Perjury

254. Perjury is taken in a twofold sense: strictly and properly it signifies a false oath, or one lacking truth; broadly it signifies any illicit oath, so that even an iniquitous oath, lacking justice, and an incautious oath, lacking judgment, are called perjury. The malice of each must be discussed.

Therefore perjury (Meineid) properly is: alpha. an assertory oath concerning a false thing which the one swearing knows to be false; beta. a promissory oath without the intention of fulfilling the thing promised or with the intention of not fulfilling it. If someone afterward culpably does not fulfill a thing seriously promised under oath, he does not properly commit perjury, but rather breach of oath (Eidbruch), although he also is customarily called perjured.

1. On perjury strictly taken. a. Perjury or a false oath is a sin grave from its whole genus: for he directly brings injury upon the veracity of God who asks that God by His supreme authority attest to a false thing; and this injury remains grave even if God is invoked in testimony of the slightest falsehood: for it is always insultingly supposed that God can be deceived or deceive.¹

b. All perjuries are of the same moral species: for just as diverse oaths do not differ specifically, so also their violations are of the same moral species.

Although execratory perjury can seem to be a double sin, against religion and against charity, nevertheless in reality it is a simple sin against religion: for no one is judged seriously to imprecate evil upon himself or his own; therefore he who utters execratory words inwardly trusts that God will not do this. Yet by these things it is not denied that execratory perjury is a double sin, both against religion and against charity toward oneself or against piety, if the perjurer seriously intends to imprecate evil upon himself or his own.

¹ Wherefore proposition 24 was condemned by Innocent XI: To call God as witness of a light lie is not such irreverence on account of which He would will or be able to condemn a man.

255. 2. On perjury broadly taken. a. An assertory oath which lacks justice, insofar as it is an oath or insofar as it is opposed to religion, is venial, even if the sin against charity or justice is grave, as if someone confirms grave detraction by oath: for by this perjury grave irreverence is not committed, since God is not invoked in testimony of a false thing, but of a true thing, although evil.

b. A promissory oath lacking justice, by which someone obligates himself to a gravely evil thing, is a grave sin; by which he obligates himself to a lightly evil thing, a light sin; by which he obligates himself to an indifferent or useless thing, likewise a light sin.

Therefore in an oath of this kind (supposing the will of fulfilling it) two sins are contained, one because the one swearing (for example, that he will commit a duel) wills an evil thing, the other of irreverence, because with divine authority interposed he obligates himself to sinning.

c. An oath, whether assertory or promissory, which lacks judgment, or to swear without sufficient cause or without due reverence, does not exceed venial sin: for the irreverence does not seem to be grave, because nothing is done which is directly opposed to some divine attribute.

alpha. The faithful must be seriously admonished not to contract the habit of swearing rashly at nearly any doubt which is objected to their sayings, or of indiscriminately confirming their promises by oath: for those who contract and retain this habit expose themselves to the great danger of swearing without consideration of the things which they swear, and thus of making many perjuries.

beta. An oath uttered from the habit of swearing, if it is voluntary, of itself is only a light sin, because it is an oath lacking judgment; but by reason of the danger which it contains of committing perjury it can be a grave sin. Therefore the faithful are to be admonished concerning the obligation of laying aside the depraved habit of swearing, as was noted above (n. 205) concerning blasphemy.

256. On a fictitious oath. A fictitious oath is an oath made only externally, without the mind of swearing or without the mind of invoking God as witness of the assertion. Two things must be declared concerning this oath: a. whether it induces obligation; b. what kind of sin it is.

1. A fictitious oath, whether assertory or promissory, is no oath and accordingly induces no obligation from the virtue of religion; but from another source there can be present an obligation of keeping unharmed him who has been deceived by the fictitious oath.

2. a. A fictitious oath which is made in confirmation of a falsehood is always a grave sin, because it is grave irreverence to invoke God, even only externally, in testimony of a falsehood, just as it is grave irreverence only externally to burn incense to an idol.

An assertory oath is made in confirmation of a falsehood if the one swearing externally invokes God as witness of a false assertion; and a promissory oath, if he swears externally without the mind of fulfilling.

b. A fictitious oath which is made in confirmation of a truth does not exceed venial sin: for although an oath of this kind contains a lie with vain invocation of the divine name, nevertheless God is not invoked in testimony of falsehood.¹

Yet from another source the one swearing fictitiously can sin gravely, namely if he swears fictitiously in those circumstances in which he is held under grave obligation to swear, for example because of the precept of a superior or judge, or if there is question of a matter of great moment, such as an onerous contract.²

¹ Cf. Reuter, II, n. 309 ff.

² Cf. Lessius, De iustitia et iure, l. 2, c. 42, n. 42.

What kind of sin is it to swear without truth, without judgment, without justice? - To swear without truth is always mortal, even in light matter, because to bring God into testimony of falsity is to will to destroy his infinitely perfect truthfulness. This is also established from proposition 24 condemned by Innocent XI; S. Th., Quodl. 1, a. 18. To swear without judgment, from lightness, for example from custom, without grave cause, or if someone swears before he has sufficiently investigated the truth, is venial per se, scandal and danger of perjury nevertheless being excluded, because it is only vain usurpation of the name of God. To swear without judgment from rashness, lest perhaps what is asserted is true, or what is promised can be fulfilled, is grave on account of the danger of perjury. To swear without justice is certainly mortal in a promissory oath if the matter concerns committing a grave sin, as is clear; indeed, according to St. Liguori, even if the matter concerns only a venial sin, at least more probably, because it seems grave irreverence to invoke God as witness or guarantor of any sin whatever to be committed. Yet Suarez with others says that the opposite opinion is common.

But in an assertory oath, more probably it is only venial per se, because the oath per se falls upon the assertion, not as evil but as true. Thus he who boasts by oath about fornication committed, although by this boasting he sins lethally, nevertheless by force of the oath per se he does not confirm the boasting, but only the truth of the fornication. Except unless the oath is assumed as an instrument or means of sinning, for example, for strengthening detraction. And this holds even if someone uses an oath as an instrument or means for consummating venial sin, because one swearing thus, as far as in him lies, makes God an accomplice of his sin. "If someone swears," says S. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7 ad 2, "that he will not do some better good which nevertheless he is not bound to do, (for example, not entering religion), he indeed sins by swearing, insofar as he places an obstacle to the Holy Spirit, who is the inspirer of a good purpose; nevertheless he does not sin by keeping the oath, but he would do much better if he did not keep it." But a sin of this sort, since the matter concerns only a counsel not to be embraced, is venial per se. L. 145, 147; Suarez, l. 3, c. 12; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7, a. 9 ad 3; q. 98, aa. 2, 3; Quodl. 1, a. 18; Struggl 5, 7, 9; E. M.; cf. here 582, 583. In public disturbances of civil society, the oath of passive obedience, as it is called, is permitted, namely that one will do nothing against the Government, and with the laws of God and the Church preserved. Pius VII, Instruction, year 1808; S. Penit., 18 Dec. 1860. Cf. here 549.

Whenever any one of the conditions required for the lawfulness of an oath is wanting, he who swears it commits a sin.

If the condition lacking is truth, the sin committed is called perjury (periurium); if judgment, the sin is called unjustifiable swearing; if justice, we say that the vovens swears unjustly.

1. PERJURY.—Perjury (periurium, peieratio, iuramentum falsum) may be defined as calling on God to witness the truth of an assertion which we know to be false, or in confirmation of a promise which we do not intend to keep.¹

¹ Peter Lombard, Sent., III, dist. 39, n. 1: “Perjury is a lie confirmed by an oath.”—Ibid., n. 2: “He also is believed to perjure himself who swears falsely with the will to deceive; and he who, thinking false what is true, swears; and he who, thinking true what is false, swears.” (Migne, P. L., CXCII, 835).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 98, art. 1: “Moral acts receive their species from the end. Now the end of an oath is the confirmation of a human statement, to which confirmation falsity is opposed. For a statement is confirmed by showing that it is firmly true, which cannot occur concerning that which is false. Hence falsity directly destroys the end of an oath, and for this reason the perversity of an oath, which is called perjury, is specified chiefly by falsity. And therefore falsity belongs to the essence of perjury.”

a) The moral guilt of perjury is measured, not by the importance of the matter involved, i. e., the assertion or promise made under oath, but solely by the perjurer’s knowledge of its untruth. This applies to simple (periurium simplex) and also, a fortiori, to solemn perjury (periurium solemne), when the false oath is taken after due instruction and admonition and with the ceremonies prescribed by law.

Perjury is ex toto genere suo a grievous sin, being not merely a qualified lie, an attack upon the highest guaranty of veracity, and a criminal profanation of the name of God, but likewise a public scandal and a sin against religion,² which even the civil law punishes severely.³ As a rule this sin involves a gross violation of justice against one’s neighbor and against society.

