The object of an act

By the object is here meant that to which the will primarily and directly tends; that which it determines to do looked at in itself, apart from the circumstances with which the action when done will be clothed; or it is the action considered in the abstract.

It is obvious that some objects, in the sense above defined, have an objective morality of their own, and this causes the will which tends towards them to be either good or bad as the object is good or bad. To blaspheme God is an action which no creature of his can will without the greatest inordinateness. The will to commit murder, or to steal another’s property, is essentially an evil will, because it tends to an evil object. On the contrary, to love God, to relieve human misery, to show love, honour, and reverence to one’s parents, are good actions, because these objects are good, and the will that tends to them is good.

Human actions, then, derive their specific morality from the object, whenever that object is of itself conformable to rational human nature or, on the contrary, not conformable to it. If the object is indifferent, without any objective moral quality, as walking, the action will derive its morality from the circumstances in which the action is performed.

Whether morality, or moral goodness or malice, is found only in the interior act of the will, or also in the exterior act? - Morality formally is only in the interior, free act of the will; materially, however, it is only also in the exterior act. For a twofold moral goodness or malice can be distinguished in the exterior act. First, the objective moral goodness or malice of the exterior act can be considered, which that act has of itself, namely from its proper object and circumstances, by which it is objectively affected, according to the right order of reason. Goodness or malice of this kind, which the exterior act has in itself because of due or undue matter and due or undue circumstances, is derived from reason, according as that object and those circumstances exhibit the rectitude of reason or a deviation from the right order of reason. This objective goodness or malice of the exterior act is prior to the goodness or malice of the act of the will. And thus the exterior act is the object of the will, insofar as it is proposed to the will by reason as a certain good apprehended and ordered by reason, or as departing from this order; and it causes moral goodness or malice in the will.

Second, moral goodness or malice can be considered in the exterior act in order to the end, according as this exterior act stands under the interior act of the will. For the end is the proper object of the will. And thus the notion of good or evil which the exterior act has from order to the end is found first in the act of the will, and is derived from it to the exterior act. Moreover, insofar as the exterior act consists in the execution of the work, it is an effect of the will and follows the will. The will is then compared to the exterior act as an efficient cause; hence the moral goodness or malice of the act of the will is the form of the exterior act, as existing in the acting cause, S. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 1. Therefore "the goodness of the end redounds from the will into the exterior act, and the goodness of the matter and circumstances redounds into the act of the will," S. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 3.

Now the exterior act and the interior act of the will, as they are considered in the genus of morals, are one human act, ib. If the human act is considered adequately in this way, the formal moral goodness or malice of the human act is intrinsically only in the interior act of the will, but in the exterior act only by extrinsic denomination. For the morality of a human act, formally considered, is found only in a free act, and freedom formally is only in the will. Likewise formal moral goodness is from order to the end, which is the proper object of the will, q. 20. a. 1. Hence it is clear that in the exterior act moral goodness of this kind, which is according to order to the end, depends wholly on the will, ib. a. 2.

But that "goodness of the exterior act which it has from matter and circumstances is other than the goodness which is from the end; it is not, however, other than the goodness of the will which it has from the very act willed, but is compared to it as its reason and cause," q. 20. a. 4 ad 2. This is confirmed, "for however much the exterior act may seem good in itself and conformable to reason, nevertheless if it is commanded by an evil internal act or depraved intention and election, it is not good insofar as it is a human act. Therefore this is a sign that in the notion of a human act it is good only by denomination from the interior act. A similar argument is this: because the exterior act precisely and taken in itself does not add formal moral goodness to a man, nor render him more virtuous. For if we understand someone who, thinking that he can execute the exterior act of virtue, has an efficacious will to exercise such an act, he is upright and virtuous, whether he can really execute it or not, because virtue does not depend on a faculty which can be lacking to us unwillingly, but on the will, supposing that the will is equal.... This doctrine concerning external acts proceeds in the same way in acts of the intellect and of the sensitive appetite." Suarez tr. 3. d. 10, s. 1. n. 6. 11. "What is clearer than that the will is reputed as the deed, where necessity excludes the deed?" S. Bernard Ep. 77; Gen. 22:16; Matt. 5:28. The will, namely a will efficacious of itself. E. M. 6. 71. 72.

