Patience

I. Notion of Patience. Patience is a moral virtue inclining man to moderate sorrow in sustaining evils below dangers of death. It is said: in sustaining evils below dangers of death; by these words it is indicated that it is a potential part of fortitude.

II. Object of Patience. 1. The remote material object is external actions, such as words and gestures of the body, by which internal sorrow is externally manifested; but the proximate object is the internal feelings of sorrow in sustaining evils below dangers of death.

2. The remote formal object is the reason of debt by which we do not allow the mind to succumb to sorrow (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 136, a. 1); but the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in the moderation of sorrow.

III. Opposed Vices. By defect there is opposed impatience, by which someone indulges sorrow more than is fair, and which is accustomed to lead to complaints, anger, etc.; by excess, insensibility, by which someone is moved less by evils, whether his own or another's, than right reason prescribes.

There are twelve Fruits of the Holy Ghost enumerated by St. Paul (Gal. v, 22-23). (a) Some of these acts grow out of the indwelling Spirit, and are delightful to the spiritual taste because they perfect the agent in himself. Charity, joy, and peace indicate that the soul is rightly disposed as to what is good; patience and longsuffering, that it is not disturbed by evils. (b) Others of these Fruits give spiritual delight because they perfect the agent in his relations to his fellows. Good will and kindness show that one is well-disposed towards others; meekness and fidelity, that injury does not overcome him, or make him deceitful. (c) Still other Fruits are delightful because they order a man’s life rightly as to external actions or internal passions, such as modesty, continency, chastity.

The Parts of Fortitude.—As has been said above, the parts of a virtue are subjective, integral and potential (see 1635, 1636).

(a) Fortitude has no subjective parts, for it is concerned with a very specialized matter, namely, the danger of death; and hence there is no room for differences of kind, although there are differences of degree (e.g., greater courage is needed to face an ignominious or cruel death than to face death amid applause or with little suffering).

(b) The integral parts of fortitude are those that are necessary for the perfect functioning of its offices in reference to major dangers (i.e., of death). Now, the first act of fortitude, namely, attack, requires greatness of soul (which makes one love the best things and despise all that is opposed to them) and greatness of deed (which makes one perform generously what was nobly willed). The second act of fortitude, namely, endurance, requires patience (that the soul be not thrown into dejection by difficulties) and steadfastness (that the soul be not turned aside from its purpose or wearied by long-continued opposition).

(c) The potential parts of fortitude are the four just named, but as exercised in reference to minor dangers.

Patience.—Patience is a virtue which from the love of moderation so controls the sadness caused by present afflictions that this passion neither excessively disturbs the internal powers of the soul nor produces anything inordinate in the external conduct. Hence it differs from the following:

(a) from temperance, for, although temperance also regulates sadness, the sadness with which it deals is caused by lack of pleasures, while that with which patience deals is caused by the presence of evils, especially of those brought on by annoyances from others;

(b) from the endurance of fortitude, for fortitude regulates fear of death, while patience regulates sadness caused by evils of whatever nature, such as sickness, bereavements, loss of money, persecution;

(c) from longsuffering and constancy, for the matter of these virtues is a good which cannot be obtained except by long waiting or a good which must be continually exercised, whereas the matter of patience is an evil that has to be endured in the present. But since the delay of a desired good causes sadness (Prov., xiii. 12), and since continuance in good is irksome to the flesh, both longsuffering and constancy are included under patience.

The Greatness of Patience.—(a) Its Rank.—Patience is less than the theological virtues, and also is inferior to prudence and justice, which perfect one in goodness; it is also less than fortitude and temperance, which preserve from the greatest impediments to goodness; for the office of patience is only to preserve one from lesser impediments, namely, the common adversities of life. But, on the other hand, patience is a part of fortitude—a potential part, because it does not connote the supreme heroism of fortitude, and an integral part, because courage in the face of death is bettered by the serenity which patience imparts.

(b) Its Necessity.—Patience is a most useful virtue. Without it one cannot long continue in the way of virtue on account of the many trials man encounters (Heb., x. 36), whereas with it the enemies of other virtues are destroyed; and hence it is called the root and guardian of virtue (cfr. Rom., v. 3, 4; James, i. 2-4; Luke, xxi. 19). But there are degrees of patience: the lowest is equanimity, which offends God neither in thought, word nor deed even though sorely tried (Job, ii. 7-10); a higher degree is submission, which prefers adversity to prosperity (Ps. cxviii. 71); the highest degree is joyful resignation, which smiles at grief and rejoices in tribulation (II Cor., xii. 10, vii. 4).

