Magnificence

I. Notion of Magnificence. By the force of the word, magnificence denotes doing something great. But to do can signify an immanent action, or a transitive action, that is, an action in an external thing (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 134, a. 2). Here it is taken in this last sense; therefore magnificence is very well defined: a moral virtue inclining man to execute great works with proportionate expenditures. It is said: to execute great works with proportionate expenditures: by these words it is indicated that it belongs to this virtue to preserve the mean of reason between the greatness of the works and the employment of expenditures.

II. Object of Magnificence. 1. The remote material object is great works insofar as they must be executed with great expenditures; but the proximate object is constituted by the actions by which these expenditures are distributed in the execution of great works.

2. The remote formal object is the reason of due proportion between great works and the expenditures to be applied to them; but the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in executing those great works with proportionate expenditures. For right reason dictates that, where great works must be done, abundant monies also be paid out for this end, as, for example, if churches, monasteries, or public buildings must be constructed (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 134, a. 1).

III. Opposed Vices. By defect there is opposed parvificence, by which someone pays out insufficient expenditures in relation to the greatness of the work, or makes a work not great enough (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 135, a. 1); by excess, consumption, by which someone pays out expenditures beyond his powers or makes a work too great (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 135, a. 2).

Greatness of Deed.—Greatness of deed is the execution of the great things to which one is inclined by greatness of soul.

(a) The virtue is a general one, if it includes every kind of noble performance; it is a special one, if restricted to princely generosity in the expenditure of large sums for great works (virtue of magnificence or munificence). The munificent person spends large sums from his purse in behalf of the worship of God (e.g., in building churches, monasteries, etc.), and for the common good (e.g., in founding schools, in endowing educational institutions, hospitals, etc.). This virtue resembles fortitude by the grandeur of its accomplishment; it falls short of fortitude, since it deals not with sacrifice of self but with sacrifice of goods. The Maecenases and the generous patrons of religion are among the greatest benefactors of humanity, for without them the best things would often languish for want of support.

(b) The vices opposed to this virtue are meanness by deficiency and vulgarity by excess. The mean man is unable to do things on a great scale, and prefers to ruin a noble work rather than make the proper outlay (e.g., after planning a beautiful church, he will spoil it by using cheap materials). The vulgar man, on the contrary, is avid for ostentation, or heavy expenditure when there is no call for it. He is liberal to works of less importance (e.g., his own usual personal needs or comforts), but penurious with works of great importance (e.g., charitable causes); or he lavishes money needlessly on great works, as when his residence is over-ornamented and offensive to good taste, or when his wedding breakfast is served with profuse extravagance and waste in order to make a display of wealth. Per se, these sins are venial, but they may be mortal on account of circumstances. Munificence is the virtue of the rich, but even the poor may have the merit of this virtue, by a good intention, especially when they show liberality to great enterprises according to their means.

What is fortitude, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Fortitude is the virtue which moderates and strengthens the soul against grave dangers, especially of death. - No precept per se of this virtue is given, but only by reason of some special precept to be fulfilled, e.g., even martyrdom to be undergone, lest faith be denied. But whether and when there is an obligation of observing the law even with danger to life was said in the treatise on Laws, and is explained in the individual treatises, when it is asked whether it is licit to do something at least to avoid death. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 140.

There is a twofold act of fortitude, to attack and to sustain: to attack distinguished and arduous things; to sustain adversities. For the act of attacking two things are required. The first is preparation of soul, namely that someone have a prompt soul for undertaking great things, which magnanimity provides. The other regards execution of the work, namely that someone not fall short in the execution of those things which he began magnanimously, which magnificence provides. For the act of sustaining two things also are required. The first is that by the difficulty of imminent evils the soul not be broken through sadness, and fall away from its greatness; and for this patience is posited, by which someone bears evils with an even soul, without disturbance of sadness. The other is that from long-lasting suffering of difficult things man not be wearied up to the point that he desists; and for this perseverance is posited.

R. To the second. These four virtues, magnanimity, magnificence, patience, perseverance, are integral parts of fortitude if they are concerned with dangers of death; but they are potential parts of fortitude if they are concerned with lesser dangers. But fortitude does not have subjective parts, because it is not divided into many virtues differing in species, since it concerns a very special matter, namely dangers of death, which are all of the same genus, although some are greater than others.

R. To the third. Timidity, fearlessness, and audacity are opposed to fortitude. Timidity is a vice exceeding in fearing; for it fears what one ought not, when one ought not, or more than one ought, whence one does not dare to attack when reason dictates, or as it dictates. If it stands in itself, it is a light sin; but if it impels to sin, it will be grave or light according to the condition of that to which it impels. - Fearlessness is a vice deficient in fearing; for one does not fear when he ought to fear, or the things that ought to be feared. It is not a sin distinct from that to whose danger someone exposes himself; for it is a sin only insofar as it is the cause of that, tacitly containing consent to that danger.

