What rash judgement is and its gravity

A JUDGEMENT is a firm assent of the mind to a proposition without fear of mistake, and if such an assent is given without sufficient grounds it is a rash judgement. The term, however, is used here only of judgements without sufficient reasons against the character of others, as that such a one is wicked, untrustworthy, a drunkard, and so on.

Such rash judgements, when they are formed deliberately with the consciousness that there is not sufficient ground for them, are sinful, and if the matter be serious they are gravely sinful. The reason is because all have a right to our good esteem unless they have forfeited it by their bad conduct; in judging others rashly we arrogate to ourselves an authority which we do not possess, and we use it unjustly against the character of our neighbour.” We thus violate justice, which in serious matters binds under grave sin.

Rash judgements, however, to which depraved human nature is so prone, are not usually grave sins in those who are striving to lead good lives. Rash and evil doubts, or suspicions, or opinions about others are frequent, but these, although wrong, are not as a rule gravely sinful, for they do not inflict serious harm on our neighbour’s reputation. 3° Jas. iv 11:

S. Th., II-II, q. 60, a. 2, 3 and 4.

418. Rash judgment (vermetel oordeel) or suspicious judgment is that which someone pronounces concerning those things which are doubtful or hidden because of certain slight conjectures; whence in the matter of justice it is that by which from slight and insufficient motives we judge evil concerning another.

To rash judgment there can be an ascent of the mind through various degrees of suspicion: the first is doubt concerning the honesty of one's neighbor, when concerning his probity we deliberately suspend judgment from insufficient motives; it is not mere doubt or absence of adhesion, a mere suspension of judgment concerning the evil of another, but a positive act by which, namely, we will to doubt and judge that one must doubt; - the second is suspicion, by which from slight motives and with great fear of erring we incline to judging that one's neighbor has done something evil; - the third is opinion, by which, not certainly but as likely and with fear, from insufficient motives we judge that one's neighbor has done something evil: it is therefore an assent of judgment, but not firm, concerning the evil of another; - the fourth follows, rash judgment strictly so called, or a firm and certain assent concerning the evil of one's neighbor given without sufficient reason. But how from an insufficient motive there can be a certain judgment is understood from the fact that the discussion is not concerning certainty properly so called, or concerning an absolutely certain assent from an evident motive, but concerning a morally certain assent which arises from an impulse of the will; but this can move the intellect to a rash assent, by bending it to assent without sufficient objective motives, even determining it to adhere firmly because of slight motives, graver motives being set after them (n. 73).

In all the aforesaid degrees, rashness or imprudence arises from this, that someone without a sufficient motive judges ill concerning his neighbor; but if he judged according to things proved and alleged, doubting when there is a sufficient reason for doubting, opining when a grave reason is present although merely probable and not certain, or pronouncing certainly when the reasons are morally certain, the judgment would be prudent, not rash nor sinful.

419. The causes from which rash judgment proceeds are indicated by St. Thomas, q. 60, a. 3: It happens from three things; "in one way indeed from this, that someone is evil in himself; and from this very thing, as though conscious of his own malice, he easily thinks evil of others... In another way it proceeds from this, that someone is badly affected toward another: for when someone despises or hates someone, or is angry with him or envies him, from slight signs he thinks evils concerning him, because each one easily believes what he desires. In a third way it proceeds from long experience; whence the Philosopher says that 'old men are especially suspicious, because they have often experienced the defects of others.' But the first two causes of suspicion manifestly pertain to perversity of affection; the third, however, lessens the nature of suspicion, insofar as experience advances toward certainty, which is contrary to the nature of suspicion."

420. Thesis. Rash judgment strictly so called is a sin against justice, grave from its genus. - It is said:

1. judgment strictly so called, i.e., a firm and morally certain assent: for doubt or suspicion from its genus is not a grave sin but a light one;

2. rash, i.e., knowingly and deliberately uttered with advertence to the slightness and insufficiency of the motives;

3. it is a sin against justice, because it is a way of acting unjustly against one's neighbor. For an internal act also regards justice, insofar as of itself it is ordered to external things and operations just or unjust, as the will of stealing or of restoring. Thus internal rash judgment is ordered to an external judgment against reputation and honor (a. 3 ad 3);

4. grave from its genus: for it can be light not only from lack of deliberation or lightness, but also from smallness of matter, namely, from slight rashness.