The Vices Opposed to Patience.—(a) The sin of deficiency in sorrow is stolidity, which is a brutal insensibility that is moved neither by one’s own nor by others’ misfortunes. This is not a virtue, but an inhuman and unnatural way of life, which takes no account of man as a feeling as well as a reasoning being.

(b) The sin of excess in sorrow is impatience, which mourns excessively under afflictions, or in looks, words or deeds expresses a complaining and rebellious spirit (Prov. xiv. 17; Judith, viii. 24, 25). Stolidity and impatience are per se venial sins, but they become mortal per accidens on account of some circumstance, as when the unfeeling man gives great scandal by his hardhearted acts, or the impatient man blasphemes (see 2450, 2451).

Steadfastness.—Steadfastness is a virtue which is so devoted to the goodness of continuing in the right that it is not fatigued by the length of time or the repeated effort required for a good work (virtue of persistence or perseverance), nor disheartened by the opposition which a good work encounters (virtue of manliness or constancy), but goes on unmoved until the conclusion which right reason calls for has been arrived at.

(a) The Virtue.—Steadfastness belongs to fortitude, since the essence of both is a struggle against difficulty; but steadfastness is the inferior, since it is nobler and more heroic to be undismayed by the peril of death than to be unconquered by strain of monotony or opposition. Steadfastness is a most important virtue, for it avails one little to begin a work well if it is not carried to a successful conclusion. Without it one puts hand to the plow but looks back (Luke, ix. 62), or begins to build but does not finish (Like, xiv. 30); with it the work begun is crowned, the harvest will be reaped (Gal., vi. 9, 10), and salvation secured (Matt., x. 22). Scripture abounds with exhortations to steadfastness (I Cor., xv. 58; Phil., iv. i; II Tim., iii. 13; Ecclus., xi. 21, 22, v. 12; John, viii. 31; Heb., xii. 7); but final perseverance is a special gift of God (I Peter, v. 10).

(b) The Opposite Vices.—Opposed to steadfastness by deficiency is the vice of effeminacy or weakness, by excess the vice of pertinacity. The effeminate person, lacking stamina to go on in a necessary good, surrenders to weariness or opposition by abandoning the undertaking or by taking up with evil (Matt., xi. 7, 8). The pertinacious person continues in the course he has begun when right reason bids him to discontinue, as when one has taken a vow and does not wish to accept the dispensation which a change of circumstances necessitates. These sins are venial unless they go counter to a grave duty, as when an effeminate person gives up the resolution to avoid a very dangerous occasion of sin, or the headstrong person determines to fast during the remainder of Lent when this will seriously injure his health.

What is fortitude, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Fortitude is the virtue which moderates and strengthens the soul against grave dangers, especially of death. - No precept per se of this virtue is given, but only by reason of some special precept to be fulfilled, e.g., even martyrdom to be undergone, lest faith be denied. But whether and when there is an obligation of observing the law even with danger to life was said in the treatise on Laws, and is explained in the individual treatises, when it is asked whether it is licit to do something at least to avoid death. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 140.

There is a twofold act of fortitude, to attack and to sustain: to attack distinguished and arduous things; to sustain adversities. For the act of attacking two things are required. The first is preparation of soul, namely that someone have a prompt soul for undertaking great things, which magnanimity provides. The other regards execution of the work, namely that someone not fall short in the execution of those things which he began magnanimously, which magnificence provides. For the act of sustaining two things also are required. The first is that by the difficulty of imminent evils the soul not be broken through sadness, and fall away from its greatness; and for this patience is posited, by which someone bears evils with an even soul, without disturbance of sadness. The other is that from long-lasting suffering of difficult things man not be wearied up to the point that he desists; and for this perseverance is posited.

R. To the second. These four virtues, magnanimity, magnificence, patience, perseverance, are integral parts of fortitude if they are concerned with dangers of death; but they are potential parts of fortitude if they are concerned with lesser dangers. But fortitude does not have subjective parts, because it is not divided into many virtues differing in species, since it concerns a very special matter, namely dangers of death, which are all of the same genus, although some are greater than others.

