Naturally good acts and supernatural merit

It follows from what has been said in the preceding section, that an action will be morally good if the object, end, and circumstances are good, The object, end, and circumstances will be good if they are conformable to man’s rational nature and to the eternal law of God. An opinion was held by some theologians that besides these conditions it is necessary to refer, actually or at least virtually, all our actions to God; otherwise they will at least be venially sinful. These theologians rested their opinion on certain texts of Holy Scripture and on passages from some of the Fathers, especially St Augustine. The principal Scripture text is from St Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians, x 31: “‘ Therefore whether you eat, or drink, or whatsoever else you do; do all to the glory of God.” There are various interpretations of the passage, but the meaning seems plain from the context. St Paul is teaching the Corinthians the duty of avoiding scandal to Jews, Gentiles, and to the Church of God. They must so order their actions, even those that are indifferent in themselves, such as eating certain kinds of food, as not to be a cause of offence to others. Then will their actions all tend to the honour and glory of God, then will they do all things in charity (1 Cor. xv 14). There is obviously no word here which can be legitimately construed into a command to direct all our actions to God by an actual or virtual intention of the will. Such a merely internal act would not tend to edify others, and in the text quoted this is what St Paul is urging the Corinthians to do. Other passages which are quoted in support of the opinion are similarly capable of being explained in a sense which affords the opinion no support. It is indeed a truth, which is insisted on by other theologians, that if an action be honest and good and performed because it is conformable to right order, it is thereby implicitly directed to God, who wills the observance of right order, and who is himself the end to which rightly ordered action tends. In this sense it is true that every good action must be referred to God; but every good action is thus referred to him by the very fact that the object, the end, and the circumstances are good.¹

¹ V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 2, n. 290.

Something else is required to make a naturally good action supernaturally meritorious. The question of merit belongs to the dogmatic treatise on grace; here it will be sufficient to give something about the subject in outline, in order to round off our treatment of human acts.

Merit in general is a certain value in an action which gives the agent the right to be rewarded by him in whose behalf the action is performed. Merit, then, with God will bea to be rewarded for one’s actions by God. right Theologians distinguish between condign and congruous merit. The former implies that there is some sort of equality between the value of the action and the reward, so that the reward is due to the agent in justice. If there is not this equality and title in justice, the merit will be only congruous. We can merit condignly an increase of grace, life eternal, and an increase of glory, as the Council of Trent defined.¹ Efficacious graces, by which we receive, preserve, and increase sanctifying grace, and the gift of final perseverance, are the objects of congruous merit.

¹ Trent, sess. 6, can. 32.

Good Acts.-An act is said to be entirely good when all its elements—its object, circumstances and purpose—are in conformity with the standards of morality. Thus, an alms given to one in need, in a considerate manner, and purely out of love for God, is good in every respect. Furthermore, the fact that the circumstances and purpose of the act are good increases the goodness derived from the object of the act.

An act is likewise entirely good when at least one of its elements is good, the others being indifferent, and none evil; for it is the good alone that is intended (see 85), and this gives the moral color to the whole act. This happens as follows: (a) when the object is indifferent and the purpose good, as when one takes a walk for the purpose of performing a work of mercy; (b) when the object is indifferent and a circumstance good, as when one eats a meal with intentional moderation; (c) when the object is good and a circumstance indifferent, as when one prays with unintentional stammering.

An act is partly good when, while its object is good, there is some evil in the circumstances that does not neutralize or transform the object. This happens in the following cases: (a) when the object is good and some minor circumstance, not intended as affecting the substance of the act, is evil, as when a person prays with distractions; (b) when the object is good and a partial, but not predominant motive is slightly evil, as when a person prays in public in order to give edification and also incidentally to help his reputation. In both these cases the good—i.e., the worship of God—is desired for itself as good, and the evil that is simultaneously desired does not change this good object.

"2. Just as an evil work by its nature is meritorious of eternal death, so a good work by its nature is meritorious of eternal life. - 4. Eternal life was promised to man in his integrity and to the angel in view of good works, and good works by the law of nature suffice of themselves for attaining it. - 15. The reason of merit does not consist in this, that those who act well have grace and the indwelling Holy Spirit, but in this alone, that they obey the divine law." Condemned propositions of Michael Baius, condemned by St. Pius V.

