Sedition

Sedition.—Sedition is a discord between different factions of the same multitude so grave as to extend to physical conflict, and to the destruction of the unity of the State.

(a) It is a discord, that is, a disagreement of wills, and so it resembles schism, war and fighting. Difference of opinion in the political parties of a country is not sedition, since there is a unity of will and purpose in all of them with reference to the common good and the peace of the State (cfr. 1197, 1348). In fact, under a democratic system of government, the existence of some opposite parties has proved a useful, if not necessary means of stimulating the interest of citizens, and of expediting the business of legislation.

(b) Sedition is between different factions of the same multitude, that is, between different sections or groups of the same body politic. Thus, it differs from war (which is between states), and from fighting (which is between individuals).

(c) Sedition extends to physical conflict, that is, it tends from its character to break out into violence and to array the opposite factions in fight against one another. If not accompanied by actual hostilities, it is simple sedition. But, if fighting has begun, it is insurrection or rebellion, when the people seek to overthrow the government; it is civil war, if one part of the nation seeks to secede from or overcome the other.

(d) It is prejudicial to the civil unity and peace of the people, that is, it tends to the violent dismemberment of the State, or at least to the disturbance of the common good. Thus, sedition is more serious than riots, tumults, gang-warfare, and like particular disturbances, which are not directed against the State itself, or against the harmony of the whole body of the people. Sedition differs also from the peaceful separation of parts of a state, and from the lawful self-defense of the people against a tyrannical government.

From the definition given above, it is plain that sedition is a special distinct species of sin. (a) It differs from spiritual discord, for unlike schism it is opposed, not to the unity of the Church, but to the unity of the State. (b) It differs from other kinds of temporal discord, for unlike war and fighting it is opposed, not to peace between nations or individuals, but to peace between the members of the same civil body. War takes away peace with foreigners, sedition takes away peace with fellow-citizens; fighting attacks a private person or persons, sedition attacks the public welfare of the country.

Sedition in the strict meaning given it above is always sinful. (a) Thus, it is a mortal sin from its nature, since it is opposed to what is manifestly one of the greatest of temporal goods, namely, the unity of the State. (b) It is opposed to charity, as destroying the bond of peace; it is opposed to justice, as injuring a unity based on law and common utility, to which the nation has a strict right. (c) Sedition is graver in some persons than in others. Thus, the moral causes of sedition (i.e., those that sow discords or promote disaffection) are more responsible than those who are led and who carry out acts of violence. The gravity of the sin in each case depends on the amount of damage that is due to one’s influence or acts.

Is one who resists a tyrannical government guilty of the sin of sedition? (a) When resistance is made by legal and pacific means, such as the rejection of a bad government at the polls, there is no sedition. (b) When legal and pacific means are impossible and armed aggression against a tyrant will benefit the common good, a rebel is not guilty of the sin of sedition. In this case, it is rather the bad ruler who causes discords and is seditious against the common good, whereas the people only defend themselves according to the laws. Thus, the rebellion of the Machabees against their Syrian oppressors was not seditious. (c) When legal means are impossible but armed aggression will not benefit the common good, a rebel is guilty of the sin of sedition.

What are the daughters of anger? - Some are from the heart: 1. Indignation, which is an inordinate affection from the fact that someone reckons himself treated unworthily by such a person. It is commonly venial. Indeed, if it proceeds from a just judgment of reason, it is nothing. Nevertheless it could be mortal if it increased up to deliberate hatred and grave contempt of the person. 2. Swelling of mind, by which someone morosely thinks out diverse ways of revenge, and by those thoughts puffs up his mind. What kind of sin it is must be judged from the quality of the revenge which is thought out. - Some are in the mouth: 1. Shouting, when an angry person raises his voice, pouring forth many things inordinately and confusedly. It is commonly venial, unless something else is added. 2. Blasphemy against God, and it is mortal. 3. Contumely against men, by which someone casts some evil upon his neighbor, with the intention of dishonoring him. 4. Malediction, by which someone wishes and imprecates evil upon another, under the account of evil. - Some are in deed, as quarrels, fights, seditions, wounds. "Quarrels, by which are understood all harms which are inflicted in deed on neighbors from anger." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 158, a. 7. When "someone intends to harm another, with the latter knowing and resisting, this is imported under the name of quarrel." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 42, a. 1. Quarrels, if they do not exceed measure, as also slight fights, are venial; otherwise, if they progress to seditions, wounds, killings. And these are commonly mortal sins on the part of the one beginning the quarrel; for the other can defend himself with the moderation of blameless defense. L. 80, 83; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 40, 41, 42.