R. To the third. Timidity, fearlessness, and audacity are opposed to fortitude. Timidity is a vice exceeding in fearing; for it fears what one ought not, when one ought not, or more than one ought, whence one does not dare to attack when reason dictates, or as it dictates. If it stands in itself, it is a light sin; but if it impels to sin, it will be grave or light according to the condition of that to which it impels. - Fearlessness is a vice deficient in fearing; for one does not fear when he ought to fear, or the things that ought to be feared. It is not a sin distinct from that to whose danger someone exposes himself; for it is a sin only insofar as it is the cause of that, tacitly containing consent to that danger.

Audacity is that which rashly casts itself into dangers. Rashly, namely without just reason. It is a sin according to the account of the evil and danger to which one exposes himself.

Presumption, ambition, vainglory, pusillanimity are opposed to magnanimity. - Presumption is excessive confidence in one's own powers, by which it happens that someone undertakes something, or is prepared to undertake something, above his powers. It is a deadly sin when it occurs with danger or injury of another, as the presumption of a physician, judge, confessor; or when it proceeds from error against the faith, as the presumption of heretics. Outside these cases it is almost always a venial sin. Ambition is an inordinate appetite of honor, by desiring more honor than is fitting. It is a light sin, unless honor is desired either with injury and harm of another, or from a gravely illicit thing, or in a gravely illicit mode or end. Vainglory is desire of vain glory. Vain, if glory is sought from simulated excellence or reputation, if greater than is fitting, or from an illicit thing, or among those who cannot judge rightly about things, or by referring it to an undue end. Per se it is a venial sin, nor does it become a mortal sin except by reason of another sin, which is sometimes involved in its effect. Pusillanimity is a sin by which someone from smallness of soul does not attempt those things which are commensurate with his natural virtue. It is grave or light according to the goods from which he recedes.

Small-magnificence and consumption or excessive profusion are opposed to magnificence. - Small-magnificence is the vice by which man falls short of the proportion which ought to be between expense and work. Consumption or excessive profusion is the vice by which someone exceeds the said proportion, namely so that he spends more than is proportioned to the work. Each is per se a light sin; it can be grave by reason of scandal, or notable harm then following to others, or by another extrinsic reason, e.g., of a vow, testament, etc., by which someone is bound to that magnificent work and ought to be contained within due expenses.

Insensibility and impatience are opposed to patience, but softness and pertinacity to perseverance. - Insensibility is had when someone is touched by no evils, neither his own nor those of neighbors. It is a sign either of brutish stupidity or of inhuman hardness. Insensibility or hardness is rarely a mortal sin; certainly per se it is only venial. - Impatience is had when someone grieves too much, or even from grief departs from the right. Impatience per se is only a venial sin, because it is only an excess in grief, or in a movement of anger, expressed by an external sign; nevertheless it can be deadly by reason of scandal or of the evil which someone does from impatience. - Softness is if someone easily recedes from good because of certain difficulties which he cannot sustain; for that is called soft which easily yields to one touching it. But it is manifest that fear of dangers impels more gravely than desire of pleasures; and the desire itself of pleasures moves more strongly than sadness concerning the lack of pleasure withdraws, because lack of pleasure is a pure defect. And therefore he is properly called soft who recedes from good because of sadness caused by the defect of delights, as if yielding to a weak mover. This is a grave sin in a venereal matter or in another matter of great moment, to which someone is bound by law, precept, vow, or oath; but it is light in a light matter. Pertinacity is perseverance in one's own opinion more than one ought; and it is venial or mortal according to the gravity of the matter, e.g., if someone is unwilling to embrace the Catholic religion lest he seem inconstant; if a Prince is unwilling to revoke pernicious laws. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 123 seqq.; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Fortit.

1070. 3. Patience is the virtue which so moderates sadness arising from present evils that, because of it, the will is not moved away from good, but rather is confirmed in it. Therefore this is not insensibility, or apathy, of which the Stoics boasted, and which in reality is a vice. The patient man feels pain in the body and sadness in the soul, but moderates both, and does not allow them to proceed beyond the limits of reason; for he remembers the words of Paul:¹ "Tribulation worketh patience; and patience trial; and trial hope; and hope confoundeth not."

¹ Rom. 5:3-5. Cf. St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, ch. 3; Olier, Introduction, ch. 9.