Namely, mortal sin is not present except by great rashness, for which three conditions are required:

a) perfect deliberation or full advertence at least in a confused way to the gravity of the thing and the insufficiency of the motives; whence if the judgment is altogether sudden, or conceived rather from lightness than from malice, the sin will be light, as often happens among men of timorous conscience, who are not accustomed to consent to such judgments;

b) full rashness or notable disproportion between the reasons and the assent, so that certain assent is given to motives altogether slight; whence the sin is light if the motives are not sufficient but approach sufficiency. Concerning this in practice judgment must be made with all circumstances considered:

Thus if a lascivious youth is seen speaking or playing secretly with a girl and in a somewhat dark place, it is a sufficient indication for judging that there is something evil; on the contrary if the same youth, or an upright man, is seen conversing with a girl in an open place in the middle of the day. If an unknown man secretly and by night enters another's house, it is not rashly judged that an evil intention is in him, otherwise if openly by day, or if a known person even by night;

c) gravity of matter, which is to be attended to from the harm inflicted, because with the quality of the persons and fact considered it is very disgraceful and notably harmful to the honor, reputation, and good estimation of one's neighbor. Hence to hold a maidservant to be lying without reason is not a grave sin; on the contrary, to hold a bishop so; to hold an unknown soldier to be a fornicator is not grave; on the contrary, to hold a priest so.

It is proved: 1) Each one has a strict right to good reputation or the good estimation of others as long as he is not morally certainly proved evil. But that right is violated by rash judgment, which of itself is grave, because it imports contempt of one's neighbor and begets dishonoring. For he who judges evil concerning another, noticing that there is no motive for judging thus, maliciously contemns him. Thus St. Thomas says:

"If it concerns something grave it is a mortal sin, insofar as it is not without contempt of one's neighbor" (a. 3); "from this very fact that someone has an evil opinion concerning another, without sufficient cause, he unduly contemns him, and therefore injures him" (ibid. ad 2). Whence Lugo: just as we sin against justice by taking away the reputation of one's neighbor among others through detraction, so among ourselves by rash judgment. And thus it differs in species from detraction.

2. For a judgment to be justly borne, three things are required: the authority of the one judging, the right reason of prudence or accurate knowledge of the cause, and perfect integrity (S. Th., a. 2). But these three are lacking in rash judgment: a) authority is lacking, since it is pronounced by a private person without office, and in circumstances in which it is done without any necessity or due office; b) accurate knowledge of the thing is lacking, since by hypothesis the judgment is rash, pronounced not from objective consideration of the thing but from an insufficient motive; c) integrity is often lacking, since for the most part it is pronounced from prejudice, envy, hatred, or from one's own perversity, not from the inclination of justice.

3. Whence Scripture often prohibits us from judging our neighbor; which at least must be understood concerning an unfounded and rash judgment (Mt. VII, 1-2; Lk. VI, 37; Rom. II, 1; Jas. IV, 11).

421. Rash suspicion (lichtvaardig vermoeden, ongegronde verdenking), under which name among theologians there also comes either rash doubting or rash opinion, of itself and regularly is only a venial sin, because it is not something full in the nature of judgment and contempt, but incomplete.

Nevertheless exceptionally and by accident it can be mortal: 1) if deliberately and without any probable foundation it is made concerning a very grave sin (incest, sodomy, bestiality) as to men altogether upright, as if a pious priest were doubted to be a heretic: for suspicion concerning such a sin can be more injurious than certain affirmation concerning an ordinary sin; but it is so only because of the special circumstances joined to it; 2) if it proceeds from envy or grave hatred: for then it is grave because of the affection from which it arises.

422. Practical admonitions. - 1. Although, if there is a serious reason for doubting concerning the goodness of one's neighbor, we cannot judge or opine evil concerning him, nevertheless we are not bound positively to esteem him good (this belongs to greater charity) unless his goodness is truly established, but we can suspend judgment.

