Chapter — Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology
V. Obligations of Inferiors and Superiors
What is the distinction between slaves and servants? - Servants are distinguished from slaves. Slaves are those who, by the law of nations and civil law against natural liberty, are subject to another master, so that they can be possessed, alienated, and sold after the manner of patrimony. Schmalz., l. 4, t. 9, n. 1 seqq. "The appellation of slaves flowed from this, that our commanders are accustomed to sell captives, and by this to preserve them and not kill them." L. 239, de Verb. sign. But servants are not slaves, but free persons who freely enter contracts of service, by hiring their works for a certain or uncertain time in the service of a master and his family. Hence servants are of the family, and therefore are also called familiars or domestics. Servants are under the governance of the master, and masters have rights and obligations toward servants. Although by servants and those of the family is not properly understood one who furnishes the duties of service only for one or another hour of the day, nevertheless those are sufficiently understood as familiars who have a stable seat for the whole day in the house of the master and serve him, but sleep at night in their own house. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 102, a. 1.
Therefore servants are also distinguished from workers. For these hire their works to some master for a certain time and labor, but are not received into his house and family, nor are they properly subject to his governance. From the contract of works there arises an obligation of commutative justice, for the servant to furnish his works to the master, and for the master to pay the agreed wage. But from the fact that he is taken into part of the master's family, the master has the right and office also of ruling and governing the servant for the common good of the family; but the obligation of observance and obedience falls upon the servant in those things which pertain to domestic order. And thus S. Th. 2. 2, q. 65, a. 2, not from some pact or from commutative justice, but from the order of society, although imperfect, recognizes in the master, besides dominion of ownership over the works of the servant, dominion of jurisdiction or power extending itself over the person even to moderate correction of him.
What are the obligations of masters? - Masters are bound toward their servants: 1. To treat them kindly, that is, by addressing and commanding them decently and humanely, by furnishing good and sufficient food, by not burdening them with too many works, by not exposing them to harmful and dangerous works without due precautions, and by conveniently caring for the sick. And generally they are bound to fulfill the offices of charity toward their own servants more than toward others, because servants labor for them, and as it were live for them, and are of the family. This is clear from natural law, and from Sacred Scripture. Ecclus. 33:31: If you have a faithful servant, let him be to you as your soul; treat him as a brother. Eph. 6:9: And you, masters, do the same things to them (servants), forbearing threats; knowing that both their Lord and yours is in heaven, and there is no respect of persons with him. C. He. 331, 332.
To govern them conveniently, having due regard for the goods of religion and salvation, to instruct and correct them conveniently; for the master is head of the servant, just as of the whole family; but it belongs to the head to direct, where there is need. It seems also clear from the words of Paul, 1 Tim. 5:8: But if anyone does not have care for his own, and especially for those of his household, he has denied the faith, and is worse than an unbeliever. But the servant is reckoned among domestics. C. He. 332; Elbel n. 950.
To pay a just price; for the matter concerns an obligation of justice and natural equity; and defrauding such a wage is numbered among the sins crying to heaven. 1 Tim. 5:18; 1 Kings 30:13; L. 342; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 102, a. 1.
The print's appendix has more on this paragraph: On Moral Theology and on Liberty. (ed.)
You will resolve: Masters can sin, and indeed even gravely: If they do not concede time to servants for learning the rudiments of the Christian faith, or do not send them to catechism and sermon; if they do not take care that at the due time they assist at Mass, confess, and communicate. If they hire or retain in the house servants addicted to illicit sects, irreligious, impious, blaspheming, speaking base things; if they do not warn and correct those sinning gravely, or do not dismiss those unwilling to promise amendment, unless perhaps they especially need their works and cannot find others. If they do not watch, as far as lies in them, that servants abstain from sins; if they permit an occasion of sinning to them; if they lead or entice them into sin by bad example or solicitations.
If they do not pay the promised or just stipend, or delay it too much; if they do not care for sick servants, and immediately expel them, or dismiss them before the fixed time without just cause. Catholic Epistle of Blessed James 5:4; C. B. 618; C. He. 331, 332; L. 342. For understanding the gravity of sin as to the aforesaid omitted warning, correction, and vigilance, and the scandal that followed, it is often necessary to open the condition of the master. For as to extraneous persons grave fault is often absent. Almost the same are the obligations of other masters toward workers who labor in their factories.