Does the external act add morality in some way to the internal act? "It must be said first, that the exterior act of itself does not bear an increase of goodness or malice, if the other things are equal, in the interior act. Thus D. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 4.... because the exterior act does not have a goodness distinct from the interior, and necessarily follows from it if it is in our power; but if it is not in our power, it does not diminish the goodness of the will.... Second, it must be said that external action is sometimes necessary for the goodness of the will, or for such goodness.... For when it is in man's power to execute an external action, he cannot have a perfect interior will unless he executes the exterior action, because the exterior act is the term and end of the interior, and because an absolutely perfect will is one that acts when it can.... Third, it must be said that accidentally the exterior act can increase goodness or malice simply.... For 1. because of the exterior act a man often endures and perseveres more in the interior act; indeed he often multiplies interior acts, and in this way it is morally worse to kill. 2. Because the exterior action itself both kindles the affection, and thus contributes to the interior act, in the way in which vocal prayer is accustomed to contribute to interior devotion. 3. External actions are useful for moderating the passions and habituating the body, so that it may more easily serve justice.... It must also be added that good external acts are useful for the effect of satisfaction for temporal punishment due for sin, because satisfaction is taken not only from goodness, but especially from the penal character of the act; but the exterior act of itself brings its own pain and sorrow. Finally it must be added that exterior acts are necessary for certain effects of grace, which are conferred either ex opere operato, or from a special privilege; such as are the effects of the sacraments and the effects of martyrdom, and any others that are similar, because, since these effects do not depend on the mind alone of the one acting, they have been promised to one exercising such a work not only in affection, but also in effect; and in the same way on the contrary, evil external acts, or even their effects, are necessary for incurring certain punishments or censures, which are not incurred by the internal act alone." Suarez tr. 3. d. 10. s. 2. n. 2. 3. 4. 6; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 1; L. 1. 2. n. 42; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5 ad 1, q. 20. a. 5, 2. D. 40. a. 3; E. M. 71. 72.

What is understood by object? - By the object of a human act is not understood here whatever is proposed to the will; for in this way both the end and the circumstances would also be its object. Rather, it is understood as that thing which someone immediately or directly and per se wills. The object is not considered here physically, namely as it is some existing thing. About the same object physically considered, moral acts diverse in species can be concerned. And thus, for example, concerning the same wife there can be an honorable conjugal act and a shameful act of adultery. The object is considered here morally, namely as it stands under the rule of morals, or under law commanding, prohibiting, permitting. And thus the object of theft is not another's property precisely insofar as it is a thing, but insofar as right reason forbids that it be taken away against the owner's will. Hence A. D. says 1. 2. q. 19. a. 2 ad 3: "it must be said that the good is represented by reason to the will as object, and insofar as it falls under the order of reason it pertains to the genus of morals and causes moral goodness in the act of the will." S. Th. q. 18. a. 5, S. q. 41. a. 3 ad 5.

Do human acts take moral goodness or malice from the object? - R. Affirmatively. The reason is that acts are intrinsically specified from the object. For the object is said to be that which we will. That which we will; not, to whom we will. Therefore as they have species from the object, so they also have goodness and malice. "The good and evil of an action," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 2, "as also of other things, is considered from the fullness of being, or from its defect. But the first thing that seems to pertain to fullness of being is that which gives species to a thing. But just as a natural thing has species from its form, so an action has species from its object, as also motion from its term.

And therefore, just as the first goodness of a natural thing is considered from its form, which gives species to it, so also the first goodness of a moral act is considered from a suitable object. Hence it is also called by some good from the genus, for example, to use one's own thing. And just as in natural things the first evil is if the thing generated does not attain the specific form, for example, if a man is not generated, but something in place of a man, so the first evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, as to take another's property. And it is called evil from the genus, the genus being taken for the species, in that way of speaking by which we call the whole human species the human genus." Hos. 9:10; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 1.

