Question V: Whether, and how, it is a sin to swear without truth

I ASSERT first, that an assertory oath in any matter whatsoever, even a very small one, is a mortal sin if it be false, and it can only be excused from mortal sin by a defect of full deliberation. So D. Bonav. question 3, in the body, and to the third objection, whom Cajetan follows, summa, V. Periur. cap. 1. Sotus lib. 8. de Iust. quaest. 2. art. 3. Toletus lib. 4. summa, cap. 21. Couar. cap. variarum, cap. 1. n. 2. and de pactis 1. p. §. 1. Suarez Tom. 2. de relig. lib. 3. de Iur. cap. 4. Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 4. num. 15. and 16. Azor Tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 4. quaest. 1. Valentia 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 3. Sanchez in summa, lib. 3. cap. 4. num. 6. who says all the others follow him. Nor does any holy end excuse it, nor fear, as Suarez, Sayrus, Sotus, Toletus teach loco cit. Navar. summa, cap. 12. Sanchez loco cit. after D. Thom. art. 3. ad 1. D. Bonavent. quaest. 2. ad ultimum, which he proves, both from the canon in Decr. lib. 2. tit. 24. cap. 15. de Iureiur. Quod si quis periurat pro vita corporis servanda, quia magis dilexit corpus, quam animam, ieiunet tres quadragesimas; and because perjuring is intrinsically evil, so that it can never be rendered honorable. So Sanchez argues, num. 7. with others.

The FIRST part of the assertion is proved by D. Bonavent. quaest. 5. from D. Augustine serm. 28. and 30. de verbis Apostoli.

SECOND, it is proved by D. Bonav. argument 3, which Valencia, Sanchez, and the rest use: because to bring God as a witness to a falsehood is a great contempt of the Divine truth. For thus God is made either ignorant or wicked, as Bassaeus also urges, V. Iuram. 2. num. 3.

HENCE it follows, first, that the Jurists were not right — whom Angelus reports, V. Periurium, teaching that their opinion is probable — in saying that a false oath told in jest is venial. Rather it is a greater sin, because it is a greater contempt, as D. Bonavent. teaches, ad 3. D. Thom. quaest. 98. art. 3. ad secundum, whom the others follow, as adduced by Sanchez num. 7.

Yet S. Bonaventure and S. Thomas ADD that it can be excused from mortal sin if the oath is sworn in jest, which removes deliberation; for then the jest is not a grave contempt of the Divine truth.

It follows SECOND, that he equally sins mortally if he swears to a matter doubtful and uncertain to himself, because he exposes himself to the danger of speaking falsely and of perjuring himself; indeed he perjures himself by bringing God as a certain witness to an uncertain matter, as Sanchez argues, num. 8. from D. Bonavent. quaest. 1. ad 1. Then, because, as S. Bonaventure says, quaest. 2. ad 1. the Divine truth is rashly brought forward and contemned, while it is called as a certain witness to an uncertain thing.

S. Bonaventure ADDS another reason, loco citato, quaest. 1. ad 3. because that which is sworn is sworn from a culpably erroneous conscience, which in matters of morals does not excuse a wicked deed. See Bassaeus 3. num. 3.

For the truth of an assertory oath it is NOT necessary that the matter be so in fact, but it is sufficient, and necessary, that the matter, prudently considered, be so firmly judged. So S. Bonav. in the cited question, whom Azorius follows, Tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 2. quaest. 5. Valentia disp. 6. q. 7. punct. 3. col. 5. Suarez in the same lib. 3. cap. 5. num. 3. Lessius lib. 2. de Iust. cap. 42. dub. 4. num. 17. Sanchez loco cit. num. 10. Hence he infers, with Valencia col. 11. and D. Bonavent. q. cit. ad argumenta, that one who lightly judges that what he swears is true is not excused from perjury, since he does not sufficiently provide that he swears truly, and it follows as true only by accident. Therefore, even if it be true, he is not excused from mortal sin if the negligence in investigating the truth was grave; but if it was light, the fault will be light also, because such as is the cause, such is the effect, as S. Bonaventure hinted, quaest. 3. ad argumenta, and many affirm with Sanchez num. 14. and with Bassaeus loco cit.