Contumely: From its genus it is mortal. It is only venial if it is small, or only material without the mind of dishonoring, provided that no notable injury to the neighbor's honor follows. And thus many parents are excused at least from mortal sin when they call their children asses, etc.; likewise women, children, and men of the lowest sort, burdening one another with insults, because, since credit is not given to them, honor is not gravely injured. Nor indeed is it a sin if it is done with the mind of correcting, humbling, or for another reason. And thus a superior can cast forth some word otherwise contumelious. Yet in this one can sin if the mode of due correction is exceeded, or the subject is more gravely dishonored than he deserved. Likewise, if for the sake of a joke, through fitting recreation, light defects are cast forth, it is pleasantness, according to S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 2, provided the other is not saddened, nor moved to anger. Contumely is also done by deed, both indirectly, as if you trample or burn the image or letters of another, etc., and directly, as if you beat an honorable man with a club, set horns at his door, or represent something which injures the honor of another.

To this belongs mocking, derision, and ridicule, when it is done by signs, as by wrinkling the nose, stretching out the lips, etc., intending the neighbor's confusion; and if this is grave, or at least the neighbor is gravely saddened by it, they are mortal. - Concerning these things note that one who has injured another's honor by contumely is bound to restore it, even if reputation has not been injured. But this can be done either through an honorable and friendly greeting, or an invitation to table, or a petition for pardon, sometimes even on bended knees and before witnesses, according as the injury was grave. It is not necessary to explain in confession the varied quality of mortal contumely. L. 81, 82. "Malediction, of which we now speak, is that by which evil is pronounced against someone either by commanding or by wishing. But to will, or by command to move toward, the evil of another, according to itself repugns to charity, by which we love our neighbor; and so according to its genus it is a mortal sin, and so much the graver, the more we are bound to love and revere the person whom we curse.... Nevertheless it happens that a word of malediction uttered is a venial sin, either because of the smallness of the evil which one imprecates upon another by cursing, or also because of the affection of the one who utters the words of malediction, while from a light movement, or jest, or from some surreption, he utters such words, because sins of words are weighed especially from the affection." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 76, a. 3; L. 83.

Is it ever lawful not to obey temporal authority? Is it ever lawful to rebel? Is it ever lawful to kill a Prince? R. To the 1st: As was already said above, n. 171, 4. Laws unjust through contrariety to human good do not oblige in the forum of conscience. Laws unjust through contrariety to divine good are in no way lawful to observe. S. Th. 1. 2, q. 96, a. 4. But in those things which are lawful, and which pertain to civil power, obedience must be given to civil Princes, even to the difficult, and also to those who abuse their authority. From these most pure sources, namely Scripture and Tradition, says Gregory XVI in Br. 9 Jun. 1832, we are most plainly taught that the obedience which men are bound to furnish to powers constituted by God is an absolute precept, which no one can oppose. Pius VI, Br. Pastoralis, 5 Jul. 1796; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 69, a. 4; q. 102, a. 1; q. 104, aa. 5, 6.

