Question — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica
Question V: On anger
Anger is thus described by D. Bonaventure in the third place cited, p. p. Centil. sect. 20, and in the Declaratorium terminorum Theologiae from Cassiodorus: Anger is an agitated movement of the soul, provoking the infliction of punishment. By Rabanus: Anger is every evil movement of the soul to do harm. From Augustine: Anger is sadness arising from the impotence of taking revenge. From Damascene, lib. 2 de fide cap. 16: Anger is the fervor of the blood about the heart, from the ebullition of bile, or from a disturbance striking. From the same: Anger is that which is bold, the avenger of injured concupiscence. From the same: Anger is the desire of vengeance. From Aristotle, 2 Rhet. lib. 2 cap. 2: Anger is the appetite of contrary pain, on account of an apparent examination: and the appetite of inflicting pain on one who opposes oneself, on account of an injury apparently inflicted: which in a certain manner examines, in that, by a due order, it deprives man as regards the judgment of the soul.
De IRACUNDIA.
Ira sic describitur a D. Bonavent. in 3. loco citando, p. p. Centil. sect. 20. et in Declaratorio terminorum Theol. ex Cassiodoro : Ira est animi motus concitatus, ad poenam provocans inferendam. E Rabbano : Ira est omnis malus motus ad nocendum. Ex Augustino : Ira est tristitia ex impotentia ulciscendi. E Damasceno, lib. 2. fid. cap. 16. Ira est feruor eius, qui circa cor est, sanguinis ex evaporatione fellis, vel returbatione feriens. Ex eodem : Ira est, id quod est audax mentis vindex laesae concupiscentis. Ex eodem : Ira est desiderium repunitionis. Ex Aristotele, 2. Reth. lib. 2. cap. 2. Ira est appetitus contrary doloris, propter apparentem examinationem : et appetitus afferendi dolorem sibi adversanti, propter illatam iniuriam apparentem : quae quodammodo examinat, per hoc, quod debito ordine hominem quantum ad iudicium animae privat.
From some of these descriptions it is gathered that anger can exist without sin, but according to reason, as D. Thomas teaches, quaest. 156, art. 2. It is proved by that Psalm 4: Be angry, and sin not — whatever Cassian, in the lib. de Institutione Religiosorum cap. 6, and others may say.
Ex aliquibus harum descriptionibus colligitur, posse esse iram absque peccato, sed secundum rationem, ut docet D. Thom. quaest. 156. art. 2. Probatur ex illo Psal. 4. Irascimini, et nolite peccare : Quidquid Cassianus lib. de Instit. Relig. cap. 6. et alii dixerint.
It is proved by D. Bonaventure, in 3 d. 15, quaest. ult., because holy zeal for vengeance is with anger; but this can be in the Saints, and it was in Christ, Mark 11, Luke 19, when he cast out the buyers and sellers from the temple. This is called anger through zeal according to the order of reason, as D. Thomas also says.
Probatvr a D. Bonavent. in 3. d. 15. quaest. ult. quia Zelus sanctus vindictae est cum ira, hic autem potest esse in Sanctis, et fuit in Christo Marci 11. Lucae 19. cum eiecit ementes, et vendentes de templo. Haec dicitur ira per Zelum secundum ordinem rationis, ut ait etiam D. Thomas.
Secondly, to detest evil and to be angry at evil are the same; and both are good.
Secvndo, detestari malum, et irasci malo, sunt idem ; utrumque autem bonum est.
Third, because the irascible power was given by God for being angry: therefore it is good.
Tertio, quia irascibilis potentia est a Deo data ad irascendum : Ergo bona.
Hence he concludes that anger can be good, insofar as it signifies an affect of detestation, and could be found in Adam in the state of innocence. And if a disturbance of sense is added besides, it could have been, and was, in Christ, yet without disturbance of mind. Thus it is said: He groaned in spirit and troubled himself, John 11. It is also repeated in the just, with some disturbance of mind, through zeal; of whom D. Gregory says, lib. 5 moral. cap. 35, and lib. 1 cap. 31: Whence the mind, when disturbed, profits, so that it may become clear; as the eye, when a collyrium is applied, is for a time disturbed, that afterwards it may be made clearer.
