Presumption, Ambition and Vanity

Vices Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Excess.—The vices opposed to greatness of soul by excess are such as desire great deeds, or honors, or fame, when or where or how they should not be desired.

(a) Excessive desire of great deeds is presumption, which attempts to do greater things than one is able to perform (cfr. 1075 sqq.), This happens in conceited persons who overestimate their own abilities, taking on themselves offices for which they are incompetent or exercising powers for which they have no authority; also in vulgar persons who mistake their fortuitous advantages, such as wealth or influence or birth, for character and ability. Presumption is a mortal sin when its cause is a grave sin (e.g., lack of faith) or when its effects are very harmful (e.g., when one who is ignorant presumes to teach or practise medicine, when one who is morally frail presumes to enter occasions of sin). There is no sin if one attempts too much in good faith and from inculpable ignorance.

(b) Excessive desire of honors (see 2010, 2011, 2351) is ambition, or an inordinate hankering after distinctions and deference. The great of soul desire honors when these are due to their station or when there is a just reason, such as the glory of God or the advantage of the neighbor (Matt., v. 15, 16; Heb., v. 4). The ambitious, on the contrary, seek to be honored beyond their deserts (e.g., when an ignorant man longs for academic degrees, a tyrant wishes to be respected on account of his tyranny, an inferior man seeks to perpetuate himself in temporary elective offices, a rich man or athletic hero expects that he will be revered above those who are eminent for virtue or learning), or they seek honor for its own or their own sake, like the Pharisees who loved the first places at feasts and the first chairs in the synagogues, and salutations in the market place, and to be called by men Rabbi (Matt., xxiii. 7; cfr. I Tim., iii. 1 sqq.; Matt., xx. 25). This sin, being excessive desire of something indifferent, is not per se mortal; but it is made mortal either by a cause that is seriously sinful (e.g., if one’s whole life is but a mad chase for preferments) or by a result that is seriously harmful (e.g., if one commits or is ready to commit serious injustice or uncharitableness to win a coveted dignity). Ambition is cured chiefly by charity, for charity is not ambitious (I Cor., xiii. 5; cfr. Gal., v. 13).

(c) Excessive desire of praise or celebrity is vanity (see 2028, 2269). The great of soul desire the good opinion of their fellow-men (see 1575 sqq.), but they also desire that their good reputation be well founded, and their motive is the glory of God or the spiritual profit of man. The vain, on the contrary, are eager for admiration and praise for which there is no justification (e.g., those who wish to be praised for virtues they do not possess) or which are valueless (e.g., those who fish for compliments over things of no great importance, such as good looks or dress, or who wish to appear learned among the uneducated, or who crave notoriety), or seek admiration without a proper motive (e.g., those who advertise themselves for self-glorification alone). Vanity, like ambition, is per se only a venial sin, but it becomes mortal on account of its cause (e.g., when the motive is to conceal crimes that are planned), or its results (e.g., when the desire to be famous makes one boast of one’s crimes, or refuse to repair injuries done to others, or neglect the honor of God), or its matter (e.g., when one is vain about a reputation for skillful injustice). Vanity is one of the capital sins (see 268 sqq.), since it is one of the motives that chiefly lead men into sin; for all desire excellence, and in consequence the love of renown is one of the chief incentives to action. Even the ambitious crave honors because of the glory honors bring. The offspring of vanity includes the sins by which a man seeks unlawfully to show off his good points, or to prove that he is not inferior and thus capture popularity or glory. In the first class are the publication by word or deed of one’s own true or pretended exploits (boasting hypocrisy), the cultivation of novelties and eccentricities designed to attract attention (such as singularity in opinion, in pronunciation, in dress, etc.). In the latter class are sins of intellect which make one hold obstinately to one’s views (stubbornness), sins of will which make one resist desires of others (discord), sins of word which make one loudly dispute (contention), sins of deed which make one refuse to yield to authority (disobedience).