2. In the external manner of acting we are by no means prohibited, for forestalling our own or another's damage, from employing due precautions, just as if one's neighbor were dishonest; for example, to shut money in a chest lest it be secretly taken by servants or unknown guests. For this belongs to prudence. It is lawful to judge concerning someone that he can become evil, and consequently, common frailty being considered, to apply a remedy lest he become evil, and thus to forestall damage, without however positively doubting without reason concerning the probity of someone in particular.

3. Rash judgments, although they are concerned with a diverse object, are probably of the same species, because they violate the same right of one's neighbor; and consequently those objects are not to be declared in confession, but it suffices to indicate the gravity or lightness of the matter.

Nota that suspicion, doubt, opinion, and judgment, where the evil of one's neighbor is in question, are often taken as one and the same by the learned and the unlearned. The reason of this confusion is, because all these acts are about the evil of one's neighbor and from insufficient indications, insofar as they are rash, as they are taken here.

However, if we speak strictly, all these acts are distinguished from one another. For doubt is, when the mind is moved toward either side, but assents to neither, and remains suspended between both. Suspicion is, when the intellect, receding from the doubt or mean, is more inclined to the assent of one side, yet so that it does not yet assent. Some do not distinguish it from opinion except by more and less, and will it to be a weak opinion or one with great misgiving ; opinion however is assent to one side with fear of the opposite side. Judgment is certain and firm assent to one side, without fear of the opposite side.

We treat here of rash suspicion insofar as it comprehends doubt and opinion, and the principal question is whether it is of its genus mortal sin, so that in the individual it is always mortal when it is fully deliberate concerning the grave evil of one's neighbor. There is difficulty also about the mind of Saint Thomas. That we may begin from the more certain,

I say 1°: Rash judgment is of its genus mortal sin. This is certain and common with the Author^{330 330} Hic q. 60, a. 3, o.

Proof. 1° from Scripture. Matt., VII, 1, it is said : Judge not, that ye be not judged. Luke, VI, 37 : Judge not, and ye shall not be judged. To the Romans, XIV, 4 : Who art thou that judgest another man's servant?

Proof. 2°. Rash judgment is not without injury and contempt of one's neighbor, and therefore is against justice and charity³³¹. Therefore it is of its genus mortal sin. ³³¹ Ibid.

It is confirmed. Everyone has the right that a good estimate be had of him by others, so long as he is not proved wicked. Now he who judges rashly of the evil of his neighbor acts against this right. Therefore he is against justice. Also against charity : 1° because against that principle of charity and right reason :

« What you would not have done to yourself, do not to another ; » 2° because it cannot be that he who thus judges of his neighbor be well disposed toward him.

I say 2°: It is more probable that rash suspicion concerning the evil of one's neighbor, insofar as it comprehends doubt and opinion, is of its genus mortal sin, and accordingly in the individual always mortal sin, when it is fully deliberate concerning the grave evil of one's neighbor.

Proof. That is mortal sin of its genus which is contrary to justice and charity. Now such is rash suspicion. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. 1° Because, as Saint Thomas says³³², it is not without contempt of one's neighbor, and therefore does him an injury. 2° Everyone has the right to be esteemed upright by others, so long as his malice does not sufficiently appear. Now he acts against this right who rashly suspects evil of him, or doubts of his uprightness. Therefore against justice. Also against charity : 1° because he acts against this first principle of all social life : « What you would not have done to yourself, do not to another ; » 2° because it can scarcely be that he who rashly suspects evil of his neighbor be well affected toward him. Therefore. ³³² Ibid., ad 2 and a. 4, o.

The adversaries answer, and it is their chief foundation, that there is indeed injury and contempt, but incomplete ; because suspicion is something incomplete in the genus of judgment.

On the contrary. Grant that contempt is incomplete in the genus of judgment, thence it is not proved that this incomplete contempt is not mortal of its genus ; because, although it is incomplete in the genus of judgment, it is nevertheless complete in the genus of a perfectly deliberate act. So, v. g., fully voluntary doubt in matters of faith is an incomplete judgment and incomplete contempt in the genus of judgment ; but, because it is complete in the genus of a perfectly deliberate act, it is sufficient for mortal sin. So again detraction concerning one's neighbor before a single upright man only is incomplete contempt, and yet, according to the highly probable opinion, it is mortal sin of its genus. Or, if you will, detraction before ten is less complete contempt than detraction before twenty, and yet in both cases it is mortal sin of its genus.