Hinc concludit, Iram esse posse bonam, prout dicit affectum detestationis, et potuisse reperiri in Adam in statu innocentiae. Et si addatur etiam perturbatio sensus, potuisse esse, et fuisse in Christo, sine tamen perturbatione mentis. Sic dicitur : Infremuit spiritu, et turbavit se ipsum, Ioan. 11. Repetitur etiam in iustis cum aliqua perturbatione mentis per Zelum ; de quibus ait D. Gregor. lib. 5. moral. cap. 35. et lib. 1. cap. 31. Unde mens perturbata proficit, ut clarescat, sicut oculus per collyrium immissum, ad tempus turbatur, ut postmodum clarior efficiatur.
But truly a disturbance deviating from reason, tending to vengeance, is a vice.
Enim vero perturbatio a ratione devia tendens ad ultionem, est vitium.
I assert, therefore, that this anger is a vice opposed to meekness. So S. Bonaventure, LL. CC.
Assero igitur, hanc iram esse vitium oppositum mansuetudini. Ita S. Bonavent. LL. CC.
It is proved by Job 5: Anger slayeth the foolish man, where D. Gregory, lib. 5 moral. cap. 35: Anger through vice blinds the eye of the mind; anger through zeal disturbs it. It is thus defined by Damascene: the avenger of injured concupiscence.
Probatvr Iob 5. Virum stultum interficit Iracundia, ubi D. Gregor. lib. 5. moral. cap. 35. Ira per vitium oculum mentis caecat, ira per Zelum turbat. sic definitur a Damasceno : Vindex laesae concupiscentiae.
The Saintly Doctor shows, loc. cit. Centil., why it is opposed to meekness; for the meek man neither wishes to begin to be disturbed toward anger immoderately. He shows that anger the vice differs from anger through zeal by reason of matter; for they are concerned with the same matter, namely with the person whom both wish to punish; but anger the vice wishes the person to be punished, so that vengeance upon the person be sated. Anger through zeal seeks vengeance upon the person, that the vice in the person may be destroyed. It is opposed also to patience, he says, by reason of the end, because patience extinguishes anger, lest it proceed; for he that is patient mitigates stirreth up angers, as Solomon testifies, Proverbs 15.
Ostendit autem S. Doctor loc. cit. Centil. cur opponatur mansuetudini ; nam mansuetus, neque vult incipere perturbari ad iracundiam immoderate. Differte autem Iram vitium, ab ira per Zelum ratione materiae ostendit ; sunt enim circa eandem materiam, scilicet circa personam, quam utraque cupit puniri, sed ira vitium vult, ut persona puniatur, ut sic satietur vindicta personae. Ira per Zelum appetit vindictam in persona, ut destruatur vitium in persona. Opponi etiam patientiae, ait, ratione finis, quia patientia extinguit iram, ne procedat ; nam, qui patiens est, iras mitigat suscitatas, ut testatur Salomon. Proverb. 15.
Hence the inordinateness of anger is apparent from the vengeance which it seeks, not according to reason; for it wills punishment unto the destruction of the person, and therefore either one which he did not deserve, or above his merit, or not according to the right order, and not according to the due end, which is the preservation of justice and the correction of fault; as, on the contrary, zeal seeks in an ordered way.
Hinc appatet inordinatio irae ex vindicta, quam appetit, non secundum rationem, quia vult punitionem ad destructionem personae, et ideo vel quam non meruit, vel supra meritum, vel non secundum ordinem rectum, et non secundum debitum finem, qui est conservatio iustitiae, et correctio culpae ; sicuti e contra, Zelus ordinate appetit.
Secondly, in which anger the vice is discerned, is that within, and often also outwardly, it boils over immoderately. Hence there arise, as it were, species of Anger, from Damascene, lib. 2 de fide ort. cap. 16: the bilious passion, which is a sudden movement of the soul, impatient of injury, and it happens on the part of the body from the commotion of the bile, and on the part of the soul from the corruption of the irascible power; and then the bile is moved to vengeance, that sadness may be expelled. This anger quickly passes. Secondly, Mania, that is, lasting anger. Thirdly, Cotus, which is anger observing the time for vengeance. And this Aristotle means, 4 Eth. cap. 5, teaching that some of the irascible are sharp and sudden, some bitter and persistent, some difficult, who watch for occasions of vengeance; nearly the same has Nyssenus, lib. 4 de viribus animae, cap. 13.
