Just and sinful anger

Anger is the inordinate appetite for revenge.

Revenge is the infliction of pain in satisfaction for an injury. As private individuals we are not allowed to avenge injuries which have been done us: “To no man rendering evil for evil. . . . Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath, for it is written: Revenge to me; I will repay, saith the Lord.¹ Sometimes, however, in trivial matters the immediate punishment of an injury is allowed to private persons, in order to prevent a recurrence of the injustice, or under circumstances in which such an action is really an act of self-defence. In other cases private revenge is not allowed, but belongs to those whose duty it is to correct delinquents and to avenge outraged justice. Anger, then, will be inordinate whenever revenge is sought without just cause, or more severe than the cause requires, or when private vengeance is indulged in, or when it is sought merely to satisfy hatred and spite. In these cases anger is of itself a grave sin because it is against justice and charity; if there be merely want of moderation in the manner of seeking or executing lawful vengeance, the sin will be venial.

¹ Rom. xii 17.

To be angry in moderation for a just cause is not sinful: “ Be angry, and sin not.”¹ Sin may even be committed through defect of anger, as when a parent or superior is never moved to anger against the faults of children or subjects, but permits them to go unpunished to their loss and the public inconvenience.

¹ Eph. iv 26.

The daughters of anger, or the sins which spring from the same root, are indignation and the swelling of passion, blasphemy, imprecation, quarrelling, and contumely; fighting, sedition, striking, and wounding; which are for the most part treated of in other chapters, or present no difficulty.

Contumely is an insulting word or gesture said or done in order to dishonour our neighbour. It is against charity, and of itself is a mortal sin except when the matter is trivial. A superior may, however, with moderation and caution treat a subject contumeliously, not in order to dishonour him, but to correct or humble him. Chaffing another about his foibles for the sake of recreation is not sinful unless it goes too far and provokes to anger or cuts too deep.

I. Notion. Anger is the inordinate appetite of vengeance. It is opposed to meekness. According to St. Thomas (II-II, q. 158, aa. 2 and 3), the inordinateness can be: 1. on the part of the object, as if you desire vengeance plainly unjust, or greater than is just, or to be inflicted by private authority, or to be inflicted from hatred, and not for the due end of preserving justice and correcting fault; 2. on the part of the manner of becoming angry, when someone either inwardly blazes up too much or outwardly discloses anger too much (St. Alphonsus, V, 79). "If vengeance is desired ordinately, it is not the sin of anger: as when superiors are angry at the faults of subjects, and punish or avenge them" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

II. Morality. 1. Anger inordinate on the part of the object is mortal from its genus; this is clear first from Sacred Scripture, according to which anger excludes from heaven;¹ then from the fact that it is opposed to charity or even to justice (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, V, 79).

2. Anger inordinate on the part of the manner is venial, as is every inordinate use of a licit thing. "It can nevertheless become mortal by accident, as if blasphemy or cursing is added" (St. Alphonsus, cited place; St. Thomas, cited place).

¹ Gal. 5:20-21. The printed note at this point appears to be misplaced; the Peter/Luke citations printed near the same marker belong to the following remedy on Christ's meekness.

III. The daughters of anger are:

1. In the heart: indignation; and swelling of mind, by which someone morosely devises diverse ways of vengeance and by these thoughts swells up his soul.

2. In the mouth: shouting, insult, blasphemy, cursing.

3. In deed: quarrel and fights (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 7; St. Alphonsus, V, 80-83).

IV. Remedies of anger: 1. Consider the meekness of Christ.¹ 2. Weigh that you almost always repent of what you have said or done when angry.² 3. Accustom yourself to resist at once the rising movement, and abstain from acting and speaking until anger has cooled.³

¹ 1 Pet. 2:23; Luke 23:34; Matt. 11:29.

² Hence the saying: An angry man, when he has returned to himself, is angry with himself.

³ Cf. Sweens, Theologia moralis fundamentalis, n. 979.

The predominant individual motives for sin are as numerous as the different characters of those addicted to sin, and hence it is impossible to classify them. The predominant general motives for sin, on the contrary, can be assigned according to the principal goods that most often move or repel with wills of all who commit sin, as follows: (a) goods of the soul, such as praise and honor, inordinately pursued (the vice of pride); (b) goods of the body, inordinately desired (the views of lust and gluttony); (c) goods that are external, unduly loved (the vice of avarice); (d) one’s own good, not sufficiently wished (the vice of sloth); (e) the neighbor’s good, not suffiviently desired (the vices of envy and anger).