² Zach. VIII, 17; Mal. III, 5; 1 Tim. I, 8–10.—Proposition condemned under Innocent XI, n. 24: “To call God as witness to a light lie is not so great an irreverence that He would or could condemn a man because of it.”—Ibid., n. 25: “With a cause it is lawful to swear without the intention of swearing, whether the matter is light or grave.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1174 sq.)—Cfr. the Bull “Inter cunctas,” of Pope Martin V, n. 14 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 664).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 98, art. 2: “To swear is to invoke God as witness. But it pertains to irreverence toward God that someone invoke Him as witness to falsity, because by this he gives it to be understood either that God does not know the truth or that He is willing to testify to falsity. And therefore perjury is manifestly a sin contrary to religion, whose office it is to show reverence to God.”—Ibid., art. 3: “Whatever by its own nature pertains to contempt of God is a mortal sin. But perjury by its own nature implies contempt of God; for from this it has the character of guilt, because it pertains to irreverence toward God. Hence it is manifest that perjury by its own nature is a mortal sin.”

³ Cfr. F. Bittner, Lehrbuch der kath. Moraltheologie, pp. 376 sq.

All sins of perjury are of the same moral species as the various oaths themselves. This holds even of the so-called periurium exsecratorium, which involves cursing one’s neighbor, though we do not, of course, mean to deny that if the evil is wished seriously, it entails an additional sin against charity.⁴

⁴ H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, p. 268.

The alarming increase of perjury in our time is no doubt largely attributable to the decline of religious faith and the growing carelessness in matters of morals. Another, minor cause is the unnecessary multiplication of oaths and the frivolous manner in which they are often administered by public officials. This abuse should be cured by the State, but the Church can aid powerfully by influencing the consciences of men. “We are forbidden to take the divine name in vain,” says the Catechism of the Council of Trent; “for he who is led to make oath, not by deliberation, but by rashness, evidently involves himself in grievous sin. That this is a most grievous crime, these very words declare: ‘Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain,’ words which, as if to assign the reason why this is so grievous an enormity, namely, because the majesty of Him is abased whom we profess to be our Lord and our God. By this commandment, therefore, it is forbidden that men swear falsely; for he who shrinks not from the enormity of calling God to witness falsehood, offers a signal injury to God, branding Him either with ignorance, as though the truth of anything could be hidden from Him, or at least with improbity and depravity, as though He would by testimony confirm falsehood.”⁵

⁵ Cat. Rom., P. III, c. 3, qu. 20.

In some dioceses perjury committed in a court of law is a reserved case in both the internal and the external forum. (Cfr. C. I. C., can. 2323.)

b) Akin to perjury is the wilful breaking of a valid oath or the intentional nonfulfilment of a promise given under oath (fractio iuramenti promissorii). The sinfulness of this act depends not only on the degree of malice inherent in the will, but likewise on the extent to which the oath is actually broken. To neglect to keep a promissory oath is, therefore, ex genere suo a grievous sin because the obligation imposed by such an oath is grievous. It permits, however, of parvitas materiae. “He who binds himself by an oath to the performance of something, not intending, however, to fulfil his promise, or having had the intention, really neglects its performance, is guilty of the same sin [as he who commits perjury ]; and this applies also to those who, having bound themselves to God by the covenant of a vow, fulfil it not.”⁶

⁶ Cat. Rom., P. III, c. 3, qu. 23: “He is to be deemed guilty of the same sin who promises under oath that he will do something, although either he did not have the intention of fulfilling the promise, or, if he did, he does not in fact perform what he promised.”

The validity and binding force of a promissory oath may not be presumed, either morally or legally, but must be proved, for the principal factor is the promise, the oath being merely an accessory to the principal. Hence if the promise was invalid, because of physical or moral inability to keep what was promised, it remains invalid even if an oath was taken to confirm it, and if it becomes invalid later, the obligation arising from the oath ceases, according to the axiom, “Cessante principali cessat accessorium.”

2. Unjustifiable or careless swearing (iuramentum vanum sive incautum) is not grievously sinful unless it involves formal contempt of God,⁷ but it easily leads to perjury and should therefore be avoided.⁸ To this class of acts belong the oaths of those who habitually call upon God in trivial matters, such as buying and selling, though they really have no intention of taking an oath.⁹

⁷ H. Busembaum, S.J., Medulla Theol. Mor., l. III, tr. 2, c. 2, dub. 3, n. 1: “As to judgment, if this alone is lacking, the sin is for the most part only venial, as if someone swears without necessity, whether from a certain levity of mind or from habit.”—Ibid., n. 2: “Nevertheless, even here one can sin mortally or venially according to the amount of negligence which the one swearing admits in investigating the truth or removing the habit.”—Ibid., n. 3: “And thus the state of those is mortal who do not remove the habit of swearing without attention as to whether that which they are accustomed to swear is true or false.”

⁸ Ecclus. XXIII, 9.—St. Augustine, Epist., 157 (al. 89), c. 5, n. 40: “Avoid swearing as much as you can. For it is better that not even the truth be sworn than that through the habit of swearing one often falls into perjury and always draws near to perjury. . . . Because the Apostle [Paul], a man most firm in truth, swore in his letters, swearing ought not on that account to be a game for us. For it is much safer, as I have said, so far as concerns us, that we never swear. . . . Not because it is a sin to swear to the truth, but because it is a most grave sin to swear falsely, into which he who is accustomed to swear falls the more quickly.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 693).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 89, art. 3, ad 3: “In an oath there is great danger, both because of the greatness of God, whose testimony is invoked, and also because of the instability of the human tongue, whose words are confirmed by an oath. And therefore these things [justice, judgment, and truth] are more required for an oath than for other human acts.”

⁹ Cat. Rom., P. III, c. 3, qu. 13: “Of this kind also is the irreligious affirmation of those who swear in a most trivial matter and without any reason or judgment, but from a certain evil habit. We see this done commonly every day by sellers and buyers.”

3. To swear unjustly (iuramentum iniustum) means to affirm under oath something that is false or promise something that is forbidden. It is a grievous sin because it involves an abuse of God’s holy name for the purpose of doing evil.¹⁰ To keep such an iniquitous oath would, of course, be an additional sin.¹¹

¹⁰ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 98, art. 2, ad 1: “He who swears that he will do something unlawful incurs perjury by swearing because of the defect of justice.”—Cfr. H. Busembaum, S.J., Medulla Theol. Mor., l. III, tr. 2, c. 2, dub. 3, n. 4: “As regards justice, he sins mortally who swears that he will do a mortally evil thing, such as that he will kill someone, because it is a grave irreverence to bind oneself, as it were, to mortal sin by divine authority, so that here two kinds of malice concur: one, that he wills evil; the other, that for this purpose he abuses the authority of God, who hates every evil.”—Ibid., n. 5: “But he sins venially who swears to do a venially evil, vain, useless, or frivolous thing, since only light irreverence is deemed present there.”—Ibid., n. 6: “Likewise, he sins venially who swears something contrary to the evangelical counsels, as that he will not enter religion or give alms or a loan.”

¹¹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 304: “One who has sworn to do an evil thing is never bound by the oath; indeed, he sins twice if he fulfils the oath, namely against religion and against the virtue to which the matter of the oath is opposed.”

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 98.—IDEM, Comment. in Sent., III, dist. 39, art. 4.—J. B. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, pp. 429 sqq.—F. A. Göpfert, Der Eid, pp. 365 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 267 sqq.

456. Definition. Perjury taken in the broad sense is any unlawful oath which, namely, lacks one of the three companions indicated above. Perjury in the strict sense (Meineid) is a moral lie confirmed by an oath. But perjury is not present if someone under oath asserts an error which he invincibly thinks to be the truth. If someone afterwards culpably does not fulfill a thing seriously promised under a promissory oath, he commits rather a breaking of the oath (Eidbruch) than perjury; nevertheless, he can truly be called perjured.

457. Principle 1. An oath pronounced with a defect of truth, or perjury strictly so called, is a mortal sin from its whole genus.