Audacity is that which rashly casts itself into dangers. Rashly, namely without just reason. It is a sin according to the account of the evil and danger to which one exposes himself.

Presumption, ambition, vainglory, pusillanimity are opposed to magnanimity. - Presumption is excessive confidence in one's own powers, by which it happens that someone undertakes something, or is prepared to undertake something, above his powers. It is a deadly sin when it occurs with danger or injury of another, as the presumption of a physician, judge, confessor; or when it proceeds from error against the faith, as the presumption of heretics. Outside these cases it is almost always a venial sin. Ambition is an inordinate appetite of honor, by desiring more honor than is fitting. It is a light sin, unless honor is desired either with injury and harm of another, or from a gravely illicit thing, or in a gravely illicit mode or end. Vainglory is desire of vain glory. Vain, if glory is sought from simulated excellence or reputation, if greater than is fitting, or from an illicit thing, or among those who cannot judge rightly about things, or by referring it to an undue end. Per se it is a venial sin, nor does it become a mortal sin except by reason of another sin, which is sometimes involved in its effect. Pusillanimity is a sin by which someone from smallness of soul does not attempt those things which are commensurate with his natural virtue. It is grave or light according to the goods from which he recedes.

Small-magnificence and consumption or excessive profusion are opposed to magnificence. - Small-magnificence is the vice by which man falls short of the proportion which ought to be between expense and work. Consumption or excessive profusion is the vice by which someone exceeds the said proportion, namely so that he spends more than is proportioned to the work. Each is per se a light sin; it can be grave by reason of scandal, or notable harm then following to others, or by another extrinsic reason, e.g., of a vow, testament, etc., by which someone is bound to that magnificent work and ought to be contained within due expenses.

Insensibility and impatience are opposed to patience, but softness and pertinacity to perseverance. - Insensibility is had when someone is touched by no evils, neither his own nor those of neighbors. It is a sign either of brutish stupidity or of inhuman hardness. Insensibility or hardness is rarely a mortal sin; certainly per se it is only venial. - Impatience is had when someone grieves too much, or even from grief departs from the right. Impatience per se is only a venial sin, because it is only an excess in grief, or in a movement of anger, expressed by an external sign; nevertheless it can be deadly by reason of scandal or of the evil which someone does from impatience. - Softness is if someone easily recedes from good because of certain difficulties which he cannot sustain; for that is called soft which easily yields to one touching it. But it is manifest that fear of dangers impels more gravely than desire of pleasures; and the desire itself of pleasures moves more strongly than sadness concerning the lack of pleasure withdraws, because lack of pleasure is a pure defect. And therefore he is properly called soft who recedes from good because of sadness caused by the defect of delights, as if yielding to a weak mover. This is a grave sin in a venereal matter or in another matter of great moment, to which someone is bound by law, precept, vow, or oath; but it is light in a light matter. Pertinacity is perseverance in one's own opinion more than one ought; and it is venial or mortal according to the gravity of the matter, e.g., if someone is unwilling to embrace the Catholic religion lest he seem inconstant; if a Prince is unwilling to revoke pernicious laws. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 123 seqq.; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Fortit.

1069. 2. Magnificence seems to be a certain part of magnanimity, and inclines one to do great things through great expenses, for example, in constructing splendid churches, or erecting colleges, universities, monasteries, when the good of the Church or the fatherland demands this.

To this virtue two vices are opposed: (a) excessive sumptuousness, when someone makes great expenses in matters of slight moment; this indeed is irrational, especially when works very necessary for the honor of God and the good of the faithful are neglected; (b) parvificence, which in great matters wills to make only small expenses, so that the works which are undertaken remain very unbecoming.

630. Notion. The second potential part of fortitude is the virtue of magnificence,¹¹³⁴ which is a virtue moderating the love of money, lest the great expenditures by which great external works ought to be made be impeded.¹¹³⁵ Therefore magnificence differs from magnanimity as a species from a genus; for magnanimity intends what is great in every matter and in all the virtues, but magnificence intends and executes it only in an external work capable of being made,¹¹³⁶ for example, in building temples, churches, and monasteries, in establishing pious foundations, and in providing a public banquet, when right reason demands this. St. Thomas¹¹³⁷ observes: "No end of human works is so great as the honor of God, and therefore magnificence chiefly performs a great work in order to the honor of God (by building and adorning churches and procuring other things necessary for worship). And therefore magnificence is joined to holiness, because its principal effect is ordered to religion or holiness."

The proximate matter of magnificence is great expenditures to be made for great external works, or the love of abundant money to be moderated.

¹¹³⁴ Prachtentfaltung, Prachtliebe [display of splendor, love of magnificence].

¹¹³⁵ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 134, a. 3.

¹¹³⁶ Cf. ib., a. 2 ad 2.

¹¹³⁷ Ib., ad 3.