Causes of Fighting.—The remedy of sinful fighting is the removal of its causes. The sources of fighting are proximate and remote.

(a) The immediate cause is anger. The angry man provokes fights (Prov., xv. 18, xxix. 22), for anger, being a desire of revenge, is not content to injure another secretly, but wishes to punish him—that is, to injure him in such a Way that he will know he is being punished and will feel grief on that account. Anger also blinds one to the foolishness of one’s actions, and so leads one precipitately into quarrels and fights (Prov., xviii. 6).

(b) The remote cause of fighting is an inordinate desire of temporal things, such as wealth, power, ease: “Why are there wars and disputes among you? Is it not because of the desires that war among your members?” (James, iv. 1). Those who are overmuch concerned with their own interests, easily take offense at what they consider slights or insults or opposition, their rage bursts forth, and they proceed at once to visit revenge on those at whom they are offended. It was greed and envy that caused the herdsmen of Palestine to fill up the wells dug by Isaac and to fight with his servants for possession (Gen., xxvi. 14 sqq.).

The Causes of Contumely.—(a) Pride is sometimes a cause, inasmuch as those who consider themselves better than others are quick to express the contempt they feel for others, if they hope that this will add to their own glory (Prov., xi. 2). But a proud person will just as often disdain to revile those whom he despises.

(b) Foolishness (see 1621) is sometimes a cause of contumely, for the foolish man speaks without thinking as he should or without caring what damage his words may cause (Prov., xx. 3). Hence, those who speak abusively to others merely in order to raise a laugh among the bystanders, little caring about the disrespect they show, cannot excuse themselves on the plea that it was all a joke.

(c) Anger is the usual cause of contumely, for the angry man seeks to show his revenge in some open and manifest way, and there is no easier or more ready means to this end than bitter, scornful or jeering words. Hence the danger of contumelious reprimands given by superiors. The subject will be enraged by the hard names applied to him, and the superior in his wrath will easily go to extremes, even of mortal sin, on account of the language he uses (e.g., exaggerated invective) or on account of circumstances (e.g., the scandal given).

Anger.—Anger is sinful when it deviates from reason, as to its matter or its manner.

(a) Thus, it is unreasonable as to its matter (i.e., its vengeance) when it punishes unjustifiably (e.g., when the person punished is innocent, when the penalty is excessive, when the legal order is not followed, when the motive is not justice or correction, but hatred, etc).

(b) It is unreasonable as to its manner (i.e., the degree of excitement felt or shown) when temper goes beyond measure. Great anger is not sinful when a great evil calls for it (e.g., the anger of Our Lord against the money-changers in John, vi. 14 sqq.; that of Mathathias against the idolatrous Jew in I Mach., ii. 24); but to fly into a rage at nothings or trifles is sinful.

Gravity of the Sin of Anger.—(a) If anger is sinful on account of its matter, it is mortal from its nature as being opposed to charity and justice. He that is angry against his brother is worthy of hell fire (Matt., v. 21, 22). It may be venial, however, on account of imperfection of the act (e.g., the sudden impulse to strike down those who do not agree with one’s opinions) or the lightness of the matter (e.g., a slap or push or box on the ears given a naughty child when a word of reproof would have sufficed).

(b) If anger is sinful on account of its manner, it is venial from its nature; for excess in an otherwise indifferent passion is not a serious disorder (see 2450). But the sin may be mortal by reason of circumstances, as when an angry person acts like a wild man, curses and swears, breaks the furniture, gives serious scandal on account of his position, or the time or place, or injures his health by the violence of his paroxysm.

Is Anger a Graver Sin than Hatred and Envy?—(a) As to its matter, anger is less grave than hatred and envy, for it pursues evil under the guise of spiritual good, pretending at least that the harm it intends is just, whereas hatred and envy pursue evil precisely as it is injurious to another, or as it is a means to one’s own temporal and external good or glory. Likewise, anger is less grave objectively than concupiscence, for the voluptuous man aims at utility or pleasure, whereas the revengeful man aims at what he makes believe is just.

(b) As to its manner, anger surpasses the vices mentioned in certain of its violent manifestations. The infuriated man, when crossed, creates a scene and makes a fool of himself; his blood boils, his face is flushed, his eyes dart fire, he froths at the mouth and trembles, he pounds, stamps and bellows like an enraged bull.

