Question V: Whether it is mortal to keep silent about another's good name when it is blackened

MARK with D. Bonaventure, loc. cit., that indirect detraction can be material and formal. It will be formal, if one keeps silent, e.g. with the end of blackening reputation. It will be material, if one keeps silent from mere omission once recognized.

Yet if one keeps silent from shame or fear, the Holy Doctor does not dare define it to be mortal, unless it is a person whose office it is to correct. For such a one is bound to restitution of the good whose loss he was bound to prevent.

He PROVES therefore there that to omit, or keep silent about a good, when it ought to be said, is mortal; for as we are bound to come to the aid of the poor in grave need with sustenance, so also are we bound in goods of reputation and honor.

The Doctors dispute much here on these words, about the causes excusing from not standing against murmuration; see Molina, Tomus 5, tract 4, disputation 34; Azorius p. 3, book 13, chapter 7; Aragon. 2. 2. question 63, article 4; Sayrus book 11, chapter 9, number 37; Lessius book 2, chapter 11, doubt 4, number 21; Reginaldus, Tomus 2, book 24, chapter 4, question 8, number 65; Peter Nauarre on restitution, book 2, chapter 4, number 337; Valentia disputation 5, question 17, p. 4; Salon. 2. 2. question 73, article 4; Soto book 5, question 10, article 4; Rebell. on the obligation of justice, p. 1, book 4, question 6; Malderus 2. 2, tract 7, chapter 1, doubt 15; Bonacina on contracts, disputation 2, question 4, p. 11, number 8; Bassaeus, s.v. Detractio.

Now they warn first, with those whom Diana follows, p. 1, tract 17, resolution 24, that in doubt whether that be detraction, we are not bound to oppose it, because it can be that he justly says it, and he is in possession of a good reputation, to which you do injury by treating him as a detractor.

By this doctrine confessors drive away many scruples from fearful men; hence Diana, part 2, tract 5, resolution 35, concludes absolutely that he who hears a detractor does not sin mortally. So too Crux in the Directorium, precept 8, question 2, article 2, doubt 5, who with one voice with D. Bonaventure, loc. cit., say: Whoever does not resist detraction out of fear, shame, negligence, or levity of mind, sins venially. Tanner subscribes, 2. 2. disputation 4, question 8, doubt 7, number 151, who with almost the same words of the Seraphic Doctor so resolved, with Bassaeus.

It is a sin against justice, if anyone directly approves even unjust detraction, or, worse, leads into it. Or it will be against charity, if anyone holds himself merely negatively, not impeding, unless he is bound by office either to correct the detractor or to defend another's reputation, namely because he is the superior of this or that one.

Commonly, however, not to repel detraction out of negligence, fear, or shame is held venial, unless the hearer is a superior, or perceives that grave loss will follow from the detraction, or the fear is so perverse that on its account one does not care to sin mortally. This alone seems contrary to the Seraphic Doctor, because knowingly and unwillingly, by saying that which justifies, he indirectly takes away its justification, against justice, and so is made subject to restitution together with detractors, as I said: although in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1, § the second branch of envy he seems to rank this sin with that of not coming to the aid of a neighbor in grave necessity, which seems against charity, though he says nothing of it here; indeed, as I said in the disputation on almsgiving, it seems to belong to justice.

Reginaldus follows the same opinion of Diana, Tomus 2, book 24, chapter 4, number 95, and Faber on restitution in 4, disputation 53, chapter 5, number 127.