First Question: On Merit, Especially Supernatural Merit

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 3 and 4; q. 114, a. 1, 2, 5-10.

190. Merit is etymologically derived from the word merces, and accordingly designates a service or laborious work done for the utility of another, which is not usually done except by hired workers for a stipend or wage. In the broadest sense it signifies whatever is sufficient, suitable, worthy for obtaining something, or that which demands something, and thus it is said even of inanimate things, for example, of a painting; more properly it is a human work to which retribution is due from some justice strictly or broadly so called, and thus it is also said of an evil work (Mt. XVI, 26; Job VI, 2; Heb. X, 29; Eccli. XVI, 14, 15); but in the strict sense it is a good work done in the service or benefit of another and therefore worthy of reward and retribution.

It can be regarded in the abstract and in the concrete: in the concrete it is a work of virtue to which a wage is due, a work worthy of retribution; in the abstract it is a property of the human act, namely, the moral value of the work by virtue of which it is worthy that something be repaid to the one operating, a goodness existing in the human act on account of which it is worthy of praise and reward, or the dignity of the work and therefore a right or title in the one operating to retribution.

191. The philosophical foundation of merit is in the exigency of the order of nature, or in the natural law by force of which the activity proper to a being belongs to it and therefore ought to profit it, since it has the perfection of the being itself as its end. Hence when a person acting freely has chosen an act in service or utility of another person, that person has furnished something which is his own; hence it is equitable and just that the other render some good, by compensating the good furnished (II-II, q. 106, a. 3; I, q. 65, a. 2). But if it is demanded and rendered according to equality, the merit is from justice properly so called; otherwise from equity and decency, friendship, and liberality, which in some way pertain to justice.

On the contrary, since every man, in order to his ultimate end, is of the same dignity, as being his own right, and consequently is not a mere means subordinated to others but exists for his own good, therefore he cannot be deprived of his order to his proper good without justice demanding recompense of punishment. Hence St. Thomas (q. 21, a. 3): he who "acts to the advantage or harm of another" "acquires merit or demerit in order to the retribution which is made according to justice."

192. Division of merit. - A. By reason of the one rewarding, merit is civil when the work is done for the utility or service either of an individual or of society; and moral when it is done in the service of God.

a) As to civil merit:

1. An act directed to the good (or evil) of an individual person has merit (or demerit) directly before the person, indirectly before society, into which the good of the person redounds, who in some way is its part and member.

2. An act directed to the good (or evil) of society has merit primarily before society, secondarily before the individual members insofar as they are members.

3. An act directed to the good (or evil) of the agent himself does not have merit before the agent himself (because justice is toward another), but can indirectly have the character of merit before society (q. 21, a. 3).

b) Every human act has moral merit before God (or demerit), insofar as it tends to the profit (or detriment), not of God Himself, but of His honor and the order established by Him; and indeed:

1. By reason of God Himself: for God is the ultimate end of man. But it is due to the ultimate end that all acts be referred to it. Therefore one who does an evil act not referable to God does not preserve the honor which is due to the ultimate end, and conversely.

2. By reason of the society of which God is ruler and guardian: God is governor and ruler of the whole universe. But he who rules a community has care of the common good and ought to render retribution for those things which are done well or badly in society. Therefore human acts have merit or demerit before God; otherwise one would have to say that He does not care about human acts (a. 4).

B. By reason of the reward, merit is one thing natural, which proceeds from the powers of nature and expects only a natural reward; whence if it is done in the service of God, it is done in order to God as natural end; another thing supernatural, which is done from the powers of grace in order to God as supernatural end, and merits a supernatural reward, namely, the good of eternal life. It is also called theological.

They differ in this, that the first follows every good act by reason of its goodness, according to some relation of justice to God, from whom, at least from fittingness, it merits at least a temporal good, and therefore imports a wage from the very notion of the act; the other imports a wage to be rendered not only from the very notion of the act but also from the state of the person operating, and therefore belongs only to supernatural acts and indeed only to the just man, to whom the wage due is eternal life itself or some other good in order to eternal life. We are treating here only of supernatural merit.

1. Del Prado well notes, De Gratia et libero arbitrio, I, p. 534: "It must be noted beforehand that merit can be taken broadly, insofar as it imports any wage whatever, whether due from justice properly so called, or from a certain proportion or fittingness, insofar as only the very notion of human acts is considered, and under this relation the Angelic Doctor treated of merit above, I-II, q. 21, and then merit is something consequent upon all and single human acts, that is, free acts, by reason of their goodness (cf. ib. a. 3, and a. 4, ad 3). The notion of merit can also be taken in a strict mode, insofar as it imports a wage to be rendered to free acts, not only from the very notion of the act, but also from the state of the person acting; and then merit is taken by order to eternal life; and the wage due is either eternal glory, or any other good whatever, whether spiritual or temporal, reduplicatively as it is a means for attaining the glory itself of eternal life. And under this higher consideration St. Thomas treats of merit in the whole of q. 114."

C. By reason of dignity, merit is: either merit simply so called, or merit de condigno, to which from justice a reward is due, for which it has equal value and equal dignity, or condignity. It is a work whose value equals the value of the reward, because there is found an equality between merit and reward according to right estimation: an equality, therefore, not always material or quantitative, but moral, which is called equality of power and proportion, as there is between seed and the fruit which is born from it (q. 114, a. 3, ad 3). Or it is merit de congruo and in a certain respect, to which in no way is retribution made from justice, but only from a certain fittingness and equity and friendship or liberality of the giver is a gift bestowed which befits the one giving; and therefore it does not infallibly obtain the reward, unless the one repaying has promised, nor then from justice but from fidelity. It is a work whose value does not equal the value of the reward, because equality between reward and merit is lacking.

In the former merit there is an exigency toward reward; in the latter, only fittingness. The former can be compared to the stipend which is due to a soldier and to the wage which is due to a servant; the latter to an honorary distinction (for example, an equestrian order) which a prince bestows upon a soldier for brave deeds, not from justice nor altogether gratuitously, or to a gratuity or gift which inferiors or servants receive on account of occupations more or less supererogatory. This division is not univocal but analogous.

193. What can man merit? - De condigno the just man can merit for himself an increase of habitual grace, the remission of venial sin, heavenly glory and its increase. De congruo he can merit for himself infallibly actual graces, the first excepted.

Christ alone could merit de condigno for others, as being the head of all men. De congruo a man can merit for others, but not infallibly: actual graces, even the first, habitual grace and its increase, the remission of sin, and eternal life.

These things are proved in the treatise on grace. Cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114.