Anger as One of the Seven Capital Vices.—(a) It has a certain preeminence in evil. Its matter is quite attractive, for revenge is sweet and the cloak of just retaliation makes it seem good; its manner is powerful, for it drives one on to dare even the most shocking crimes.

(b) It is the spring of many sins. In the heart anger produces indignation against the object of displeasure, whom the angry man looks upon as base and unworthy, and soreness about the treatment of self, which fills the mind with plans of revenge. Sins of the mouth due to anger are incoherent cries of rage, words of contumely and blasphemy (Matt., v. 22), while its sinful deeds include quarrels and every kind of injury.

What are the acts of the will which consist in the pursuit of good and in flight from evil? - These acts of the will can be distinguished according as the passions of the sensitive appetite, to which they correspond, are distinguished. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. Now the passions are: love, to which hatred is opposed; desire or concupiscence, to which flight or abomination is opposed; delight, to which sadness is opposed; hope, to which despair is opposed; daring, to which fear is opposed; finally anger, which has no opposite.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. The first three are passions of the concupiscible; the four latter are passions of the irascible. Love is the simple complacency of good, which proceeds from the connaturality and coaptation of the one appetizing with regard to the thing suitable to him. Dilection adds to love a preceding election; charity adds to love a certain perfection, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price. One love is of friendship, another of concupiscence. For to love is to will good to someone. Toward that good which someone wills to someone there is love of concupiscence. Toward that to which someone wills good there is love of friendship. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 26.

Hatred is the simple displeasure and detestation of evil, which arises from a certain dissonance of the appetite toward that which is apprehended as repugnant and harmful. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 29. One hatred is of abomination, another of enmity. The former is the detestation of some evil of a person; the latter is also the detestation of the person himself, to whom one wills evil. Concupiscence or desire is the movement of the appetite into an absent good. Flight or abomination is the detestation of an absent evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30.

Delight is a certain repose of the appetite from the presence of a delighting good. Sadness is a certain pain from the presence of evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31, 35. Hope is the movement of the appetite into a future good, arduous, possible to obtain, and according to this possibility or impossibility hope differs from despair. Hence it is that hope imports a certain approach to an arduous good; despair, on the contrary, imports withdrawal from it. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 40. a. 1, 4. "Fear flees future harm because of its victory over the one fearing; but daring attacks imminent danger because of its victory over the danger itself." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1. For fear "does not regard evil absolutely, but with a certain difficulty or arduousness, so that it can scarcely be resisted." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 41. a. 2 ad 3. "According to the opposition of good and evil, fear is contrary to hope; according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, daring is contrary to fear, but despair to hope." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1 ad 3.

Anger is the appetite of vengeance, as possible to itself. It seeks evil itself under the notion of vindictive justice. Hence it regards one object according to the notion of good, namely the vengeance which it seeks, and another according to the notion of evil, namely the harmful man, against whom it wills to be avenged through the infliction of punishment. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 46. a. 2, 6. It has no contrary either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the opposition of good and evil. For it is a movement toward attacking the injurious evil already lying upon one. Hence neither can there be a movement toward fleeing evil; nor can there be a movement toward good: for when this has been obtained, there is repose and joy of the appetite. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. a. 3.

What is anger? Anger is an inordinate appetite of revenge.

This disorder can occur in two ways: 1. On the part of the mode of being angry, as, for example, if you are too much inflamed inwardly, or outwardly reveal anger too much through signs. - 2. On the part of the object, as, if you desire revenge for a cause plainly unjust, or greater than is just, e.g., by wishing death to an enemy who has not deserved it, or revenge to be executed by one's own authority, or finally, although the revenge is just, nevertheless you do not desire it as just, but as satisfying your malevolent mind. If revenge is desired in an ordered way, there is no sin of anger, as when superiors are angry at the faults of subjects, and punish them, or avenge them. Anger inordinate in the first way mentioned before is from its genus a venial sin; nevertheless it can become mortal by accident, on account of the violation of another virtue, e.g., religion, piety, charity, etc., as if blasphemy, malediction, or scandal is added; and also, if a movement of the soul of this sort is truly vehement and deliberate. Anger inordinate in the second way is from its genus mortal, because it is directly against charity and justice, Gal. 5:20. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 88, a. 5 ad 1; 2. 2. q. 108, 158; L. 79.