But the OTHER part of the assertion, namely that assertory perjury is excused from mortal sin by indeliberation. It is proved by D. Bonav. quaest. 3. in the body, because the slipperiness of the tongue is great, which often can, through a slip, not follow the command of the will, and render the act non-human, or imperfectly such; Sanchez uses this reasoning at num. 15. So also think D. Thom. art. 3. citato, ad 2. Cajetan there, Sylvester V. Iurament. 2. quaest. 6. Navar. summa, cap. 12. Valencia, Suarez, and others cited above.

I ASSERT second, that a promissory oath, by defect of the concordance of the will to fulfill with the promise uttered — which is called truth of the present — is wicked. So D. Bonav. quaest. 3. body, and to the third, whom Sylvester follows, V. Iuram. quaest. 1. Armilla there, Cajetan 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. ad 1. and q. 98. art. 2. and 3. and in summa, under the word Periurium, c. 2. and 3. Sotus 8. de Iust. q. 1. art. 7. and quaest. 2. art. 1. and 3. Navar. in summa, cap. 12. Valencia loco cit. puncto 3. concl. 2. Azor Tom. 1. lib. 11. c. 4. q. 1. Suarez lib. 3. citato, c. 15. Clavis Regia lib. 5. cap. 4. n. 27. Lessius lib. 2. de Iust. c. 42. dub. 4. num. 18. Sanchez loco citato, num. 16. Bassaeus n. 1.

It is PROVED by D. Bonav. argument 3, quaest. 3. and quaest. prima ad 1. because thus the Summa Truth is brought forward as a witness to a known falsehood, and so the gravest injury is inflicted upon God by swearing a lie.

HENCE it follows that one also sins mortally who swears to give a thing which he is in doubt whether he can fulfill: likewise to promise with a doubting mind of fulfilling, or to promise a thing which he believes he cannot fulfill. It is proved by D. Bonavent. quaest. 1. ad 1. because he certainly swears to an uncertain thing, and therefore lies, as I said above concerning the assertory oath, with Sanchez.

The GREATER difficulty is when the truth of the future is lacking, namely, in not giving the promised thing, which one swore with the intention of giving. And indeed, when the matter is grave, all maintain it to be mortal. The question is when it is light, which I shall treat in disp. de Periurio, q. 3.

The FIRST opinion is that it is always mortal. So Valencia disp. 6. q. 7. puncto 3. concl. 3. Gabriel in 3. dist. 39. q. 2. art. 2. concl. 4. Cajetan sum. v. Periurium, cap. 2. Lessius lib. 2. de Iust. cap. 42. dub. 5. num. 25.. Bassaeus 4. num. 3. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 24. Reg. lib. 18. num. 9.

The SECOND opinion distinguishes: if the matter is wholly trifling, it is mortal; but if partial, it is only venial. So Cajetan 1. 2. q. 87. art. 7. dub. 1. Navar. summa, c. 12. n. 10. and c. 18. n. 4. Covarr. lib. 1. variarum lect. c. 1. Philiarc. Tom. 1. p. 2. lib. 3. c. 3. Corduba summa, q. 188. as it seems, Tabiena V. iurare, q. 10. n. 11. Armilla V. Iuram. n. 12. Pedraza praecepto 2. §. 5. But Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 4. expressly, with Sylvius q. 89. art. 3. See Diana part. 4. tract. 4. resol. 70. and part. 5. tract. 5. resol. 4.

The THIRD opinion is that it is only a venial fault, even if that matter be wholly trifling. So Sanchez lib. 3. summae, cap. 4. num. 23. D. Antoninus 1. part. tit. 10. cap. 4. Angelus V. Iuramentum, 5. num. 41. Sylvester V. iuramentum, 4. quaest. 1. Sotus lib. 8. de Iust. quaest. 1. art. 7. dub. 1. Navar. in summa, cap. 12. and cap. 18. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 3. fol. 1061. Azor Tom. 1. lib. 5. cap. 27. quaestio 2. and lib. 11. c. 5. quaestio 3. Enriquez lib. 5. de poenitentia, cap. 20. num. 4. Manuel 1. Tomo summae, c. 192. Peter Ledesma 2. Tom. tract. 11. c. 3. dub. 1. Tolet. lib. 4. cap. 21. Diana part. 2. tract. 15. resol. 25. dragging many along with him, saying the opposite opinion is the more severe one. Sà V. Iuram. num. 7. Suarez de Iurament. lib. 3. cap. 16. from num. 9. and they say it is probable — Alcozet summa, cap. 15. fol. 52. Corduba summa, q. 188. at the end. Tanner. indeed, disp. 5. quaest. 5. dub. 1. says, if the thing is very small, some tiny part of what was promised, the oath is judged to be kept; but if it is the whole thing, it is mortal, because God is called as a witness to a falsehood. Finally he says, as probable, that it is only venial. Bassaeus loco cit. says all are probable.