Is an act good if the object is good, but the end evil? - R. Negatively. For he who acts for an evil end, although he wills the good, nevertheless wills it under the notion of evil, and therefore according as it is willed by him it is evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7. Hence S. Alph. 1. 5. n. 38 says: "if the object is good, but the end of the one acting is evil, the human act is wholly evil from the malice of the end, which destroys every goodness." Except unless the end is lightly evil, not chief and moving to acting, but secondary and impelling, for example, if someone preaches the word of God and is also impelled by vainglory. For there is a certain light disorder, which does not corrupt the substance of the action from its object and end, but is joined extrinsically by another act. Cf. 81. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4. 6, 2. D. 38. q. 1. a. 4; Suarez tr. 3. d. 6. s. 1. 2, d. 8. s. 1. n. 13.

Is an act good if the object is evil, but the end good? - R. Negatively. The Apostle condemns those saying: let us do evil things, that good things may come. Rom. 3:8. But the reason is that the intention of a good end, as extrinsic to the very willed object, if this is evil, does not prevent someone from really willing evil. Since the substance of the act is from the object, if this is evil, it is impossible for it to be made honorable from a good end, or even from good circumstances. - S. Aug. l. Contra mendac. n. 18; Suarez tr. 3. d. 4, d. 8. s. 1. n. 20 seq.

What is lawful to do against the enemy in war? - In a just war it is lawful to do all things against the enemy which are necessary and apt for obtaining the just end of war, yet according to the command and express or tacit will of the commander of the war. The reason is that he who has a right to the end also has a right to the necessary and apt means. Therefore in a just war it is lawful to do against the enemy all things which are necessary and apt for obtaining the just end of war. Which are necessary and apt; for other things harmful to the neighbor, which are not necessary for such an end, cannot justly be inflicted, and the damage afterward must be repaired. The just end of war, namely to overcome the enemies. Laym. 9; Sporer 112; Struggl 45; L. 409.

5. In order that an act be morally evil, it suffices that the malice be indirectly, virtually, or implicitly willed in another thing to which it is annexed. The reason is that malice cannot be intended otherwise. No one operates intending evil; but someone does not seek evil except by reason of some good which he apprehends in it. Therefore it suffices that someone seek in a thing the pleasurableness to which he knows malice to be annexed.

7. Whether an act is good if the object is good, but the end evil? — R. In the negative. For he who acts for an evil end, although he wills the good, nevertheless wills it under the aspect of evil, and therefore as it is willed by him it is evil. The honorableness of the means is then in no way truly sought, but only the means of attaining a depraved end is sought. “When someone wills to give alms on account of vain glory, this is one act of the will, and this whole act is evil, although it does not have malice from everything that is in it.” St. Thomas, 2 D. 38. q. 1. a. 4 ad 4; 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7. And St. Alphonsus says: “If the object is good, but the end of the one operating is evil, the human act is wholly evil from the malice of the end, which destroys every goodness.” Tr. de Act. hum. n. XXXVIII; Suarez, D. 6, S. 1, 2; D. 8, S. 1, n. XIII.

26. • The object is that about which the moral act is concerned, and in which the will of the agent is proximately and per se terminated.

The object is good, or evil, or indifferent, according as it agrees or does not agree with reason, law, or right order, or holds itself apart from law or right order. Likewise it can be intrinsically good or evil, that is, by reason of itself from the requirement of right order; or not intrinsically, but only by reason of a positive precept.

I say: From the object morally considered is taken the first and essential morality of a human act; for the morality which the object gives to an action is conceived before every other which may come either from the end or from the circumstances.

The morality which is taken from the object is called morality, or objective goodness or malice. - If the object is in itself indifferent, it will receive its morality from the end or from the circumstances.

Intrinsically evil objects, however, are of a threefold class, namely 1. Some are such absolutely, and independently of every circumstance, because of themselves they involve repugnance with right order absolutely necessary, as hatred of God, blasphemy, etc. - 2. Others are intrinsically evil, not precisely in themselves, but by reason of an adjunct or of some condition which depends on the dominative power of God or of man: such are the taking away of another's thing, injury to body or reputation, and similar things which sometimes become lawful. - 3. Finally, others are evil only by reason of danger which they ordinarily have joined to them, as the sight of a base object, the reading of a depraved book, etc. These, a reasonable cause being given and the danger being removed, can become lawful.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 2.