What are the daughters of anger? - Some are from the heart: 1. Indignation, which is an inordinate affection from the fact that someone reckons himself treated unworthily by such a person. It is commonly venial. Indeed, if it proceeds from a just judgment of reason, it is nothing. Nevertheless it could be mortal if it increased up to deliberate hatred and grave contempt of the person. 2. Swelling of mind, by which someone morosely thinks out diverse ways of revenge, and by those thoughts puffs up his mind. What kind of sin it is must be judged from the quality of the revenge which is thought out. - Some are in the mouth: 1. Shouting, when an angry person raises his voice, pouring forth many things inordinately and confusedly. It is commonly venial, unless something else is added. 2. Blasphemy against God, and it is mortal. 3. Contumely against men, by which someone casts some evil upon his neighbor, with the intention of dishonoring him. 4. Malediction, by which someone wishes and imprecates evil upon another, under the account of evil. - Some are in deed, as quarrels, fights, seditions, wounds. "Quarrels, by which are understood all harms which are inflicted in deed on neighbors from anger." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 158, a. 7. When "someone intends to harm another, with the latter knowing and resisting, this is imported under the name of quarrel." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 42, a. 1. Quarrels, if they do not exceed measure, as also slight fights, are venial; otherwise, if they progress to seditions, wounds, killings. And these are commonly mortal sins on the part of the one beginning the quarrel; for the other can defend himself with the moderation of blameless defense. L. 80, 83; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 40, 41, 42.

Contumely: From its genus it is mortal. It is only venial if it is small, or only material without the mind of dishonoring, provided that no notable injury to the neighbor's honor follows. And thus many parents are excused at least from mortal sin when they call their children asses, etc.; likewise women, children, and men of the lowest sort, burdening one another with insults, because, since credit is not given to them, honor is not gravely injured. Nor indeed is it a sin if it is done with the mind of correcting, humbling, or for another reason. And thus a superior can cast forth some word otherwise contumelious. Yet in this one can sin if the mode of due correction is exceeded, or the subject is more gravely dishonored than he deserved. Likewise, if for the sake of a joke, through fitting recreation, light defects are cast forth, it is pleasantness, according to S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 2, provided the other is not saddened, nor moved to anger. Contumely is also done by deed, both indirectly, as if you trample or burn the image or letters of another, etc., and directly, as if you beat an honorable man with a club, set horns at his door, or represent something which injures the honor of another.

To this belongs mocking, derision, and ridicule, when it is done by signs, as by wrinkling the nose, stretching out the lips, etc., intending the neighbor's confusion; and if this is grave, or at least the neighbor is gravely saddened by it, they are mortal. - Concerning these things note that one who has injured another's honor by contumely is bound to restore it, even if reputation has not been injured. But this can be done either through an honorable and friendly greeting, or an invitation to table, or a petition for pardon, sometimes even on bended knees and before witnesses, according as the injury was grave. It is not necessary to explain in confession the varied quality of mortal contumely. L. 81, 82. "Malediction, of which we now speak, is that by which evil is pronounced against someone either by commanding or by wishing. But to will, or by command to move toward, the evil of another, according to itself repugns to charity, by which we love our neighbor; and so according to its genus it is a mortal sin, and so much the graver, the more we are bound to love and revere the person whom we curse.... Nevertheless it happens that a word of malediction uttered is a venial sin, either because of the smallness of the evil which one imprecates upon another by cursing, or also because of the affection of the one who utters the words of malediction, while from a light movement, or jest, or from some surreption, he utters such words, because sins of words are weighed especially from the affection." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 76, a. 3; L. 83.

531. 3. The malice of anger. (A) Concerning anger considered in itself. To judge concerning its gravity, one must distinguish between anger insofar as it is a passion, and anger which is an appetite for vengeance.

(a) Anger, insofar as it is an inordinate movement of the irascible appetite, is a sin venial from its kind. For this anger is not inordinate except in the mode, insofar as someone blazes up beyond what the matter deserves, or more often than is fitting; now an inordination which touches only the mode of acting is not grave of itself.

Nevertheless the excess can be so great that it becomes a mortal sin, when someone deliberately grows too ardently heated within, or outwardly manifests signs of anger, so that he loses the peace of soul, or gravely offends his neighbor. Yet often unexpected movements of anger, even more vehement ones, are excused from mortal sin, because they are not sufficiently deliberate.