D. BONAVENTURE seems to me to be with the first opinion. First, because at art. 1. quaest. 3. he places therein the reason for mortality in perjury, because the Divine truth is rashly or falsely brought forward as a witness, and he excuses only by indeliberation. Then, serm. 3. in Decalogum, he places the end of the promissory oath in truth, though ordered to peace, etc. And in speculo animae he asserts universally that there is an obligation of fulfilling in the promissory oath; otherwise he would call the transgressor a transgressor of the precept absolutely, but he would not say that if he sinned only venially, because he holds that a venial sin is not against a precept.

Moreover, in prima parte Centil. sect. 12. after making the division of the oath into Assertory and Promissory, he defines Perjury to be a lie confirmed by oath. Or: Periurium est falsa, vel perversa iuratio. And he calls it perverse from a defect of justice; false from a defect of truth. Therefore he will be a perjurer who does not exhibit what he swore to promise.

I ASSERT that a promissory oath, with the exhibition of anything sworn of light matter failing, is mortal.

It is PROVED first by the argument of D. Bonavent. quaest. 3. That which is the cause that God is brought forward as a witness to falsehood inflicts a grave injury upon God: But the failure of the rendering of the thing, even a very small one sworn, is the cause that God has been brought forward as a witness to falsehood: Therefore. The major is proved from D. Bonavent. locis adductis, because this gravely obstructs the end of the oath, which is to bring faith to the divine testimony; and what gravely repugns the end of the oath is mortal, as Cajetan disputes, 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 2. and 3.

It is CONFIRMED. For to be the cause that God has testified a falsehood is just the same as to make God be judged to testify falsely: But to be the cause that God testifies a falsehood is certainly a grave injury: Therefore. Hence D. Bonavent. wisely condemns both in the same way, without distinction, from this one chapter, because the Divine truth is contemned. The minor is proved, because since man has brought the Lord into testimony to confirm himself in promises he is about to make, already, as much as lies in him, he renders the testimony of God false, not to say empty.

It is CONFIRMED by Valencia from D. Bonav. because Perjury is against the religion of the oath, whose essence is to take God as a witness to truth: Therefore, the truth being violated, the oath is gravely injured, even if the matter promised by oath is very small; for it makes no difference to the formal reason of the Divine truth whether it is brought forward as a false witness of this or that thing, great or small. Otherwise, if the matter is to be considered, the same will hold in the assertory oath.

It is CONFIRMED second; for only then does the gravity or levity of the matter pertain to the gravity of the sin, when it is the immediate object of its transgression, as is evident in theft, and indeed also in a vow, in which, because its reason stands in the exhibition of that matter made to God, therefore the gravity or levity of the transgression is taken from it, which stands in denying to God that that thing has been transferred to His service; but in an Oath that matter promised to a man is not the matter of an act of religion when the oath is fulfilled: Therefore neither is it the object of transgression. The consequence is proved, because virtue and sin, its contrary contrary to truth, are concerned with the same object. The antecedent is proved by Valencia from D. Thom.

BUT I prove this from D. Bonav. in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 1. at the end, for the promissory oath has as the object of its promise the thing promised to a man, whence that thing promised does not pertain to religion: But a vow regards as its object a thing as sacred to God, and therefore the act is specified by it, or is afterward recognized as specified. Likewise the end of the oath is to establish and confirm the truth by Divine testimony: but the end of a vow is to increase goodness by the exhibition of a new good work. Finally even the means is different, because one swears by God; but one vows by promise. Whence if anyone, while fulfilling what was sworn and promised, should wish to abstract from the circumstance of the divine glory, which redounds from the observance of the oath, and should wish only to execute the work promised, as such a work is, without doubt he would satisfy the oath; provided indeed he made true what he swore: Therefore the thing promised, or the promised act, does not pertain to the virtue of religion: Therefore neither will the opposite deformity be against religion, inasmuch as it is a negation of the exhibition of the thing, but only inasmuch as God has been brought forward as a false witness.