Thus holds the most common and certain opinion. Therefore Innocent XI condemned proposition 24: "To call God as witness to a light lie is not so great an irreverence that on account of it He wills or can condemn a man."⁶⁰¹ And among the questions to be proposed to Wycliffites and Hussites there is also this: "Whether he believes that perjury knowingly committed, from whatever cause or occasion, for the preservation of his own bodily life or that of another, even in favor of the faith, is a mortal sin?"⁶⁰² The intrinsic reason is that every perjury is essentially a notable injury and contempt of God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. Therefore the Angelic Doctor⁶⁰³ says: "Those things which of themselves are venial sins, or even good in genus, if they are done in contempt of God, are mortal sins. Hence much more, whatever by its nature pertains to contempt of God is a mortal sin. But perjury by its nature imports contempt of God.... Hence it is manifest that perjury by reason of itself is a mortal sin.... He who perjures himself in jest does not avoid divine irreverence, but in some respect increases it more, and therefore he is not excused from mortal sin." Therefore, if even a jocose lie confirmed by an oath is a mortal sin, there is no slightness of matter in perjury; consequently, it is a mortal sin from its whole genus, i.e., it always induces the guilt of mortal sin unless there is an imperfection of the act because of insufficient knowledge or will. Since these things are so, it is easily understood why the most severe penalties against the perjured have been enacted by divine, ecclesiastical, and civil law. God Himself threatens the perjured with a curse and exclusion from the kingdom of heaven;⁶⁰⁴ the Church excludes the perjured from giving testimony and punishes them at the prudent judgment of the Ordinary;⁶⁰⁵ and civil laws are accustomed to punish the perjured with the penalty of grave imprisonment.⁶⁰⁶

Note. He also commits true perjury who swears with a purely mental restriction, as is clear from proposition 26 condemned by Innocent XI.⁶⁰⁷

Likewise, a feigned oath seems to be referred to perjury, as was already said above in n. 441.

⁶⁰¹ Denz., n. 1174.

⁶⁰² Denz., n. 664.

⁶⁰³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 98, a. 3c and ad 2; cf. 3, dist. 39, q. 1, a. 5, sol. 1, where St. Thomas says: "If [someone] swears falsely, I believe that he always sins mortally, whether the oath is solemn or not solemn."

⁶⁰⁴ Cf. Zech. 5:3ff.

⁶⁰⁵ Code of Canon Law, c. 1757, § 2, n. 1; c. 1795, c. 2; c. 2323.

⁶⁰⁶ Cf. Penal Laws for the German Empire, § 153ff.

⁶⁰⁷ "If someone ... for any other end whatever should swear that he did not do something which he really did, understanding within himself something else which he did not do, or another way from that in which he did it, or anything else true added, he does not really lie nor is he perjured" (Denz., n. 1176).

458. Principle 2. An oath pronounced with a defect of judgment is from its genus a venial sin. Thus holds the common opinion.

The reason is that the irreverence inflicted upon God in this way does not seem to be so great as to constitute a mortal sin, because no divine attribute is directly violated, and notably not the veracity and justice of God. Moreover, through a defect of the companion of judgment, the principal end of an oath, namely, the confirmation of the truth spoken, is not lost. "Hence," St. Thomas⁶⁰⁸ says, "it is not necessary that swearing without cause always be a mortal sin, as is swearing falsely." But accidentally an oath made without judgment can be a mortal sin, e.g., because of grave scandal caused, as if a priest should swear in this way, or because of a proximate danger of perjuring oneself.

⁶⁰⁸ 3, dist. 39, q. 1, a. 5, sol. 1 ad 3.

459. Principle 3. An oath pronounced with a defect of justice is from its genus a grave sin.

Enough has already been said concerning this matter above in n. 445; hence it is to be recalled briefly: a) An assertory oath made against justice is a grave sin if the assertion itself was gravely sinful; otherwise it is a light sin, namely, when the assertion itself was lightly sinful.⁶⁰⁹ Hence one who confirms a grave unjust detraction by oath commits two mortal sins, namely, detraction and abuse of an oath. But one who confirms a lightly evil detraction by oath commits two light sins: one of light detraction, the other of light abuse of an oath. b) A promissory oath made without justice, i.e., containing an unlawful promise, is certainly a grave sin if the thing promised is gravely unlawful, e.g., adultery, an irreligious marriage, etc. But if the thing promised is in itself lightly evil, e.g., a lie, slight harm, etc., nevertheless, according to the more probable opinion, such an abuse of an oath seems to be so irreverent toward God as to constitute a mortal sin. Hence one who swears that he will commit adultery commits two mortal sins, namely, against chastity and against religion. But one who swears that he will inflict slight harm upon his neighbor commits one light sin, namely, the slight harm intended, and another probably grave sin, namely, the grave abuse of an oath.⁶¹⁰ Thus objectively speaking. In practice, however, judgment must often be otherwise, both because of a defect of a true intention of swearing and because of the erroneous conscience of the one swearing.

⁶⁰⁹ There are those who teach (e.g., Noldin, De praec. n. 255) that an assertory oath which lacks justice is always a venial sin from its genus.

⁶¹⁰ Cf. Ballerini in the notes to Gury (Comp. theol. mor. I, n. 309), who endeavors well to reconcile the diverse authors apparently disagreeing on this matter.

S. Th. II-II, q. 98.

795. Perjury (parjure; meineed) is a perverse or vicious oath.

One kind is 1. strictly and properly so called, which imports falsity and is maximally perverse, because it is directly opposed to the end of an oath, which is the confirmation of truth: namely, it is a false oath which essentially lacks formal truth, or a lie confirmed by oath (faux serment; valsche eed).

Another kind is 2. taken broadly and generally, and is every illicit oath, or one deprived of one of the three required conditions or companions, namely:

a) A vain and incautious oath, if only judgment of discretion is lacking (serment indiscret ou vain; onbezonnen eed).

b) Or an iniquitous or dishonest oath, if justice is lacking (serment malhonnete; oneerlijke eed).

These are indirectly opposed to the end of an oath and to truth: "for in whatever mode someone swears something illicit, from this he incurs a certain falsity, because he is obliged to do the contrary... and when he swears indiscreetly, by this very fact he commits himself to the danger of incurring falsity" (a. 1, ad 1).

c) Indeed also if truth of future execution is lacking in a promissory oath (violation de serment; eedschending): nevertheless this is rather a sin of omission than a sin contrary to the oath and a perverse oath.

But if the aforesaid conditions are lacking in a fictitious oath, there is simulated perjury, which is a sin of the same species because the external irreverence toward God is the same.

796. Perjury strictly so called, or a lying oath, is a mortal sin from its whole genus, as is clear from proposition 24 condemned by Innocent XI,¹ and from the nature of the thing, because it is directly contrary to the divine attribute of infinite truth: for always he who swears a lie, even the lightest, appeals to God Himself, infinite truth, as witness of falsehood, as if either He did not know the truth, or could lie and wished to testify to falsehood; whence he contemns God and, so far as in him lies, destroys infinite truth, and at the same time evacuates the end of an oath, of confirming truth (a. 2 and 3).

¹ "To call God as witness of a light lie is not so great an irreverence on account of which He would will or be able to damn a man."

Hence God punishes it most severely (Lev. XIX, 12; Zach. V, 3, 4; Prov. VI, 16-19; Eccli. XXIII, 11; Mt. V, 33), and the Code of law says that it is to be punished (can. 2323), whence in several places solemn perjury is a sin reserved to the Ordinary.

797. Perjury improperly so called from defect of judgment alone, or an incautious oath, that is, without due cause of swearing, is a sin (Ex. XX, 7; Deut. V, 11; Eccli. XXIII, 9, 16; Mt. V, 34), but, if the other conditions are present, it is only venial, scandal, contempt, and danger of another grave defect being excluded: for it is not directly to act against some divine attribute, but only to act irreverently with the divine majesty, by using His name in vain.

798. Perjury improperly so called from defect of justice, or an iniquitous oath:

1. If it is merely assertory, per se it is probably only venial, because the oath does not fall upon the assertion insofar as it is evil but insofar as it is true; whence it does not destroy the end of the oath, nor make God witness of a lie, but of a depraved or indecent thing, which per se does not appear to be a grave injury, unless the oath is employed as a means or instrument of sinning, for example, for conciliating greater faith to detraction, or in attestation of depraved love for seducing a girl: for this, so far as in itself lies, is to make God a cooperator of iniquity.

2. If the oath is promissory:

a) To swear a gravely illicit action, without doubt and with all consenting, is always a mortal sin.

b) Likewise to swear even a lightly illicit action is mortal from its whole genus, for it seems a grave irreverence to call God as witness and patron, so that by His authority He may confirm the purpose of committing any evil whatsoever, even the lightest, because it is directly repugnant to His infinite sanctity; nevertheless per accidens, because of ignorance, it will often be venial.

c) On the contrary, to swear an indifferent, vain, useless, or idle action, or one impeditive of a greater good, contempt being excluded, is only venial: it is to assume the name of God in vain.

799. Observations. - 1. In a promissory oath there is perjury strictly so called and always mortal sin if the one swearing is without the intention of fulfilling the promise; likewise one swearing an impossible thing, because he cannot have this intention of fulfilling, for example, a debtor who swears that he will pay the price within a month and knows certainly that he cannot.

2. A custom or habit of swearing is evil, because, as a proximate occasion, it inclines to sins, namely, false, dishonest, vain oaths. Whence there is an obligation of removing it (Eccli. XXIII, 9 sq.; Mt. V, 34), and he sins who voluntarily acquires such a habit, or neglects to eliminate it: interiorly and as to affection, as often as, adverting to the obligation of retracting the habit, he does not retract it; exteriorly and as to effect, as often as from the habit he utters sufficiently foreseen vicious oaths by morally interrupted acts. But he sins gravely if from custom he is disposed to swear anything indiscriminately, even false and gravely dishonest things; venially if he is disposed only to swear vain or lightly dishonest things.