638. 1. Three vices are opposed to fortitude, namely, timidity or cowardice, fearlessness, and daring or temerity.

a) Timidity, of which there is discussion here, is not the passion of fear, for passions in the Aristotelian sense are something indifferent; but it is inordinate fear of temporal evils and especially of the dangers of death. Certainly, in every sin an inordinate fear is included; thus the avaricious man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so concerning the others. But the principal fear is that of the dangers of death. And therefore an inordination of such fear is opposed to fortitude, which concerns the dangers of death. Thus St. Thomas.¹¹⁶² Inordinate fear, therefore, is excess in fearing and defect in daring. From the first head it is called timidity; but from the second, cowardice; yet on account of their affinity each is called by the common term timidity. This timidity of itself is only a venial sin; if, however, someone from inordinate fear transgresses a grave precept, this is a mortal sin, or rather the cause of a mortal sin. How fear or dread takes away or diminishes the voluntary and consequently the notion of sin was said above, I, n. 69. The greatest cowardice is when someone, on account of the miseries of this life which he considers intolerable, commits suicide.

b) Fearlessness is the vice which does not fear dangers, and especially the dangers of death, when they ought to be feared. This vice arises either from contempt for life, which a man esteems little, or from pride by which he attributes too much strength to himself, or from stupidity of soul. Fearlessness is a sin insofar as it causes other sins, or insofar as from it a man sins against charity toward himself.

c) Daring or temerity, insofar as it is taken here, is excess in attacking dangers.¹¹⁶³ Daring arises from the same causes as fearlessness, with which it is intimately connected, but chiefly from vain boasting. The same holds concerning the sinfulness of this vice as was said concerning fearlessness. In a duel, in certain contests, in acrobatic exercises, etc., the vices of temerity and fearlessness are accustomed to occur.

¹¹⁶² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 125, a. 2.

¹¹⁶³ Waghalsigkeit, Tollkühnheit [foolhardiness, rash boldness].

639. 2. Four vices are opposed to magnanimity, namely, three by excess: presumption, ambition, and vainglory; one by defect, namely, pusillanimity.

a) Presumption,¹¹⁶⁴ which is opposed to magnanimity, is not to be confused with presumption which is contrary to hope.¹¹⁶⁵ The former is a vice inducing one to undertake works which surpass the powers of the agent; the latter is that which hopes for eternal beatitude through means not ordained by God. If it is said that presumption opposed to magnanimity undertakes those things which altogether exceed the powers of the agent, the powers to be understood are not only his own but also those of others which are nevertheless available to the agent; for that which we can do with the assistance of friends and especially of God is not considered altogether to exceed our powers; whence we are not presumptuous when we undertake works of the virtues, even difficult ones, with confidence in the assisting aid of divine grace. An example of sinful presumption is Peter, who, led by excessive confidence, said: "Lord, I am ready to go with thee, both into prison and to death,"¹¹⁶⁶ and nevertheless afterward denied Christ at the voice of a maidservant. Those also sin by such a sin of presumption who, without sufficient capacity, undertake the offices of judge, pastor, confessor, etc. The origin and culpability of this presumption were already discussed above, I, n. 412. Seneca describes presumption very vigorously: "If magnanimity raises itself beyond its measure, it will make a man threatening, inflated, turbulent, restless, and hasty toward whatever excellences of words and deeds, honorableness being neglected."¹¹⁶⁷

b) Ambition,¹¹⁶⁸ which is opposed to magnanimity by excess, is a vice by which someone inordinately desires an honor which he does not merit or which he refers not to God but only to his own utility; or it can be defined more briefly: an inordinate appetite for honor.¹¹⁶⁹ Since honor is a thing good or indifferent in itself, an inordinate appetite for it is of itself only a venial sin; nevertheless, it can become mortal on account of circumstances, for example, if someone places his last end in such human honor, or if he seeks honor from some mortal sin (boasting concerning sins committed), or if someone seeks his own honor with grave harm to others. The inordinate appetite for honor, or ambition, often has very contrary effects, since instead of true honor, mockery and contempt befall the ambitious man.