What are the obligations of servants? - Servants are bound to furnish to masters: 1. Reverence; for thus the Apostle, 1 Tim. 6:1: Let servants judge their masters worthy of all honor. From this, those can sin even gravely who mock masters, spurn them, or manifest their hidden defects. 2. Obedience and compliance in all those things to which they have obligated themselves by force of contract and by force of positive laws, C. A. 1172; C. B. 616, 617, and in those things which regard good morals. For by force of service there arises a relation of superiority and subjection between master and servant. Therefore, if the right of governance belongs to the master, the obligation of obeying corresponds to the servant. Thus Eph. 6:5: Servants, obey your carnal masters with fear and trembling in the simplicity of your heart, as Christ. And 1 Pet. 2:18: Servants, be subject in all fear to masters, not only to the good and modest, but also to the difficult. Hence they sin more or less, by reason of matter, who, when something is prescribed to them, grumble, answer insolently, waste time uselessly, neglect to perform the prescribed labor, or labor for themselves with damage to the master; and in one word, all those who do not furnish the service which ordinarily is usually required and furnished by such persons. 3. Fidelity; according to the words of Paul to Titus 2:9: Servants are to be subject to their masters... not defrauding, but showing good faith in all things. Hence they sin, and often gravely against justice, who do not have care for things entrusted to them, who by their fault allow them to become worse, who steal expensive foodstuffs, or those not usually given to them, whether for eating, or for giving or selling to outsiders, who manifest secrets of the family, especially if harm follows from this. Leo XIII, Enc. Quod Apostolici, 28 Dec. 1878; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 103; L. 343.
For understanding the gravity of the sin, by reason of irreverence, disobedience against observance and dulia, and infidelity against justice, the condition of service must be manifested in confession. Otherwise the grave malice which is had is either not declared, or is not sufficiently expressed in its lowest species. Almost the same are the obligations of workers toward their own patrons.
The print's appendix has more on this paragraph: On Moral Theology and on Liberty. (ed.)
Note: "Wages are owed to servants sick for a brief time, for example, for a few days, because the time of the year for which they are hired is to be taken morally, or no attention is to be given to a defect for a brief time; for a small time with respect to the whole year is to be reputed as nothing. But otherwise, if the servant is sick for several months, because wages are by no means owed for an office not furnished. L. 346. Nor is the master bound to expenses to be made for care, or for remedies and the work of a physician. All agree on this if the expenses are notable; indeed St. Liguori, n. 864, after Lugo, admits this, at least as probable, if the expenses are light. But no wages are owed to workers, even those sick for a brief time, because they are hired by the day... therefore they must be paid only for individual days, indeed for half a day, if they fail for half a day." Gury, Cas. 972; C. B. 616, 617.
A master cannot dismiss a servant before the established time without grave cause. The reason is that a contract of hiring is truly onerous, obligating each party according to the measure of the matter. Therefore, just as a servant cannot desert the master without grave cause if the latter, by defect of the servant, would have to undergo grave harm, so likewise neither can a master without grave cause cast off a servant hired for a year. A master dismissing a servant before the time without sufficient cause is bound to repair the harm arising from this. But if a servant departs before the established time, per se he has a right to salary almost according to the proportion of time served, though somewhat less; but if the master suffers grave detriment from the departure of the servant, he can retain a proportionate part of the stipend. L. 342, 345; C. H. 1584; C. B. 620 seqq.
Servants can rightly receive salary from a master burdened by debts if they have furnished service in good faith. For it is the just wage of labor, and the master gives his own thing. "But whether they are bound to depart if they notice that the master is rendered unable to satisfy debts from such service? Navarrus, etc., affirm. Yet Molina denies, and not improbably, says Laymann. For they do not sin against justice if, asked by the master, they serve and receive wages; nor against charity, if others will not be lacking for serving." L. l. 3, n. 694, and this especially if the master needs the servant.