R. To the 2nd: It is never altogether lawful to rebel. "In this matter," says St. Liguori, "the principle of John Gerson was exceedingly pernicious, who dared to assert that a monarch can lawfully be judged by the whole nation if he rules the kingdom unjustly... a principle, I say, not only false, but most pernicious." The reason is that subjects, by the very fact that they are subjects, cannot arrogate to themselves power above the Prince, by judging and punishing him. L. H. A. Tr. 8, n. 13; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 42, a. 2; q. 60, a. 6; q. 64, a. 3; q. 69, a. 4. But it is one thing to make rebellion, or to bring violence against a legitimate prince in order to depose him; another thing to resist unjust laws and their execution. Rebellion is a kind of aggression, not defense. But if a force plainly unjust is brought, resistance is then made not to authority, but to unjust force. "And therefore, just as it is lawful to resist robbers, so it is lawful in such a case to resist bad Princes, unless perhaps because of scandal, when from this some grave disturbance would be feared," S. Th. 2. 2, q. 69, a. 4; q. 42, a. 2, or there were no hope of a good outcome, and greater public evils were to be feared. Cf. also the Letters of Leo XIII, Sapientiae christianae, 10 Jan. 1890, who, speaking of laws openly disagreeing with divine right, injurious to the Church and contrary to Religion, then says, "to resist is a duty, to obey a crime." Therefore it is lawful to oppose passive resistance to unjust laws. For one must obey God rather than men, Acts 5:29. "For this reason to cast off obedience, and by the force of the multitude to call the matter to sedition, is the crime of treason, not only against human majesty, but also against divine." Leo XIII, Enc. Letter Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1895, section Non est magni toward the end. For "whoever have the right of commanding do not receive it from elsewhere, but from that supreme Prince of all, God. There is no power except from God, Rom. 13:1... Nature itself testifies that whatever power there is anywhere proceeds from God." When this is known and persuaded, "those things are understood altogether to pertain to justice: to revere the majesty of Princes, to be subject constantly and faithfully to public power, to do nothing seditiously, to preserve the holy discipline of the city."

Leo XIII, l. c., sections Talis, Eiusmodi; Pius X, Ep. Notre charge, 25 Aug. 1910.

R. To the 3rd: It is never lawful for anyone to kill a Prince, neither for a private man nor for the multitude; for the reason is the same for him and for this. The contrary opinion of the ancients is called by St. Alphonsus, l. c., improbable, false, most false. "I ask," says the Holy Doctor, "is he a man like others? And if he is a man, he cannot be deprived of life or goods by those who do not have the right to expel him from life or goods. The doctrine of the holy Fathers is common, that it is never lawful for any private person to kill a man, however private, and however iniquitous he may be, unless he has public authority, or unless this is necessary for protecting his own life." And the very same holds whether the Prince is good or bad; whether legitimate, or an usurper of the kingdom. Prop. condemned by the Council of Constance, Sess. 15, d. 6 Jul. 1414; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 12, a. 2; q. 42, a. 2; q. 64, a. 3; q. 101, aa. 1, 3; q. 102, aa. 1, 2; q. 104, aa. 1, 2, 5; Aertnys 178; E. M.

What is war? War is a fight of a multitude against an external multitude, undertaken by the legitimate authority of Princes, for defending the good of the commonwealth or for vindicating an injury inflicted upon it. War differs from a brawl because a brawl is a fight between private persons, of a few or of individuals against a few or individuals. It differs from sedition, because sedition is the attack of a multitude against a multitude in the same commonwealth or society. A brawl proceeds from an inordinate will. And therefore a brawl always imports sin. And in him indeed who unjustly attacks another, it is per se mortal sin; for to inflict harm on a neighbor, even by natural work, is not without mortal sin. But because sedition has a special good to which it is opposed, namely the unity and peace of the multitude, it is a special sin. It is opposed to justice and to the common good, insofar as it inflicts harm on the commonwealth and its citizens. "And therefore from its genus it is mortal sin, and so much the more grave as the common good which is attacked through sedition is greater than private good.... But those who defend the common good by resisting them are not to be called seditious, just as neither are those who defend themselves called brawlers." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 42, a. 2. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 40, a. 1; q. 41, a. 1; q. 42, a. 1.