SANCHEZ n. 23. tries to enervate these arguments. He supposes, however, that failing a promise is not properly a lie, but infidelity; because he who promises something, if he has the mind of doing what he promises, does not lie, since he does not speak against what he holds in his mind. Then, because to lie is intrinsically evil, in such a way that it is never lawful: but not to fulfill a promise is sometimes lawful.

Moreover, although he renders the promise false, nevertheless he does not lie, and so neither does he bring God in as a witness to a falsehood, but he is unfaithful under Divine authority. Therefore, although the defect of primary truth, when he promises but his mind does not accord, is a lie; yet the defect of fulfillment is not a lie; and thus although in the former no smallness of matter can be allowed, yet it can be allowed in the latter.

It is CONFIRMED, because while a man is brought in as a witness to a promise, he intervenes only as a witness of a present contract: but with respect to execution he is not brought in as a witness, but in order to lend authority by way of suretyship: Therefore the same must be said of God. Finally, because in any matter gravely evil that is sworn, the first truth of the oath fails, it is always mortal, as if you swear to a homicide without the intention; but to fail a promise of a thing, even venially evil, is no fault: Therefore this truth is not to be considered independently of the matter promised, as happens in the former truth, but just as when the matter is evil there is no sin, so it will be only venial when the matter is licit but light.

YET these reasons are frivolous; for I do not say that he lied in the first truth, if he had the mind of promising; but I say that he lies, while the sworn promise still stands virtually, and he inwardly intends not to fulfill it, and for this concordance he brought God in as a witness; for he did not bring God in as a witness that he then said in his mind what he spoke, but that he would accord in deed, or by the exhibition of the thing, with what was promised; and therefore he brought God in as a witness that he would preserve that conformity of mind and promise up to the exhibition of the thing; and therefore he is a liar as often as in his mind he discordes from the promise; and therefore that malice, which will never be licit, always endures. Nor indeed ought the excision from lying be made, as Sanchez wrongly takes it, alleging a difference, because lying is never lawful; but failing a promise is often lawful: for he ought to take that defect of execution as grounded in the lie of perjury, and thus it will never be lawful, just as lying itself is not lawful.

But what he says of the man who assists as a witness to a contract, and surety of execution, is not to the point, for God, as supreme Lord and searcher of hearts, is brought in as a witness to that truth which in the accord of mind with voice is to endure up to the exhibition, etc.; therefore another contracts this security, and God does not intervene as one from whom the creditor could satisfy himself in the case where the debtor fails, but only that He may be a witness; for it is truly a promissory oath, as all confess. Moreover it is defined by all as Vocatio Dei in testem, as Sanchez confesses lib. 3. cap. 1.

BUT, even should God assist as surety by His authority, still the injury is grave, because whatever authority in the least truth, even materially opposed to fidelity, is taken from God, the reason of Deity is taken away, and He is rendered false.

But what he says of matter gravely evil, which if deceitfully promised makes perjury; but that if evil light matter in the enunciation is not fulfilled, there is no sin — is not to the point; he ought to have compared both under the same reason; and then I say: just as it is no sin not to fulfill an act venially evil that was sworn, so much less to fulfill an act gravely evil.

Nor ought he to pass from an evil act to a good act; therefore it is no sin to fail a promise of a thing venially evil, because this is not legitimate matter of an oath, and therefore it did not obligate at the outset; indeed an injury was inflicted upon God by that oath, because justice is lacking, as I shall say quaest. 6. But a good thing, which we now have at hand, is legitimate matter of an oath; and therefore just as from the truth in the promise it is owed, so also in the exhibition, while that obligation of the accord of intention with the promise endures up to the exhibition of the thing. Therefore, even if he repents having invoked God as a witness, he is still guilty, because the invocation already past perseveres, which cannot not have been.

Moreover, our reasons are not on that account shaken, because he was bound to prove that that exhibition of the matter, not only as it constitutes the act, but as it regards that matter, is the object of religion, so that from thence he might prove that the levity or gravity of the matter increases or diminishes the fault of the violated promise. Note, however, that some very small things are sworn which excuse, as when a Father swears to punish his son; for these things are sworn for terror, or from an inordinate affection of vengeance. See Valencia.

From these things, therefore, it is also deduced that he who swears to do many very small things daily for men sins mortally every day by violating the promise; but not so he who vows very small things daily, because the vow regards that matter as the object of religion. Therefore that very small matter will make a small defect against religion.