Morality of the Act Indirectly Willed

The Morality of the Act That Is Indirectly Willed.—An act is said to be willed indirectly, or in its cause, when it is foreseen as the result of another act which alone is directly intended (see 35 sqq.). According to the different moral character of the acts, there are four cases in which the act is willed indirectly:

(a) when both the act directly willed and the resultant act are bad. Examples: Titus is heartily opposed to quarreling and blasphemy; but he makes himself drunk to forget his troubles, foreseeing that he will quarrel and blaspheme while in that state. Balbus has a real dislike for uncharitable thoughts; but he chooses the company of a notorious scandalmonger in order to be amused, knowing that thoughts against charity will be caused by listening to him;

(b) when the act directly willed is bad and the resultant act is good. Example: Caius is very miserly when sober, but liberal when intoxicated; to vary the monotony of his life, he decides to become intoxicated, but grieves at the thought of the money he may give away to some deserving charity before he returns to his senses. Sempronius decides on an act of injustice with sorrow over the unbidden thoughts of remorse or repentance that will follow his act;

(c) when both acts are good. Example: Out of charity Titus makes up his mind to visit a pious relative who is ill; and he foresees that thoughts of improving his own conduct—a thing not pleasing to him—will be occasioned by this visit;

(d) when the act directly willed is good and the resultant act is bad. Examples: Balbus takes a drug prescribed for his health, although he foresees it will make him unable to go to church. Caius gives alms to the poor, intending only an act of charity, but he knows that thoughts of vainglory will arise.

The act indirectly willed sometimes gives, sometimes does not give, a new morality. (a) Thus, if it is good, it adds no internal goodness, since the will only permits, without intending the good act. Example: Caius, who does not intend, but regretfully permits his act of charity which he foresees, does not desire the act of charity. (b) If it is bad, the act indirectly willed adds a bad act of the will, if the will desires evil by permitting what it has no right to permit. Example: Titus who does not prevent, when he should, what will lead to blasphemy on his part, implicitly desires the act of blasphemy.

168. State of the question. The things which we have said concerning morality regard the act in itself, or directly willed; but, since there are effects which are voluntary only in the cause or indirectly, it remains to be inquired whether these also are moral and imputable to the agent. For understanding this, a few things must be noted beforehand.

(A) That is voluntary in itself, or directly, which the will immediately and expressly intends either as the end or as the means; thus certainly the death of an enemy which the murderer intends as the end is voluntary in itself, or the killing of a traveler which a thief intends as a means for taking money. - But that is voluntary in the cause, or indirectly, which is intended neither as the end nor as the means, but is foreseen as going to follow from the act directly willed, and consequently is imputed to it in some way; thus he who from curiosity reads a depraved book, foreseeing that doubts concerning the faith are going to arise from reading of this kind, by that very fact indirectly, or in the cause, wills to experience these doubts. - Again an effect can be voluntary in the cause in two ways: positively, if an action is posited from which the effect is foreseen as going to follow; and negatively, if an action is omitted while foreseeing the effect as going to follow from this omission; thus he who sees a house blazing in fire, and does nothing to extinguish the fire, when he could do something, indirectly and negatively wills the conflagration.

169. (B) These things posited, it is asked whether an effect voluntary in the cause is truly voluntary and ought to be imputed to the agent. Namely, an act is imputable when its goodness or malice can and ought to be attributed to the agent as to its proper author; moreover one can be held as the proper author of this action when he freely posited it, with prior knowledge of its morality.

Nevertheless in this matter one must carefully distinguish between a good effect and an evil effect. A good effect, willed only in the cause, is not imputed to the agent; thus he who writes a book for the sake of making profit, foreseeing at the same time good effects going to follow from its reading, but not intending them in themselves, even confusedly, does not perform a morally good act, because he intends his own utility, not honorableness; this is clear from what was said above, n. 145. - But an evil effect, willed only in the cause, can be imputed to the agent; for from what was said in n. 146, an act contracts the malice of the object as often as this is known and interpretatively willed; but when it truly ought to be imputed will be clear from what is to be said below.

(C) The indirect voluntary can occur in two ways: (a) sometimes an evil effect, willed in the cause, follows from an act directly willed without the concurrence of another free agent: then it is called the indirect voluntary simply. (b) Sometimes, however, an evil effect is produced with the concurrence of another free agent: then it is called a case of cooperation, because namely two (or more) concur toward the production of this effect. - Concerning each one, we must speak separately.