He who swears from custom either a) attends to the act of swearing and to the defect of the conditions required for it, and then the vicious oath is voluntary in itself; or b) attends only to the act of swearing and not to its defect, and then the oath is gravely or lightly culpable in its cause, namely, in the custom, as was said; or c) attends to nothing, and then properly he does not swear, because the intention of swearing is lacking, but the speech can be culpable in its cause, insofar as externally it sounds like an evil oath or at least a vain use of the name of God; d) but if he has retracted the custom, the oath will not be voluntary even in its cause.

3. To ask for an oath with defect of truth, justice, or judgment a) is not licit, if it cannot be furnished without such defect, because it would be directly to induce to sin, for example, to ask that someone swear falsely or by false gods. b) Nor is it licit if the other does not advert to the defect and sins only materially, or if he swears what he thinks is true, although in fact it is false, because the one asking is the true moral cause of the oath; but the ignorance of the one swearing cannot excuse him who knowingly asks that God be invoked as witness of a dishonest or false thing (Lev. V, 1). c) But it is licit, from a just and proportionate cause, to ask an oath from him who can swear well, but who probably or certainly will swear badly, for example, by false gods. But if the other is going to commit perjury strictly so called, there is easily a sufficient cause on account of the common good for a public person who from office ought to ask the oath, and besides "she does not seem to exact it, but he at whose instance she exacts it"; never or very rarely for private persons, because regularly it would be to give an occasion of sinning without hope of some good (a. 4, and ad 4).

16. If someone, whether alone, or in the presence of others, whether questioned, or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation, or for any other purpose, swears that he did not do something which he really did, understanding within himself something else, or some other way than that in which he did it, or whatever else added being true, he does not really lie, nor is he a perjurer.

XI. "A culpably retained habit of swearing falsely, deliberately, or indifferently truly and falsely, is more probably not a sin of actual perjury, but is to be confessed as the very sin of the habit of perjury." Patritius Sporer, tract. 3, on the 2nd precept of the Decalogue, ch. 1, sect. 4, §5, n. 151, p. 226 in my copy, from Tamburini, Bk. III, ch. 1, n. 2. See Diss. 7, ch. 5, and others.

I. As has been said, truth is the chief of the conditions necessary for a lawful oath. It is not, however, necessary that this truth always be so in fact; but it suffices that the swearer, in good faith, believe the matter about which he swears to be true in his own mind. For it can happen that a matter is false, although it does not really stand thus, in the mind of the swearer; that is, metaphysical truth is not required, but moral truth. Wherefore truth is not taken so much from the object itself, or the matter sworn, as from the swearer himself — namely, that you swear the matter to be true, when, with sincere mind, you think it to be true, so that you swear without perjuring yourself. And, on the contrary, it can happen that you swear a false matter, and perjure yourself, because you think it to be false. So that I may resolve more clearly all the difficulties that can occur in the use of an assertory oath, I will present the following little questions with their responses.

II. Question I. Does one who swears falsely in the lightest matter sin mortally? Response: The Summa Angelica reports Godfrey teaching, in the chapter "Quod autem," that perjury in the lightest matter is a venial sin; which opinion Angles reckons probable, in these words (s.v. Perjurium): "It might, however, be said that a jesting lie is not, properly, a lie; and therefore he could hold that it is not properly perjury. But the safer opinion, according to the judgment of theologians, is otherwise." Antonio da Ignazio, in the Prolegomenon of Moral Theology of the Jesuits, ch. 1, and Henrique a Santo Ignazio, adjudge this same opinion, along with Bauny, in his Summa, p. 65, 15th edition, where he teaches it. And what Bauny says — as Godfrey's opinion, that one does not sin mortally, since it is not so great an irreverence as this — is proposition 24 among those condemned by Innocent XI, in these words: "To call God to witness to a light lie is not so great an irreverence as to warrant that one should be unwilling, or unable, to condemn a man for it." Domenico Viva, in his Theological Balance, interprets Bauny as admitting the smallness of matter only in a promissory oath. Let it be so. For I willingly interpret Catholic writers, as far as I can, in a sound sense along with the others. What I deny is that the proposition condemned by Innocent XI was, in its very words, conceived entirely in the sense of an assertory oath, not a promissory one. That the reason for the proscribed proposition does not hold, Fr. Viva himself testifies. Whatever the case may be, it is evident that the matter stands thus — since the malice of perjury does not derive its gravity from the lie, whether light or grave, whether jesting or pernicious, but from the irreverence, and supreme injury, which is done to God, whenever such matter of invocation, or the calling of God to witness of falsehood, occurs, whether it be the gravest, or the lightest.

For whoever invokes God, tacitly testifies that God can be deceived, or can deceive — and thus takes away from God his infallible truth. Therefore every perjury is a mortal sin. Indeed, the Angelic Doctor adds (II-II, q. 98, art. 3), where he establishes that every perjury is a mortal sin — he adds, I say, in his reply to the second objection, that perjury in a light matter is, in one respect, a graver sin than in a grave matter, and therefore, on the part of its own genus, a mortal one. He who perjures himself in jest does not avoid the divine irreverence, but in some respect increases it; and therefore is not excused from mortal sin. Only the defect of consideration, and of deliberation, or advertence, could excuse from mortal fault; but in such a case there would not be perjury — since the very reason for swearing requires deliberation, in the manner to be explained below. Here are the Angelic Doctor's own words: "He who swears falsely from a slip of the tongue, if indeed he adverts that he is swearing, and that what he swears is false, is not excused from mortal sin, any more than from contempt of God. If, however, he does not advert to this, he does not seem to have the intention of swearing; and therefore he is excused from the crime of perjury." Thus all authors teach, after Innocent XI condemned the aforesaid proposition.

III. Question II. Does one who swears a doubtful matter as certain, or, on the contrary, a certain matter as doubtful, sin mortally? Response: All the Doctors respond affirmatively. For one who swears a doubtful matter as certain, or a certain matter as doubtful, really lies: therefore he commits perjury, which is a mortal sin. You ought, then, to affirm or deny a matter in that manner in which you, all things prudently weighed, judge it to be. If the matter is doubtful to you, you ought only to declare it while doubting; if certain, you ought to declare it not doubtingly, but assertively.

IV. Question III. Does one who swears something by hyperbole, which, as it sounds, is not true, sin mortally? Response: Sánchez (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 4, n. 5), Tamburini (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 2, §1, n. 4), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 7, q. 7), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 1, punct. 3, n. 6) respond negatively — since to say something false by a hyperbolic and figurative locution is not a lie, nor a sin. For this opinion they praise St. Augustine, and St. Thomas, who explains this in II-II, q. 111, art. 1. He recounts several sayings of Sacred Scripture which are explained by a figurative signification. In this manner is explained that saying of David (1 Kings 1): "Saul and Jonathan... were swifter than eagles, stronger than lions." That very many expressions of Sacred Scripture are explained by figurative and hyperbolic speech is well established. But that men who are neither Prophets nor Patriarchs, as those commonly were who are established from Scripture to have spoken figuratively, can confirm their hyperbolic assertions by oath, does not seem to me proven at all. For this reason, oaths of this kind, which Tamburini presses in the place cited — namely, "I swear that Peter possesses infinite riches," "that you are loved by me infinitely," "that your rivals are innumerable," etc. — since in the first place it is certain that such oaths are for the most part incautious, and consequently lack judgment, and are therefore illicit; moreover, an oath is granted by strictest right, and by way of medicine — therefore it is to be employed only when a grave illness, or necessity, presses.