c) Vainglory,¹¹⁷⁰ insofar as it is opposed to magnanimity by excess, is taken for an inordinate appetite for empty glory. The appetite for one's own glory is not of itself something vicious, whence we are admonished: "So let your light shine before men";¹¹⁷¹ but the appetite for empty glory is sinful; for to desire something vain is vicious, according to this: "Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?"¹¹⁷² Glory can be called vain in three ways: in one way on the part of the thing concerning which someone seeks glory, as when someone seeks glory concerning that which is not worthy of glory, such as some fragile and perishable thing (for example, bodily beauty); in another way on the part of the one from whom someone seeks glory, such as a man whose judgment is not certain (for example, if someone wishes to be praised by an ignorant man as learned); in a third way on the part of the very person who desires glory, namely, when he does not refer the appetite for his glory to a due end, such as the honor of God or the salvation of his neighbor. Thus St. Thomas.¹¹⁷³ Vainglory in itself is only a venial sin, because it is not simply repugnant to charity and because it is only an inordination concerning a thing indifferent in itself; nevertheless, it can easily become not only a mortal sin, but also a capital sin from which many other sins spring, as was said above, I, n. 414.¹¹⁷⁴

d) Pusillanimity¹¹⁷⁵ is opposed to magnanimity by defect, and it is a disposition of soul by which someone shrinks from undertaking or doing something as though it were too great and surpassed his powers, when in reality it does not surpass them. Whence, just as the magnanimous man rightly tends toward great things, so the pusillanimous man, from culpable ignorance of his own condition, shrinks from great things which befit him. An example of such pusillanimity in the Gospel is the slothful servant who hid his talent in a napkin and on that account was gravely rebuked. Pusillanimity of itself does not signify a grave sin; nevertheless, it can become a grave sin if someone from pusillanimity omits a grave duty; for example, if parents omit correcting disobedient children because they think themselves unable to make an effective correction; if someone no longer fights against temptations, thinking himself unable to conquer them. Pusillanimity which concerns things altogether necessary for salvation can become the sin of despair. Pusillanimity is conquered by placing hope in divine assistance, which will never fail men of good will. Pusillanimity often arises from a morbid quality of the body or from fixed ideas.

¹¹⁶⁴ Selbstüberschätzung, Vermessenheit [self-overestimation, presumption]; cf. above, I, n. 412.

¹¹⁶⁵ Cf. I, n. 549.

¹¹⁶⁶ Luke 22:33.

¹¹⁶⁷ In St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 130, a. 2 ad 3.

¹¹⁶⁸ Cf. above, I, n. 413.

¹¹⁶⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 131, a. 1.

¹¹⁷⁰ Cf. above, I, n. 414.

¹¹⁷¹ Matt. 5:16.

¹¹⁷² Ps. 4:3.

¹¹⁷³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 132, a. 1.

¹¹⁷⁴ Pascal says very wittily and truly concerning vainglory: "Vanity is so rooted in the heart of man that a lackey, a kitchen boy, and a porter boast and wish to have their admirers; and the philosophers themselves want them. Those who write against glory wish to have the glory of having written well; and those who read it wish to have the glory of having read it; and I who write this perhaps have this desire, and perhaps those who will read it will also have it" (Pensées [1907] 400).

¹¹⁷⁵ Kleinmütigkeit [pusillanimity, faintheartedness].

640. 3. Two vices are opposed to magnificence, namely, one by excess: inordinate sumptuousness,¹¹⁷⁶ the other by defect: parvificence.¹¹⁷⁷ Each vice is an inordination concerning great expenditures to be made, and for this reason parvificence is distinguished from avarice and illiberality. Whence St. Thomas teaches: "Just as the magnificent man agrees with the liberal man in this, that he expends money promptly and delightfully, so also the parvificent man agrees with the illiberal or avaricious man in this, that he makes expenditures with sadness and slowness. But they differ in this, that illiberality is considered in regard to common expenditures, whereas parvificence concerns great expenditures, which it is more difficult to make, and therefore parvificence is a lesser vice than illiberality."¹¹⁷⁸ The sinfulness of these vices must be measured from the other sins which are committed on account of them.

¹¹⁷⁶ It was called by the Greeks banausia, by which word both a low, tradesmanlike disposition and the excessive luxury and ostentation proceeding from it are signified; moderns use the word chiefly in the former sense.

¹¹⁷⁷ Knauserei, Engherzigkeit [stinginess, narrow-mindedness].

¹¹⁷⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 135, a. 1 ad 3.