Various degrees are distinguished in patience: (a) to bear with an equal soul the loss of riches, reputation, health, parents, and friends, even when these things happen to us without our fault; (b) to bear those things which are repaid by the ungrateful for benefits received; (c) to sustain all these things not only patiently, but with joy, like the apostles, who "went rejoicing from the presence of the council, because they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus."²

² Acts 5:41.

To this virtue is opposed impatience, by which someone grieves too much and from sorrow withdraws from what is right, for example, by complaining bitterly about God and men, and for that reason seeking consolation in pleasures or in idleness. - Impatience is in itself a venial sin, but it can become grave if someone deliberately murmurs gravely against God and divine ordinances, or from this commits lethal sins.

633. Notion. The third virtue joined to fortitude as a potential part is patience, which can be defined: a virtue by which someone so endures present evils (especially those inflicted by others) that he is not inordinately saddened by them;¹¹³⁹ or, as Cicero says: "Patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of honorableness or utility."¹¹⁴⁰

If patience concerns the moderation of sadness arising from the imminence of death, it is an integral part of fortitude; but if the sadness arises from lesser evils, then it is only a potential part of this virtue.¹¹⁴¹

The proximate matter of patience is present sadnesses rightly to be tolerated; but its subject is the concupiscible part.¹¹⁴²

¹¹³⁹ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 136, a. 4 ad 2.

¹¹⁴⁰ De invent. rhetor. l. 2, c. 54.

¹¹⁴¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 136, a. 4 ad 3.

¹¹⁴² Ib., ad 2.

634. Patience is a special and very necessary virtue, because its principal act is rightly to moderate the passion of inordinate sadness, which is a very good and necessary office. For inordinate sadness is a great evil and an impediment to many goods. Whence it is said in Sacred Scripture: "Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it."¹¹⁴³ "As the moth doth by a garment and the worm by the wood, so the sadness of a man hurteth the heart."¹¹⁴⁴ "Happy is he that hath had no sadness of his mind."¹¹⁴⁵ Sadness is indeed sometimes salutary, if it is assumed moderately and for a short time on account of the absence of spiritual goods or the presence of spiritual evils (especially sins); nevertheless, it must then be well tempered through patience. Sacred Scripture very frequently and urgently commends patience: "For patience is necessary for you."¹¹⁴⁶ "Tribulation worketh patience; and patience trial; and trial hope; and hope confoundeth not."¹¹⁴⁷ "In your patience you shall possess your souls."¹¹⁴⁸ St. Thomas¹¹⁴⁹ explains this text, saying: "Therefore a man is said through patience to possess his soul, insofar as he plucks out by the root the passions arising from adversities by which the soul is disturbed."

Some of the holy Fathers¹¹⁵⁰ wrote entire books concerning the virtue of patience, for example, St. Cyprian, who writes in the book On the Good of Patience:¹¹⁵¹ "But patience, dearest brethren, not only guards good things but also repels adversities; favoring the Holy Spirit and cleaving to heavenly and divine things, it struggles by the bulwark of its virtues against the deeds of the flesh and body by which the soul is assailed and captured." St. Zeno, Bishop of Verona,¹¹⁵² St. Augustine,¹¹⁵³ and St. Gregory the Great¹¹⁵⁴ also wrote excellently concerning patience. The first degree of this virtue is to tolerate afflictions without murmuring; the second, without lamentation and complaints before others; the third, with joy, like the Apostles, who went rejoicing from the presence of the Council because they had been accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus.

¹¹⁴³ Ecclus. 30:25.

¹¹⁴⁴ Prov. 25:20.

¹¹⁴⁵ Ecclus. 14:2.

¹¹⁴⁶ Heb. 10:36.

¹¹⁴⁷ Rom. 5:3ff.

¹¹⁴⁸ Luke 21:19.

¹¹⁴⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 136, a. 2 ad 2.

¹¹⁵⁰ They are enumerated by Migne, Patr. lat. (Indices) 220, 666.

¹¹⁵¹ n. 14 (Migne, Patr. lat. 4, 655).

¹¹⁵² With great eloquence this author treats of the virtue of patience and at the end exclaims: "O how I wish, if I could, to celebrate thee more by conduct, O patience, queen of all things! ... Thou art every day both the mother and crown of martyrs; thou the wall of faith, the fruit of hope, the friend of charity! ... Happy, and eternally happy, is he who shall always have had thee in himself" (l. 1, tr. 6, n. 8; Migne, Patr. lat. 11, 317).