Are servants bound to restitution when they culpably do not impede harms which are inflicted upon the master? - Either servants are hired to guard and defend the family estate, and to watch and impede lest any harm be inflicted upon it, as administrators, guards, etc., who are usually called by this name rather than by the name of servants; or they are hired for mere labor and furnishing their work in necessary things of the family, who are commonly called servants properly. In the first case they are bound to restitution and compensation of harms. For they are bound to impede the harm of masters from office and contract, and therefore from strict commutative justice.
In the other case, some say that even servants are bound to compensation of harms, whether they are inflicted by outsiders or by other servants. Their reason is that by force of the service itself, the master commits his things into custody to each servant. Others more commonly and more probably say that they are bound if theft and harm is committed by outsiders; but that they are not bound if it is committed by other servants or domestics. The reason is that by the very fact that they are admitted into the family, they are indeed judged to undertake the obligation of defending it against outsiders, but by no means also against other familiars. Finally, others say that servants are not bound to restitution or compensation of harm. For although they are obligated from charity to impede that harm, nevertheless they are not obligated from justice. For they are indeed hired to furnish labor and their work in necessary things of the family, but by no means also to guard and defend the goods of the family. Special servants and ministers are placed over custody and vigilance above domestic things or the family, and specifically over care and custody of the pantry; and to these the keys for guarding things are handed over. Therefore then servants are bound to restitution or compensation of harm, when that care and custody of the family estate has been committed to them by special duty, either explicitly or implicitly, for example, when a key is given to them for taking something from some place, because for then the custody of that place is entrusted to them. Given this variety of opinions, the confessor ought prudently to abstain from urging the obligation of restitution. Lugo, d. 19, nn. 105, 106; L. l. 3, nn. 344, 573.
Can servants, judging that the salary is below the work furnished by them, use hidden compensation? - R. Affirmatively, if masters do not pay the stipend established by agreement, or diminish it. For then they openly injure commutative justice. Ithur., Cas. 1, n. 2.
R. Negatively, at least speaking generally, outside the aforesaid case. This is proved: 1. from prop. 37 condemned by Innocent XI. 2. For although they have agreed about a lower price, nevertheless the contract, as being just in conscience, must be stood by. At least speaking generally, because several except: 1. If the servant is compelled by force or fear to consent to an unequal price. 2. If, compelled by necessity, he consented to it, provided however that the master would not already have justly found other servants at the same low price, or did not receive this one asking from mercy. Indeed, if a servant serves with no wage established, from mere charity of the master, so that he may be fed by him, he can claim none, "just as happens with boys whom nobles or Bishops are asked to admit into their family; for then it suffices if the masters give them food, clothing, and habitation, since such is the custom." L. 348. 3. If he is unwillingly burdened with undue works. 4. If he increases the works from the will of the master, whether express or tacit; for the worker is worthy of his wage; but otherwise if he himself altogether spontaneously increases the works, because then he is judged to remit the works in order to conciliate to himself the favor of the master. L. 522, 523; E. M. 1473.
Note: What has been said of servants is to be said likewise of other workers, and of merchants. What the just compensation is can also be left to the judgment of the servant, if he is prudent and of a timid conscience. But in practice the matter often is not without danger of illusion. The practical danger must also be guarded against, lest, if he is discovered to have taken the master's money secretly, he be denounced as a thief and condemned to prison. L. 524.
What are the obligations of teachers and pupils? Between teachers and pupils there are, in a certain way, the same obligations as between parents and children. The reason is that parents, whose right and obligation properly concerns the education and instruction of children, substitute teachers for themselves, who therefore hold their place in this matter toward the children. Therefore masters and preceptors owe to pupils love, good example, right education, correction, and true doctrine. Hence they are bound to perfect themselves in the science which they teach, in order to instruct others duly; to promote the progress of pupils in letters, as much as lies in them; to turn them away as much as they can from others who are defiled by depraved morals, whom they ought in no way to admit into their schools. They can also sin gravely when they neglect the instruction of pupils, or punish them unjustly or indiscreetly; but especially if they seduce them, by driving them toward sins; if they do not teach good morals; if deliberately they teach false things as true, or things harmful to salvation; if they retain pupils imbued with bad morals, who are pernicious to others, etc.