What intention is required in adults for receiving the individual sacraments? - In baptism and order there is required at least a habitual explicit will. The reason is that sacraments of this kind impose grave obligations to be fulfilled. But no one is judged to receive a grave obligation; rather, his positive will must be altogether clear. Lugo d. 9, n. 119, 127; L. 81, 82. The sacrament of baptism and of order is indeed invalidly conferred on those having only interpretative intention. Nevertheless Coninck, Sporer, Dicastillo, etc., apud Croix l. 6, p. 1, n. 168, and others judge that for receiving baptism an implicit intention contained in contrition or attrition had by the recipient suffices, or, as Lugo d. 9, n. 130 says, in the will of giving one's name to the Christian Religion, or, if he is ignorant of this, of doing whatever things are necessary for salvation, as La Croix has it, l.c. Cf. L. 82. This indeed can have place in urgent necessity, but baptism must then be conferred conditionally, and therefore repeated conditionally if time allows, unless there is certainty concerning a true and explicit intention not retracted. Cf. S. C. de P. F., March 30, 1898.

In confirmation, extreme unction, and the Eucharist, a habitual implicit will suffices, which is less rightly called interpretative, and which consists in this, that someone has had a general intention, and has not retracted it, of applying those things which are necessary and useful for his salvation; or of living and dying in the Catholic religion, with the helps of the same religion; or, a fortiori, of receiving all the sacraments in life and at death. The reason is that these sacraments bring many advantages and no disadvantage. But all are judged to wish to receive advantages. Hence both confirmation and extreme unction can be conferred conditionally on a dying person deprived of his senses. Ritual, de Extr. unct. § 6; L. 82. But if he in reality had never thought of receiving them, they would have to be altogether repeated.

For penance there is required either actual or at least virtual intention; nor therefore does habitual intention suffice. The reason is that in this sacrament the acts of the penitent are required for the matter, and these indeed cannot be had without at least virtual will of receiving the sacrament.

L. 82. - Likewise for matrimony at least virtual intention is required. For "since each spouse is not only receiving, but also minister of the sacrament, in each of them there is certainly required that intention which is demanded in the ministers of the other sacraments." L. 82.

Fr. Lehmkuhl, ed. 11, n. 66, requires for the Eucharist, besides the case of viaticum, an expressed habitual intention. Yet ordinarily it is not only virtual, but even actual. The reason, he says, is that "in the general will of living a Christian life there is in no way contained the will of receiving the sacred Eucharist so many times and at such a time." - But if, besides the case of viaticum, it is a question of the Eucharist to be received from obligation, certainly that general will also implicitly contains this. And if that general will is conceived more determinately, namely of applying all the means constituted by God as necessary and useful for salvation, certainly this will would also implicitly include the Eucharist to be received from mere devotion. Finally, if the general will of dying in a Christian manner includes the will of receiving the sacraments of the Church at the point of death, why does the general will of living a Christian life not include the will of receiving Christ's sacraments during life? "Wherefore," the same Fr. Lehmkuhl concludes, "an adult to whom, besides the case of viaticum, the Holy Eucharist were given without his knowledge, would indeed receive it materially, but not with fruit." - But consequently to the things which have just been noted: if in the case of Viaticum the aforesaid adult would receive the sacred Eucharist sacramentally and with fruit, also outside that case he would receive it sacramentally and with fruit, if namely, as was said, he has its will at least implicitly.

S. Th. II-II, q. 37-42.

954. Sins against private peace. - To peace, which is an effect of charity, several sins are opposed. To private peace there is opposed:

1. In the heart, discord, which is directly contrary to concord or union of wills, and is a dissension of wills (not only of intellects) concerning the good of God or neighbor which from charity we ought to will, namely, concerning a necessary good about which we are bound to consent.

Discord happens in two ways: a) in itself, when someone knowingly and from intention dissents from the good of God or neighbor in which he ought to consent, and thus it is a mortal sin from its genus because it is contrary to charity; b) accidentally, when the intention of some persons is toward a good which pertains to the honor of God or the utility of neighbor, but one judges this to be good, while another has a contrary opinion, and such discord, which is rather of opinions and intellects than of wills, is not against charity nor a sin, unless it is with error concerning those things which are of the necessity of salvation, or exceeds the limits of moderation so that pertinacity is unduly applied. - Discord arises from vainglory, because we love our own will and our own judgment more than is right.