V. Question IV. Is it lawful to swear something which you judge only probably to be true? Response: This little question is proposed by La Croix (Bk. III, part 1, ch. 70, n. 267). He responds in these words: "Sánchez (Bk. III, ch. 4, q. 2, dub. 3, n. 77) affirms this — since you swear this which you judge to be true; therefore you do not perjure yourself. Castropalao, part 5, n. 2, and others, in Diana, part 4, tract. 4, n. 10, extend this to swearing even in judgment. Some hold that one can lawfully swear a matter which he has heard from a notable and trustworthy man to be true. That which is probable, according to some, in Diana, is licit to swear even in judgment." Leander (tract. 1, disp. 8, near the end, p. 48), recalling to examination the kind of probability necessary for an oath, reports Tamburini as requiring a probability that induces moral certainty. But, reckoning this too rigid, he adds this: "But certainly any probability makes for moral certainty, as we have often said, with the common view." Whence... , as Palao well says, it will suffice, if he prudently judges, "according to a probable reason, that it is so." If you wish to know the principles of this doctrine, you must recall to memory the principles of probability, which Leander employs in their fullest amplitude. For he says that any probability whatsoever produces moral certainty, and that therefore any probable opinion whatsoever is a rule of honest action, and this is contained in that proposition condemned by Alexander VII, which stands in order 3: "Generally, whenever we act with either intrinsic or extrinsic probability, however slight, provided we do not depart from the bounds of probability, we always act prudently." This assertion, so indefinite, and generally set forth, Leander asserts of any probability whatsoever — whether grave, or slight — generating moral certainty, which anyone can prudently follow, as a rule of his own conscience, and this even in swearing. The Church has expressly condemned this. By a stronger right, then, that which Leander adds is to be execrated, namely, that anyone can swear a matter to be true which he judges only probable. Do not theologians commonly teach that God is called by oath to witness the truth? But, according to Leander, and those whom he cites, Sánchez, Diana, Castropalao, we will be able to invoke him as witness of probability! How can we swear that something is true which is not true, but only probable to us? For "true" is opposed to "false," and "probable" is opposed not to "false," but to "improbable." Since, then, contrary probable reasons occur most frequently concerning the same matter, anyone will be able, by oath, to affirm the same matter, and also, by oath, to deny it. According to the Probabilists, one can, from probable opinions, follow whichever one prefers, and now embrace, now reject, the same one. Or at least one will be able to select whichever part is to be affirmed or denied by oath, whichever has seemed more opportune, and more accommodated to his own affairs. All of which not only betrays laxity, but even strikes horror. If Leander, with the authors he adduces, had said that one can swear a matter which he knows to be probable, as probable, it would somehow seem tolerable. But, since they assert that one can swear as true what we merely judge probable, and moreover that any probability whatsoever can induce moral certainty, we can in no way admit this. Wherefore we reject Leander's opinion as false.

The opinion, however, which Fr. La Croix reports from Sánchez and others, we reject as improbable — since what we know only by probable conjecture, as Sánchez himself says, we cannot affirm as true, but as probable. For the common opinion of theologians is that the matter of an oath is truth, considered not absolutely, and as it is in reality, but in the manner in which it is perceived by the intellect. Therefore, if the swearer knows the matter as probable, he cannot swear it as true; and if he does not know it as true, he cannot swear it as merely probable. What they further add — that for an oath to be given in judgment, moral certainty is required, but that in other private oaths probable certainty suffices — this, as I judge, is a mere fabrication. For the reasoning is the same for a private, as for a public, oath: for the same is the formal reason which is attributed to each species — namely, the invocation of divine testimony in confirmation of truth. The same certainty, therefore, is necessary for both oaths, whether in judgment, or outside judgment. One who knows a matter as probable cannot swear it as true, but as probable, and conversely. It is indeed true that, according to the decrees of the laws, in judgment, testimonies are not admitted except of those things of which the witness has evidence, that is, unless he is a witness from having seen with his own eyes; and consequently a knowledge of the truth wholly evident is necessary. For the rest, whatever positive law may prescribe, in every oath, whether public or private, moral certainty is necessary — which we shall explain in the following little question.

When, however, someone confirms by oath a probable knowledge which he has of some matter, the matter of the oath is not the probability, or the doubt itself, but the truth of the probability and of the doubt: for, when I swear that I either opine, or doubt about some matter, I swear the truth — because it is really true that I have such an opinion, or doubt, or suspicion.

VI. Question V. What certainty is required, in order for someone to be able to swear licitly? Response: For a clearer, and fuller, understanding of the preceding question, I have proposed to settle this little question. There is one certainty which is evident, and metaphysical; another, experimental; another, moral; another, probable, which admits various degrees. Very many recent theologians and Casuists teach that a knowledge which is verisimilar, or probable, concerning some matter, suffices for someone to be able to swear. Thus teach, besides those cited in the preceding number, the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 3, §1), who praise Candido, Lessius, Azor, and others. This opinion does not at all convince me, and, according to the adversaries' own principles, seems to me false. For, if they themselves teach that a probable opinion produces moral certainty, and that we can choose, between two opinions on the same matter, whichever we reckon more opportune for ourselves — it certainly follows that we too will be able, by oath, to confirm or deny the same matter, according as time and our own reasons shall demand. How false, and erroneous, this is, no one fails to see.

VII. Rejecting, then, this opinion, we say, first, that indeed a mathematical, and altogether evident, certainty is not always required in an oath — since this cannot be had in very many cases; but we assert that a moral certainty is necessary, which excludes every prudent doubt. This moral certainty, however, is in no way induced by conjectures, and merely probable and verisimilar reasons — since the adversaries themselves flee to reflex principles, so that these merely probable reasons may not remove this doubt. But most weighty foundations, and reasons, are necessary, which render us certain concerning the matter about which we must swear. This opinion of ours is clearly drawn from the Catechism of the Council of Trent, Part III, on the second commandment of the Decalogue, §2: "The first thing, then, that is required in an oath is truth — namely, that what is asserted be true, and that the one who swears judge it so to be, not rashly, nor led by any light conjecture, but by the most certain arguments." This same thing is taught by Cardinal Bellarmine (Bk. I, on the Sacraments in general, ch. 16): "Even though one has a probable reason for believing, he nonetheless does not have certainty; for it can happen that he thinks he believes, and yet does not really believe. But certainty is required for testifying, that is, in the name of God; nor does a probable opinion suffice, as is clear in the similar case of an oath."

To witness truly, and to swear well, is not lawful, except for one who can know what he swears. No one swears well unless he can say, 'I have sworn... and I will keep it, to judge the justice of thy testimonies' — that is, unless he has certainty. For nor does a probable opinion suffice, just as a probable opinion does not suffice for testifying by oath; but only in a matter of which we are most certain. This opinion can be confirmed by what St. Ambrose writes (on Psalm 118, sermon 14, n. 14): "The voice of one walking in light." To say, "I swore," is a testimony of knowledge... Let it not be permitted, then, to swear except concerning matters of which we are most certain. Let no one swear who does not know what he swears... To swear, then, is a judgment of knowledge and of conscience... Let light go before you, if you intend to swear — that is, let the knowledge of the truth go before you, so that the bond of the oath may not harm you.

VIII. It is true, however, that the adversaries too admit that moral certainty is necessary; but in this they fail, that they teach that this moral certainty can be had by merely verisimilar conjectures, and merely probable reasons. For even granting that a probable opinion produces so much certainty as suffices as a rule of honest action, it does not, for that reason, follow rightly that it produces so much certainty as suffices for swearing that to be true which we opine to be only probable. For a greater certainty is required for an oath than for any moral opinion whatsoever. For this latter, mere true probability suffices to be a rule of honest action. But when someone swears something as true, it is not enough that it be probable; it is required that it appear true to the swearer — not through merely probable reasons, but through most weighty principles, or arguments, and certain ones. When this certainty is lacking, and only conjectures and probable reasons appear, then the swearer ought to affirm, or deny, a matter as probable, not as true.

IX. Question VI. What certainty is required for an oath to be tendered in judgment? Response: In the forum, certain knowledge is necessary... ; testimonies from hearsay are not admitted there, since witnesses there must have evidence from sight. More recent theologians commonly teach, the theologians of Salamanca, Sporer, La Croix, and many others whom they cite, that a witness worthy of credence suffices for swearing outside judgment; not so in judgment. When someone swears concerning another's deed, they say, experimental knowledge is necessary, such as is had by sight; but that a single credible witness suffices outside judgment, not so in judgment.

But it seems to me that it must be said that, whether in judgment or outside judgment, no one can swear a matter as true which he has heard only from a single witness, even a trustworthy one; but he must swear it in the manner in which he knows it — namely, either because he has had it established by his own eyes, or because he has received it by report from others. Although a trustworthy witness may be a foundation for me to believe prudently what he relates, this faith, or credulity, cannot be of such authority to me that, relying on it, I could absolutely swear that what I have heard is true; but I can only swear that I have heard it. Why can we not swear before a judge, absolutely, that what we have heard from a single witness is true? For no other reason, surely, than that a single human witness does not induce certainty sufficient for an oath. And although in judgment the discussion concerns the harm of one's neighbor, nonetheless such a great certainty is demanded in judgment, not so much to avoid the harm of anyone, as so that every occasion of perjury may be removed. This is the peculiar thing that occurs to be said concerning judicial oaths — namely, that judges, in pronouncing sentence, ought to exact such oaths as are established by the testimony of the eyes concerning that which is affirmed — namely, oaths of experimental, as it is called, certainty.

It is false, then, what more recent theologians commonly assert — that, outside judgment, one can absolutely swear something to be true which he knows only through probable reasons and conjectures; but, whether in judgment or outside it, you are able to swear what you know: and what you know only by hearsay, you ought to swear by hearsay; and what is established to you by sight, you ought to swear is established to you by sight. The reason for this is that, whether in judgment or outside it, the formal reason of the oath is the same — namely, the invocation of divine testimony; and the same reverence is owed to God everywhere and always. This, however, is the distinction between judicial and private oaths: that a judge decides nothing, unless witnesses swear a matter established by sight; private men, however, more often give credence to, and deliberate much upon, oaths concerning things heard (especially where the harm of a third party is not at issue). Wherefore, if you swear to me that you heard from a most trustworthy man, subject to no exception, that some deed occurred, I, as a private man, would give it full credence; and, insofar as such knowledge concerned my affairs or business, I would use it as a rule for many of my deliberations; but, as a judge, I would have no faith in you, nor would I decree anything relying on such an oath.

