Point II. On Magnificence

I. Notion of Magnificence. By the force of the word, magnificence denotes doing something great. But to do can signify an immanent action, or a transitive action, that is, an action in an external thing (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 134, a. 2). Here it is taken in this last sense; therefore magnificence is very well defined: a moral virtue inclining man to execute great works with proportionate expenditures. It is said: to execute great works with proportionate expenditures: by these words it is indicated that it belongs to this virtue to preserve the mean of reason between the greatness of the works and the employment of expenditures.

II. Object of Magnificence. 1. The remote material object is great works insofar as they must be executed with great expenditures; but the proximate object is constituted by the actions by which these expenditures are distributed in the execution of great works.

2. The remote formal object is the reason of due proportion between great works and the expenditures to be applied to them; but the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in executing those great works with proportionate expenditures. For right reason dictates that, where great works must be done, abundant monies also be paid out for this end, as, for example, if churches, monasteries, or public buildings must be constructed (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 134, a. 1).

III. Opposed Vices. By defect there is opposed parvificence, by which someone pays out insufficient expenditures in relation to the greatness of the work, or makes a work not great enough (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 135, a. 1); by excess, consumption, by which someone pays out expenditures beyond his powers or makes a work too great (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 135, a. 2).