Secvndvm, in quo dignoscitur ira, vitium est, quia interius, et saepe etiam extra immoderate feruescit. Hinc enim enascitur veluti species Irae ex Damascen. lib. 2. de fide ort. cap. 16. Fellea passio, quae est subitus animi motus, impatiens laesionis, et accidit ex parte corporis, ex commotione fellis ; et ex parte animae ex corruptione vis irascibilis, et tunc movetur fel ad vindictam, ut expellatur tristitia. Haec ira cito transit. Secundo Mania, id est, manens ira. Tertio Cotus, quae est ira observans tempus ad vindictam. Et hoc vult Aristoteles 4. Eth. cap. 5. docens iracundos quosdam esse acutos subitos, quosdam amaros pertinentes, quosdam difficiles, qui observant vindictae occasiones, eadem fere habet Nyss. lib. 4. de viribus animae, cap. 13.
Six daughters are reported of this impious mother: Rixa (Brawling), which is the bold will of avenging proceeding in injury done. Tumor mentis (Swelling of mind), which is the will of avenging fleeing the adversary on account of estimated enmities. Contumelia (Contumely), which is the will of avenging fleeing the adversary on account of estimated enmities. Contumelia (Contumely), which is the vindicating will through the upbraiding of evils. Clamor (Clamour), which is the act of the avenging will, exalting the voice through vituperation, coming to the ears of others. Indignatio (Indignation), which is the will avenging itself through a sign of annoyance outwardly declared. Blasphemia (Blasphemy), which is the will avenging itself through opprobrium inflicted upon God or the Saints. Or, according to Isidore, lib. in Deuter. cap. 16, there are three daughters of anger, namely homicide, clamour, and indignation; for vengeance is inflicted by homicide through the hand, by clamour through the mouth, and by indignation through a sign.
Hanc impiam matrem referunt sex filiae, Rixa, quae est audax vindicandi voluntas in iniuriam facti procedens. Tumor mentis, quae est voluntas vindicandi fugiens aduersantem propter aestimatas inimicitias : Contumelia, quae est voluntas vindicandi fugiens aduersantem propter aestimatas inimicitias : Contumelia, quae est voluntas vindicans per exprobrationem malorum. Clamor, qui est voluntatis ultricis actus, exaltando vocem per vituperium ad aliorum aures perveniens. Indignatio, quae est voluntas, se vindicans per signum molestiae exterius declaratum. Blasphemia, quae est voluntas se vindicans per opprobrium, Deo, vel Sanctis illatum. Vel secundum Isidorum lib. in Deuter. cap. 16. sunt tres filiae irae, scilicet homicidium, clamor, et indignatio ; nam vindicta infertur homicidio per manum, clamore per os, et indignatione per signum.
The same are indicated by S. Thomas, art. 2; Tannerus, d. 3, quaest. 3, dub. 7, num. 116.
Eadem indicant S. Thom. art. 2. Tannerus d. 3. quaest. 3. dub. 7. num. 116.
Nevertheless anger is not altogether deadly, but only if grave vengeance is intended; the eruption outward into signs, or clamour, can be deadly per accidens, through scandal, or for another reason given above. Whence the Gloss on Psalm 4, from Cassiodorus: Anger is venial which is not carried through to effect. So far S. Thomas, art. 3, from the common opinion; D. Bonaventure, in speculo animae, cap. 3, from D. Gregory, lib. 5 moral. cap. 31, and from the Gloss of Cassiodorus in Pharetra, lib. 2, cap. 9.
Non tamen omnino ira est mortifera, sed solum, si vindicta gravis intenditur ; eruptio vero ad extra signis, vel clamore, potest esse per accidens mortifera, per scandalum, vel alia ratione supra. Unde Glossa ad Psal. 4. e Cassiodoro, Venialis est ira, quae non perducitur ad effectum. Hactenus S. Thom. art. 3. ex communi sententia. D. Bonavent. in speculo animae, cap. 3. ex D. Gregorio lib. 5. moral. cap. 31. et ex Glossa Cassiodori in Pharetra, lib. 2. cap. 9.
I assert, thirdly, that Anger is a capital vice. It is evident from the daughters of Anger related above. Hence Proverbs 19: He that is apt to be angry shall be more prone to sin, and cap. 27: Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth, as the Saintly Doctor observes in Diaeta, tit. 1, cap. 5.