X. Question VII. What diligence is required in inquiring into the truth necessary for an oath? Response: The theologians of Salamanca (loc. cit., n. 4) answer in these words: "Equal diligence is not required in every matter to scrutinize the truth of the thing sworn; but, according to the condition of the greater or lesser weight of the thing, greater or lesser diligence is to be employed. For in matters of greater weight, greater care is to be employed than in matters of lesser moment."

This rule seems to me false. Since it is not the nature of the thing sworn, but the supreme gravity and dignity of the oath itself, that ought to be the norm of the diligence necessary in the inquiry of the truth before one swears. Is not assertory perjury, even in the lightest matter, a mortal sin? Why? Because the gravity of perjury is derived not from the matter sworn, but from the injury done to divine truth. Therefore, since an oath, by its own nature, with no regard to the matter sworn, is, among all peoples, a matter of the highest moment, the utmost diligence for the inquiry of truth ought to precede it. Only, then, can it be said that greater or lesser diligence is to be employed with respect to the truth itself, insofar as the matter which is sworn is more or less accessible and open to view, not with respect to the matter sworn. When, however, the matter sworn is grave in weight, since it concerns the reputation, or fortune, of one's neighbor, greater diligence and deliberation is required, not by force of the oath, or of the virtue of religion, but by force of another virtue, of justice, or of charity — since, if you swear falsely against your neighbor in a grave matter, besides perjury you commit the sin of injustice. And it is in this sense that it is said that, when the matter sworn is of great weight, grave diligence is also required on this ground, so that, besides perjury, the sin against justice may be avoided. All this seems certain to me, and cannot be denied even by more recent authors, though they assert the contrary in ambiguous words.

XI. Question VIII. Does one who is notably negligent in inquiring the truth of the matter he swears sin mortally, even though it happens that the matter he swears is true? Response: Sánchez (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 4, n. 10), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 7, q. 1), and, in them, Scotus, Cajetan, Richard, Sotus, Navarrus, and commonly all Doctors teach that this person sins mortally — since he exposes himself to the danger of perjury, and omits the necessary diligence in a matter of grave weight.

But, so that all that has been said in the preceding little questions may be more validly confirmed, and especially that rule in which we said that probable knowledge, which can suffice for governing other human acts, by no means suffices for the making of an oath, it is worth bringing forward St. Thomas's teaching. The holy Doctor, then, has this (II-II, q. 89, art. 3, ad 3): "There is great danger in an oath, both on account of the greatness of God, whose testimony is invoked, and also on account of the fickleness of the human tongue, whose words are confirmed by the oath. And therefore such things (namely, truth, judgment, justice) are more required for an oath than for other human acts."

XII. Question IX. Can it be lawful — as the Scholastics call it — to swear that one saw a fellow student attend classes for the time required by the university for completing his course, if it suffices that they have commonly seen him frequent the schools? Response: Tamburini (Bk. III, ch. 2, §1, n. 8) relates this case from Hurtado, in Diana, Part V, tract. 8, resol. 10. A student, wishing to prove attendance, for which he needs two witnesses, can employ two friends who did not see him present at the lectures, but who are sufficiently persuaded that he was present; but they cannot swear that they saw it. Tamburini approves this decision, to which I in no way can accede. For this resolution is quite involved, and entangled. Why can they not swear that they saw him, but can absolutely swear that he frequented the schools? Because they are sufficiently persuaded that he was present at the lectures. Why so? No ground of that persuasion is adduced. Wherefore it seems to be implied that these two student friends did not at all see him, and yet can freely and absolutely swear that they saw him attend classes, or that the student himself testifies to it, or that they themselves, kindly and out of a certain inclination toward their student friend, have been persuaded that he really did frequent the schools. But no one fails to see that these foundations are by no means sufficient for making the oath that the student attended lectures — for, in order for the aforesaid friends to be able to swear this in good faith, it is necessary either that they themselves saw him, or that they have as witnesses persons worthy of credence who affirm this. What authors commonly teach afterward — that, for this oath to be given without fault, it is not necessary that the swearers should have seen the student go to school every single day — is true, since such knowledge cannot be had by due diligence. It will suffice, then, for them to know that the student commonly attended the lectures; for this is what universities require, and no more — although, so that the oath may be pronounced with due religion, the swearers ought to confirm by oath a common, not a daily, presence in the schools. Extremes are nonetheless to be avoided. When an oath is made according to the mind of the one questioning, truth, judgment, and justice accompanying it in good faith, one must beware of excessive anxiety, and superstition, lest, while you strive to avoid one extreme, you fall into the other.

XIII. Question X. Is it lawful to persuade someone to swear a truth of which he himself is ignorant? Response: It is certain among all that this is not lawful — since one who swears without certain knowledge sins mortally; therefore one who induces him to swear in this manner, without certain knowledge, similarly sins. For the clarity of this matter, this case is usually proposed. Peter, a merchant, to prove that Paul owes him a hundred gold pieces, which he really does owe, but which Paul otherwise denies owing, induces Anthony to swear the truth of this debt — namely, that Paul owes Peter a hundred gold pieces — although it is false that Anthony has this knowledge. Anthony swears. His oath, then, is certainly perjury. He is not, however, bound to restitution, since the debt of a hundred gold pieces is supposed to be true. And although Peter the merchant produces reasons which seem to him... seem true, you cannot for that reason swear in judgment that you know it; nor even outside judgment; but you can only swear that you have heard from Peter that this sum of money is owed him by Paul.

I ASSERT first, that an assertory oath in any matter whatsoever, even a very small one, is a mortal sin if it be false, and it can only be excused from mortal sin by a defect of full deliberation. So D. Bonav. question 3, in the body, and to the third objection, whom Cajetan follows, summa, V. Periur. cap. 1. Sotus lib. 8. de Iust. quaest. 2. art. 3. Toletus lib. 4. summa, cap. 21. Couar. cap. variarum, cap. 1. n. 2. and de pactis 1. p. §. 1. Suarez Tom. 2. de relig. lib. 3. de Iur. cap. 4. Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 4. num. 15. and 16. Azor Tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 4. quaest. 1. Valentia 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 3. Sanchez in summa, lib. 3. cap. 4. num. 6. who says all the others follow him. Nor does any holy end excuse it, nor fear, as Suarez, Sayrus, Sotus, Toletus teach loco cit. Navar. summa, cap. 12. Sanchez loco cit. after D. Thom. art. 3. ad 1. D. Bonavent. quaest. 2. ad ultimum, which he proves, both from the canon in Decr. lib. 2. tit. 24. cap. 15. de Iureiur. Quod si quis periurat pro vita corporis servanda, quia magis dilexit corpus, quam animam, ieiunet tres quadragesimas; and because perjuring is intrinsically evil, so that it can never be rendered honorable. So Sanchez argues, num. 7. with others.

The FIRST part of the assertion is proved by D. Bonavent. quaest. 5. from D. Augustine serm. 28. and 30. de verbis Apostoli.

SECOND, it is proved by D. Bonav. argument 3, which Valencia, Sanchez, and the rest use: because to bring God as a witness to a falsehood is a great contempt of the Divine truth. For thus God is made either ignorant or wicked, as Bassaeus also urges, V. Iuram. 2. num. 3.

HENCE it follows, first, that the Jurists were not right — whom Angelus reports, V. Periurium, teaching that their opinion is probable — in saying that a false oath told in jest is venial. Rather it is a greater sin, because it is a greater contempt, as D. Bonavent. teaches, ad 3. D. Thom. quaest. 98. art. 3. ad secundum, whom the others follow, as adduced by Sanchez num. 7.

Yet S. Bonaventure and S. Thomas ADD that it can be excused from mortal sin if the oath is sworn in jest, which removes deliberation; for then the jest is not a grave contempt of the Divine truth.

It follows SECOND, that he equally sins mortally if he swears to a matter doubtful and uncertain to himself, because he exposes himself to the danger of speaking falsely and of perjuring himself; indeed he perjures himself by bringing God as a certain witness to an uncertain matter, as Sanchez argues, num. 8. from D. Bonavent. quaest. 1. ad 1. Then, because, as S. Bonaventure says, quaest. 2. ad 1. the Divine truth is rashly brought forward and contemned, while it is called as a certain witness to an uncertain thing.

S. Bonaventure ADDS another reason, loco citato, quaest. 1. ad 3. because that which is sworn is sworn from a culpably erroneous conscience, which in matters of morals does not excuse a wicked deed. See Bassaeus 3. num. 3.