¹¹⁵³ Liber de patientia (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 611).

¹¹⁵⁴ In evang. l. 2, hom. 35 (Migne, Patr. lat. 76, 1261).

635. Relation between patience and longanimity. To patience pertains longanimity,¹¹⁵⁵ which partly differs from it and partly agrees with it. It differs because the object of patience is an evil, whereas, on the contrary, the object of longanimity is a good; for longanimity is the virtue by which someone tolerates annoyances arising from the fact that he tends toward some good to be possessed after a long time. But since this long delay is accustomed to cause sadness and longanimity bravely tolerates this sadness, in this it agrees with patience, which is likewise the toleration of sadness.¹¹⁵⁶

¹¹⁵⁵ Langmut [longanimity].

¹¹⁵⁶ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 136, a. 5.

636. Means for obtaining patience. To obtain the patience so necessary for the Christian life, it helps to consider: 1. the patience and longanimity of God tolerating sinners; 2. the patience of Christ in His life and death; 3. the patience of the saints; 4. the fruits of patience in each life, namely, satisfaction for sins committed and eternal glory in the future life; 5. the evils which arise from impatience, by which, namely, the merit of patience is lost, the evil is not diminished but rather increased, since impatience itself is often an evil more tormenting than that evil from which the impatience took its rise; finally, 6. that many sins often proceed from impatience, especially against charity.

641. 4. Two vices are opposed to patience, one by defect and the other by excess. By defect there is opposed insensibility or hardness, namely, when someone is touched in no way by any evils, whether his own or another's. This indeed is a defect of sadness, although it is an excess of endurance. That this insensibility is sinful is clear of itself, since it is consonant neither with human nature nor with social life, but savors of stupid brutality and unnatural hardness. By excess (of sadness, but by defect of endurance) there is opposed to patience impatience, by which someone is excessively saddened or withdraws from the good because of sadness or pain. The impatient man for the most part outwardly manifests his impatience by murmurings, lamentations, or irascibility. Each sin, namely, insensibility and impatience, is of itself only a venial sin; nevertheless, it becomes mortal if on account of it another virtue, for example, fraternal charity, is gravely injured.¹¹⁷⁹

¹¹⁷⁹ It is remarkable that St. Thomas does not speak of the vices opposed to patience in the Summa theologica.

S. Th. II-II, q. 136.

923. Patience (geduld) is a virtue which so moderates sadness, arisen from present evils, that on account of it the will is not moved away from the good, but rather is strengthened in it. Thus someone bears himself well in suffering things which presently harm him, especially things inflicted by others, namely, so that he is not inordinately saddened in them. It is in the concupiscible appetite, because it is concerned with sadness, but it imitates the mode of fortitude, because it restrains sadness which holds one back from the good of reason, in the same way in which fortitude restrains fear of death (a. 4, ad 2).

Hence 1) it is not insensibility or apathy, of which the Stoics boasted, and which in reality is a vice. For just as fortitude is not fearlessness, but the brave man feels fear of death and restrains it within the limits of reason, so the patient man feels pain in the body and sadness in the soul, but restrains both and does not allow them to proceed beyond the limits of reason, recalling the words of Paul (Rom. V, 3-5): "Tribulation works patience..."

2. This he does from an affection for honesty which is found in the restraining of sadness, and therefore it is a special virtue.

3. It is necessary (Hebr. X, 32-36; Rom. V, 3; Lk. XXI, 19), because inordinate sadness is a great evil and an impediment of many goods (Eccli. XIV, 2; XXX, 25; Prov. XXV, 20); on the contrary, through patience man radically roots out the passions of adversities by which the soul is disquieted (a. 2, ad 2), as will be shown more in the following number.

4. This can be done in various degrees, whence various degrees are distinguished in patience:¹ a) to tolerate without murmuring, or with an equal soul to bear the loss of riches, reputation, health, parents, and friends; b) to tolerate without lamentation and complaint before others, or to bear those things which happen to us without our fault; c) to tolerate with joy, or to sustain all those things not only patiently but with a joyful soul, as the Apostles did (Acts V, 41).