ASSERO tertio, Iram esse vitium capitale. Patet ex filiabus supra relatis Irae. Hinc Prov. 19. Qui ad indignandum facilis est, erit ad peccandum proclivior, et cap. 27. Ira non habet misericordiam, nec erumpens furor, ut observat S. Doctor in Diaeta, tit. 1. cap. 5.
The daughters of Anger the Saintly Doctor there enumerates: Hatred, Contention, War, Conflagration, Homicide, Rapine, and many others.
FILIAS Irae ibi numerat S. Doctor, Odium, Litem, Bellum, Incendium, Homicidium, Rapinam, et alias multas.
Their birth the Saintly Doctor thus reviews in speculo animae, cap. 3: For it is considered as in the heart, and hence indignation and the murmur of the mind; or it breaks forth at the mouth, and behold clamour, blasphemy, contumely, etc. The will goes forth to works, and behold calumnies, injuries, etc.
EARUM nativitatem sic recenset S. Doctor in speculo animae, cap. 3. Vel enim consideratur ut in corde, et hinc indignatio, et rumor mentis; aut erumpit ad os, et ecce clamor, blasphemia, contumelia, etc. Voluntas ad opera egreditur, et ecce calumniae, damnificationes, etc.
Of anger the Saintly Doctor thus speaks in compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3, cap. 24: Anger in its genus is a mortal sin, because, according to Isidore, Anger is the mind agitated to the inflicting of provoked punishment. But such a movement is contrary to charity, which is not provoked, nor thinketh evil. Anger, therefore, either signifies the anger of zeal, which is the detestation of vice — and this is not sin, but of perfection.
DE ira sic loquitur S. Doctor. in compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3. cap. 24. Ira ex suo genere est peccatum mortale, quia, secundum Isidorum, Ira est animus concitatus ad poenam provocanti inferendam. Talis autem motus contrariatur charitati, quae non irritatur, nec cogitat malum. Ira igitur vel dicit iram Zeli, quae est detestatio vitii, et haec non est peccatum, sed est perfectionis.
One can also be angry at oneself in this manner, as the Gloss says upon that Psalm 4 text, Be angry, and sin not: What is a penitent man, but one angry with himself? Or it signifies a remission of affection toward one's neighbor, whereby a man neither grieves over his neighbor's evil, nor rejoices over his good — although he likewise does not grieve over his good, nor rejoice over his evil, but is indifferent toward him: but this is not mortal, but an imperfection of his charity. Or it signifies actual impatience without the appetite for vengeance; and such a movement, even deliberate, is a venial sin, because it has the incomplete nature of anger, as is evident from the definition cited. Or it signifies impatience with an appetite for vengeance; and this in three ways: sometimes it is from nature, as in melancholics, and thus it is no sin, since it is a natural movement; sometimes from an undeliberate appetite, and it is venial; sometimes from a deliberate will, and it is mortal.
POTEST etiam quis sibi per hunc modum irasci, sicut dicit Glossa super illud, Psal. 4. Irascimini, et nolite peccare. Quid est homo poenitens, nisi irascens sibi? Vel dicit remissionem affectus circa proximum, per quem homo non dolet de malo proximi, nec gaudet de bono eius, licet etiam non doleat de bono, nec gaudeat de malo eius, sed est indifferens ei: At sic non est mortale, sed imperfectio eius charitatis. Vel dicit actualem impatientiam absque appetitu Vindictae, et talis motus etiam deliberatus est veniale peccatum, quia habet incompletam rationem irae, ut patet ex citata definitione. Vel dicit impatientiam cum appetitu vindictae; et hoc tripliciter; quandoque enim hoc a natura, ut in melancholicis, et sic nullum est peccatum, cum sit motus naturalis. Quandoque est ab appetitu indeliberato, et est veniale. Quandoque a voluntate deliberata, et est mortale.
The various kinds of anger, good and evil, the Saintly Doctor reviews in lib. 1 de profectu Relig. cap. 14. Of the nature of anger, its similitudes, effects, and harms, and remedies, wonderful things are those which the Saintly Doctor reviews in Diaeta, tit. 1, cap. 5, and de profectu Religiosi, lib. 1, cap. 30 and 31.
VARIA irae genera, bona, et mala recenset S. Doctor lib. 1. de profectu Relig. cap. 14. De irae natura, similitudinibus, effectibus, et damnis, remediisque, mira sunt, quae recenset S. Doctor in Diaeta, tit. 1. cap. 5. et de profectu Religiosi, lib. 1. cap. 30. et 31.
