Question III: On magnificence

Magnificence is defined by Bl. Bonaventure, in explicat. terminorum Theol.: "It is the thought and administration of great and lofty things with a large and most splendid undertaking of soul." The same is found de septem donis. De Dono fortitudinis, cap. 3. and lib. 5. Comp. Theol. cap. 36. Which definition is Tully's, lib. 2. de Inventione.

I assert first, that this is a virtue. It is proved because it works great things in its proper matter, keeping due proportion to him who works, or makes the outlay. Therefore there is required in these right thought, or intention; and administration in the outward execution, as Tully used to say. It differs from magnanimity, for this is concerned with great honors, that with great expenses; and because no end of human works is so great as the goods of God, therefore magnificence is concerned chiefly in great expenses for the honor of God, as Aristotle in 4. Eth. cap. 2. said: "Honorable expenses are the greatest, those that pertain to divine sacrifices."

I assert second, that it is a potential part of Fortitude. So St. Bonaventure, locis adductis, and Bl. Thomas, quaest. 134. art. 4.

It is proved, because two things are required that something be a potential part of some virtue. The first is, that it have agreement and affinity with that virtue as with a principal; the second, that it be surpassed by it. Now Magnificence agrees with Fortitude in that each tends to something arduous, and each is in the Irascible, doubtless because magnificence moderates hope in order to a magnificent work; but it falls short of fortitude, because that arduous thing to which fortitude tends has difficulty from danger impending over the person; but the arduous thing to which magnificence tends has difficulty from the outlay of goods, which is much less than danger to the person.