532. (b) Anger, insofar as it is an inordinate appetite for vengeance, is a sin mortal from its kind. For it is opposed to charity, and sometimes to justice, namely when he concerning whom we wish to take vengeance is truly innocent; now each virtue obliges under grave obligation, as is explicitly taught where these virtues are treated. Here it is enough to report the words of the Master:³ "But I say to you, that everyone who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment; but he who shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be liable to the council; and he who shall say, Fool, shall be liable to the gehenna of fire." For there he is affirmed worthy of grave punishment who is inwardly angry against his neighbor, or manifests inward anger by grave insults.

³ Matt. 5:22.

Yet not rarely even the appetite for vengeance is excused from grave sin, either on the part of the one desiring, for example when the movement of anger precedes the mature judgment of the intellect, or on the part of the object, when someone seeks to vindicate himself in some slight matter.

533. (B) But if anger is considered in its effects, it is the graver in proportion as the effects are worse.

(a) When it is carried to the extreme, it introduces many grave evils, which Seneca describes:¹ "You will see murders and poisons, mutual filth of accused men, destructions of cities, and ruins of whole peoples, and the heads of princes sold under the civil spear, and torches set under roofs, and fires not confined within walls, but immense spaces of regions gleaming with hostile flame... Look upon so many leaders handed down to memory: one anger stabbed in his bedroom; another anger struck among the sacred things of the table; another it tore to pieces amid the laws and the crowded spectacle of the forum; another it ordered to give his blood by the parricide of his son..." Yet generally anger does not indulge these unspeakable crimes.

¹ De Ira, lib. I, n. 2.

(b) Nevertheless it often brings after itself other effects, which Gregory describes:² through anger wisdom is lost, because the mind, vehemently moved, is soon clouded, and can scarcely know what is to be done and in what order; - the grace of social life is lost, because he acts inhumanely who does not temper by human reason the movement of anger, and thence concord is broken; - justice is abandoned: for while the troubled mind embitters the judgment of its reason, it thinks everything which fury suggests to be right; - grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit are excluded: for since he resides only in a quiet soul, by expelling the quiet of mind, we close our soul to the Holy Spirit.

² St. Gregory, Moral., l. c., P. L., 724.

S. Th. II-II, q. 158 and 159.

1036. Two sins are opposed to meekness: irascibility primarily and by defect; secondarily and by excess, lack of anger, by which someone does not stir up anger which he needs for fulfilling an office of justice or charity to which he is bound, for example, to correct, chastise, beat back the contumacious. This is not distinguished in malice from the omission itself of the office, and is not evil except insofar as in it the omission of the due action is judged to be willed.

1037. Irascibility (irascibilite; grammoedigheid) is the inordinate appetite of vengeance. - To be angry of itself is not evil: for anger properly is a passion of the irascible appetite, and passions as such are not evil. Yet a passion can be evil: a) from the object or according to species, as envy from its object is evil, which is sadness concerning another's good, which in itself is repugnant to reason: in this way anger is not evil of itself, since its object, vengeance, can be sought well or badly; b) from the mode, if it rises up more or less than reason dictates: in this way anger is evil, if it abounds more than reason dictates, or even if, when reason dictates, it is deficient. Hence anger is good and praiseworthy, provided both according to the mode of reason and legitimate vengeance are sought, for example, that another be corrected, that the order of justice be preserved, that reason execute justice more strongly, that others be deterred, etc.: then it is called zeal (anger through zeal); on the contrary, it is evil if illegitimate vengeance is sought, or if in legitimate vengeance the mode of reason is passed over (anger through vice). Hence irascibility is rightly defined: an inordinate appetite of vengeance.

1038. Anger (colere; gramschap) can be evil in two ways:

1. On the part of the object: a) by seeking unjust vengeance upon him who did not deserve it, or beyond what he deserved; b) by seeking vengeance not according to legitimate order, but to be executed by one's own authority; c) by seeking it not for the due end, which is the conservation of justice and the correction of fault, but, for example, from hatred as satisfying one's own evil soul, or intending rather the extermination of the sinner than the abolition of the sin. This anger from its genus is mortal, because it is contrary to charity and justice; yet it can be venial, not only from indeliberation, but also from lightness of matter, when one seeks to avenge himself in some small matter, for example, if he pulls a boy a little by the hair or by the ear, or something of this sort.

