§ I. On the Object

26. • The object is that about which the moral act is concerned, and in which the will of the agent is proximately and per se terminated.

The object is good, or evil, or indifferent, according as it agrees or does not agree with reason, law, or right order, or holds itself apart from law or right order. Likewise it can be intrinsically good or evil, that is, by reason of itself from the requirement of right order; or not intrinsically, but only by reason of a positive precept.

I say: From the object morally considered is taken the first and essential morality of a human act; for the morality which the object gives to an action is conceived before every other which may come either from the end or from the circumstances.

The morality which is taken from the object is called morality, or objective goodness or malice. - If the object is in itself indifferent, it will receive its morality from the end or from the circumstances.

Intrinsically evil objects, however, are of a threefold class, namely 1. Some are such absolutely, and independently of every circumstance, because of themselves they involve repugnance with right order absolutely necessary, as hatred of God, blasphemy, etc. - 2. Others are intrinsically evil, not precisely in themselves, but by reason of an adjunct or of some condition which depends on the dominative power of God or of man: such are the taking away of another's thing, injury to body or reputation, and similar things which sometimes become lawful. - 3. Finally, others are evil only by reason of danger which they ordinarily have joined to them, as the sight of a base object, the reading of a depraved book, etc. These, a reasonable cause being given and the danger being removed, can become lawful.