2. From discord often is born contention, which is an altercation of words by which one contradicts another inordinately, either by attacking the truth, or by defending it in an undue mode, for example, with too much acrimony. In the first case it is a mortal sin from its genus, namely, in matter of great moment: of faith, morals, justice, etc.; in the second case it is only venial, unless it generates grave scandal. It likewise arises from vainglory, by which each of those contending strives to carry off victory over the other.

3. From discord and contention sometimes is born strife, which is a fight of hands among private persons, by which, with souls inflamed by anger, one strives to strike or injure another. It is a mortal sin from its genus in the aggressor; yet if it does not exceed measure, as also a very light fight, it is venial. In one defending himself there is no sin, if he does not exceed the limits of moderation; if he exceeds a little, it is venial; if much, mortal, for example, if without necessity someone rises up to injure another gravely. - It arises from anger.

955. Sins against public peace. - To public peace, or peace of a multitude, there are opposed:

1. To the peace of the Church, schism, which is the voluntary separation of oneself from the unity of the Church, the profession of faith being retained, or the voluntary separation of a baptized person from the Catholic Church. It is committed in two ways, for "the unity of the Church is attended in two things, namely, a) in the connection of the members of the Church with one another..., and b) again in the order of all the members to one head... And therefore they are called schismatics 1. (perfectly) who refuse to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff (with rebellion, so that they pertinaciously refuse to obey precepts), and 2. who refuse to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him" (in doctrine, worship, sacraments). From this it is clear that it is a most grave and mortal sin from its whole genus. Nevertheless it is less grave than infidelity, which is against God himself according as he is in himself the first truth upon which faith rests, while schism is against the unity of the Church, which is a participated good and less than God himself. And although charity is nobler than faith, the sin which is opposed against the secondary good of charity, namely, the good of neighbor, is less than infidelity, because the good of neighbor is less than the object of faith, which is God himself.

2. To the peace of a civil multitude, both a) illicit war; and b) sedition, which is a tumult or aggressive war by which one part of the commonwealth unjustly rises up against another, or against the legitimate prince, in which latter case it is called rebellion. It is a sin so much graver as the common good (namely, the peace and unity of society) excels a private good; whence it is mortal from its whole genus.

These sins are also against justice, and are better considered in the treatise on Justice.

956. Observation. - External heretics are also schismatics, but not conversely, although nevertheless schism leads to heresy. Schismatics also are punished by the same ecclesiastical penalties as heretics. Moreover, concerning communication with schismatics and concerning cooperation with schism, one must speak similarly as for heresy (cf. treatise on Faith).

I. Hatred of God is twofold: one which is included in every sin; the other peculiar, which is described as an aversion from God, by which the will detests God insofar as he prohibits sins and inflicts punishments. This hatred of God is the gravest of all crimes, since it is opposed to the most excellent virtue of charity according to its primary act, namely the divine love. It is by its kind mortal, nor does it admit the excuse of parvity of matter; but it can turn out venial only from imperfect deliberation.

II. Hatred of the neighbor is an expressed malevolence, by which we wish him evil. It is by its kind deadly; yet it can become venial, both by parvity of matter and by imperfect deliberation — as if you wish a light evil to your neighbor, or if with imperfect deliberation you desire it for him.

III. It is licit to abominate the sinner, as sinner, according to Proverbs 29: The just abominate a wicked man. For then the sin is hated, not the man. For it is never licit to wish evil to a man, insofar as it is his evil, even with an inefficacious affection; nor is it licit to be saddened over his good, or to rejoice over his evil, as is plain from the proscribed thesis of Innocent XI recounted in the preceding chapter.

IV. Although it is never licit either to desire or to rejoice over the neighbor's evil, it is nevertheless licit, with an inefficacious affection, to wish some temporal evil to another, and to rejoice over it, insofar as this temporal evil conduces to his spiritual good — for instance, that he desist from sin, that he be called back to a better way — as St. Thomas teaches, on the third book, distinction 30, article 1, ad 4. For charity has an order, and each one ought to love himself more than another, and his kin more than strangers, and friends more than enemies, and the common good of many more than the good of one.