Christ distinguished anger according to three degrees, as it breaks forth in the heart: Whosoever is angry with his brother, Matthew 5; secondly, as it breaks forth into signs: Whosoever shall say, Raca; thirdly, into effects: Whosoever shall say, thou fool. This S. Doctor reports in Pharetra, lib. 2, cap. 9, from D. Gregory, 21 Moral. cap. 4, where he says: He who with subtle examination enumerates the steps of human actions, assigns anger without voice to judgment; anger in voice, to counsel; but anger both in voice and in speech, to the fires of gehenna. Here it is held that all these can be mortal, yet always the later ones graver, as D. Augustine also teaches, lib. 1 de Sermone Domini in monte, cap. 19, where he says: If it is not lawful to be angry with his brother without cause, or to say Raca, or to say thou fool; much less is it lawful to hold something in the mind, so that indignation be converted into hatred.
DISTINXIT Christus iram secundum tres gradus, prout erumpit in corde: Qui irascitur fratri suo, Matth. 5. Secundo pro ut erumpit in signa: Qui dixerit, Raca. Tertio in effectibus: Qui dixerit, fatue. Haec refert S. Doct. in Pharetra, lib. 2. cap. 9. ex D. Gregor. 21. Moral. cap. 4. ubi ait: Qui humanorum actuum subtili examine gressus enumerat, iram sine voce, iudicio; iram in voce, consilio; iram vero in voce, atque sermone, gehennae ignibus mancipat; Ubi habetur posse haec omnia esse mortalia, semper tamen posteriora esse graviora, ut docet etiam D. Augustinus lib. 1. de Serm. Domini in monte, cap. 19. ubi ait: Si irasci non est fas fratri suo sine causa, aut dicere Raca, aut dicere fatue: multo minus fas est in animo tenere aliquid, ut in odium indignatio convertatur.
The same S. Augustine, rule 3, cap. 38: Better is he who, though often tempted by anger, yet hastens to obtain forgiveness from him to whom he acknowledges he has done an injury, than he who is slower to be angry, and slower to incline to asking pardon. Many other excellent things see in Pharetra with the Saintly Doctor, loc. cit.
IDEM S. Augustinus regula 3. cap. 38. Melior est, qui quamvis ira saepe tentetur, tamen impetrare festinat ut sibi dimittat, cui se fecisse agnoscit iniuriam, quam qui tardius irascitur, et ad veniam petendam tardius inclinatur. Multa alia praeclara vide in Pharetra apud S. Doctorem loc. cit.
Examples of anger in Scripture read in the Biblia pauperum, cap. 95, where of the anger of man through zeal, and cap. 96, where of the vice of anger. The Saintly Doctor warns in Confessionali, cap. 2, particula 4: the penitent is to be questioned about Anger, concerning those things in which he breaks forth outwardly into Anger by cursing, reviling, blaspheming, etc.
EXEMPLA irae in scriptura lege in Bibl. pauperum, cap. 95. ubi de Ira hominis per Zelum, et cap. 96. ubi de irae vitio. Monet autem S. Doctor in Confessionali, cap. 2. particula 4. Interrogandum poenitentem de Ira, de his, quibus extra erumpit in Iram maledicendo, convitiando, blasphemando, etc.
One must also note, with D. Bonaventure, in Pharetra, loc. cit., from D. Bernard, ep. 69, that there is also given a vice in the extreme opposite to anger, that is, not to be angry when one ought to be angry; for he says this is to be unwilling to amend sin; just as previously to be angry before one ought to be angry is to add sin to sin. The same has the Author of the Imperfect Work on Matthew, homil. 11, and D. Thomas, quaest. 158, art. 8, and Tannerus noted it, disp. 3, quaest. 3, dub. 7, num. 174, and others.
OPORTET autem advertere cum D. Bonavent. in Pharetra, loc. cit. ex D. Bernardo ep. 69. dari etiam vitium in aliquo extremo oppositum irae, id est, non irasci, quando irascendum sit; hoc enim ait esse, nolle peccatum emendare; sicut prius irasci, quam irascendum sit, est peccatum peccato addere. Idem habet Author imperfecti in Matth. homil. 11. et D. Thom. quaest. 158. art. 8. et notavit Tannerus disp. 3. quaest. 3. dub. 7. num. 174. et alii.