Listening to detraction

654. How he sins. 1. He who hears one detracting and does not impede the detraction which he can easily impede sins in a twofold way against charity: first, because he does not impede the sin of the detractor by correcting him; then because he does not avert evil from the defamed person. For anyone is bound from charity to avert evil from his neighbor if he conveniently can.

A superior also who hears detraction is bound to impede it from charity; but neither the superior of the one defaming nor the superior of the one defamed is bound to impede it from justice: not the superior of the one defaming, because he must only correct his subject, but not watch over the good of others; not the superior of the one defamed, because by reason of his office he must take care only of the spiritual good, not of the temporal good, of his subjects.

Therefore anyone, even a private person, in grave matter is of himself bound under grave obligation from charity to impede detraction; yet in order that to hear and not impede one detracting be a grave sin, it is required: a. that the other certainly and unjustly detract: for it can happen that there is present a just cause of narrating the vices of another, which cause must be supposed in a grave and God-fearing person; b. that there be certain hope of impeding the detraction: for it often happens that from correction the detractor is rather excited to increasing the detractions; c. that the detraction can be impeded without grave inconvenience. An inconvenience of this kind would be insults which he fears, or great shame which the one impeding the detraction must suffer.

Hence private persons are almost always excused from mortal sin if because of negligence, shame, or fear they do not impede detraction; and they are excused from every sin if they fear lest the detractor break forth into greater things or lest they themselves gravely offend him. A fortiori they lack every fault who, noticing the detraction, depart, turn the conversation elsewhere, or by some sign show that this speech displeases them: for by this reason they indirectly try to impede the detraction.

2. He who voluntarily hears a detractor in such a way that he rejoices over the defamation of his neighbor, yet does not cooperate toward his damage, sins against justice by affection, because he consents to the detractor and therefore commits the same sin by internal affection.

a. He who against his own will must be present among those detracting and cannot impede detraction, for example, servants serving at tables or ministering to clients in workshops, does not sin at all, provided he neither directly nor indirectly provokes detractions nor narrates what he has heard to others, unless they are public.

b. He who rejoices not over the detraction, but only over the mode of narrating or over the novelty of the matter, etc., morally does not sin, because these do not pertain to hatred nor to injustice, but at most to idleness and curiosity, which are only lightly evil.

3. He who directly or indirectly induces another to detract in grave matter, whether by provoking, questioning, or approving him, sins gravely against justice, because he provokes another to a sin against justice and thus is the cause of the damage which a third person suffers in reputation.

Yet he who privately fishes out another's crime from another without intention of divulging it does not seem to sin gravely, both because he does not gravely harm the reputation of the other, and because he acts more from curiosity than from the intention of injuring another.

If by listening to a detractor we encourage him to slander another, we are formal co-operators in his sin and are as guilty as the detractor himself. If our listening is not indeed the efficacious cause of the detraction, we do not sin against justice, but we sin against charity if we could prevent the detraction and do not do so. For charity obliges us, as we saw above, to correct an erring brother and to prevent harm being done to our neighbour as far as possible. It is true that private individuals will seldom be bound by a grave obligation in this matter; frequently they could not intervene without doing more harm than good; but those in authority are more frequently and more strictly bound to correct their subjects and to defend their reputation against slander.

I. He who positively influences detraction, for example by asking, laughing, or applauding, sins against justice. Yet sufficiently probably he sins only slightly who fishes out the crime of the neighbor without the intention of divulging it (n. 1069; St. Alphonsus, III, 979).

II. He who only internally rejoices over detraction sins against charity with respect to the defamed person; likewise with respect to the defamer, insofar as he omits fraternal correction in a case in which he is held to it (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

III. He who does not rejoice over detraction as such, but over the hearing of a new thing, or over curious knowledge of the crimes of others, or over the witty manner of narrating, or over the thing narrated as amusing, is excused at least from mortal sin (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

IV. He who does not impede detraction which he can easily impede sins against charity. But practically the obligation at least grave of positively impeding often is absent, "because in this matter of detraction it can be most difficult to establish that correction would be profitable, and from another source detractors corrected before others are very easily offended; indeed there is danger that they would rather increase or confirm the detraction. ... But according to all, those are excused even from venial sin who, noticing the detraction, either depart, or divert the conversation, or turn away the face or show it sad" (St. Alphonsus, III, 981). The contrary must be said about a Superior who does not impede detraction, namely:

1. The Superior of the defamer per se is held from charity, even more than others, to correct the subject; indeed even from justice, if he is the pastor, although he is not the Superior, or the Bishop of the defamer. But with respect to a defamer who is not a subject he is held no otherwise than others are.