101. Etymologically, an object is that which is set before someone; hence the object of a human act is everything that is set before the deliberation of reason and the choice of the will, and thus it also includes circumstances. In the present matter, however, it is taken in a stricter sense and designates that which, whether the thing is a thing or a person, is first and per se attained by the act, and thus it is distinguished from circumstances, which are not attained except secondarily and per accidens and by reason of another: to take another's property is the object of theft; little or much is a circumstance.

Concerning the essential objective element nothing general can be said, because, since all objects are singular, it varies with the different objects.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 2; a. 4, ad 3; a. 6; a. 7, ad 1; a. 10; q. 1, a. 3, ad 3; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3.

147. State of the question.

We have seen that the supreme species in morality, namely goodness and malice, arise from object, circumstance, and end; but the lowest species of moral acts must also be considered, according to which they have such a special goodness or such a special malice. Hence it is asked:

a) whether that distinction arises from the same three sources;

b) indeed, since a natural being is placed in only one species, it is doubted whether several species of morality can be found in one moral act.

To these we shall give an answer, with object, circumstances, and end considered separately.

148. Principle I. The object considered morally gives to human acts not only generic morality but also specific morality.

It is explained. The sense is: the object not only makes the essential distinction between good and evil, and constitutes the supreme species of goodness and malice in human acts, but also the lowest species by which various good or evil acts are distinguished among themselves.

It is proved: a moral act is essentially a movement toward an object considered morally, as toward a term. But every movement essentially has its lowest species from the term. Therefore every human act has its lowest moral species from the object considered morally. And therefore according as objects express diverse agreement with reason or opposition to it, various species of good acts are distinguished (for example, love of God and of neighbor, faith and charity, fortitude and temperance), or of evil acts (for example, homicide and theft, blasphemy and detraction, lust and anger).

It is no obstacle to this doctrine 1) that a circumstance can constitute the lowest species of morality in a human act, because then it enters into the object and becomes its principal condition and, as it were, the specific difference of the human act, as will be explained more below, art. 2;

2. that a human act receives species from the end, because a) the end is the object of the will; b) as to the exterior commanded act, the end of the work is the same as the object, while the adjoined end of the one acting is a circumstance adding species, which is considered by the agent as an accessory condition of the object arriving extrinsically, insofar as the act takes place under the influence of the will, whose object is the end of the one acting (cf. art. 3).

149. Principle II. One and the same moral act can have a multiple species of morality.

It is proved: 1) This is not verified of a human act according to physical being, because a physical being is specified by a natural form which is determined to one thing and therefore is one in species; but according to moral being an act is specified by an object apprehended by reason, which is not determined to one thing, but under a diverse consideration can be referred to diverse species according to supervening moral conditions, whether the species are per se subordinated to one another, or are disparate, as if theft is ordered to drunkenness (a. 7, ad 1). Thus to take what belongs to another from a sacred place includes a diverse specific repugnance to the order of reason, which dictates that injury is not to be done to a sacred place; and yet one object remains, but one composed of several things.

2. Moral being accedes as a quality to physical being itself, and therefore just as one physical thing can be of diverse species of perfection or defect according to accidents, for example the same man white and musical, blind and deaf, so one physical act can pertain to several moral species. Hence nothing prevents the same act from being in diverse species of virtue or sin.

150. Principle III. One and the same moral act cannot nevertheless be both good and evil at the same time and in the same respect.

It is proved: for an act to be simply good, goodness from every part is required; for it to be simply evil, malice from any part suffices. Therefore.

And nevertheless an act evil from one part is not therefore deprived of all goodness proceeding from other sources: thus an act good according to species can be evil because of a circumstance, or an act good according to species and circumstances can be ordered to an evil end, because, as St. Thomas says, "when the posterior has been removed, the prior nevertheless remains," I Sent., d. 41, q. 1, a. 2 (cf. I-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3). The exception is if the act is done from the sole or total cause of evil, because then no goodness is intended or contracted, but the act is considered as a mere means of evil, insofar as the object is considered as wholly evil.