641. 4. Two vices are opposed to patience, one by defect and the other by excess. By defect there is opposed insensibility or hardness, namely, when someone is touched in no way by any evils, whether his own or another's. This indeed is a defect of sadness, although it is an excess of endurance. That this insensibility is sinful is clear of itself, since it is consonant neither with human nature nor with social life, but savors of stupid brutality and unnatural hardness. By excess (of sadness, but by defect of endurance) there is opposed to patience impatience, by which someone is excessively saddened or withdraws from the good because of sadness or pain. The impatient man for the most part outwardly manifests his impatience by murmurings, lamentations, or irascibility. Each sin, namely, insensibility and impatience, is of itself only a venial sin; nevertheless, it becomes mortal if on account of it another virtue, for example, fraternal charity, is gravely injured.¹¹⁷⁹

¹¹⁷⁹ It is remarkable that St. Thomas does not speak of the vices opposed to patience in the Summa theologica.

642. 5. Two vices are likewise opposed to perseverance, namely, one by defect, which is softness or inconstancy, when someone, on account of difficulties which occur in the continuation of a good work, easily withdraws from it contrary to the right dictate of reason. This inconstancy is called softness by St. Thomas,¹¹⁸⁰ which nevertheless is not to be confused with softness which is a sin against chastity. Inconstancy of itself is not a grave sin; nevertheless, it is the cause of many evils and impedes very many goods; for it renders the soul of man weak and almost powerless to accomplish any great work, since difficulties arise in every great work. By way of excess there is opposed to perseverance pertinacity,¹¹⁸¹ which is an inclination to persist in a resolution contrary to the dictate of right reason, as if someone wills to persist in a false religion which he clearly knows to be false. This pertinacity is a mortal or light sin according to the quality of the obligation and virtue which is injured through it.

¹¹⁸⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 138, a. 1.

¹¹⁸¹ Hartnäckigkeit [obstinacy].

S. Th. II-II, q. 130-133.

918. To magnanimity by excess there are opposed: presumption, ambition, and vainglory, which inordinately seek excellence in works, in honor, or in reputation and estimation. Presumption regards the proximate matter: acts worthy of honor; ambition the remote matter: honors; vainglory the natural effect of honor: praise.

1. Presumption (verwaandheid) or overconfidence is the inordinate appetite of attacking something above one's powers. It is excessive hope. But in the present matter the question is not about presumption opposed to theological or divine hope, which rashly expects beatitude through means not ordained by God and rejects or perverts the divine help from which it is to be hoped for (of which we spoke in the treatise on hope, I, 833), but about presumption or excessive hope in one's own powers: this, namely, is opposed to magnanimity, which is concerned with the passion of hope.

It arises from culpable error concerning one's own powers. Concerning these, error can be committed in two ways: in one way according to quantity, as when someone judges himself to have greater virtue or knowledge or something of this sort than he has, for example, those who without sufficient capacity undertake the office of judge, physician, advocate, confessor, etc., who usurp power which they do not have, who by their own authority without long study interpret the Scriptures...; in another way concerning the genus of the thing from which someone dignifies himself, as when someone esteems himself great and more worthy from that from which he is not great nor worthy, for example, on account of riches or some goods of fortune.

It is of itself a venial sin, because it is not against charity; accidentally it becomes mortal by reason of the cause, as if it proceeded from culpable error in faith, or by reason of the effect, as if it is done with great danger or notable harm, proper or another's, as can happen in physicians, confessors, advocates, who presume without skill to undertake an office or to exercise it in such a way, and in those who without a reasonable cause thrust themselves into the proximate occasion of sinning.

2. Ambition (eerzucht) is an inordinate appetite for honor.

It happens in four ways: by seeking honor for excellence which is not possessed, as if an ignorant man wishes to be honored as learned; or for a blameworthy thing, as for sin or for a thing acquired by sin; or by not referring honor to God, to whom honor is owed principally on account of excellent goods; or by not referring it to the utility of others, but resting in honor: for that in which man excels is given to man by God so that from it he may benefit others.

It is of itself a venial sin, because it is not against charity; accidentally it becomes mortal either by reason of the cause, as if it comes from culpable error in faith, or if someone seeks honor from affection for mortal sin, or abuses honor for that sin; or by reason of the effect, as if someone commits mortal sin to seize honor, prepared for all things on account of honor, or constitutes his last end in honor, or if it is done with grave harm or injury of the neighbor.

3. Vainglory (roemzucht, ijdelheid) is an inordinate appetite for glory and reputation, that is, an appetite for vain glory, or for vain manifestation and estimation among others concerning one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious; an excessive desire for human esteem and praise. This is also a capital sin, as was set forth in the treatise on Sins (I, n. 502).