170. Preliminary notes. In order that one may judge concerning the morality of an effect, it must first be inquired how it is connected with the cause.

¹ St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 64, a. 7; Suarez, De volunt., disp. I, sect. 5; Billuart, diss. I, a. 4; Elbel-Bierbaum, t. I, n. 23; Walsh, n. 88-192; Laloux, De Act. humanis, diss. 8; Ball. P., I, n. 26-32; Bouquillon, nn. 328, 371-374; Noldin, n. 33-38.

(a) Sometimes a cause is so determined to producing one effect that this effect follows necessarily: then the effect is directly intended and is deservedly imputed to the agent; thus he who knowingly applies fire to wood directly wills to burn it, because fire of itself is determined to burning.

(b) Sometimes, however, the cause produces a double effect, yet in such a way that one is subordinated to the other and follows necessarily from it; thus if someone knowingly and willingly discharges a gun at the father of a family, certainly foreseeing that from his death his children will be deprived of support, the double effect (the death of the father and the miserable condition of the children) is deservedly imputed to the agent, because the former is directly intended as a means to the end, namely vengeance, but the latter indirectly as an effect which necessarily follows from the means directly willed.

(c) Effects produced by a cause can be so coordinated that they proceed equally immediately, because the cause of itself is determined to producing each; thus if a physician gives to a pregnant woman a medicine which can heal her and at the same time cause abortion; in which case each effect is said to follow per se. But if one effect does not proceed equally immediately from the cause, because this is not of itself determined to producing such an effect, this follows per accidens: thus if someone writes a good or indifferent book for the sake of making profit, by whose reading, however, another, on account of his own fragility, is scandalized. - Now the question is whether and when effects of this kind, which proceed either per se or per accidens from the cause, and were willed in the cause, are imputable to the agent.

There will be a double principle: the former declares when an evil effect is imputable; the latter when it can be permitted.

171. First principle: An evil effect, willed only in the cause, is morally imputable when these three things concur at the same time, namely: 1. the agent foresaw the effect at least in the confused; 2. he was able not to posit the cause; 3. he ought to have impeded the effect. It is explained and proved by parts.

1. It is required that the agent have foreseen the effect at least in the confused; for if he did not foresee it in any way, the effect is not voluntary, and therefore not imputable: nothing is willed unless foreknown. - But he foresees the effect in the confused who knows, even obscurely or indistinctly, or at least suspected that the effect was going to follow; thus he who undertakes the office of physician, judge, confessor, etc., adverting that he is wholly lacking the knowledge required for such an office, truly, although indistinctly, foresees the evil effects going to follow from this; likewise the hunter who suspects that what he sees is a man, and nevertheless fires upon it, confusedly foresees the homicide going to follow from this.

Conversely, he who becomes drunk from a small draught of liquor whose force he did not suspect does not incur the malice of drunkenness.

From this it is given to understand when sins committed in drunkenness ought to be imputed: if someone has known by experience that, in the state of drunkenness, he is liable to anger, fights, blasphemies, etc., and nevertheless freely becomes drunk, he is guilty of sins of this kind, because he foresaw them; but if he is not accustomed to commit these things, the same cannot be imputed to him, if perhaps they occur, because they were not foreseen.¹

¹ Certain theologians assert that for imputability it suffices that the agent could and ought to have foreseen the effect; which falls back into the same thing, for he neither could nor ought to have foreseen it if he in no way actually foresaw it.

172. 2. It is required that the agent could not have posited the cause: for if he is morally bound to posit the cause, he cannot abstain from that act, and therefore the effect is not morally imputable to him; since no one is bound to the impossible. - Thus the priest is not guilty of sacrilege who gives communion to a sinner whose unworthiness he knows only from confession, because he is bound faithfully to keep the sacramental seal.

173. 3. It is required that the agent be bound to impede the evil effect; for if he is by no means bound to this, he permits rather than effects the effect; and besides, if he has a just and proportionate reason for permitting it, such an effect is not to be imputed to him.

Now he is bound to impede the effect if this flows of itself from the cause: for then he who wills the antecedent wills also the consequent. But if the effect follows per accidens, namely from other causes independent of the will of the agent, so that the act posited is rather the occasion than the cause of the evil effect, the agent is not bound to impede this effect by abstaining from an act otherwise good, which is only the occasion of the evil effect. Thus a physician who, in the exercise of his art, is liable to not a few movements of concupiscence, is not guilty of these, even if he foresaw them, because the exercise of medicine produces those movements not of itself, but per accidens.

