

a) that, by looking ahead into the future, it may rightly order what according to itself befits the due end, and this is done by

1. foresight (prévoyance; vooruitzicht), which regards "contingent future things insofar as they are orderable to the end of human life," and "imports... a certain respect of something distant, to which those things which occur in the present are to be ordered" (a. 6). But solicitude (zorgvuldigheid) pertains to foresight of future things (q. 48, ad 5);

b) that it attend to the circumstances of the affair, which can render it evil or inopportune, and this is done by

2. circumspection (omzichtigheid): "Because prudence is concerned with singular operable things in which many things concur, it happens that something considered according to itself is good and suitable to the end, which nevertheless from certain concurrent things is rendered either evil or not opportune for the end: just as to show signs of love to someone, considered according to itself, seems suitable for alluring his soul to love; but if pride or a suspicion of flattery should happen in his soul, this will not be suitable for the end. And therefore circumspection is necessary for prudence, namely so that man compare that which is ordered to the end with those things which surround it" (a. 7), in which there is a special difficulty (ad 3);

c) that it avoid extrinsic impediments which can impede the good, and this is

3. caution (précaution; behoedzaamheid), for example, lest damage be incurred, such as adverse health, lest the neighbor be offended, lest one be exposed to an occasion of sin, etc. (a. 8).

2. Foresight is the principal part of prudence (I, q. 22, a. 1). Cajetan explains how it agrees with prudence, how it does not agree, how it is a part of prudence, and how it is prudence itself. Several understand foresight to be mere cognition of future events, but this is not according to the mind of St. Thomas.

26. Observation. - If the act is of great moment, it will not be perfectly prudent unless all the aforesaid conditions are present.