For the truth of an assertory oath it is NOT necessary that the matter be so in fact, but it is sufficient, and necessary, that the matter, prudently considered, be so firmly judged. So S. Bonav. in the cited question, whom Azorius follows, Tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 2. quaest. 5. Valentia disp. 6. q. 7. punct. 3. col. 5. Suarez in the same lib. 3. cap. 5. num. 3. Lessius lib. 2. de Iust. cap. 42. dub. 4. num. 17. Sanchez loco cit. num. 10. Hence he infers, with Valencia col. 11. and D. Bonavent. q. cit. ad argumenta, that one who lightly judges that what he swears is true is not excused from perjury, since he does not sufficiently provide that he swears truly, and it follows as true only by accident. Therefore, even if it be true, he is not excused from mortal sin if the negligence in investigating the truth was grave; but if it was light, the fault will be light also, because such as is the cause, such is the effect, as S. Bonaventure hinted, quaest. 3. ad argumenta, and many affirm with Sanchez num. 14. and with Bassaeus loco cit.

But the OTHER part of the assertion, namely that assertory perjury is excused from mortal sin by indeliberation. It is proved by D. Bonav. quaest. 3. in the body, because the slipperiness of the tongue is great, which often can, through a slip, not follow the command of the will, and render the act non-human, or imperfectly such; Sanchez uses this reasoning at num. 15. So also think D. Thom. art. 3. citato, ad 2. Cajetan there, Sylvester V. Iurament. 2. quaest. 6. Navar. summa, cap. 12. Valencia, Suarez, and others cited above.

I ASSERT second, that a promissory oath, by defect of the concordance of the will to fulfill with the promise uttered — which is called truth of the present — is wicked. So D. Bonav. quaest. 3. body, and to the third, whom Sylvester follows, V. Iuram. quaest. 1. Armilla there, Cajetan 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. ad 1. and q. 98. art. 2. and 3. and in summa, under the word Periurium, c. 2. and 3. Sotus 8. de Iust. q. 1. art. 7. and quaest. 2. art. 1. and 3. Navar. in summa, cap. 12. Valencia loco cit. puncto 3. concl. 2. Azor Tom. 1. lib. 11. c. 4. q. 1. Suarez lib. 3. citato, c. 15. Clavis Regia lib. 5. cap. 4. n. 27. Lessius lib. 2. de Iust. c. 42. dub. 4. num. 18. Sanchez loco citato, num. 16. Bassaeus n. 1.

It is PROVED by D. Bonav. argument 3, quaest. 3. and quaest. prima ad 1. because thus the Summa Truth is brought forward as a witness to a known falsehood, and so the gravest injury is inflicted upon God by swearing a lie.

HENCE it follows that one also sins mortally who swears to give a thing which he is in doubt whether he can fulfill: likewise to promise with a doubting mind of fulfilling, or to promise a thing which he believes he cannot fulfill. It is proved by D. Bonavent. quaest. 1. ad 1. because he certainly swears to an uncertain thing, and therefore lies, as I said above concerning the assertory oath, with Sanchez.

The GREATER difficulty is when the truth of the future is lacking, namely, in not giving the promised thing, which one swore with the intention of giving. And indeed, when the matter is grave, all maintain it to be mortal. The question is when it is light, which I shall treat in disp. de Periurio, q. 3.

The FIRST opinion is that it is always mortal. So Valencia disp. 6. q. 7. puncto 3. concl. 3. Gabriel in 3. dist. 39. q. 2. art. 2. concl. 4. Cajetan sum. v. Periurium, cap. 2. Lessius lib. 2. de Iust. cap. 42. dub. 5. num. 25.. Bassaeus 4. num. 3. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 24. Reg. lib. 18. num. 9.

The SECOND opinion distinguishes: if the matter is wholly trifling, it is mortal; but if partial, it is only venial. So Cajetan 1. 2. q. 87. art. 7. dub. 1. Navar. summa, c. 12. n. 10. and c. 18. n. 4. Covarr. lib. 1. variarum lect. c. 1. Philiarc. Tom. 1. p. 2. lib. 3. c. 3. Corduba summa, q. 188. as it seems, Tabiena V. iurare, q. 10. n. 11. Armilla V. Iuram. n. 12. Pedraza praecepto 2. §. 5. But Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 4. expressly, with Sylvius q. 89. art. 3. See Diana part. 4. tract. 4. resol. 70. and part. 5. tract. 5. resol. 4.

The THIRD opinion is that it is only a venial fault, even if that matter be wholly trifling. So Sanchez lib. 3. summae, cap. 4. num. 23. D. Antoninus 1. part. tit. 10. cap. 4. Angelus V. Iuramentum, 5. num. 41. Sylvester V. iuramentum, 4. quaest. 1. Sotus lib. 8. de Iust. quaest. 1. art. 7. dub. 1. Navar. in summa, cap. 12. and cap. 18. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 3. fol. 1061. Azor Tom. 1. lib. 5. cap. 27. quaestio 2. and lib. 11. c. 5. quaestio 3. Enriquez lib. 5. de poenitentia, cap. 20. num. 4. Manuel 1. Tomo summae, c. 192. Peter Ledesma 2. Tom. tract. 11. c. 3. dub. 1. Tolet. lib. 4. cap. 21. Diana part. 2. tract. 15. resol. 25. dragging many along with him, saying the opposite opinion is the more severe one. Sà V. Iuram. num. 7. Suarez de Iurament. lib. 3. cap. 16. from num. 9. and they say it is probable — Alcozet summa, cap. 15. fol. 52. Corduba summa, q. 188. at the end. Tanner. indeed, disp. 5. quaest. 5. dub. 1. says, if the thing is very small, some tiny part of what was promised, the oath is judged to be kept; but if it is the whole thing, it is mortal, because God is called as a witness to a falsehood. Finally he says, as probable, that it is only venial. Bassaeus loco cit. says all are probable.

D. BONAVENTURE seems to me to be with the first opinion. First, because at art. 1. quaest. 3. he places therein the reason for mortality in perjury, because the Divine truth is rashly or falsely brought forward as a witness, and he excuses only by indeliberation. Then, serm. 3. in Decalogum, he places the end of the promissory oath in truth, though ordered to peace, etc. And in speculo animae he asserts universally that there is an obligation of fulfilling in the promissory oath; otherwise he would call the transgressor a transgressor of the precept absolutely, but he would not say that if he sinned only venially, because he holds that a venial sin is not against a precept.

Moreover, in prima parte Centil. sect. 12. after making the division of the oath into Assertory and Promissory, he defines Perjury to be a lie confirmed by oath. Or: Periurium est falsa, vel perversa iuratio. And he calls it perverse from a defect of justice; false from a defect of truth. Therefore he will be a perjurer who does not exhibit what he swore to promise.

I ASSERT that a promissory oath, with the exhibition of anything sworn of light matter failing, is mortal.

It is PROVED first by the argument of D. Bonavent. quaest. 3. That which is the cause that God is brought forward as a witness to falsehood inflicts a grave injury upon God: But the failure of the rendering of the thing, even a very small one sworn, is the cause that God has been brought forward as a witness to falsehood: Therefore. The major is proved from D. Bonavent. locis adductis, because this gravely obstructs the end of the oath, which is to bring faith to the divine testimony; and what gravely repugns the end of the oath is mortal, as Cajetan disputes, 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 2. and 3.

It is CONFIRMED. For to be the cause that God has testified a falsehood is just the same as to make God be judged to testify falsely: But to be the cause that God testifies a falsehood is certainly a grave injury: Therefore. Hence D. Bonavent. wisely condemns both in the same way, without distinction, from this one chapter, because the Divine truth is contemned. The minor is proved, because since man has brought the Lord into testimony to confirm himself in promises he is about to make, already, as much as lies in him, he renders the testimony of God false, not to say empty.

It is CONFIRMED by Valencia from D. Bonav. because Perjury is against the religion of the oath, whose essence is to take God as a witness to truth: Therefore, the truth being violated, the oath is gravely injured, even if the matter promised by oath is very small; for it makes no difference to the formal reason of the Divine truth whether it is brought forward as a false witness of this or that thing, great or small. Otherwise, if the matter is to be considered, the same will hold in the assertory oath.

It is CONFIRMED second; for only then does the gravity or levity of the matter pertain to the gravity of the sin, when it is the immediate object of its transgression, as is evident in theft, and indeed also in a vow, in which, because its reason stands in the exhibition of that matter made to God, therefore the gravity or levity of the transgression is taken from it, which stands in denying to God that that thing has been transferred to His service; but in an Oath that matter promised to a man is not the matter of an act of religion when the oath is fulfilled: Therefore neither is it the object of transgression. The consequence is proved, because virtue and sin, its contrary contrary to truth, are concerned with the same object. The antecedent is proved by Valencia from D. Thom.