One can, without violating charity, wish some temporal evil to another, or rejoice if it should happen — not insofar as it is his evil, but insofar as it is an impediment of evils to another whom one is more bound to love, or to the Community, or to the Church. Similarly of his temporal evil, according as by the evil of punishment the evil of fault is frequently prevented. Hence it is licit to wish for victory in a just war, for the destruction of the Turks, for the common good of the Church or of the Principality; it is licit to wish that a punishment be inflicted by the judge on a malefactor, that he desist from inflicting harm on the Community or on a neighbor. Yet the utmost vigilance is needed in desires of this kind, however inefficacious, lest under the appearance of the common good the cupidity of private vengeance lie hidden. Similarly it is never licit to wish a lesser evil to oneself or to others in order to avoid a greater. Wherefore they gravely sin who deliberately desire death for themselves in order to avoid other troubles.

V. Question I. Is it a sin to speak ill of one's neighbor? Answer. He who with deliberate mind imprecates a grave evil upon his neighbor sins mortally. Weak women, and base men, frequently burst forth into these imprecations, and, to excuse themselves, allege the impulse of anger, as though anger were not a sin. That anger can at times forestall reason is true; but frequently, from a depraved habit and from grave negligence in restraining anger, women and men break forth into such curses. They often say, when their anger has cooled, that they are displeased at having hurled such curses; but this is not a sign that they did not sin: for when the anger has been poured out, the mind perceives the evil it has committed, and therefore is then displeased. Parish priests and Confessors, then, should instruct such persons, and show them the necessity of curbing the savage beast of anger: since their frequent curses flow from a depraved habit of becoming angry. But this wicked habituation does not excuse them, but accuses them. That Confessors may be able to discern whether they have offended gravely or lightly, let them weigh all the circumstances, the deliberation of mind, the scandal, the gravity of the evil wished, and the rest of that kind.

VI. Question II. What is discord? Answer. It is a dissension of wills from the divine good and the good of the neighbor, in which they ought to agree. It is opposed to concord, which unites hearts and wills. By its kind it is a mortal sin. For God, Proverbs 6, detests him who sows discord among brethren. It is required, however, that someone knowingly dissent from the good of God or of the Neighbor, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 37, art. 1. Wherefore there is no discord when one, in good faith, judges that this pertains to the honor of God and the utility of the Neighbor, and another judges otherwise. For this frequently happens even among the holier men themselves.

VII. Question III. What is contention? Answer. It is an altercation of words for impugning the truth; or it is an impugning of the truth with a confidence of clamor, as the Angelic Doctor says, II-II, q. 38, art. 1, where he opportunely adds: But if contention is called an impugning of falsity with a due measure of acrimony, then contention is praiseworthy. Acrimony must never be poured out upon persons, but only, with due sparingness, upon errors. This acrimony is like a seasoning, which must be used with great prudence and moderation, especially in vocal disputations. For when men dispute with mutual words, if they clamor with an immoderate outcry of voices, if they rub each other with mutual wit, the disputation easily ends in criminal contention, because the persons are present. But when errors are refuted in writing, often the authors of the errors are either dead or absent; therefore there is no danger of culpable contention. Hence it is that the mildest Fathers — Augustine, Bernard, and others — often used a style sprinkled with wit. For the reader is wearied by a cold reading; but, on the contrary, writing seasoned with a moderate pepper of acrimony sharpens his palate.

VIII. Question IV. What is Schism? Answer. It is a deliberate separation from the unity of the Church. Now he is separated from the Church who refuses either to communicate with her members, or to render due obedience to the Roman Pontiff, her visible head. Not every disobedient man is a schismatic, because pertinacity can be lacking. But every schismatic is disobedient; just as every heretic is a schismatic, but not conversely. Yet in practice these two crimes, schism and heresy, are scarcely separated, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 39, art. 1, ad 3.