631. Magnificence is a special virtue annexed to fortitude. For it has a special object which is in some manner similar to the object of fortitude; because its object, namely, great expenditures for constructing great works, is something special and arduous; nevertheless, it is not so arduous as the object of fortitude, which is dangers of death to be endured. The magnificent man chiefly intends great works for the common good. "That which pertains to the person of each individual is something small in comparison with that which belongs to divine things or common things. And therefore the magnificent man does not principally intend to make expenditures in those things which pertain to his own person, not because he does not seek his own good, but because it is not great. If, however, something among those things which pertain to him has greatness, the magnificent man also magnificently pursues this, such as things which are done once, as a wedding, or even things which are permanent, as it pertains to the magnificent man to prepare a fitting dwelling."¹¹³⁸ From what has been said it follows that magnificence is a virtue whose exercise pertains to kings or to the rich, because they alone are able to dispose of great expenditures; but according to affection and preparation of soul, and consequently also according to merit, this virtue can also exist in the poor, who have a sincere will to make great expenditures for great works if they possessed sufficient money.

¹¹³⁸ Ib., a. 1 ad 3.

632. Relation to liberality. Magnificence has some likeness to liberality, but nevertheless really differs from it. The first difference is that liberality extends to all operations which concern money, namely, to expenditures, receipts, and gifts; but magnificence concerns only expenditures, that is, outlays. The second difference is that, even in expenditures or outlays, magnificence exceeds liberality in the greatness of the expenditures; for magnificence concerns only great expenditures (as the name itself demonstrates), but liberality can also concern moderate ones.

S. Th. II-II, q. 134-135.

921. Magnificence (grootdadigheid) is inadequately distinguished from magnanimity, as a species from a genus. Magnanimity tends to all great things to be done, in every genus, or to the great as virtuous; magnificence tends only to great things able to be made, namely, to great external works as such, for example, it is in splendid temples being built, or colleges, universities, hospitals, monasteries being erected, according to right reason, when the good of the Church or of the fatherland demands this (a. 2, ad 2 and 3). For this great expenses of money are necessary; hence it is a virtue moderating the love of money, lest the great expenses be impeded by which great external works ought to be done (q. 134, a. 3).

Hence 1) its matter is great expenses to be made for great external works, and the love of money to be moderated. Hence according to affection it can be in the poor, not according to effect;

2. its special object is a great work and great expenses proportioned to it: thus it tends to the arduous and therefore is in the irascible appetite; but it falls short of fortitude because the difficulty is lesser, namely, only on account of spending things, not on account of danger of life;

3. it differs from liberality: the latter is concerned with all operations and uses concerning monies; magnificence concerns expenses alone, that is, expenditures, and indeed great ones, for liberality is also concerned with moderate ones (q. 134, a. 1, ad 1; a. 3, ad 2; q. 135, a. 1, ad 3).

922. Two vices are opposed to magnificence:

a) Consumption (profusion), or excessive sumptuousness, when someone makes great expenses in things of little moment (which do not deserve them), more than the dignity of the work demands; and this indeed is irrational, especially if works very necessary for the honor of God and the good of the faithful (or of men) are neglected.

b) Parvificence (mesquinerie), which in great matters wills to make only small expenses, so that the works undertaken remain very unbecoming. This intends first small expenses, while magnificence first regards the great work and consequently the expenses.

Of themselves they are venial sins, unless they withdraw from a grave precept.

Magnificence is defined by Bl. Bonaventure, in explicat. terminorum Theol.: "It is the thought and administration of great and lofty things with a large and most splendid undertaking of soul." The same is found de septem donis. De Dono fortitudinis, cap. 3. and lib. 5. Comp. Theol. cap. 36. Which definition is Tully's, lib. 2. de Inventione.

I assert first, that this is a virtue. It is proved because it works great things in its proper matter, keeping due proportion to him who works, or makes the outlay. Therefore there is required in these right thought, or intention; and administration in the outward execution, as Tully used to say. It differs from magnanimity, for this is concerned with great honors, that with great expenses; and because no end of human works is so great as the goods of God, therefore magnificence is concerned chiefly in great expenses for the honor of God, as Aristotle in 4. Eth. cap. 2. said: "Honorable expenses are the greatest, those that pertain to divine sacrifices."

I assert second, that it is a potential part of Fortitude. So St. Bonaventure, locis adductis, and Bl. Thomas, quaest. 134. art. 4.

It is proved, because two things are required that something be a potential part of some virtue. The first is, that it have agreement and affinity with that virtue as with a principal; the second, that it be surpassed by it. Now Magnificence agrees with Fortitude in that each tends to something arduous, and each is in the Irascible, doubtless because magnificence moderates hope in order to a magnificent work; but it falls short of fortitude, because that arduous thing to which fortitude tends has difficulty from danger impending over the person; but the arduous thing to which magnificence tends has difficulty from the outlay of goods, which is much less than danger to the person.