Question III: On the Goodness and Malice of the External Effect

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 20, a. 5; q. 73, a. 8; q. 77, a. 7; II-II, q. 64, a. 7 and 8; q. 79, a. 3, ad 3; q. 150, a. 4; Quodlibet IX, 15.

In human acts the external effect merits an altogether special consideration, from which, according as it is good or evil, morality can depend, especially in an exterior act. For the doctrine concerning the morality of the effect is of very great moment in practice and is as it were the key by which several difficult cases must be solved, such as concerning cooperation, scandal, damage, etc. Now concerning this matter the following principles have force.

172. Principles concerning the morality of the external effect.

I. A good or evil effect directly and in itself voluntary is imputed to the agent either unto goodness or unto malice, whence it increases the goodness of an act otherwise good, and the malice of an act otherwise evil; but if a good effect is joined to an evil act, it does not remove the malice of the act, although it can diminish it.

II. A good effect willed only in the cause or indirectly is not imputed unto goodness, because good is not done rightly, as right reason dictates and as it deserves to be done, unless it is willed on account of itself; hence goodness is not contracted unless it is intended in itself (n. 146).

III. An evil effect willed in the cause or indirectly is imputed to the agent unto malice, if three conditions are verified:

1. if it was foreseen in some way, at least in confusion: nothing is willed unless foreknown;

2. if it could have been impeded, insofar as the cause could have been not placed, or once placed could have been removed: for the effect is not more voluntary than the cause;

3. if it also ought to have been impeded, that is, if there was present an obligation of avoiding the effect, or of not placing the cause, or of removing the cause lest the effect follow (nn. 60 and 63).

One can be bound to impede an evil effect either from office, for example, parents or a teacher to ward off wicked companions from children entrusted to them, lest they be depraved; or from justice, as a guardian or administrator concerning things or affairs entrusted to him; or from religion, that divine honor be provided for; or from every virtue, lest an effect directly contrary to it be produced; or from charity, which, for example, demands that you cry out lest another unknowingly fall into danger of life. On the contrary, if you do not take necessary care of your health, it will not therefore be imputed to you that on some day you cannot fast, just as neither that you experienced pollution because you ate meat on a forbidden day: for these things are not to be avoided precisely lest such an effect follow.

173. Principle concerning the licit mode of causing an evil effect. - Each virtue generally obliges one to avoid the cause which produces an evil effect opposed to it, for example, harm to a third party, scandal, dishonorable movements; yet not always. It is licit to place a cause which produces at the same time a good and an evil effect, if the good effect follows at least as immediately from the cause as the evil, or not by means of the evil, and there is a proportionately grave reason, with two other things always necessary presupposed, namely, an action licit in itself and a right intention of the agent.

Therefore four things are required: a) two on the part of the effect, so that the evil effect is not imputed; namely:

1. that the good effect follow at least as immediately from the cause as the evil, or not by means of the evil effect; otherwise the latter would be the means for obtaining the good effect, although evil things are not to be done that good things may come (n. 156, 5): hence it is illicit to lie in order to save a man, to procure abortion in order to avoid infamy, or to kill the fetus in order to save the life of the mother, to steal money in order to give alms, etc.

2. That there be a reason for placing the cause, and indeed a proportionately grave one, that is, that the good procured surpass or equal the evil: for reason dictates that a lesser good is not to be procured by an act from which a greater evil follows; on the contrary, if the good compensates the evil, no reason now appears why the evil ought to be avoided: thus it is not licit to kill an invader in order to preserve goods of lesser price; it is licit in order to preserve life. Hence the greater the malice of the effect, the greater must be the excusing reason; and it is always required that the good effect cannot suitably be obtained otherwise, for otherwise there would no longer be a reason for bringing on the evil effect.

b) That not only the evil effect not be imputed, but also that it be caused licitly, or that the action itself be honorable, two other things are further required on the part of the action:

3. That the action in itself (that is, setting aside the circumstances) not be evil, but honorable or at least indifferent: for a cause evil in itself per se includes fault.

4. That the end of the agent be honorable, and therefore that the evil effect not be intended but only the good; otherwise the evil would be voluntary in itself or at least willed. Hence it is also required that there be no proximate danger of consenting to the evil or approving it.

