Section — McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology
Parts
The Parts or Kinds of Prudence
The Parts or Kinds of Prudence.—As the divisions of parts correspond with the divisions of wholes, we should note that there are three kinds of wholes: a subjective, an integral, and a potestative whole.
(a) A subjective whole is one that is present as to its entire essence and all its power in each of the parts. This kind of whole is found in the genus, each of whose species partakes of the entire nature and energy included in the generic concept, just as the mode of being and of acting expressed by the term “animal” is found fully in dogs, cats, horses, and so on with the other kinds of animals.
(b) An integral whole is one that is not present in all its fullness either of essence or of power in the single parts. This kind of whole is found in a finished composite made up of heterogeneous units, such as a house; for neither walls, nor roof, nor foundation, nor any other single portion of the building is a complete house or has all the uses of a house, but if any one of them is lacking the house is not integral or complete.
(c) A potestative whole is one that is present in all its essence, but not in all its power in each single part. This kind of whole is exemplified in an active principle functioning through diverse faculties, such as the soul which thinks, wills, perceives, accomplishes by means of mind, will, sense, and bodily organs. The soul is present in its entirety in each of these, since it is a simple substance, but in one it exercises one power, in another a different power, in none of them all its powers.
It is customary to speak also of the integral, subjective and potestative parts of a moral virtue. (a) Thus, the quasi-integral parts of a virtue are those functions without which its act is not perfectly performed; and with which it is more perfect. (b) The subjective parts are the species into which the virtue is divided. (e) The quasi-potestative parts are certain subsidiary or annexed virtues which have to do with the secondary acts of a principal virtue, as not having the full efficacy of the latter.