¹ Thus from the part of the mode. For from the part of the evils which someone suffers, the first degree is patiently to bear damages of fortune; the second, detriments of reputation; the third, detriments of body and life. From the part of the cause, the first degree is to tolerate things inflicted as punishment for fault; the second, those things which happen without fault; the third, those things which are inflicted by the ungrateful.

924. Patience is not the greatest of the virtues. - For "those virtues which are constitutive of good order more directly to good than those which are impeditive of things which lead away from good. And just as among those which are constitutive of good some virtue is more powerful to the extent that it establishes man in a greater good (such as faith, hope, and charity, than prudence and justice); so also among those which are impeditive of things withdrawing from good, some virtue is more powerful when that which is impeded by it withdraws more from good. But dangers of death, concerning which there is fortitude, or pleasures of touch, concerning which there is temperance, withdraw more from good than any adversities whatsoever, concerning which there is patience. And therefore patience is not the greatest of the virtues; but it falls short not only of the theological virtues, and prudence, and justice, which directly establish man in good, but also of fortitude and temperance, which draw back from greater impediments" (a. 2).

Nevertheless 1) in some respect it is more perfect according to a certain aspect. For "it is said to have a perfect work (Jas. I, 4) in tolerating adversities; from which first proceeds sadness, which patience moderates; secondly anger, which meekness moderates; thirdly hatred, which charity takes away; fourthly unjust harm, which justice prohibits" (ad 1). But patience "not only excludes unjust vengeance which justice also excludes; nor only hatred, which charity does; nor only anger, which meekness does; but it also excludes inordinate sadness, which is the root of all the aforesaid. And therefore in this it is more perfect and greater, because in this matter it extirpates the root" (I-II, q. 66, a. 4, ad 2). "But to remove the principle of each thing is more perfect. Nor yet does it follow, if in this patience is more perfect, that it is more perfect simply" (a. 2, ad 1).

2. Hence also, because "possession imports quiet dominion, therefore through patience man is said to possess his soul (Lk. XXI, 19), insofar as he radically roots out the passions by which the soul is disquieted" (ad 2).

3. Indeed "patience is said to be the root and guardian of all virtues, not as though directly causing and conserving them, but only by removing what prohibits," namely, the impeding causes or passions (ad 3).

925. Means for obtaining patience, which is very necessary to the Christian man, are enumerated by Billuart, diss. 2, a. 5: "It helps to consider 1. the patience of God tolerating sinners; 2. the patience of Christ dying for us; 3. the patience of the saints; 4. the fruits of patience in both lives: satisfaction for sins in the present life, eternal glory in the future; 5. redemption from the pains of hell and of purgatory; 6. the evils of impatience: for by this the merit of patience is lost, the evil is not diminished, but rather is increased; indeed impatience itself is an evil tormenting more than the original evil whence it is caused; finally it impels to many sins."

926. Two vices are opposed to patience:

a) By excess, hardness, when someone is in no way touched or saddened by any evils, whether his own or another's; which is consonant neither with human nature nor with social life.

b) By defect, impatience, by which someone grieves too much, and from grief withdraws from the good, for example, bitterly complaining about God and men, and on that account seeking consolation in pleasures or in idleness.

Of themselves they are venial, but mortal by reason of the effect or by reason of scandal, for example, if someone deliberately murmurs gravely against God and the divine ordinations, or from this commits lethal sins such as blasphemies, woundings, etc.

927. Longanimity (lankmoedigheid), by which someone tends toward some good to be obtained after a long time, partly differs from patience, partly agrees with it. It differs because the object of patience is evil, the object of longanimity is good; it agrees because from the delay of the good hoped for there is caused sadness, which longanimity restrains, and sadness is the object of patience. And therefore longanimity is comprehended under patience (a. 5).

Patience is defined by Bl. Bonaventure, 3. part. Centil. sect. 43.: "It is the virtue bearing with equanimity the evils of insults and of every adversity." Or: "Patience is the equanimous endurance of evils inflicted," or from Bl. Gregory, homil. 35. in Euang.: "True patience is to endure the evils of others with equanimity, and to be moved by no grief of soul against him who inflicts evils." Or: "Patience is the victorious endurance of all annoyances inflicted from elsewhere."

In the explicatorio terminorum Theol. he thus defines it: "Patience is the equanimous endurance of evils."