IX. Question V. What is sedition? Answer. It is an aggressive war of one part of the Commonwealth against another part, or against its own Prince. It is by its kind a mortal sin, because it is gravely adverse to peace, to unity, and to the common good. Of war and duel I shall treat in explaining the fifth precept.

Sedition is a dissension of citizens, as it were some going apart by themselves.

It is indeed, of its kind, a mortal sin, since it is repugnant to the peace of the Republic: And it is against Charity, nay even against justice. See D. Thom. art. 2. and Tanner disp. 2. quaest. 6. dub. 7. num. 94.

Many Seditions, gravely punished by God, are related by S. Doctor in the Bibliis pauperum, cap. 50. especially against Moses. Exodus 15. 16. Num. 11. 21.

He relates the sedition of the Ephraimites against Jephte Judg. 12. and of the Jews against Roboam 3. Kings 12.

It is certain, however, that on the part of those who defend justice and truth, it is not a sin, as D. Thom. teaches art. 2. Caietan in summa, V. seditio, Valencia disp. 3. quaest. 17. puncto 2. Whence these are not properly to be called seditious.

Sedition moreover is a special sin against Charity, to which it is repugnant in a special way, differing from Discord, Schism, War, and Riot, as D. Thom. shows art. 1.

Discord indeed is only in the souls; sedition, however, breaks forth also outside.

Schism is opposed to the unity of the Church; sedition, however, to the political unity of the Republic.

War is between entire Republics; sedition, however, between the members of the same Republic.

Riot is between two, or a few; but Sedition is among very many. Wherefore the Apostle 2. Corinth. 2. enumerates seditions as sins distinct from others.

Sedition is therefore against the peace of Charity, but materially; it is also against justice, insofar as it inflicts damage on the Republic and its citizens. See Valencia.

"When they say the King owes his crown to the choice of his people, they tell us that they mean to say no more than that some of the King's predecessors have been called to the throne by some sort of choice. Thus they hope to render their proposition safe by rendering it nugatory." (Burke, Reflections on French Revolution.)

1. The great question about civil power is, not whence it first came in remote antiquity, but whence it is now derived and flows continually as from its source, whether from the free consent of subjects so long as that lasts, or whether it obtains independently of their consent. Can subjects overthrow the ruler, or alter the polity itself, as often as they have a mind so to do? or has the ruler a right to his position even against the will of his people? A parallel question is, can a province annexed to an empire secede when it chooses, as South Carolina and other Confederates once attempted secession from the American Union?

2. These questions raise two totally different issues, which must be first carefully distinguished and then severally answered. The first point at issue is whether subjects may dethrone their ruler, a people alter their polity, or a province secede from an empire, at discretion. The second point is, whether the same may be done under pressure of dire injustice. One little matter of phraseology must be rectified before an answer is returned to this first point. The question whether subjects may dethrone their ruler at discretion, from the terms in which it is drawn, can lead to none but a negative answer. From the fact that they are subjects, and this man, or this body of men, their ruler, their allegiance cannot be wholly discretionary. That sovereign is a mere man of straw, there is no soul and substance of sovereign power in him, who may be knocked down and carted away for rubbish, any moment his so-called subjects please. Rousseau is quite clear on this point. The true debateable form of the question is, whether the people, being themselves sovereign, can remove at will the official persons who actually administer the State; whether they can change the polity, and whether the inhabitants of a province can secede. The answer now is simple: all depends upon the polity of the particular country where the case comes for discussion. And if so it be that the constitution makes no provision one way or another, any dispute that may occur must be settled by amicable arrangement among the parties concerned: if they cannot amicably agree, they must fight. To save this last eventuality, it were well that any claim which the people in any country may have to remove princes and statesmen from office, to alter the polity, or to divide the empire, should be made matter of the clearest understanding and most express and unambiguous stipulation. Even so, such a provision must be generally viewed with disfavour by the political philosopher, seeing how it tends to the weakening and undermining of government; whereas the same considerations that make out government to be at all a boon and a necessity to human nature, argue incapacity and instability in the governing power to be a deplorable evil. We must add, that where the people keep in their hands any power to alter the polity, or transfer the administration to other hands, there they hold part at least of the sovereignty; and the alteration or transference is effected by them, not as subjects, but as partial ruler.