2. On the part of the mode, anger is evil if it is too burning interiorly, or is manifested too much exteriorly. This of itself is venial; nevertheless it becomes mortal because of an effect prohibited under grave obligation, such as scandal, blasphemy, notable harm to health, etc. But let it be noted that anger is not necessarily inordinate because it is great, but because it is too great; hence a vehement motion of anger is good provided it is required by right reason or conformed to it, for example, if it is proportioned to the quality of the fault, to the condition of the sinner, and to other circumstances. Hence even Christ was moved by grave anger when he cast the merchants out of the temple.

1039. Gravity of anger. - Anger is a capital vice, as was said in the treatise on sins, I, n. 510. Yet it is not the gravest of sins.

For:

1. According to itself and on the part of the appetible object, "anger seems to be the least of sins." Because a) it is a lesser sin than hatred and envy: "on the part of the evil which it seeks, anger agrees with those sins which seek the evil of neighbor, as with envy and hatred; but hatred seeks the evil of another absolutely insofar as it is such, while the envious man seeks the evil of another on account of the appetite of his own glory; but the angry man seeks the evil of another under the account of just vengeance." But "it is worse to seek evil under the account of evil than under the account of good; and it is worse to seek evil under the account of an exterior good, which is honor or glory, than under the account of the rectitude of justice." Therefore it is clear that hatred is graver than envy, and envy than anger. And b) on this side, "the sin of anger also seems to be less than (the sin) of concupiscence, insofar as the good of justice, which the angry man seeks, is better than the pleasurable or useful good which the concupiscent man seeks" (a. 4).

2. But on the part of the mode of becoming angry, anger has a certain special disorder and excellence before those vices, because of the vehemence and swiftness of its motion (a. 4). And under this respect three species of irascibility are distinguished: a) of those suddenly becoming angry and from any slight cause: it is bilious anger, which pertains to the sharp; b) of those remaining in anger and sadness from too much retained memory of an injury inflicted: it is mania, which is called madness, and is found among the grave and bitter; c) of the obstinate, who do not cease from anger unless they complete vengeance: it is fury, which pertains to the difficult and grave, who seek vengeance with an obstinate appetite and do not dismiss anger until they punish.

1040. Vices opposed to clemency. - Clemency mediates between cruelty and excessive mildness. Cruelty is an atrocity of soul in exacting punishments and exceeds the mode in punishing. Mildness contrary to reason mitigates or remits due punishments.

Cruelty (cruaute; wreedaardigheid) is the vice by which punishments are exacted beyond measure from austerity of soul: the excess of punishments externally pertains to injustice, but according to the affection of soul by which one is ready to increase punishments it pertains to cruelty. Therefore this supposes true or usurped authority in the one punishing, and guilt in him who is punished. But if either condition were lacking, there would be ferocity or savagery, which intends to torture innocent men, and takes pleasure in the torment and pains of men.

Excessive mildness (overdreven zachtheid) is a vice equally pernicious to the commonwealth as cruelty, by which punishment is mitigated or altogether remitted contrary to the dictate of reason, when the welfare of the delinquent or the example of others requires just severity. This enervates discipline, and leaves vices unpunished, and disturbs the peace of good citizens.

Anger is thus described by D. Bonaventure in the third place cited, p. p. Centil. sect. 20, and in the Declaratorium terminorum Theologiae from Cassiodorus: Anger is an agitated movement of the soul, provoking the infliction of punishment. By Rabanus: Anger is every evil movement of the soul to do harm. From Augustine: Anger is sadness arising from the impotence of taking revenge. From Damascene, lib. 2 de fide cap. 16: Anger is the fervor of the blood about the heart, from the ebullition of bile, or from a disturbance striking. From the same: Anger is that which is bold, the avenger of injured concupiscence. From the same: Anger is the desire of vengeance. From Aristotle, 2 Rhet. lib. 2 cap. 2: Anger is the appetite of contrary pain, on account of an apparent examination: and the appetite of inflicting pain on one who opposes oneself, on account of an injury apparently inflicted: which in a certain manner examines, in that, by a due order, it deprives man as regards the judgment of the soul.

From some of these descriptions it is gathered that anger can exist without sin, but according to reason, as D. Thomas teaches, quaest. 156, art. 2. It is proved by that Psalm 4: Be angry, and sin not — whatever Cassian, in the lib. de Institutione Religiosorum cap. 6, and others may say.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure, in 3 d. 15, quaest. ult., because holy zeal for vengeance is with anger; but this can be in the Saints, and it was in Christ, Mark 11, Luke 19, when he cast out the buyers and sellers from the temple. This is called anger through zeal according to the order of reason, as D. Thomas also says.