"1. If anyone shall say that man can be justified before God by his works, whether done through human nature or through the teaching of the law, without divine grace through Jesus Christ: let him be anathema. - 2. If anyone shall say that divine grace through Christ Jesus is given only for this, that man may more easily live justly and merit eternal life, as though through free will without grace he could do both, though with hardship and difficulty: let him be anathema." Council of Trent, sess. 6, canons.

5. Merit before God is one thing natural, another supernatural. Natural merit is that which is found in good works of the natural order. For good works are meritorious before God of some reward. Appositely St. Thomas says appositely, I-II, q. 21, a. 4: "It must be said that the act of some man has the notion of merit or demerit according as it is ordered to another, either by reason of him or by reason of the community. But in both ways our good or evil acts have the notion of merit or demerit before God. By reason of God himself, indeed, insofar as he is man's ultimate end; and it is owed that all acts be referred to the ultimate end; hence he who does an evil act, not referable to God, does not preserve the honor of God, which is owed to the ultimate end. But on the part of the whole community of the universe, because in any community he who rules the community chiefly has care of the common good; hence it belongs to him to render retribution for those things which are done well or badly in the community. But God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, and especially of rational creatures. Hence it is manifest that human acts have the notion of merit or demerit by comparison to him; otherwise it would follow that God would not have care of human acts."

22. 6. That an act be meritorious, it is more probably required that it be from some supernatural motive. - For Sacred Scripture, when it promises eternal life to moral works, adds something which signifies that those works must be done from a supernatural motive. It promises eternal life to works done for Christ, for the name of Christ, in the name of Christ, etc. Moreover, Scripture and the Fathers teach that the just man lives by faith, that faith is the beginning, root, and foundation of justification, and consequently that man does not merit except through works done from faith. But faith proposes a supernatural end to our works. Indeed supernatural merit must have a relation to God, the supernatural end of man. Hence the Apostle at Heb. 11:6: "To those who... seek glory and incorruption and honor, he will render eternal life." Namely, to those who intend by their works glory and honor before God, and incorruptible or supernatural goods, God will repay eternal life. Furthermore those acts are meritorious of eternal life which are elicited by infused virtues. But infused virtues are distinguished in species from acquired virtues according to order to the ultimate end and according to their proper objects. "Intention makes the work good; faith directs the intention." St. Augustine, on Psalm 31, n. 4. "But, because what does not proceed from the fountain of faith does not arrive at eternal rewards, the condition of heavenly works is one thing, that of earthly works another." St. Leo the Great, Sermon 7 on Lent, ch. 3;

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 63, a. 4; Suarez, l. c., ch. 10; Maur., bk. 6, q. 92; Struggl, part 8. Cf. here n. 6 ff.

85. Natural faculties, aided by divine concurrence, indeed suffice for eliciting an act naturally good, provided it is not too arduous;¹ but, since in fact we have been ordered to a supernatural end, it is useful to say certain things in passing concerning those principles which are superadded to our nature for making a meritorious act.

¹ What fallen man can and cannot do, without grace, as to ethically good works, was declared in the treatise concerning Grace, n. 33-48. - In the same treatise all those things which concur toward a meritorious act are set forth more fully.

1. The Christian, by receiving baptism, is constituted an adoptive son of God and heir of the heavenly kingdom, and receives a certain participation of the divine nature, namely habitual grace, by force of which human nature is elevated to the supernatural state, and radically becomes capable of acting meritoriously; at the same time virtues are infused into the powers of the soul, which perfect them and render them proximately apt for eliciting supernatural acts; to these are added the gifts of the Holy Spirit, for performing more perfect and more arduous works by a certain divine instinct. Finally, that our faculties, already adorned with supernatural virtues and gifts, may break forth into act and in fact elicit supernatural works, undeserved helps are provided to them, which are called actual graces. Thus in Christians nature is perfected by grace; faculties are completed by infused virtues and gifts; the concurrence by which God cooperates with our acts is supernatural; thus we are able to act not only honorably, but also supernaturally and meritoriously.

But when habitual grace and charity are lost by mortal sin, faith and hope remain in the soul, provided someone has not sinned gravely against these virtues; nor are actual graces denied to him, by whose aid he is able to elicit supernatural acts¹ of fear of God, hope, penance, and love, and to recover sanctifying grace.

¹ These acts of the sinner are indeed supernatural, but not meritorious de condigno, as is declared in the treatise concerning Grace.