3. The second point we raised was, whether a dethronement, or an alteration of polity, or a secession, may be brought about, not indeed at discretion for any cause, but under pressure of dire injustice. It comes to this: May the civil power be resisted when it does grievous wrong? Let us begin our reply with another question: May children strike their parents? No. Not even in self-defence? when the parent is going about to do the child some grievous bodily hurt? That is an unpleasant question, but the answer is plain. We can make no exceptions to the rule of self-defence. Self-defence in extreme cases may raise the arm of a child against its parent: in a similar extremity it may set a people in conflict with their civil ruler. Still we regard with horror the idea of striking a parent, and speak of it generally as a thing never to be done: so should we regard and speak of rebellion. We should not parade it before men's eyes as a deed to be contemplated, admired, and readily put in execution. "I confess to you, Sir," writes Burke, "I never liked this continual talk of resistance and revolution, or the practice of making the extreme medicine of the constitution its daily bread."

4. The conditions under which the civil authority may be withstood in self-defence, are fairly stated in the Dublin Review for April, 1865, p. 292. We must premise, that such a course of self-defence once publicly entered upon is like a rock rolled over the brow of a steep mountain: down it rolls and rebounds from point to point, gathering momentum in the descent, till in the end the ruler, once defied, has to be dethroned, the polity subverted, the empire rent, or they who made the resistance must perish.

"Resistance is lawful:—(1) When a government has become substantially and habitually tyrannical, and that is when it has lost sight of the common good, and pursues its own selfish objects to the manifest detriment of its subjects, especially where their religious interests are concerned. (2) When all legal and pacific means have been tried in vain to recall the ruler to a sense of his duty. (3) When there is a reasonable probability that resistance will be successful, and not entail greater evils than it seeks to remove. (4) When the judgment formed as to the badness of the government, and the prudence of resistance thereto, is not the opinion only of private persons or of a mere party: but is that of the larger and better portion of the people, so that it may morally be considered as the judgment of the community as a whole."

5. Side by side with this we will set the teaching of Leo XIII., Encyclical, Quod Apostolici.

"If ever it happens that civil power is wielded by rulers recklessly and beyond all bounds, the doctrine of the Catholic Church does not allow of insurgents rising up against them by independent action (proprio marte), lest the tranquillity of order be more and more disturbed, or society receive greater injury thereby: and when things are come to such a pass that there appears no other ray or hope of preservation, the same authority teaches that a remedy must be sought in the merits of Christian patience and in earnest prayers to God."

The words we have italicized seem to point to conditions (4) and (3) respectively, as laid down by the writer in the Dublin Review.

For an instance of a king dethroned, not proprio marte, but with every appearance at least of an act of the whole nation, see the dethronement of Edward II., as related by Walsingham, Historia Anglicana, I., pp. 186, 187, Rolls Series.

6. "We save ourselves the more virulent and destructive diseases of revolution, sedition, and civil war, by submitting to the milder type of a change of ministry." (Times, April 7, 1880.)

7. It is not monarchical governments alone that can ever be resisted lawfully: but what is sauce for the king's goose is sauce also for the people's gander. There is no special sanctity attaching to democracy.

It might seem that, since resistance requires to be justified by the approval of "the larger and better portion of the people" (n. 4, condition [4]) no just resistance can ever be offered to the will of the democratic majority. But the said majority may be in divers ways coerced and cajoled, a mere packed majority, while the malcontents may be, if not "the larger," clearly "the better" portion of the community. (s. iv., n. 5, p. 321.)

Readings.—St. Thos., De Regimine Principum, i., 6; 2a 2æ, q. 42, art. 2; 2a 2æ, q, 69, art. 4, in corp.; Locke, Of Civil Government, nn. 200, 201, 203, 204, 208, 209, 223, 224, 225, 227, 229, 230, 232.