174. But when the three aforesaid conditions concur, the evil effect, although indirectly willed, is truly free and consequently imputable. Then, however, sin is committed not at that instant in which the evil effect follows, but at that instant in which it was foreseen and intended; and therefore, even if the effect does not follow, the sin has already been committed, because it has been willed.

Thus he who gives poison to another, foreseeing that death will follow from it, at this very instant commits homicide in his heart, even if, on account of the intervention of a physician or some other cause, death does not in fact follow. Thus he who adverts that he will be made drunk by further drink, and by experience knows that in drunkenness he commits many sins, implicitly intends all these sins at that instant in which he intends to drink the further drink.

Whence, in order to judge concerning the gravity of an indirectly willed sin, attention must be paid to the very malice of the internal act: the more distinct and certain the foresight of the evil effect was, the graver is the fault; the less distinct and certain, the lighter is the fault. Whence many are excused from grave sin because, on account of lightness of soul, they apprehend only confusedly the depraved effects of their actions.¹

¹ Vieux Moraliste rightly explains this, apud Ami du Clergé, XX, 1898, p. 1121-1129.

175. Second principle: It is lawful to posit an act good in itself or indifferent, from which a double effect follows, one good and the other evil, provided the good effect is not produced except not by means of the evil, a proportionately grave reason is present, and the end of the agent is honorable.

Therefore four conditions are required:

1. That the act be in itself good or indifferent; for if it is evil in itself, it can never become lawful, even if a good effect follows from it, and a fortiori if an evil effect follows. - But in order to judge whether the act is evil in itself or not, attention must be paid to whether the malice arises from the circumstances, or is found in the act itself according to the common estimation of the prudent: if the former, the act is judged good or indifferent in itself; if the latter, it must be judged evil in itself. - Thus, since hypnotic sleep is evil not in itself, but from circumstances, sometimes, though rarely, it can be permitted on account of a grave reason, provided due precautions are applied for warding off depraved effects.

176. 2. That the good effect not be produced except by means of the evil effect; for if the evil effect immediately follows from the cause, and the good arises only through the mediation of that evil effect, it is not lawful to posit the cause: for then the evil effect is assumed as a means to good, and therefore is directly intended.² Thus he acts illicitly who gives an intoxicating drink to a servant so that thereby he may cast horror of drunkenness into others.

² Certain persons, however, deny the necessity of this second condition; for, they say, it is lawful to kill an unjust aggressor in order to protect one's own life; now in this case the good effect, namely the preservation of one's own life, is not obtained except through the mediation of the evil effect, that is, the death of the aggressor. Thus Walsh, n. 143-144. - The matter is not without difficulty; nevertheless it can be said that in this case the death of the unjust aggressor is not an effect morally evil in itself: by natural and divine right, the killing of the innocent is indeed prohibited, but not that of the guilty. - Besides, he who, in order to protect himself, kills the aggressor, does not intend his death as a means to the preservation of life, but strikes or fires for the end of rendering him unarmed and incapable of harming, foreseeing nevertheless that perhaps the death of the aggressor will follow from this.

177. 3. That there be present a proportionately grave reason for positing the cause and permitting the evil effect, so that the good effect compensates for the evil. For right reason dictates that it is better to lack a lesser good than to obtain it through an act from which a greater evil follows; but conversely, if the good effect surpasses or at least compensates for the evil, the law which prohibited the evil effect now seems to cease.

The whole difficulty is in defining what reason is proportionately grave. But this, in individual cases, can be discerned only from the judgment of the prudent, all the circumstances being attended to. The principal adjuncts to be carefully weighed are reduced to these:

(A) One must inspect not only the advantage or disadvantage going to arise in the particular case, but also that which would threaten the whole society, if such an action were generally permitted or prohibited. For there are actions for which there does not seem to be a sufficient reason, if attention is paid to the particular case; but it will be recognized as present if regard is had to the universality of cases, with attention to the public good, or the good of the whole society.¹ Thus the social good requires that an unjust aggressor can be killed when other means of preserving one's own life are lacking, even if the aggressor perhaps loses not only temporal life, but eternal life; for otherwise assassins, robbers, and impious men, knowing that good men, for guarding life, would never kill, would become more audacious and would disturb families and society itself with homicides and robberies, as is explained in De Justitia, n. 325.