86. 2. But infidels, who have not been justified by baptismal regeneration, receive at the opportune time undeserved helps, by whose aid they can fulfill the natural law. When for some time they have observed this law, God, according to the common opinion, kindly bestows on them, not from justice, but from mercy, certain actual graces of illumination; if they consent to these, they will be led step by step to faith, hope, charity, and justification; but once justified, they are equated with Christians, and can truly merit. - All these things indeed are set forth at length in the treatise concerning Grace.²

² Since in the present Treatise we are able to touch these things only in passing, the professor, according to various circumstances, will explain the same things more or less to his students.

197. 1. Notion. Meritorious acts are distinguished from supernatural acts in this, that more conditions are required for merit properly so called than for the supernatural.

All honorable acts are called supernatural which proceed from a supernatural principle (i.e. from a faculty elevated by grace, whether habitual or actual), and at the same time are elicited from a motive known through revelation;¹ hence certain acts of unbelievers, by which they prepare themselves for justification, are supernatural, although they are not properly meritorious, from what is to be said.

¹ Certain theologians, with Noldin (n. 79-80), assert that the former condition suffices, and that it is not required that the motive be supernatural; for, when the root and principle of the act is something supernatural, the fruit or effect must also be supernatural. Yet others more commonly reject that opinion; for since acts are specified by the formal object, supernatural works differ from natural works by reason of the formal object, or motive. - To compose the dispute, perhaps it could be said that an act elicited under the influence of actual grace is already supernatural inchoatively, but does not become totally supernatural unless there is added a motive known by faith.

But a meritorious act is a good and supernatural work done on account of God, from which, divine ordination being posited, there arises a right to supernatural retribution.

It is called (a) a good and supernatural work, so that thus it may be distinguished from natural merit by which someone can obtain a merely natural reward; thus an unbeliever, by acting honorably, can obtain some natural recompense. But a meritorious work ought to be supernatural both by reason of the principle, insofar as it is done under the influence of grace, and more probably by reason of the end, insofar as it is done at least implicitly on account of a supernatural end, as will be declared below. (b) On account of God; for if some work is not done on account of God, there is no reason why retribution should be expected from Him. (c) From which there arises a right...; in this consists the essence of merit, and it is distinguished from impetration; for merit gives a certain right to retribution, while impetration gives no right, but obtains favor from mere mercy. (d) Yet there is added, divine ordination being posited; for unless God had willed to give us supernatural retribution on account of our good works, we would have no right to it: all that we have or do is from God and is owed to God, and therefore we can have no strict right relative to God, unless He Himself confers such a right upon us. (e) To supernatural retribution; in this merit is distinguished from satisfaction; for satisfaction compensates for the injury brought against God, while merit is ordered to obtaining reward.¹

¹ Therefore a threefold value can be present in our works: impetratory, which arises from petition clothed with due conditions, and is founded partly on the mercy of God, partly on His promises; meritorious, which arises from the supernatural work itself done on account of God, and is founded partly on justice, partly on the divine promise; satisfactory, insofar as it is a penal work which is accepted by God as compensation for the injury brought against Him. In the prayer of the just this threefold value can be found: insofar as it fittingly asks from God, it can impetrate; insofar as it performs a supernatural work acceptable to God, it can merit grace; but insofar as it performs a difficult and laborious work, it makes satisfaction for its sins.

198. 2. Species. A twofold merit is usually distinguished:

(a) Merit de condigno is that to which a reward is owed from justice, or at least from fidelity: from justice, when the work of itself equals the reward; from fidelity, when a promise is present, by force of which the reward, although exceeding the work, is nevertheless infallibly granted. Merit de condigno is true merit, or merit simply and properly so called, and therefore theologians intend to speak of it as often as they do not expressly signify otherwise.

(b) Merit de congruo is that to which reward is owed not from justice or fidelity, but from mere fittingness. - To explain the difference between each, certain theologians use this comparison: a soldier who conducted himself very strenuously in war has a twofold merit: he merits de condigno the stipend promised to soldiers; but he merits de congruo, besides the ordinary stipend, to be promoted to some dignity.

In the Treatise De Gratia (n. 193-204), it is proved that a justified man, that is, one placed in the state of grace, can truly merit an increase of grace and eternal life; here therefore it will suffice to set forth the conditions required for merit, especially the conditions required for merit de condigno; for the conditions for merit de congruo are the same, with two exceptions, namely the state of grace and the promise of God, which are not required for merit de congruo. - Conditions of this kind are taken: 1. on the part of the one operating; 2. on the part of the work; 3. on the part of God.