They can sin gravely, however, both by reason of office and by reason of the stipend which they receive. If the teacher has assumed from quasi-contract a special care for the education of his pupils, by contrary sins, for example of scandal, not only charity but also justice is violated. Hence the condition of teacher is to be explained in those sins. Pupils are bound to show teachers love, reverence, and obedience, because of their superiority and care, while they are instructed by them in good morals and arts. The reason is clear: for this is what the reciprocal obligation of pupils to teachers imports; teachers would plainly be obligated in vain to instruct them, or to imbue them with good morals, unless pupils likewise were obligated to follow the admonitions and precepts of the teachers. Pupils sin, however, gravely or lightly according to the gravity or lightness of the matter itself, and its various circumstances, if they do not obey teachers in things pertaining to studies and good morals; if they do not show honor and reverence to teachers; namely if, far from studying diligently, they waste time in idleness, play, or other follies against the will of their teachers; if they detract from teachers, or ridicule them, jeer at them, afflict them with curses, calumnies, annoyances, etc. C. 1. ult. de Magistr. etc.; Clem. 2. e. t.; L. 361; S. Th. Quodl. 3, a. 9; E. M. The condition of pupil is to be explained in grave sins against due reverence and obedience. Otherwise the grave malice against observance is not declared.
700bis. Schools: By her native right the Church has true authority over schools, whether private or public, in order to her own end. And the Church has in fact always applied care lest schools, even lower schools, be lacking, and for the sake of the poor, as may be seen in the Decrees, title de Magistris, and lest anything be demanded for the license to teach. Parents sending their children to heretical, schismatic, neutral schools generally sin gravely. They can be excused from the gravest necessity, scandal being removed, and the proximate danger of all perversion against faith and morals being removed, and suitable means being used for the right, Christian, and Catholic education of the children. E. M.
Studies: The teaching of Sacred Scripture is to be imparted in each Seminary, according to the prescription made on this matter by Pius X, Litt. Quoniam in re biblica, 27 Mar. 1906.
In the plan of studies, moreover, those things are to be observed which are contained in the Encyclical Letter of Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, section I, "Primo igitur," and following, and are repeated in the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum.
Therefore scholastic Philosophy is to be handed on, especially that which was handed on by Saint Thomas, concerning which whatever was sanctioned by Leo XIII remains in force. Scholastic Theology also is to be handed on. But account is also to be taken of positive theology, and indeed more than before, yet with due moderation. The science of philosophical matters cannot decline from divine and ecclesiastical authority. Profane disciplines also are to be cultivated, especially those of natural things, yet with no harm to sacred studies. As to the directors and teachers to be chosen for Seminaries or Catholic Universities and religious houses of studies, whoever, in any way, shall have been imbued with modernism are to be barred both from the office of governing and from the office of teaching. All books, periodicals, and any reviews which have the savor of modernism are to be permitted neither to adolescents in Seminaries nor to hearers in Universities. Besides this it is prescribed that individual teachers, before beginning lectures at the start of the year, show to their Ordinary the text which each has proposed to himself in teaching, or the questions or theses to be treated; then that during the year itself the method of each one's teaching be examined; and if it should appear to depart from sound doctrine, this will be the reason why the teacher is immediately to be removed. Finally, besides the profession of faith, they are to give an oath to their Ordinary, according to the established formula, and with their name subscribed.
The same thing must be furnished each year to their moderators by teachers or lecturers in religious orders before they begin lectures; namely they are bound also to show to them the text of lectures, and the questions or theses to be treated, and at the beginning of the year to give the oath. For the effect of sacred ordination, years of studies cannot be said to be completed by the feast of Pentecost or of the Most Holy Trinity; rather it is required that the scholastic course of nine months be completed, with the final examination successfully passed. E. M. Ordering of studies: In the Seminaries of Italy the ordering of discipline, and of schools and studies, is to be observed which is contained in the Circular Letter of the S. C. Consist., 16 Jul. 1912, A. A. S. vol. 4, p. 491 seqq. The S. C. Consist., Circular Letters 16 Jul. 1912 and 17 Oct. 1913 to the Ordinaries of Italy, recommends that in the Seminaries of Italy scholastic texts more apt and of safer doctrine be used, with others excluded, which can be dangerous for the formation of clerics. Hence in particular in the aforesaid letters are excluded: Il primo passo alla filosofia of Aloysius Ambrosi, the manual works of ecclesiastical history by F. S. Funk and F. S. Kraus, the manual work of Patrology by Rauschen, works of consultation and erudition, Delehaye's Leggende agiografiche, and similar things. E. M.
