Article II: On the Opposed Sins

S. Th. II-II, q. 158 and 159.

1036. Two sins are opposed to meekness: irascibility primarily and by defect; secondarily and by excess, lack of anger, by which someone does not stir up anger which he needs for fulfilling an office of justice or charity to which he is bound, for example, to correct, chastise, beat back the contumacious. This is not distinguished in malice from the omission itself of the office, and is not evil except insofar as in it the omission of the due action is judged to be willed.

1037. Irascibility (irascibilite; grammoedigheid) is the inordinate appetite of vengeance. - To be angry of itself is not evil: for anger properly is a passion of the irascible appetite, and passions as such are not evil. Yet a passion can be evil: a) from the object or according to species, as envy from its object is evil, which is sadness concerning another's good, which in itself is repugnant to reason: in this way anger is not evil of itself, since its object, vengeance, can be sought well or badly; b) from the mode, if it rises up more or less than reason dictates: in this way anger is evil, if it abounds more than reason dictates, or even if, when reason dictates, it is deficient. Hence anger is good and praiseworthy, provided both according to the mode of reason and legitimate vengeance are sought, for example, that another be corrected, that the order of justice be preserved, that reason execute justice more strongly, that others be deterred, etc.: then it is called zeal (anger through zeal); on the contrary, it is evil if illegitimate vengeance is sought, or if in legitimate vengeance the mode of reason is passed over (anger through vice). Hence irascibility is rightly defined: an inordinate appetite of vengeance.

1038. Anger (colere; gramschap) can be evil in two ways:

1. On the part of the object: a) by seeking unjust vengeance upon him who did not deserve it, or beyond what he deserved; b) by seeking vengeance not according to legitimate order, but to be executed by one's own authority; c) by seeking it not for the due end, which is the conservation of justice and the correction of fault, but, for example, from hatred as satisfying one's own evil soul, or intending rather the extermination of the sinner than the abolition of the sin. This anger from its genus is mortal, because it is contrary to charity and justice; yet it can be venial, not only from indeliberation, but also from lightness of matter, when one seeks to avenge himself in some small matter, for example, if he pulls a boy a little by the hair or by the ear, or something of this sort.

2. On the part of the mode, anger is evil if it is too burning interiorly, or is manifested too much exteriorly. This of itself is venial; nevertheless it becomes mortal because of an effect prohibited under grave obligation, such as scandal, blasphemy, notable harm to health, etc. But let it be noted that anger is not necessarily inordinate because it is great, but because it is too great; hence a vehement motion of anger is good provided it is required by right reason or conformed to it, for example, if it is proportioned to the quality of the fault, to the condition of the sinner, and to other circumstances. Hence even Christ was moved by grave anger when he cast the merchants out of the temple.

1039. Gravity of anger. - Anger is a capital vice, as was said in the treatise on sins, I, n. 510. Yet it is not the gravest of sins.

For:

1. According to itself and on the part of the appetible object, "anger seems to be the least of sins." Because a) it is a lesser sin than hatred and envy: "on the part of the evil which it seeks, anger agrees with those sins which seek the evil of neighbor, as with envy and hatred; but hatred seeks the evil of another absolutely insofar as it is such, while the envious man seeks the evil of another on account of the appetite of his own glory; but the angry man seeks the evil of another under the account of just vengeance." But "it is worse to seek evil under the account of evil than under the account of good; and it is worse to seek evil under the account of an exterior good, which is honor or glory, than under the account of the rectitude of justice." Therefore it is clear that hatred is graver than envy, and envy than anger. And b) on this side, "the sin of anger also seems to be less than (the sin) of concupiscence, insofar as the good of justice, which the angry man seeks, is better than the pleasurable or useful good which the concupiscent man seeks" (a. 4).

2. But on the part of the mode of becoming angry, anger has a certain special disorder and excellence before those vices, because of the vehemence and swiftness of its motion (a. 4). And under this respect three species of irascibility are distinguished: a) of those suddenly becoming angry and from any slight cause: it is bilious anger, which pertains to the sharp; b) of those remaining in anger and sadness from too much retained memory of an injury inflicted: it is mania, which is called madness, and is found among the grave and bitter; c) of the obstinate, who do not cease from anger unless they complete vengeance: it is fury, which pertains to the difficult and grave, who seek vengeance with an obstinate appetite and do not dismiss anger until they punish.

1040. Vices opposed to clemency. - Clemency mediates between cruelty and excessive mildness. Cruelty is an atrocity of soul in exacting punishments and exceeds the mode in punishing. Mildness contrary to reason mitigates or remits due punishments.

Cruelty (cruaute; wreedaardigheid) is the vice by which punishments are exacted beyond measure from austerity of soul: the excess of punishments externally pertains to injustice, but according to the affection of soul by which one is ready to increase punishments it pertains to cruelty. Therefore this supposes true or usurped authority in the one punishing, and guilt in him who is punished. But if either condition were lacking, there would be ferocity or savagery, which intends to torture innocent men, and takes pleasure in the torment and pains of men.

Excessive mildness (overdreven zachtheid) is a vice equally pernicious to the commonwealth as cruelty, by which punishment is mitigated or altogether remitted contrary to the dictate of reason, when the welfare of the delinquent or the example of others requires just severity. This enervates discipline, and leaves vices unpunished, and disturbs the peace of good citizens.