¹ Cf. Laloux, diss. 8, p. 217; Walsh, n. 136-137.

178. (B) Attention must be paid to the gravity of the evil effect: the graver the evil foreseen is, the greater the excusing reason must be. Thus if someone repels an unjust aggressor by bringing death upon him, a greater reason is required than if he inflicts a non-lethal wound: in the former case, it is required that the goods to be defended be of the greatest importance, while in the latter they can be of lesser importance (De Justitia, n. 329-331).

179. (C) The influence of the action upon the effect, whether good or evil, must also be inspected. For the evil effect must be compensated by the agent because his action influences that effect; therefore it must be compensated in that proportion in which it influences the effect. - But the measure of the influence depends on several things, namely on proximity, probability, and the positive or negative mode of acting. Generally, the more proximately, the more probably, the more positively the action influences the evil effect, the greater reason is required for lawfully positing it.

(a) A cause is called the more proximate the fewer intermediates there are between it and the effect; for example, if someone learns to read, foreseeing that perhaps he will incur the danger of reading depraved books, and from this of experiencing temptations, this last effect follows quite remotely from the act; but if someone in reality reads a depraved book, movements of concupiscence follow more proximately from this reading; therefore a greater reason is required.

(b) A cause influences the effect the more probably the more likely this effect is foreseen as going to follow from the cause; for example, if someone throws a stone from a window in a city and on a street where many pass by, the wounding of one's neighbor is going to follow much more probably than if he does this in a village where very few make the journey; therefore a much greater reason is required.

(c) The agent influences the effect the more positively the more actively he behaves; thus a greater reason is required for doing something than for omitting something from which an evil effect is going to follow.

180. (D) Attention must also be paid to the connection, more or less necessary, between the cause and the effect; thus, for leasing to heretics some building in which they will spread their errors, a greater reason is required if they cannot find any other building in the place than if they can easily lease others.

(E) Likewise one must keep before the mind the right or office which belongs to the agent of positing the act: certainly a lesser reason is desired if there is question of those who have a special right, or a fortiori an office, of doing the act; for example, if a physician or priest foresees that he will experience some temptation by reading books which he has the right and office of reading, in order rightly to fulfill his duty, a much lesser reason suffices than if there is question of another who wants to read the same books only from curiosity.

181. 4. It is required that the end of the agent be honorable, that is, that the agent not intend the evil effect which he foresees, nor afterward approve it, but behave permissively only with regard to it; wherefore he cannot take complacency in the depraved effect, but ought to be so disposed that he would wish it not to be produced, if he could otherwise obtain the good effect which he intends. This is clear from what was said where we treated concerning the end, n. 150; for he who intends a depraved end, or takes complacency in it, by that very fact wills some evil.

182. When the four aforesaid conditions concur at the same time, the evil effect only indirectly willed is not imputed to the agent; for that effect, insofar as it is evil, must be judged morally involuntary, since the will neither intends it nor takes complacency in it.¹ The agent indeed foresees and permits, or tolerates, the evil effect, but on account of a just and proportionate cause, just as God Himself tolerates evil on account of grave reasons. Now the public good demands that an act, otherwise good or indifferent, not be prohibited on account of an evil effect, if there is present a grave reason for positing it, as is clear from the examples already brought forward and from others to be brought forward in the whole course of the work.

¹ "Nothing prevents there being two effects of one act, one of which alone is in the intention, while the other is outside the intention. But moral acts receive species according to that which is intended, not from that which is outside the intention." (St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 64, a. 7).

IX. Lust indirectly voluntary, which the will does not procure nor intend, to which it neither positively consents nor resists, but toward which it behaves negatively, and which it only permits because it does not repress it when it can and ought to repress it, is of itself venially evil; per accidens, sometimes mortal on account of danger of consent.

It is proved: in this a man sins, because reason and will are lacking in their office of directing and repressing the motions of the lower powers, nor can he bear himself indifferently to whether his motions and acts are inordinate or not; but:

a. per se he does not sin mortally, because positive consent of the will is lacking;

b. per accidens he would sin mortally if from this there were a proximate danger of consenting to venereal pleasure.