Glory is clear knowledge with the praise of others; and it is the natural effect and end of honor, since from honor someone is rendered clear in the knowledge of others. For from the fact that testimonies of honor are exhibited to someone, his excellence is clear among others. Hence honor is sought because glory from honor is sought. Whence consequently magnanimity is also concerned with glory, and the inordinate appetite for glory is opposed to magnanimity.

It happens in three ways: a) by seeking glory from that which is not worthy of glory, or of so much glory, as from an evil, false, fictitious, fragile thing, from riches, trifles, etc.; b) by seeking it from those who are not able to discern what is worthy of glory, for example, from one whose judgment is not certain; c) by seeking and not referring glory to the due end, namely, to the honor of God or proper or another's utility. For glory of itself is an indifferent thing, and accordingly to stand in it as in an end and to seek it for its own sake is illicit: for to seek an indifferent thing is not good unless it is done for a good end extrinsic to the thing; therefore to seek glory is illicit except insofar as it is useful for something, otherwise it would be an idle and vain act and accordingly sinful (q. 132, a. 3; cf. Q. D. De Malo 9, a. 2).

Vainglory of itself is a venial sin: for of itself it does not say anything against charity, but is only an inordination of the appetite of a thing indifferent according to itself. Yet accidentally, that is, by reason of another thing or something joined to it, it becomes mortal: 1. on the part of the one glorying himself: a) by reason of the effect, for example, if someone is prepared to sin mortally in order to acquire glory, or constitutes his last end in glory, or grave harm to the neighbor follows from it, as if on account of it a physician is unwilling to employ a colleague, with grave danger of health in the sick person, or a teacher is unwilling to retract a great error which he taught; b) by reason of the end, as if he seeks glory from affection for a mortal sin. 2. Also on the part of the matter about which someone glories: a) if someone glories concerning a good, but falsely, which is against reverence for God (for example, to seek divine honors for oneself), or concerning goods as if they were not from God, or concerning a temporal good loved more than God, or concerning the testimony of men which he prefers to divine testimony; b) if he glories concerning evil, namely, concerning a mortal sin committed (q. 132, a. 3; cf. Q. D. De Malo 9, a. 2).

919. Remarks. - Let the words of St. Thomas be noted (q. 132, a. 1, ad 3): "It pertains to the perfection of man that he know himself; but that he be known by others does not pertain to his perfection; and therefore it is not to be sought for its own sake. Yet it can be sought insofar as it is useful for something, either for this, that God be glorified by men, or for this, that men profit from the good which they know in another, or for this, that the man himself, from the goods which he knows in himself, through the testimony of another's praise, may strive to persevere in them and to advance to better things. And according to this it is praiseworthy that someone have care for a good name and that he provide good things before God and men; but not that he be vainly delighted in the praise of men."

920. To magnanimity by defect there is opposed pusillanimity. - This is a disposition of soul by which someone flees as though too great and exceeding his powers those things which, all circumstances considered, he could and ought to do, since in reality they do not exceed them. Thus one who, terrified by difficulties and not sufficiently trusting in divine help, flees offices proposed to him by superiors, or does not fulfill the offices of his own state, from empty fear.

It arises from culpable ignorance. It is a mortal sin if it draws one back from a grave precept.

FOUR are these, of which three are opposed by excess, Presumption, Ambition, and Vain glory: the fourth by defect, namely Pusillanimity.

PRESUMPTION is the vice by which one attempts things that exceed his powers and capacity. Thus St. Thomas, art. 1. and 2., following Aristotle, 2. Eth. cap. 7. and lib. 4. cap. 3. For the magnanimous man does not strive for things greater than befit him, nor does he transgress the proportion of his capacity, just as naturally every action is commensurated with the power of the agent. The same St. Bonaventure teaches, in speculo animae, cap. 1.

BUT SINCE what we can do through others we can in a manner do through ourselves, according to Aristotle, 3. Eth. cap. 3., therefore it is not presumption to attempt a work of virtue with Divine help, which is denied to no one. It will, however, be presumption if one attempts it from himself, or for his own merits, or falsely, or more than others, as Bl. Bonaventure teaches, loco citato.