32. 4. A natural act and a supernatural act, according as it is elicited by natural powers alone (for example, to think, to speak) or is produced by the help of supernatural grace (for example, to elicit an act of contrition, of faith, etc.). An act is not supernatural from the fact that it turns upon a supernatural object, but from the fact that it is elicited by a supernatural principle. Hence if someone considers the mystery of the Trinity by the light of natural reason alone, he does not elicit a supernatural act; on the contrary, if someone by the help of grace resists a carnal temptation, he performs a supernatural act. - All supernatural acts elicited in this life are meritorious⁹ (either de condigno or at least de congruo, properly or broadly so called).

⁹ Cf. below, on merit, n. 139.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 3 and 4; q. 114, a. 1, 2, 5-10.

190. Merit is etymologically derived from the word merces, and accordingly designates a service or laborious work done for the utility of another, which is not usually done except by hired workers for a stipend or wage. In the broadest sense it signifies whatever is sufficient, suitable, worthy for obtaining something, or that which demands something, and thus it is said even of inanimate things, for example, of a painting; more properly it is a human work to which retribution is due from some justice strictly or broadly so called, and thus it is also said of an evil work (Mt. XVI, 26; Job VI, 2; Heb. X, 29; Eccli. XVI, 14, 15); but in the strict sense it is a good work done in the service or benefit of another and therefore worthy of reward and retribution.

It can be regarded in the abstract and in the concrete: in the concrete it is a work of virtue to which a wage is due, a work worthy of retribution; in the abstract it is a property of the human act, namely, the moral value of the work by virtue of which it is worthy that something be repaid to the one operating, a goodness existing in the human act on account of which it is worthy of praise and reward, or the dignity of the work and therefore a right or title in the one operating to retribution.

191. The philosophical foundation of merit is in the exigency of the order of nature, or in the natural law by force of which the activity proper to a being belongs to it and therefore ought to profit it, since it has the perfection of the being itself as its end. Hence when a person acting freely has chosen an act in service or utility of another person, that person has furnished something which is his own; hence it is equitable and just that the other render some good, by compensating the good furnished (II-II, q. 106, a. 3; I, q. 65, a. 2). But if it is demanded and rendered according to equality, the merit is from justice properly so called; otherwise from equity and decency, friendship, and liberality, which in some way pertain to justice.

On the contrary, since every man, in order to his ultimate end, is of the same dignity, as being his own right, and consequently is not a mere means subordinated to others but exists for his own good, therefore he cannot be deprived of his order to his proper good without justice demanding recompense of punishment. Hence St. Thomas (q. 21, a. 3): he who "acts to the advantage or harm of another" "acquires merit or demerit in order to the retribution which is made according to justice."

192. Division of merit. - A. By reason of the one rewarding, merit is civil when the work is done for the utility or service either of an individual or of society; and moral when it is done in the service of God.

a) As to civil merit:

1. An act directed to the good (or evil) of an individual person has merit (or demerit) directly before the person, indirectly before society, into which the good of the person redounds, who in some way is its part and member.

2. An act directed to the good (or evil) of society has merit primarily before society, secondarily before the individual members insofar as they are members.

3. An act directed to the good (or evil) of the agent himself does not have merit before the agent himself (because justice is toward another), but can indirectly have the character of merit before society (q. 21, a. 3).

b) Every human act has moral merit before God (or demerit), insofar as it tends to the profit (or detriment), not of God Himself, but of His honor and the order established by Him; and indeed:

1. By reason of God Himself: for God is the ultimate end of man. But it is due to the ultimate end that all acts be referred to it. Therefore one who does an evil act not referable to God does not preserve the honor which is due to the ultimate end, and conversely.

2. By reason of the society of which God is ruler and guardian: God is governor and ruler of the whole universe. But he who rules a community has care of the common good and ought to render retribution for those things which are done well or badly in society. Therefore human acts have merit or demerit before God; otherwise one would have to say that He does not care about human acts (a. 4).

B. By reason of the reward, merit is one thing natural, which proceeds from the powers of nature and expects only a natural reward; whence if it is done in the service of God, it is done in order to God as natural end; another thing supernatural, which is done from the powers of grace in order to God as supernatural end, and merits a supernatural reward, namely, the good of eternal life. It is also called theological.