Secondly, to detest evil and to be angry at evil are the same; and both are good.

Third, because the irascible power was given by God for being angry: therefore it is good.

Hence he concludes that anger can be good, insofar as it signifies an affect of detestation, and could be found in Adam in the state of innocence. And if a disturbance of sense is added besides, it could have been, and was, in Christ, yet without disturbance of mind. Thus it is said: He groaned in spirit and troubled himself, John 11. It is also repeated in the just, with some disturbance of mind, through zeal; of whom D. Gregory says, lib. 5 moral. cap. 35, and lib. 1 cap. 31: Whence the mind, when disturbed, profits, so that it may become clear; as the eye, when a collyrium is applied, is for a time disturbed, that afterwards it may be made clearer.

But truly a disturbance deviating from reason, tending to vengeance, is a vice.

I assert, therefore, that this anger is a vice opposed to meekness. So S. Bonaventure, LL. CC.

It is proved by Job 5: Anger slayeth the foolish man, where D. Gregory, lib. 5 moral. cap. 35: Anger through vice blinds the eye of the mind; anger through zeal disturbs it. It is thus defined by Damascene: the avenger of injured concupiscence.

The Saintly Doctor shows, loc. cit. Centil., why it is opposed to meekness; for the meek man neither wishes to begin to be disturbed toward anger immoderately. He shows that anger the vice differs from anger through zeal by reason of matter; for they are concerned with the same matter, namely with the person whom both wish to punish; but anger the vice wishes the person to be punished, so that vengeance upon the person be sated. Anger through zeal seeks vengeance upon the person, that the vice in the person may be destroyed. It is opposed also to patience, he says, by reason of the end, because patience extinguishes anger, lest it proceed; for he that is patient mitigates stirreth up angers, as Solomon testifies, Proverbs 15.

Hence the inordinateness of anger is apparent from the vengeance which it seeks, not according to reason; for it wills punishment unto the destruction of the person, and therefore either one which he did not deserve, or above his merit, or not according to the right order, and not according to the due end, which is the preservation of justice and the correction of fault; as, on the contrary, zeal seeks in an ordered way.

Secondly, in which anger the vice is discerned, is that within, and often also outwardly, it boils over immoderately. Hence there arise, as it were, species of Anger, from Damascene, lib. 2 de fide ort. cap. 16: the bilious passion, which is a sudden movement of the soul, impatient of injury, and it happens on the part of the body from the commotion of the bile, and on the part of the soul from the corruption of the irascible power; and then the bile is moved to vengeance, that sadness may be expelled. This anger quickly passes. Secondly, Mania, that is, lasting anger. Thirdly, Cotus, which is anger observing the time for vengeance. And this Aristotle means, 4 Eth. cap. 5, teaching that some of the irascible are sharp and sudden, some bitter and persistent, some difficult, who watch for occasions of vengeance; nearly the same has Nyssenus, lib. 4 de viribus animae, cap. 13.

Six daughters are reported of this impious mother: Rixa (Brawling), which is the bold will of avenging proceeding in injury done. Tumor mentis (Swelling of mind), which is the will of avenging fleeing the adversary on account of estimated enmities. Contumelia (Contumely), which is the will of avenging fleeing the adversary on account of estimated enmities. Contumelia (Contumely), which is the vindicating will through the upbraiding of evils. Clamor (Clamour), which is the act of the avenging will, exalting the voice through vituperation, coming to the ears of others. Indignatio (Indignation), which is the will avenging itself through a sign of annoyance outwardly declared. Blasphemia (Blasphemy), which is the will avenging itself through opprobrium inflicted upon God or the Saints. Or, according to Isidore, lib. in Deuter. cap. 16, there are three daughters of anger, namely homicide, clamour, and indignation; for vengeance is inflicted by homicide through the hand, by clamour through the mouth, and by indignation through a sign.

The same are indicated by S. Thomas, art. 2; Tannerus, d. 3, quaest. 3, dub. 7, num. 116.

Nevertheless anger is not altogether deadly, but only if grave vengeance is intended; the eruption outward into signs, or clamour, can be deadly per accidens, through scandal, or for another reason given above. Whence the Gloss on Psalm 4, from Cassiodorus: Anger is venial which is not carried through to effect. So far S. Thomas, art. 3, from the common opinion; D. Bonaventure, in speculo animae, cap. 3, from D. Gregory, lib. 5 moral. cap. 31, and from the Gloss of Cassiodorus in Pharetra, lib. 2, cap. 9.