2. The Superior of the defamed person likewise per se is held, even more than others, from charity to impede the evil of the subject; not, however, from justice, even if he is his pastor or Bishop, because from that virtue he is not held to attend to the temporal good of the subject (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

But what if the Superior has not impeded the detraction?

Response 1. The Superior of the defamer is held from charity to compel the subject to restore reputation; indeed from justice, if he is pastor or Bishop.

Response 2. The Superior of the defamed person likewise per se is held from charity to provide for the restitution of reputation; not, however, from justice, even if he is pastor or Bishop, because from that virtue he is not held to provide for the temporal good of the subject.

Response 3. If there is question of the Superior of both, and the defamed person implores the authority of the Superior, more probably he is held from justice to take care of the restitution of reputation, because in the case he seems to act as a judge, who from justice speaks the law (St. Alphonsus, III, 980).

393. 1. Those who induce others to detract, by inquiring concerning the defects of the neighbor, or by praising him in such a way that they move others to detraction, or by approving their narration, sin in the same way as those detracting themselves, not only against charity, but also against justice; for formally they cooperate with an unjust action; besides, they give scandal, by provoking others to sin.

2. Those who voluntarily rejoice concerning detraction, without nevertheless formally cooperating with it, sin against charity, because they rejoice concerning the evil of the neighbor; gravely, if they do this from hatred, envy, or revenge, or another motive of this kind, and otherwise the matter is grave; venially, if from curiosity, or from the mode of narrating, or from another lightly sinful motive.

394. 3. He who neither approves detraction, nor rejoices concerning it, but only does not impede it, sins against charity, unless he is excused by some reason, - both because he does not avert evil from the defamed person, and because he does not impede the sin of the detractor; but he does not injure justice, because he is not bound from justice to avert that twofold evil.

That obligation of impeding detraction chiefly lies upon superiors; since the superior of the one defaming ought to correct the detractor, and the superior of the one defamed ought to avert the evil of his subject; whence, other things being equal, superiors sin more gravely in this case than subjects or equals; yet not against justice, because by force of their office they ought to watch over the spiritual, not the temporal, good of subjects, and therefore they are not bound from strict justice to impede their defamation.

It was said unless he is excused by some reason; for there are those who do not sin even venially by not impeding detraction: (a) because they prudently foresee that every correction will be useless or even harmful, e.g., because the detractor is thereby stirred up to increase the detraction; (b) because a grave inconvenience is feared, e.g., quarrels, insults; (c) or because he does not dare to say anything, on account of reasonable shame.

In practice, nevertheless, one ought or at least it is expedient to manifest a certain displeasure, if possible, whether by departing, or especially by diverting the conversation to other things, as soon as the opportunity presents itself.

F. Nevertheless there is an obligation of charity to impede detraction as far as one can; nevertheless in practice this will rarely be grave. It will be grave if three conditions are verified: a) another is certainly detracting unjustly; b) there is a founded hope of impeding the detraction; c) this can be done without relatively grave inconvenience; which conditions are rarely present.

Often it will be more opportune to employ indirect means of impeding rather than direct ones, unless the matter concerns superiors who can intervene authoritatively.

433. Those cooperating in detraction, some directly consent to it, either because they induce the detractor to denigrate one's neighbor, or because they voluntarily rejoice over it; others indirectly, merely do not impede detraction.

1. Those who induce to detraction, by asking about the defects of one's neighbor, or by praising him in such a way that they move others to detract, or by approving their narration, sin in the same way as those who detract themselves: namely, against charity and against justice, and indeed externally; for they formally cooperate in an unjust action, and provide direct scandal, by provoking others to it. Whence they are bound to reparation in solidum with the detractor.

2. Those who internally rejoice over detraction, without themselves formally cooperating, sin not only against charity because they rejoice over the evil of one's neighbor, but also with an unjust affection, because they take complacency in the unjust action of detraction: gravely if they do it from hatred, envy, or vengeance and the matter is grave; lightly if from curiosity or concerning the manner of narrating, lightly sinful.

3. Those who merely do not impede detraction sin, unless they are excused by some reason, against charity alone, because they do not impede the evil of the defamed person, nor the sin of the detractor; not however against justice, because they are not bound from justice to avert that double evil. Thus especially superiors, who from justice or office are bound to correct subjects, nevertheless are not bound from justice, by force of their office, to watch over the reputation of others.