Academic Degrees: Regulars can have the habitual faculty from the S. C. to obtain academic degrees from the Biblical Commission. Degrees regularly are necessary for various dignities and ecclesiastical offices, for the Episcopate, for the Archdiaconate, for the penitentiary, theological, and scholastic Canonry, for the office of capitular vicar, Advocate before the Roman Congregations. Assistants in Rome must be distinguished by the laurea of doctor in sacred theology and in canon law. C. Sapienti Consilio, Ord. serv. in R. C., Normae pecul. c. 6, n. 5. E. M. Doctorate: Let no one hereafter be given the laurea of Theology and Canon Law who has not previously completed the established curriculum in scholastic philosophy. But if he should be given it, let him be given it in vain. The precept that no one is to be given the laurea of Theology unless he first has obtained the laurea in philosophical disciplines, or at least has furnished certain testimony concerning the completed curriculum in Scholastic Philosophy, is strictly to be observed. If anyone is enrolled in the same year in the Faculty of Theology and of Canon Law at the same time, even if in different Institutes, let him be deprived of every right to receive degrees. But if he is given some degree, let him be given it in vain. No one can be admitted to the school of the canonical text unless he proves by written document that he has studied for a year in some Institute in the Institutions of Canon Law. Those to be promoted to the doctorate are bound to make the profession of faith, according to the formula prescribed by Pius IV, with the addition prescribed by Pius IX. Academic degrees obtained in Rome or elsewhere at Catholic Universities or Pontifical Institutes are to be judged altogether valid in other places, without new confirmation, or new taxes to be exacted. The laurea of Doctor in Theology or in Canon Law, which is granted through the S. Congregation of Studies, without any examination made, but because of excellent merits, has all the rights and privileges of any other doctoral laurea. The manner of testing the doctrine of candidates for academic degrees in Sacred Scripture is found in Acta Apostolicae Sedis, vol. 3, p. 47 seqq., p. 296 seqq. Teachers, at the beginning of the year in Seminaries, and teachers or lecturers in religious orders, after the profession of faith has been made, are likewise bound to emit the oath, according to the formula prescribed by Pius X, M. P. Sacrorum antistitum. Before anyone is admitted by the superiors of some school, lyceum, or university to academic degrees, it must be evident by document that he was not enrolled in another institute. E. M.
The print's appendix has more on this paragraph: On the Study of the Doctrine of St. Thomas. (ed.)
What are the obligations of inferiors as regards ecclesiastical Superiors? Subjects are bound to show to their spiritual Superiors love, honor, and obedience in those things which pertain to their jurisdiction and care; likewise necessary support. Proof: 1. This is clear from many places of Sacred Scripture, 1 Tim. 5:17, 18; Heb. 13:17, etc. 2. As to love, reverence, and obedience, because they are superiors, having true jurisdiction; as to support, because the laborer is worthy of his wage. As to those who serve the common utility, that is, Princes, soldiers, and others of this sort, the stipends of livelihood are owed by the people; so also to those who minister to worship for the salvation of the whole people, the people owe stipends of sustenance. Trid. s. 25, C. 17 de R.; Leo XIII, Enc. Sapientiae christianae, 10 Jan. 1880; S. Th. Quodl. 6, a. 10; Quodl. 10, a. 12; E. M.
The print's appendix has more on this paragraph: On Moral Theology and on Liberty. (ed.)
You will resolve: Therefore all Christians are bound under grave fault to obey the Supreme Pontiff in matters pertaining to faith, to morals, and to Christian discipline; for in these he is the Vicar of Christ on earth. In the same way, diocesan subjects are bound to obey Bishops, according to the nature of the matter, in those things which pertain to their jurisdiction. They must also depend on the Supreme Pontiff and on the Bishops as regards Catholic social action. For the Supreme Pontiff and the Bishops have the right of directing it. Pius X, 1 Mar. 1905, Ep. to Card. Svampa.