In the opusclo de septem donis, de dono fortitudinis, cap. 3., it is stated: "Patience is the cause of honesty and utility, the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous things." So also in compend. Theologicae veritatis, c. 36., and opusc. de profectu religiosi lib. 2. c. 34., from Bl. August. de patientia, cap. 2.: "Patience is that by which we bear evils with an equal mind, that is, without perturbation of justice."

Hence it is clear that it is a special virtue.

It is proved, because the reason of moral virtue is to preserve the rectitude and good of reason against the impulse of the passions: but Patience thus moderates the passions of the Irascible and Concupiscible against sadness, lest reason succumb in adversities.

It is proved by Bl. Bonaventure, ad 21. Lucae, in those words: "In your patience you will possess your souls," and Proverb. 16. "The patient man is better than the strong: and he who rules his spirit, than he who takes cities," and cap. 15. "He that is patient is governed with much wisdom," and cap. 19. "The doctrine of a man is known by patience"; Iacob 1. "Patience has a perfect work"; Heb. 10. "Patience is necessary for you, that, doing the will of God, you may receive the promise." He has similar things de septem donis, de dono fortitudinis, cap. 3.

The same he proves there from Bl. Gregory, homil. 36. in Evang. and homil. 20. in Ezech.

In cap. 8. Lucae, he proves it in those words: "Hearing the word, they retain it, and bring forth fruit in patience," and from the place of James cited above, Heb. 10.

He observes, moreover, in sermone 2. de pluribus Martyribus, that for the formal object of patience there is required adversity tolerated out of the motive of honesty, and a right will; yet it can happen out of necessity as a virtue, as on account of it Manasses in captivity attained salvation.

And in serm. 3. de sanctis Apostolis he observes, from Bl. Bernard, serm. 2. de Convers. S. Pauli, a threefold kind of patience, or three degrees of this virtue. The first is to tolerate without murmuring. The second is to tolerate willingly. The third is to go joyfully to punishments, as Act. 5. "The Apostles went rejoicing, etc."

I assert second, that Patience is a quasi-potential part of Fortitude. So Bl. Bonaventure, locis adductis, and Bl. Thomas, quaest. 136. art. 4.

It is proved, because it is concerned with difficult things together with fortitude; but it falls short of it, because it is concerned also with difficult things of less moment than death.

Note, that it is similar to longanimity, because each endures evil for the sake of some good; it differs, however, because longanimity is concerned in tending to something distant in remoteness, and thus it regards hope more than sadness; and because the longanimous man is not broken by the long hope of expectation, as the holy Doctor says, de profect. Relig. lib. 2. cap. 35., he imitates patience.

I assert third: that Patience is inferior not only to the Theological virtues, but also to the four Cardinal virtues; And as to the Theological virtues, it is clear; because they have a nobler object, God. As to the Cardinal virtues, it is plain from what was said at the beginning of disput. 1. But it can be surpassed by Fortitude, for that bears more vehement dangers of death, and thus it ought to be stronger in regulating reason; so also Temperance is recognized as better, which moderates the vehemence of the concupiscibles by touch.

It is said, however, to work a perfect work in its genus. It is also called the root of all virtues by Bl. Gregory, homil. 35. in Evang., in Bl. Bonaventure above, inasmuch as it removes the one thing that prohibits, which is sadness, as Tannerus notes, disp. 5. num. 86., and Bl. Bonaventure, in 4. dist. 22. art. 3. quaest. 1. Whence the Apostle, Heb. 12. "Let us run by patience, etc.," as St. Bonaventure has it, in Diaeta, loco citando.

I assert fourth: that perfect Patience is a gift of God. So Bl. Bonaventure in almost all the places cited, especially de septem donis, and in Diaeta, tit. 7. cap. ult.

It is proved by St. Bonaventure, because, as the Apostle says, Heb. 12., that which leads to eternal life is above nature, and a gift of God: such is patience, as I have said: Therefore. The major is proved; for means ought to be proportioned to the end, as the holy Doctor often says; but glory is supernatural.

Read the proof, or touchstone of Lydian stone, for proving true patience in Bl. Bonaventure, de profectu Religiosi, lib. 2. cap. 35. The merit and reward of Patience you have in cap. 36. The degrees and progress of Patience in cap. 37.

Most illustrious Panegyrics of Patience from the Fathers you have in Bl. Bonaventure, lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 33.