1. Vermeersch well notes, Th. M. I, n. 133, that one must take care not to apply the rule stated concerning a twofold effect, good and evil, caused simultaneously, to the diverse case of an action which can be this or that, for example, that which I see is perhaps a man, perhaps a beast. The voluntary discharge of a gun at that thing will be perhaps homicide, perhaps useful hunting. Here it is not a question of partial causality into a harmful effect which nevertheless is not imputed on account of a proportionate reason of a good simultaneously caused; or, by full causality, one of two things disjunctively comes about. Therefore homicide is hypothetically accepted and chosen: it is one probable evil effect. For this reason it is no more licit to inflict it upon a probable man than upon a certain man.

Yet this principle is not always rightly explained by all.

a) Some assert that it is not required that the good effect be immediate, but that it suffices that it not come about by means of the evil, even if it is more remote. But this seems to be a question about the mode of speaking: for then the possibility of obtaining the good effect already results immediately from the action, and this already is a certain good effect.

b) Others understand the principle only of a cause per se as to the good effect and of a cause per accidens as to the evil effect, so that the good effect ought to follow per se and as it were necessarily from the action, and the evil effect only per accidens. But although in this case there can more easily be a reason for placing the action, or compensation of the evil effect by the good, nevertheless it is not proved that this is a condition without which not, so that otherwise one would have to abstain from the action. For it does not seem impossible that there be a cause from which there would follow simultaneously per se a twofold effect: one good, the other evil (suppose health, and drunkenness or abortion); which nevertheless it would be licit to employ if it were necessary for obtaining the good effect, provided that this compensates the evil. Indeed, if the evil effect followed per se from the cause, and the good merely per accidens, why could we not order that cause per accidens to obtaining the good effect, if in this way it is certainly produced and truly outweighs the evil? Therefore by such a restriction they seem to limit the principle unduly.

c) Finally, others apply the principle too materially, and seem to think that the good effect considered in itself must always be equal to the evil effect. But it suffices that the goodness of the effect, together with the utility which it procures for the agent or others, and the inconvenience and damage avoided (which would arise if the cause were not placed), compensate the evil, that is, not always the evil effect but at least the influence of the action upon this effect: for the evil effect must be compensated by the agent because his action influences it; whence it must be compensated insofar as the action influences it. Hence a graver reason for placing the cause is required:

1. the graver or worse the effect is, both in itself and with respect to the harm of others, especially of society; for example, a greater cause is required for killing an aggressor than for slightly wounding him, greater for producing an effect harmful to society than to an individual;

2. the more actively and necessarily the evil effect proceeds from the action, the more closely it coheres with it, and the more probably it follows from it; for example, a greater reason is required in one who concurs proximately, a lesser in one who concurs remotely, in the sin of another (for example, the making of a bad book or drunkenness); greater for reading a bad book than a book of lighter character from which movements of concupiscence more remotely arise; greater for placing a cause per se than a cause per accidens. Likewise a very urgent cause is required for a maidservant to be able to exercise service in a house where she is often enticed to sin by the son; a much lesser motive suffices if an outsider coming into the house at times solicits;

3. the less right the agent has to place the cause and the more certain it is that, if he does not act, the effect will not be produced; in other words, the greater the obligation from office of impeding the evil. For example, a greater reason is required for renting a building to heretics if they can find no other than if they can easily rent one; a greater reason for a bookseller to be able to sell a bad book if no other seller is found who will give it, than if another will sell it.

All these things are to be considered together so that it may prudently be estimated whether the good compensates the evil.

174. How great is the imputability of the evil effect. - For determining the gravity of the fault incurred by the one who places the cause of an evil effect, the axiom has force: an effect voluntary in the cause is not more culpable than the cause itself. This is not to be understood of the cause considered in itself and independently of the effect: for it can happen that an action in itself good, indifferent, or lightly evil contracts grave malice from the effect, for example, if the throwing of a stone or a slight lie is the cause of homicide; conversely, that an action in itself gravely evil has light malice by reason of the effect, for example, drunkenness which produces light anger, homicide bringing on some other small harm. But it is to be understood of the cause considered as cause, that is, insofar as it influences the effect; hence the nature and gravity both of the influence or causality and of the effect itself are to be considered. Hence:

1. a cause which per se, proximately, and gravely influences an evil effect, besides its proper malice which perhaps it has from itself, further acquires the grave or light malice of the effect; hence a cause per se gravely evil, which proximately influences a lightly evil effect, has a light malice superadded; on the contrary, a cause per se lightly evil, which proximately influences a gravely evil effect, has grave malice from this;

2. a cause which per se but lightly and remotely, or only per accidens, influences even a grave effect, by reason of the influence contracts only light malice, for example, if from the immoderate taking of food or from drunkenness or from morose delectation not prolonged pollution follows. For a small influence upon a grave thing is not of itself something notable. Yet such a cause has grave malice by reason of the effect, if that effect is strictly prohibited so that all things which even lightly concur toward it are to be avoided (as happens in a matter of justice, lest grave harm be brought upon one's neighbor), or if by reason of office or state there is a special obligation of avoiding the effect. Thus the influence of drunkenness upon pollution is lightly culpable, but upon homicide is gravely culpable.