They differ in this, that the first follows every good act by reason of its goodness, according to some relation of justice to God, from whom, at least from fittingness, it merits at least a temporal good, and therefore imports a wage from the very notion of the act; the other imports a wage to be rendered not only from the very notion of the act but also from the state of the person operating, and therefore belongs only to supernatural acts and indeed only to the just man, to whom the wage due is eternal life itself or some other good in order to eternal life. We are treating here only of supernatural merit.

1. Del Prado well notes, De Gratia et libero arbitrio, I, p. 534: "It must be noted beforehand that merit can be taken broadly, insofar as it imports any wage whatever, whether due from justice properly so called, or from a certain proportion or fittingness, insofar as only the very notion of human acts is considered, and under this relation the Angelic Doctor treated of merit above, I-II, q. 21, and then merit is something consequent upon all and single human acts, that is, free acts, by reason of their goodness (cf. ib. a. 3, and a. 4, ad 3). The notion of merit can also be taken in a strict mode, insofar as it imports a wage to be rendered to free acts, not only from the very notion of the act, but also from the state of the person acting; and then merit is taken by order to eternal life; and the wage due is either eternal glory, or any other good whatever, whether spiritual or temporal, reduplicatively as it is a means for attaining the glory itself of eternal life. And under this higher consideration St. Thomas treats of merit in the whole of q. 114."

C. By reason of dignity, merit is: either merit simply so called, or merit de condigno, to which from justice a reward is due, for which it has equal value and equal dignity, or condignity. It is a work whose value equals the value of the reward, because there is found an equality between merit and reward according to right estimation: an equality, therefore, not always material or quantitative, but moral, which is called equality of power and proportion, as there is between seed and the fruit which is born from it (q. 114, a. 3, ad 3). Or it is merit de congruo and in a certain respect, to which in no way is retribution made from justice, but only from a certain fittingness and equity and friendship or liberality of the giver is a gift bestowed which befits the one giving; and therefore it does not infallibly obtain the reward, unless the one repaying has promised, nor then from justice but from fidelity. It is a work whose value does not equal the value of the reward, because equality between reward and merit is lacking.

In the former merit there is an exigency toward reward; in the latter, only fittingness. The former can be compared to the stipend which is due to a soldier and to the wage which is due to a servant; the latter to an honorary distinction (for example, an equestrian order) which a prince bestows upon a soldier for brave deeds, not from justice nor altogether gratuitously, or to a gratuity or gift which inferiors or servants receive on account of occupations more or less supererogatory. This division is not univocal but analogous.

193. What can man merit? - De condigno the just man can merit for himself an increase of habitual grace, the remission of venial sin, heavenly glory and its increase. De congruo he can merit for himself infallibly actual graces, the first excepted.

Christ alone could merit de condigno for others, as being the head of all men. De congruo a man can merit for others, but not infallibly: actual graces, even the first, habitual grace and its increase, the remission of sin, and eternal life.

These things are proved in the treatise on grace. Cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114.

58. Merit is of two kinds. Condign merit is a strict title to a reward, on account either of a promise freely given or of a benefit received; it, moreover, imposes an obligation upon one person to make an adequate return to another. Congruous merit is not a strict title to a recompense, but only a matter of propriety or suitableness in the bestowal of a reward; hence there is no just claim on the one side and, consequently, no real obligation on the other.

Part I. Merit with regard to our fellow-men. Proof. We often have the power either to confer or not to confer a benefit upon our fellow-men, according as we choose. Now, if we freely do good to others, reason dictates that they ought to do good to us in return; and thus we have a title, founded on reason, to receive a reward from our fellow-men. This title is called merit. Hence we can merit a reward from men.

Part II. Merit with regard to God. Proof. We are often physically free either to do a certain act, whereby we honor God and thus contribute to His external glory, or not to do the act. If we perform the act in question, we give to Him what is, in some manner, a benefit, and we have what is, in some manner, a claim to receive a benefit in return.

Part III. The latter is not merit in the same sense as our merit with men. Proof. The good we do our fellow-men, in so far as it is not due to them, obliges them strictly to a proportionate return; but we cannot strictly give anything to God which is not entirely due to Him, since, as creatures, we belong in every way to God our Creator. Consequently, if He owes us a reward at all, it is not for the benefits He receives at our hands; but only because He owes it to Himself to fulfill His promises of a reward. For, by implanting in every heart an insatiable longing after perfect happiness, He has implicitly promised us a reward — on condition, of course, that we do our part. Therefore, we can merit a reward from God and men: from men, by reason of that which they owe us; from God, by reason of that which He owes Himself.