Proof. 2°, and this chief refuge of the adversaries is more strongly shaken. Rash suspicion of the gravest evils of one's neighbor is in the individual mortal sin. Therefore rash suspicion of its genus is mortal sin. — The consequence is plain ; because what is venial of its genus, however much it be increased within its species, remains venial, nor becomes mortal unless by some circumstance it be drawn to another species, as theologians commonly teach after D. Thomas, Ia 2ae, q. 88, a. 5. — Proof. of the antecedent. Rash suspicion gravely contemns one's neighbor in the grave case and inflicts on him a grave injury. Therefore. — Proof. of the antecedent. No one exists who does not think himself gravely contemned and suffering grave injury, if someone without cause suspects of him, or even doubts, that he is a sodomite, incestuous with his mother, a heretic, a magician, a sorcerer, etc., so that he would rather lose a notable sum of money than have such a suspicion held of him. I appeal to the very adversaries as witnesses.

There remains the difficulty about the mind of D. Thomas.

The conclusion is therefore proved from D. Thomas, or rather the argument already made from him in the prior proofs is renewed. For, according to Saint Thomas here a. 3, c, rash judgment is mortal sin of its genus, because it is with contempt of one's neighbor. Now, according to the same holy Doctor in the reply to the second objection and in the body of the next article, suspicion also is with contempt of one's neighbor : « From this very fact, he says, that anyone holds an evil opinion of another without sufficient cause, he unduly contemns him, and therefore does him an injury » ; so that the holy Doctor speaks in exactly the same way of both. Therefore.

Serra answers that Saint Thomas speaks of suspicion in the second degree, in which it is taken for certain judgment.

On the contrary. Saint Thomas speaks of that suspicion of which he speaks in the argument to which he responds. But in the argument to which he responds, he speaks of suspicion as distinguished from certain judgment. It is plain to one reading the argument, which is thus : « By illicit judgment some injury is done to one's neighbor. But evil suspicion consists in the mere opinion of a man, and thus does not seem to pertain to the injury of another. Therefore the judgment of suspicion is not illicit. »

You will object : Saint Thomas here a. 3, c., distinguishing three degrees of suspicion, says : « The first degree indeed is, that a man from light indications begin to doubt of the goodness of someone, and this is venial and light sin ; it pertains, says Augustine, to human temptation, without which this life is not led!...³³³ » ³³³ Aug., in Ps. LXX enarr., n. 3.

I answer. Saint Thomas, like Saint Augustine on whom he is founded, is speaking of sudden suspicion not fully deliberate. Which is plain first from his very words : « That, he says, a man begin to doubt » ; for no one is said to begin to doubt who after full advertence deliberately doubts and continues to doubt, especially of the grave evil of his neighbor. Second it is plain from the reason he adduces from Augustine, namely that such suspicion « pertains to human temptation, without which this life is not led. » Moreover, rash suspicion fully deliberate of the grave evil of one's neighbor pertains not to human but to diabolical temptation, as Bannez well notes ; and it is false that the life of many is not led without such suspicions.

THE PRINCIPAL difficulty concerns Judgment, by which one judges evil of another; for to judge good of someone is rarely, and only per accidens, a fault.

THEREFORE I suppose that to judge something for a just cause is not a sin. This is commonly supposed by S. Bonaventure and S. Thomas and others, and it is proved by the Holy Doctor on John 12 with that text: Judge not according to the appearance, but judge just judgment.

BUT WHAT cause is required for judging rightly is left to the prudent judge, as Soto noted, Book 3 de Iustitia, quaest. 4. art. 3; Valencia disp. 5. quaest. 4. puncto 3.

THEREFORE I ASSERT: to judge deliberately that someone is evil, gravely harming his reputation, without a just cause, is mortal sin.

IT IS PROVED from the Holy Doctors, first from Matthew 7: Judge not, that you may not be judged. They confirm it from Bede on that passage, and from St. Augustine tract. 90. in Ioannem.