What are the obligations of ecclesiastical superiors? Spiritual Superiors in turn are bound to show to subjects love, care, doctrine, and good example. Proof: 1. This is clear from many places of Sacred Scripture. Cf. Epp. to Timoth. and to Tit., and from Trid. s. 23, C. 1 de R. 2. This is evinced from their very office. Hence neglect of souls as to care and administration of the sacraments, as to doctrine and correction in ecclesiastical superiors, is not only against charity, but also against justice, and for the most part a mortal sin, according to that saying of Ezech. 34:2, 4: Woe to the shepherds of Israel ... that which was weak you have not strengthened, and that which was sick you have not healed, etc. L. 357 seqq.
The print's appendix has more on this paragraph: On Moral Theology and on Liberty. (ed.)
What are the obligations of subjects toward civil authority?
Subjects are also bound to show love, reverence, and obedience to secular superiors. For in the civil order they are true superiors, bearing toward us in the temporal order the place of God Himself. This is confirmed from Sacred Scripture, Rom. 13:1 seqq.; 1 Pet. 2:13, 17. For this reason the Catechism of the Council of Trent compares and joins an obligation of this sort with that by which we are bound toward paternal and ecclesiastical authority. For, p. 3, on the 4th Commandment, section 15, after it has taught that parents and ecclesiastical superiors are to be honored with due honor, it adds: "The same must be said of Kings, Princes, Magistrates, and the rest, to whose power we are subject. For if we pay them any honor, it is referred to God; for an eminent degree of dignity has the veneration of men, because it is a likeness of divine power; in this also we venerate the providence of God, who has attributed the administration of public office to them, and uses them as ministers of His power." Hence it is clear that reverence is to be shown not only to Princes, but also to their officials according to their office and dignity.
Leo XIII, Enc. Letter Quella lunga, 29 Jun. 1881; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 104, a. 5, 6; Quodl. 8, a. 7; Quodl. 10, a. 12; E. M. Therefore it is not fitting to speak rashly about those who perform public office, nor maliciously to carp at their deeds; although it is permitted to scrutinize them and to speak and write publicly about them, insofar as the laws permit this, so that right judgment may be made concerning them and public utility may be provided for. Therefore they sin against charity and justice who announce in newspapers the hidden offenses of certain persons, which do not harm others, or publish them in conversations and speeches, so that they may repel them from some office. Those wound the observance due to them who inflict insults upon them, whether by words or writings, and who deny them the signs of honor due to them. Kenrick tr. 8, nn. 164, 165.
The print's appendix has more on this paragraph: On Moral Theology and on Liberty. (ed.)
What are the obligations of civil superiors? These are bound to show to subjects love, good example as to morals and religion, the administration of justice, and to provide for public happiness by just and suitable means. This is most plainly clear from the very nature of their office. For the end of civil government is the safety of the commonwealth. The Fathers of the Seventh Council of Toledo, chap. 10, explaining the office of kings, present them as "not looking to the rights of their own advantage, but consulting the fatherland." Hence secular superiors sin gravely by negligence, connivance, and omissions, for example if they do not protect subjects from enemies and unjust vexations, and most of all by positive injuries, oppressions, and excessive exactions, or by persecution of the Christian religion; which injustices God certainly will not leave unavenged. For, as is said in Wis. 6:6, 7, a most severe judgment shall be made upon those who preside: for mercy is granted to the little, but the powerful shall powerfully suffer torments. Struggl 28. They likewise sin if, as far as they can, they do not turn away from society crimes which tend to the common harm, if likewise they do not remove from it the sects of Freemasons, socialists, anarchists, etc., if they put over the commonwealth men ignorant and inexperienced. This grave precept of choosing good men, in due proportion, in a Constitutional and Republican Government, also urges all electors of Deputies, from legal justice, and, other circumstances being excluded, not only do those sin who give a vote to bad men, but also those who by not taking part are the cause that bad men are elected by others; for each one, when he can and no legitimate excuse is present, is bound to turn evil away from the commonwealth. Therefore the obligation per se is both to take part in the election and to choose a suitable deputy. No one is ignorant how many evils come from impious deputies both to religion and to civil society, since the sum of all matters has been entrusted to them, and they not only give counsel, but with others make the laws themselves. Make an exception unless somewhere and at some time, because of special reasons, it is better to act otherwise, and a special prescription is had for acting otherwise. Cf. here, on Particular Obligations of Clerics, n. 195.