AMBITION is the vice by which one inordinately desires honor. Thus Bl. Thomas, quaest. 130. art. 1. and 2.; Bl. Bonaventure, in speculo animae, cap. 4. This, moreover, happens in three ways: either the ambitious man seeks an honor he does not merit, or an honor which he does not refer to God, or to the utility of others, but to his own advantage. Thus St. Thomas, quaest. 131. art. 1. and 2.; Bl. Bonaventure, in Pharetra 3. part. cap. 24., proving this with many authorities of the Fathers.

Wherein the Seraphic Doctor notes, serm. 5. Hexaëmer., that honor is not a good desirable per se.

VAIN glory is the vice by which glory is sought vainly, either about what is not, or about what is not worthy of glory; or about what is praised only by the judgment of men, either by seeking glory, or by referring glory itself to an undue end. Thus Bl. Thomas, quaest. 132. art. 1. and 2.; Bl. Bonaventure, in speculo animae, cap. 1. and 4. Thus it is opposed to magnanimity, seeking a glory which is a certain effect of honor unduly. See also Bl. Bonaventure, p. p. Centil. sect. 18. and in explicatione terminorum Theol.

It can, moreover, be mortal, if one glories in illicit things, or refers glory to himself as his last end.

VAIN glory is a capital vice, whose daughters are Disobedience, Boastfulness, Hypocrisy, Incontinence, or Contentiousness, Obstinacy, Discord, and Presumption of novelty. Thus St. Bonaventure, in speculo, loco cit. and p. p. Centil. sect. 18.; Bl. Thomas, quaest. 132. art. 4. and 5., from Bl. Gregory, 31. moral. cap. 31.

DISOBEDIENCE is the will fleeing subjection, unwilling to be subject to superiors.

BOASTFULNESS is the will, on account of an apparent power of its own, showing itself off.

HYPOCRISY is the will simulating itself deceitfully under the appearance of sanctity, acting openly in a base manner and vilely in secret, with no intention, no work.

INCONTINENCE is the will, by conforming itself, seeking to be praised by those who are evil.

OBSTINACY is the will fleeing the warning of probity, irrevocably defending its words or deeds.

Discord is the will fleeing the lessening of its wisdom, dissenting from what is said by others.

Presumption of novelty is the will exceeding the quality of its state, desiring to be conspicuous on account of an apparent novelty of knowledge or wisdom.

But Bl. Isidore, lib. in Deuter. cap. 16., distinguishing between pride and vainglory, says that from pride arise Contempt, Envy, Disobedience, Blasphemy, Murmuring, Detraction, and others. But from Vain glory, he says, arise Contentions, Heresies, Boastfulness, and Presumption of novelty. So the holy Doctor, p. p. Centil. sect. 18.

Nothing, however, is to be wondered at, that these are born of Vain glory, as of a bad shrub, for the appetite for glory is vehement, and on the part of the universal matter, as Tanner also notes, d. 3. quaest. 2. dub. 5. num. 73.

Pusillanimity is the vice opposed to Magnanimity by defect, whereby one shuns great things, even those proportioned to his powers; thus that servant who on that account hid his talent was punished, Matth. 25. Lucae 19. Thus Bl. Thomas, quaest. 133. art. 1. and 2. It is placed among the vices by Aristotle, 4. Eth. cap. 3., and by Bl. Gregory, p. p. Pastor. cap. 5. It is, moreover, at the other extreme from presumption, as Bl. Bonaventure teaches, in speculo animae, cap. 3. He names this vice a child of Sloth.

The holy Doctor adds that it has the nature of mortal sin, when by pusillanimity the things necessary for salvation are omitted; if anyone out of pusillanimity should neglect the defense, preaching, or correction, to the detriment of faith, or the spiritual, or even temporal loss of his neighbor, as St. Gregory says in Past. part. 1. cap 5.

From this branch arise servile, human, and worldly fear. Servile fear is when one abandons evil out of fear of punishment.¹ Human fear is when one, sparing the flesh, shuns spiritual goods that are adverse to the flesh. Worldly fear is when out of fear of the world, that is, of some person, one omits a good. ¹ Editor's note: the print reads 'ob metum poenae timorem' — a typesetter's doublet ('metum... timorem'); rendered as 'out of fear of punishment'.

The first fear is always mortal; but the second and third are only mortal when on their account things necessary for salvation are omitted. See all this in speculo animae, loc. cit.