NEXT it is proved by 1 Corinthians 4: Do not judge before the time. So D. Thomas art. 3, and P. Bonaventure p. p. Centil. sect. 10, where he observes that rash judgment is measured according to the Savior's saying, Matthew 7: With what judgment you judge, you shall be judged. Where the Gloss says: If you judge anyone rashly with venial condemnation, you shall be condemned venially. If with mortal condemnation, you shall be condemned mortally. This, he says, is to be understood without prejudice to the opinion of others; for some say it is not mortal unless reputation is gravely harmed. Whence Valencia in the place cited, and Tanner disp. 4. quaest. 3. dub. 2. num. 18, with Aragon, just as they think it mortal to judge some light things of a Religious man, as that he is a liar; so they would not think it mortal to judge of a worldly young man that he has committed fornication, or of a soldier that he has killed someone unjustly, because the judgment is a grave evil insofar as reputation is gravely taken away or harmed. From similar things (they say) such men are not harmed. Valencia adds that it is also an undue and unjust judgment to judge rashly of the future, e.g. that man will perish, for that belongs to God, who perhaps will change that sinner's heart.

IT IS PROVED secondly by the Holy Doctor opusc. de profectu religiosi, Lib. 1. cap. 1, from Romans 14: But thou, why judgest thou thy brother's servant? and Luke 6: Judge not, and you shall not be judged. He defines rash judgment as when I believe something was done with an evil intention, when it could have been done with another intention; or when someone is judged gravely fallen on light indications. For this is to usurp the scrutiny of hearts, which is proper to God, as is said in Jeremias 17.

THE SAME Holy Doctor cites on Luke 6 the words alleged, where he adds Proverbs 17: He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, both are abominable before God.

HE OBSERVES that to justify the wicked is abominable, not per se, but per accidens, when he is to be compared with another in order to something of justice, e.g. the distribution of honors, etc., and by that judgment an equality with another in good reputation is established or promoted, and the wicked man is preferred or made equal to the just, as the Holy Doctor noted in the places alleged, and Valencia puncto 1, and Navarre commentar. in Rubric. de Iudic. n. 47.

I ASSERT secondly: to judge of someone, even gravely, from light indications, but with fear/doubt, is not mortal sin. So S. Bonaventure in the places cited, and D. Thomas art. 3; Sylvester under the word Iudicium, quaest. 4; Cajetan on the said art. 3; Navarre loc. cit. num. 49 and following. So also Tanner loc. cit. num. 20, who says light indications are those by which a prudent man would not be moved to that judgment. So also Soto, Valencia, Aragon, and others.

IT IS PROVED by the Holy Doctor, because the neighbor is not gravely harmed.

HE OBSERVES, however, in the place cited on the Judgment of suspicion that it is threefold. The first is of violent suspicion, when no or few signs of good appear, but all of evil; and this is not a sin. The second of temerity; when many signs of good, few of evil; and it is a grave venial sin. The third, when many of evil, but few are signs of good; and this is a lighter venial sin.

HE NOTES also in the place cited, de profectu religiosi, that fear is sometimes confused with suspicion, although they differ: for fear is directed to caution, as when, without suspecting evil of anyone, I close the Monastery as a precaution.

VALENCIA ADDS that such a judgment with doubt can be mortal by reason of the person; as if you judge some gravest evil of a most honest man, even with doubt, as incest with his mother or sister.

HE NOTES also punct. 4. that one can doubt by standing in suspense; but such doubt can be a sin, even if only venial, when one is lightly grounded and hangs between the two, so as not to incline toward judging the good. He adds, however, with Soto loc. cit. that it can be mortal by reason of a most illustrious person, as if someone is in doubt about Blessed John the Baptist, whether he was a saint or sinned mortally, etc.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ADDS, moreover, that thoughts of this kind belong more to a Prelate, who by reason of his governance can prudently be in suspense or doubt, and likewise to one who is enlightened from above, of whom the Apostle says: The spiritual man judgeth all things; but it is not true of those "spiritual" men who, like Catos, everywhere stick in their nose and judge with a quince-like zeal — say rather with a dog-in-the-manger zeal.