I assert, thirdly, that Anger is a capital vice. It is evident from the daughters of Anger related above. Hence Proverbs 19: He that is apt to be angry shall be more prone to sin, and cap. 27: Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth, as the Saintly Doctor observes in Diaeta, tit. 1, cap. 5.

The daughters of Anger the Saintly Doctor there enumerates: Hatred, Contention, War, Conflagration, Homicide, Rapine, and many others.

Their birth the Saintly Doctor thus reviews in speculo animae, cap. 3: For it is considered as in the heart, and hence indignation and the murmur of the mind; or it breaks forth at the mouth, and behold clamour, blasphemy, contumely, etc. The will goes forth to works, and behold calumnies, injuries, etc.

Of anger the Saintly Doctor thus speaks in compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3, cap. 24: Anger in its genus is a mortal sin, because, according to Isidore, Anger is the mind agitated to the inflicting of provoked punishment. But such a movement is contrary to charity, which is not provoked, nor thinketh evil. Anger, therefore, either signifies the anger of zeal, which is the detestation of vice — and this is not sin, but of perfection.

One can also be angry at oneself in this manner, as the Gloss says upon that Psalm 4 text, Be angry, and sin not: What is a penitent man, but one angry with himself? Or it signifies a remission of affection toward one's neighbor, whereby a man neither grieves over his neighbor's evil, nor rejoices over his good — although he likewise does not grieve over his good, nor rejoice over his evil, but is indifferent toward him: but this is not mortal, but an imperfection of his charity. Or it signifies actual impatience without the appetite for vengeance; and such a movement, even deliberate, is a venial sin, because it has the incomplete nature of anger, as is evident from the definition cited. Or it signifies impatience with an appetite for vengeance; and this in three ways: sometimes it is from nature, as in melancholics, and thus it is no sin, since it is a natural movement; sometimes from an undeliberate appetite, and it is venial; sometimes from a deliberate will, and it is mortal.

The various kinds of anger, good and evil, the Saintly Doctor reviews in lib. 1 de profectu Relig. cap. 14. Of the nature of anger, its similitudes, effects, and harms, and remedies, wonderful things are those which the Saintly Doctor reviews in Diaeta, tit. 1, cap. 5, and de profectu Religiosi, lib. 1, cap. 30 and 31.

Christ distinguished anger according to three degrees, as it breaks forth in the heart: Whosoever is angry with his brother, Matthew 5; secondly, as it breaks forth into signs: Whosoever shall say, Raca; thirdly, into effects: Whosoever shall say, thou fool. This S. Doctor reports in Pharetra, lib. 2, cap. 9, from D. Gregory, 21 Moral. cap. 4, where he says: He who with subtle examination enumerates the steps of human actions, assigns anger without voice to judgment; anger in voice, to counsel; but anger both in voice and in speech, to the fires of gehenna. Here it is held that all these can be mortal, yet always the later ones graver, as D. Augustine also teaches, lib. 1 de Sermone Domini in monte, cap. 19, where he says: If it is not lawful to be angry with his brother without cause, or to say Raca, or to say thou fool; much less is it lawful to hold something in the mind, so that indignation be converted into hatred.

The same S. Augustine, rule 3, cap. 38: Better is he who, though often tempted by anger, yet hastens to obtain forgiveness from him to whom he acknowledges he has done an injury, than he who is slower to be angry, and slower to incline to asking pardon. Many other excellent things see in Pharetra with the Saintly Doctor, loc. cit.

Examples of anger in Scripture read in the Biblia pauperum, cap. 95, where of the anger of man through zeal, and cap. 96, where of the vice of anger. The Saintly Doctor warns in Confessionali, cap. 2, particula 4: the penitent is to be questioned about Anger, concerning those things in which he breaks forth outwardly into Anger by cursing, reviling, blaspheming, etc.

One must also note, with D. Bonaventure, in Pharetra, loc. cit., from D. Bernard, ep. 69, that there is also given a vice in the extreme opposite to anger, that is, not to be angry when one ought to be angry; for he says this is to be unwilling to amend sin; just as previously to be angry before one ought to be angry is to add sin to sin. The same has the Author of the Imperfect Work on Matthew, homil. 11, and D. Thomas, quaest. 158, art. 8, and Tannerus noted it, disp. 3, quaest. 3, dub. 7, num. 174, and others.