BUT I prove this from D. Bonav. in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 1. at the end, for the promissory oath has as the object of its promise the thing promised to a man, whence that thing promised does not pertain to religion: But a vow regards as its object a thing as sacred to God, and therefore the act is specified by it, or is afterward recognized as specified. Likewise the end of the oath is to establish and confirm the truth by Divine testimony: but the end of a vow is to increase goodness by the exhibition of a new good work. Finally even the means is different, because one swears by God; but one vows by promise. Whence if anyone, while fulfilling what was sworn and promised, should wish to abstract from the circumstance of the divine glory, which redounds from the observance of the oath, and should wish only to execute the work promised, as such a work is, without doubt he would satisfy the oath; provided indeed he made true what he swore: Therefore the thing promised, or the promised act, does not pertain to the virtue of religion: Therefore neither will the opposite deformity be against religion, inasmuch as it is a negation of the exhibition of the thing, but only inasmuch as God has been brought forward as a false witness.

SANCHEZ n. 23. tries to enervate these arguments. He supposes, however, that failing a promise is not properly a lie, but infidelity; because he who promises something, if he has the mind of doing what he promises, does not lie, since he does not speak against what he holds in his mind. Then, because to lie is intrinsically evil, in such a way that it is never lawful: but not to fulfill a promise is sometimes lawful.

Moreover, although he renders the promise false, nevertheless he does not lie, and so neither does he bring God in as a witness to a falsehood, but he is unfaithful under Divine authority. Therefore, although the defect of primary truth, when he promises but his mind does not accord, is a lie; yet the defect of fulfillment is not a lie; and thus although in the former no smallness of matter can be allowed, yet it can be allowed in the latter.

It is CONFIRMED, because while a man is brought in as a witness to a promise, he intervenes only as a witness of a present contract: but with respect to execution he is not brought in as a witness, but in order to lend authority by way of suretyship: Therefore the same must be said of God. Finally, because in any matter gravely evil that is sworn, the first truth of the oath fails, it is always mortal, as if you swear to a homicide without the intention; but to fail a promise of a thing, even venially evil, is no fault: Therefore this truth is not to be considered independently of the matter promised, as happens in the former truth, but just as when the matter is evil there is no sin, so it will be only venial when the matter is licit but light.

YET these reasons are frivolous; for I do not say that he lied in the first truth, if he had the mind of promising; but I say that he lies, while the sworn promise still stands virtually, and he inwardly intends not to fulfill it, and for this concordance he brought God in as a witness; for he did not bring God in as a witness that he then said in his mind what he spoke, but that he would accord in deed, or by the exhibition of the thing, with what was promised; and therefore he brought God in as a witness that he would preserve that conformity of mind and promise up to the exhibition of the thing; and therefore he is a liar as often as in his mind he discordes from the promise; and therefore that malice, which will never be licit, always endures. Nor indeed ought the excision from lying be made, as Sanchez wrongly takes it, alleging a difference, because lying is never lawful; but failing a promise is often lawful: for he ought to take that defect of execution as grounded in the lie of perjury, and thus it will never be lawful, just as lying itself is not lawful.

But what he says of the man who assists as a witness to a contract, and surety of execution, is not to the point, for God, as supreme Lord and searcher of hearts, is brought in as a witness to that truth which in the accord of mind with voice is to endure up to the exhibition, etc.; therefore another contracts this security, and God does not intervene as one from whom the creditor could satisfy himself in the case where the debtor fails, but only that He may be a witness; for it is truly a promissory oath, as all confess. Moreover it is defined by all as Vocatio Dei in testem, as Sanchez confesses lib. 3. cap. 1.

BUT, even should God assist as surety by His authority, still the injury is grave, because whatever authority in the least truth, even materially opposed to fidelity, is taken from God, the reason of Deity is taken away, and He is rendered false.

But what he says of matter gravely evil, which if deceitfully promised makes perjury; but that if evil light matter in the enunciation is not fulfilled, there is no sin — is not to the point; he ought to have compared both under the same reason; and then I say: just as it is no sin not to fulfill an act venially evil that was sworn, so much less to fulfill an act gravely evil.

Nor ought he to pass from an evil act to a good act; therefore it is no sin to fail a promise of a thing venially evil, because this is not legitimate matter of an oath, and therefore it did not obligate at the outset; indeed an injury was inflicted upon God by that oath, because justice is lacking, as I shall say quaest. 6. But a good thing, which we now have at hand, is legitimate matter of an oath; and therefore just as from the truth in the promise it is owed, so also in the exhibition, while that obligation of the accord of intention with the promise endures up to the exhibition of the thing. Therefore, even if he repents having invoked God as a witness, he is still guilty, because the invocation already past perseveres, which cannot not have been.

Moreover, our reasons are not on that account shaken, because he was bound to prove that that exhibition of the matter, not only as it constitutes the act, but as it regards that matter, is the object of religion, so that from thence he might prove that the levity or gravity of the matter increases or diminishes the fault of the violated promise. Note, however, that some very small things are sworn which excuse, as when a Father swears to punish his son; for these things are sworn for terror, or from an inordinate affection of vengeance. See Valencia.

From these things, therefore, it is also deduced that he who swears to do many very small things daily for men sins mortally every day by violating the promise; but not so he who vows very small things daily, because the vow regards that matter as the object of religion. Therefore that very small matter will make a small defect against religion.

It is CERTAIN that it is not lawful to require an oath in which two companions will be lacking, namely justice, or judgment; since no cause of exacting such oaths can arise, the one exacting will sin with the sin of the one swearing, mortally or venially.

The DIFFICULTY, however, will be if Truth will be lacking.

Concerning the three kinds of persons it may be doubted whether they are legitimate exactors of an oath from a perjurer, and they are: Judges, Plaintiffs, and Private persons.

AS REGARDS the Judge, I ASSERT that he can require an oath, the order of law being observed, from one whom he knows will commit perjury. Thus teach the Alensis, part 3, quaest. 31, m. 2, art. 6, quaest. 1, and both Holy Doctors adduced here, whom follow Richard. in 3, d. 39, art. 3, quaest. 3, Paludanus quaest. 2, Maior. quaest. 3, Gabr. quaest. 2, art. 3, dub. 11, Archid. cap. Ille, num. 2, 22, quaest. 5, ibi, Bellamera, and Turrecrem., Socinus regul. 210, Abulensis quaest. 198 on 5 Matth., D. Antonin. part 2, tit. 10, cap. 7, §. 10 and §. 3, Angel. V. Iuram. 3, num. 11, Sylvest. ibi 2, quaest. 9, Armilla vers. 33, Tabien. ibi quaest. 33, num. 34, and V. Periur. quaest. 3, Sotus lib. 8 de Iustitia, quaest. 2, art. 4, Navarr. summae, cap. 12, Covarr. de pactis, p. p., §. 6, num. 2, Pedraza Summae, on the second precept, §. 7, Alcozer summae, cap. 15, Toletus lib. 4 summae, cap. 21, num. 10, Sayrus lib. 5, cap. 5, Petrus de Ledesma, Tome 2, tract. 11, cap. 5, dubio 6, Azor. Tom. 1, lib. 11, cap. 11, Graff. part 2, decis. lib. 2, cap. 4, num. 5, Suarez de Iuram. lib. 3, cap. 14, num. 13 and 17, Lessius lib. 2 de iustitia, cap. 42, d. 10, num. 49, Philiarc. Tom. 1, part 2, lib. 3, cap. 16, Manuel, first Tome of the summa, cap. 191, whom Sanchez brings forward and follows in lib. 3 summae, cap. 8, numero 2.

SOME restrict it, that the Judge cannot do this of his own accord, but only at the instance of a party. Thus seem to think D. Thom., Richardus, Paludanus, Gabr., Socinus, Abul., D. Antonin., Angel., Sylvest., Tabiena, Navar., Sotus, Sayrus, Petr. Ledesma, Pedraza, Manuel, cited above: but more clearly Archid., Bellamera, Azorius, Maior, and Graffius.

BUT they are to be expounded as follows: when he would do it with no right compelling him, but of his own accord merely to instruct his conscience; but otherwise when the judge is bound ex officio to inquire, as in criminal causes, when he proceeds ex officio, as can be seen in Iulius Clarus lib. 5 receptarum in prac. crimin., quaest. 6, num. penult. Thus Durandus 3, d. 39, quaest. 5, ad 2, and there Paludanus quaest. 2, art. ult., ad 2, Turrecremata cap. Quamvis, num. 2, in solut. ad 3, 22, quaest. 1, Alens. loc. cit., Leonard. and Philiar. cited, after D. Bonavent., quaest. 3, corpore, where he says, if he is a judge, it accords, as far as the order of law goes, to inquire ex officio. Therefore, if he is not compelled to this, he ought not to exact such an oath. See Diana part 5, tract. 7, resol. 9, Bassaeus V. Iuram. 3, num. 9.