1. Then the malice is grave, not by reason of the influence, but by reason of the special prohibition or obligation.

175. When is the morality of the effect contracted?

The whole goodness or malice of the effect is contracted inchoatively, interiorly and as to affection, when the cause is voluntarily placed, even if per accidens the effect does not follow: for then the effect is intended at least in confusion; consummatively, exteriorly and as to the effect, when the effect truly occurs, unless at this moment the past will, insofar as possible, has been retracted: for then the effect will be only materially good or evil.

176. Observation for understanding the doctrine of St. Thomas. - In q. 20, a. 5, briefly and with several other general principles presupposed, St. Thomas teaches several things concerning the morality of the effect, which can be understood from what has been said:

A. In the order of execution, the following willed event, whether it follows or does not follow, does not add formal goodness or malice to the external action, just as it "does not make an act evil which was good, nor good which was evil; for example, if someone gives alms to a poor man, which he abuses for sin, nothing is lost to him who gave the alms; and similarly, if someone patiently bears an injury done to him, he who did it is not on this account excused."

For morality depends upon the voluntary. That the intended effect follows or is impeded per accidens is involuntary. Therefore it does not change the morality of the act.

B. In the order of intention he teaches three things concerning the event:

1. The following event which was forethought, that is, distinctly foreseen and in some way willed, in the diverse mode which ought to be present for contracting goodness or malice, increases the formal goodness or malice of the exterior act.

1. Thus St. Thomas himself interpreted himself, q. 73, a. 8 and ad 1.

2. The following event not forethought, that is, not distinctly foreseen, if it follows per se and for the most part from such an action, adds directly to the goodness or malice of the act, which is better from its genus from which several good things are apt to follow, and worse from which several evil things are apt to follow. In this doctrine, however, the general principle is presupposed: that this goodness in fact be contracted, it must be intended; that malice be contracted, it must in some way be foreseen, at least in confusion, which nevertheless easily happens if the action of itself is apt to produce the evil effect.

3. The following event not forethought, if it follows per accidens and in fewer cases, does not directly add to goodness or malice, for example, the abuse of alms by a poor man.

These things are to be understood on the supposition that from the same act there does not follow, with equal immediacy, a twofold effect: one evil, and the other good but greater and compensating. For then what was said in n. 173 must be applied.

177. Corollary. - From what has been said it is understood why and how far it is illicit voluntarily to expose oneself to danger of acting badly or sinning: for this is not sufficiently avoiding the evil effect, or even it is placing the cause of an evil effect. That danger can be from an internal cause (as is a depraved imagination or passion) or an external one (namely, an occasion, such as a thing enticing to evil); absolute, that is, commonly for all, or relative to such a determinate person; proximate or grave, which in many cases or at least frequently is connected with sin, or remote or light, which is rarely connected. Now:

1. It is illicit without a just and proportionate reason to expose oneself to a proximate or grave danger of acting badly. For one who without sufficient reason wills a thing, by that very fact imputably wills everything which is probably connected with it, and therefore one who intends to incur the danger of acting badly, by that very fact wills the evil probably connected with it. And one who is bound altogether to avoid sin is also bound to avoid the means which probably leads to it. Hence one who does not avoid such a danger, when he can, is convicted of not sufficiently avoiding but loving that evil whose danger he loves (Eccli. III, 27). Hence everyone is bound under grave obligation to avoid a proximate danger of committing a grave evil; a proximate danger of committing a light evil, under light obligation.

2. It is licit from a just reason proportionately grave, namely, of a compensating good effect, to expose oneself to the danger, even grave and proximate, of acting badly. The reason is that one who from a just reason exposes himself to danger does not love the evil, but the good cause on account of which he so acts, nor properly exposes himself to danger, but rather unwillingly undergoes the danger. Understand this with the restriction: provided there is a founded hope of overcoming the danger and suitable precautions are applied for this, by which the danger becomes remote; for certain sin is absolutely to be avoided.

3. To expose oneself without reason to a light and remote danger (of some moment), even of committing grave evil, is illicit but lightly; yet it is licit from any reasonable cause, even a light one: for some disorder against reason is had in this, that someone without cause places a useless action, with which in addition a danger of evil is joined.