Hence man is bound to resist those motions positively, insofar as is necessary and morally possible for not consenting and for repressing the motions:

1. ordinarily not directly, that is, by contrary or violent acts, such as suppression of imagination, compression of the members, chastisement of the body, and so forth, because this is not necessary for the aforesaid end, or is too difficult, or even excites more;

2. but indirectly, by applying the mind to other incompatible things, especially those which more strongly affect the mind, for example by interrupting the work, pursuing business, an external occupation requiring special attention, praying, and so forth; indeed:

3. sometimes, if there is a just cause for not resisting otherwise and for not repressing the motions, positive resistance by a simple act of displeasure, at least implicit, suffices. This act is not to be frequently repeated, since until it is retracted it is judged morally to persevere. Thus if someone has experienced that other resistance is useless for checking the motions, or excites and increases them more; or if the motions have their origin from a necessary cause or from a useful action, as was said in the preceding number, c, and it is too troublesome to repel them, for example on account of duration; or if the motions are light and transitory, both because the causes exciting such motions are very frequent and therefore the obligation of repressing them would be too difficult, and because they are repressed better and more effectively by contempt: for solicitude about impeding them is accustomed to excite imaginations and increase the motions. All these things are easily verified in the scrupulous person, who therefore will show sufficient displeasure by simply despising the motions.

173. Principle concerning the licit mode of causing an evil effect. - Each virtue generally obliges one to avoid the cause which produces an evil effect opposed to it, for example, harm to a third party, scandal, dishonorable movements; yet not always. It is licit to place a cause which produces at the same time a good and an evil effect, if the good effect follows at least as immediately from the cause as the evil, or not by means of the evil, and there is a proportionately grave reason, with two other things always necessary presupposed, namely, an action licit in itself and a right intention of the agent.

Therefore four things are required: a) two on the part of the effect, so that the evil effect is not imputed; namely:

1. that the good effect follow at least as immediately from the cause as the evil, or not by means of the evil effect; otherwise the latter would be the means for obtaining the good effect, although evil things are not to be done that good things may come (n. 156, 5): hence it is illicit to lie in order to save a man, to procure abortion in order to avoid infamy, or to kill the fetus in order to save the life of the mother, to steal money in order to give alms, etc.

2. That there be a reason for placing the cause, and indeed a proportionately grave one, that is, that the good procured surpass or equal the evil: for reason dictates that a lesser good is not to be procured by an act from which a greater evil follows; on the contrary, if the good compensates the evil, no reason now appears why the evil ought to be avoided: thus it is not licit to kill an invader in order to preserve goods of lesser price; it is licit in order to preserve life. Hence the greater the malice of the effect, the greater must be the excusing reason; and it is always required that the good effect cannot suitably be obtained otherwise, for otherwise there would no longer be a reason for bringing on the evil effect.

b) That not only the evil effect not be imputed, but also that it be caused licitly, or that the action itself be honorable, two other things are further required on the part of the action:

3. That the action in itself (that is, setting aside the circumstances) not be evil, but honorable or at least indifferent: for a cause evil in itself per se includes fault.

4. That the end of the agent be honorable, and therefore that the evil effect not be intended but only the good; otherwise the evil would be voluntary in itself or at least willed. Hence it is also required that there be no proximate danger of consenting to the evil or approving it.

1. Vermeersch well notes, Th. M. I, n. 133, that one must take care not to apply the rule stated concerning a twofold effect, good and evil, caused simultaneously, to the diverse case of an action which can be this or that, for example, that which I see is perhaps a man, perhaps a beast. The voluntary discharge of a gun at that thing will be perhaps homicide, perhaps useful hunting. Here it is not a question of partial causality into a harmful effect which nevertheless is not imputed on account of a proportionate reason of a good simultaneously caused; or, by full causality, one of two things disjunctively comes about. Therefore homicide is hypothetically accepted and chosen: it is one probable evil effect. For this reason it is no more licit to inflict it upon a probable man than upon a certain man.