The obligation of impeding detraction is of itself grave in grave matter, unless some reason excuses. Nevertheless for mortal sin there is required: a) another certainly detracting unjustly; b) a founded hope of impeding detraction; c) without a relatively grave inconvenience, for example, of quarrel or insult.

Whence St. Alphonsus teaches: because in this matter it can be established with greatest difficulty that correction will profit, and on the other hand detractors corrected before others are very easily offended, the opinion excusing hearers ordinarily from mortal sin if they omit correction can reasonably be sustained. They are excused also from venial sin if, noticing the detraction, they depart or turn the conversation aside, etc., because these actions are true corrections. Nevertheless a superior is bound more strictly than a private man, because of the reasons adduced.

The obligation of impeding detraction can be fulfilled:

a) by restraining it through authority, if the hearer has it;

b) by correcting fraternally among equals;

c) by proving the falsehood if it can be done, or by otherwise bringing it about that faith is not given to the detractor;

d) by showing a sad countenance with displeasure or indignation, by turning the conversation to another thing, by reporting good things concerning the defamed person, by excusing him or interpreting him praiseworthily.

MARK with D. Bonaventure, loc. cit., that indirect detraction can be material and formal. It will be formal, if one keeps silent, e.g. with the end of blackening reputation. It will be material, if one keeps silent from mere omission once recognized.

Yet if one keeps silent from shame or fear, the Holy Doctor does not dare define it to be mortal, unless it is a person whose office it is to correct. For such a one is bound to restitution of the good whose loss he was bound to prevent.

He PROVES therefore there that to omit, or keep silent about a good, when it ought to be said, is mortal; for as we are bound to come to the aid of the poor in grave need with sustenance, so also are we bound in goods of reputation and honor.

The Doctors dispute much here on these words, about the causes excusing from not standing against murmuration; see Molina, Tomus 5, tract 4, disputation 34; Azorius p. 3, book 13, chapter 7; Aragon. 2. 2. question 63, article 4; Sayrus book 11, chapter 9, number 37; Lessius book 2, chapter 11, doubt 4, number 21; Reginaldus, Tomus 2, book 24, chapter 4, question 8, number 65; Peter Nauarre on restitution, book 2, chapter 4, number 337; Valentia disputation 5, question 17, p. 4; Salon. 2. 2. question 73, article 4; Soto book 5, question 10, article 4; Rebell. on the obligation of justice, p. 1, book 4, question 6; Malderus 2. 2, tract 7, chapter 1, doubt 15; Bonacina on contracts, disputation 2, question 4, p. 11, number 8; Bassaeus, s.v. Detractio.

Now they warn first, with those whom Diana follows, p. 1, tract 17, resolution 24, that in doubt whether that be detraction, we are not bound to oppose it, because it can be that he justly says it, and he is in possession of a good reputation, to which you do injury by treating him as a detractor.

By this doctrine confessors drive away many scruples from fearful men; hence Diana, part 2, tract 5, resolution 35, concludes absolutely that he who hears a detractor does not sin mortally. So too Crux in the Directorium, precept 8, question 2, article 2, doubt 5, who with one voice with D. Bonaventure, loc. cit., say: Whoever does not resist detraction out of fear, shame, negligence, or levity of mind, sins venially. Tanner subscribes, 2. 2. disputation 4, question 8, doubt 7, number 151, who with almost the same words of the Seraphic Doctor so resolved, with Bassaeus.

It is a sin against justice, if anyone directly approves even unjust detraction, or, worse, leads into it. Or it will be against charity, if anyone holds himself merely negatively, not impeding, unless he is bound by office either to correct the detractor or to defend another's reputation, namely because he is the superior of this or that one.

Commonly, however, not to repel detraction out of negligence, fear, or shame is held venial, unless the hearer is a superior, or perceives that grave loss will follow from the detraction, or the fear is so perverse that on its account one does not care to sin mortally. This alone seems contrary to the Seraphic Doctor, because knowingly and unwillingly, by saying that which justifies, he indirectly takes away its justification, against justice, and so is made subject to restitution together with detractors, as I said: although in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1, § the second branch of envy he seems to rank this sin with that of not coming to the aid of a neighbor in grave necessity, which seems against charity, though he says nothing of it here; indeed, as I said in the disputation on almsgiving, it seems to belong to justice.

Reginaldus follows the same opinion of Diana, Tomus 2, book 24, chapter 4, number 95, and Faber on restitution in 4, disputation 53, chapter 5, number 127.