Yet this principle is not always rightly explained by all.

a) Some assert that it is not required that the good effect be immediate, but that it suffices that it not come about by means of the evil, even if it is more remote. But this seems to be a question about the mode of speaking: for then the possibility of obtaining the good effect already results immediately from the action, and this already is a certain good effect.

b) Others understand the principle only of a cause per se as to the good effect and of a cause per accidens as to the evil effect, so that the good effect ought to follow per se and as it were necessarily from the action, and the evil effect only per accidens. But although in this case there can more easily be a reason for placing the action, or compensation of the evil effect by the good, nevertheless it is not proved that this is a condition without which not, so that otherwise one would have to abstain from the action. For it does not seem impossible that there be a cause from which there would follow simultaneously per se a twofold effect: one good, the other evil (suppose health, and drunkenness or abortion); which nevertheless it would be licit to employ if it were necessary for obtaining the good effect, provided that this compensates the evil. Indeed, if the evil effect followed per se from the cause, and the good merely per accidens, why could we not order that cause per accidens to obtaining the good effect, if in this way it is certainly produced and truly outweighs the evil? Therefore by such a restriction they seem to limit the principle unduly.

c) Finally, others apply the principle too materially, and seem to think that the good effect considered in itself must always be equal to the evil effect. But it suffices that the goodness of the effect, together with the utility which it procures for the agent or others, and the inconvenience and damage avoided (which would arise if the cause were not placed), compensate the evil, that is, not always the evil effect but at least the influence of the action upon this effect: for the evil effect must be compensated by the agent because his action influences it; whence it must be compensated insofar as the action influences it. Hence a graver reason for placing the cause is required:

1. the graver or worse the effect is, both in itself and with respect to the harm of others, especially of society; for example, a greater cause is required for killing an aggressor than for slightly wounding him, greater for producing an effect harmful to society than to an individual;

2. the more actively and necessarily the evil effect proceeds from the action, the more closely it coheres with it, and the more probably it follows from it; for example, a greater reason is required in one who concurs proximately, a lesser in one who concurs remotely, in the sin of another (for example, the making of a bad book or drunkenness); greater for reading a bad book than a book of lighter character from which movements of concupiscence more remotely arise; greater for placing a cause per se than a cause per accidens. Likewise a very urgent cause is required for a maidservant to be able to exercise service in a house where she is often enticed to sin by the son; a much lesser motive suffices if an outsider coming into the house at times solicits;

3. the less right the agent has to place the cause and the more certain it is that, if he does not act, the effect will not be produced; in other words, the greater the obligation from office of impeding the evil. For example, a greater reason is required for renting a building to heretics if they can find no other than if they can easily rent one; a greater reason for a bookseller to be able to sell a bad book if no other seller is found who will give it, than if another will sell it.

All these things are to be considered together so that it may prudently be estimated whether the good compensates the evil.

17. The effect consequent upon an action is distinguishable from the action itself, from which it is not unfrequently separated by a considerable interval of time, as the death of a man from poison administered a month before. The effect consequent enters into morality only in so far as it is either chosen as a means or intended as an end (nn. 2, 3, p. 31), or is annexed as a relevant circumstance to the means chosen (n. 9, p. 34.). Once the act is done, it matters nothing to morality whether the effect consequent actually ensues or not, provided no new act be elicited thereupon, whether of commission or of culpable omission to prevent. It matters not to morality, but it does matter to the agent's claim to reward or liability to punishment at the hands of human legislators civil and ecclesiastical.

18. As soul and body make one man, so the inward and outward act—as the will to strike and the actual blow struck—are one human act. The outward act gives a certain physical completeness to the inward. Moreover the inward act is no thorough-going thing, if it stops short of outward action where the opportunity offers. Otherwise, the inward act may be as good or as bad morally as inward and outward act together. The mere wish to kill, where the deed is impossible, may be as wicked as wish and deed conjoined. It may be, but commonly it will not, for this reason, that the outward execution of the deed reacts upon the will and calls it forth with greater intensity; the will as it were expands where it finds outward vent. There is no one who has not felt the relative mildness of inward feelings of impatience or indignation, compared with those engendered by speaking out one's mind. Often also the outward act entails a long course of preparation, all during which the inward will is sustained and frequently renewed, as in a carefully planned burglary.

Readings.—St. Thos., 1a 2ae, q. 18, art. 1; ib., q. 18, art. 2, in corp., ad 1; ib., q. 18, art. 3, in corp., ad 2; ib., q. 18, art. 4-6; ib., q. 18, art. 8, in corp., ad 2, 3; ib., q. 18, art. 9, in corp., ad 3; ib., q. 18, art. 10, 3; ib., q. 18, art. 11, in corp.; ib., q. 20, art. 4, in corp.