Leo XIII, Enc. Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1885; Trid. s. 25, C. 20 de R.; Suarez, de Leg. l. 1, c. 7, n. 5; E. M. Deputies, however, legitimately elected, and truly suitable, by reason of the common good, from legal justice, are bound to accept the office conferred upon them, unless they are excused by a grave and just cause. Likewise Deputies and Senators, since some part of public government has in fact been committed to them, not only must not consent by passing wicked laws to the harm of religion and to the harm of the public good, but they are also bound to impede them by their presence and by their vote. Therefore it is not lawful for them to vote for wicked laws of this sort, nor is it lawful for them to be absent. And if by culpable absence they themselves are the cause why wicked laws are made to public harm, they are guilty both of violated legal justice, by which they are bound, by special reason of their office, to promote the public good, and of violated commutative justice, from a quasi-pact with their electors. As regards the election of Deputies, those things serve the matter which S. Thomas has from S. Augustine, 1. 2, q. 97, a. 1: "If the people is well moderated and serious, and a most diligent guardian of the common utility, a law is rightly made by which it is lawful for such a people to create for itself magistrates through whom the commonwealth is administered. But if little by little the same people, depraved, has a vote for sale, and commits government to disgraceful and wicked men, rightly is taken away from the people such a power of giving honors." Cf. also 1. 2, q. 105, a. 1. "For the work of Catholic men ... to embrace the very highest affairs of the commonwealth is generally useful and honorable... Generally, to be unwilling to touch any part of public affairs would be as much a fault as to contribute no zeal, no work, to the common utility; and all the more because Catholic men are impelled, by the admonition of the doctrine which they profess, to manage the matter honestly and from faith. On the contrary, if they are idle, those will easily receive the reins whose opinions offer, indeed, no great hope of salvation. And this would also be joined with the ruin of the Christian name, for those who would be ill-disposed toward the Church can do very much, and those who are well-disposed, very little. For this reason it is clear that there is a just cause for Catholics to approach public affairs; for they do not approach, nor ought they approach, for this reason, that they approve what at this time in the ordering of public affairs is not honorable, but so that they may turn these very arrangements, as far as can be done, to the public good, having a sincere and true intention to introduce the wisdom and virtue of the Catholic religion, like most wholesome juice and blood, into all the veins of the commonwealth." Leo XIII, Enc. Letter Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1885.
705bis. Note: Ordinary power is that which belongs to someone by force of his dignity or office. Delegated power is that which belongs to someone from the concession of him who has ordinary power. Power of Jurisdiction properly is the power of declaring the law from a public office, and such is the power of ruling subjects and declaring the law in a Society, whether civil or ecclesiastical. One furnished with this power can make laws.
Economic power properly is that which looks to the external order to be preserved in some Community, according to the nature and end of that Community. Such is, for example, the power of a Superiorissa of the Novitiate over Novices. One furnished with this power can make statutes. Power of jurisdiction can be exercised in the internal forum for private utility, and in the external forum for public utility. It is contentious if it is exercised in judgment as regards litigants; voluntary if it is exercised outside judgment concerning affairs in themselves not contentious. Lastly, dominative power properly is that which is exercised over a person as though over something of one's own, as may be seen in a master in relation to a slave, in a father in relation to a son, in a husband in relation to a wife, in a regular Prelate in relation to his subject. Cf. 600; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 57, a. 4; q. 88, aa. 8, 9; q. 189, a. 5.
The print's appendix has more on this paragraph: On Moral Theology and on Liberty. (ed.)
Is it ever lawful not to obey temporal authority? Is it ever lawful to rebel? Is it ever lawful to kill a Prince? R. To the 1st: As was already said above, n. 171, 4. Laws unjust through contrariety to human good do not oblige in the forum of conscience. Laws unjust through contrariety to divine good are in no way lawful to observe. S. Th. 1. 2, q. 96, a. 4. But in those things which are lawful, and which pertain to civil power, obedience must be given to civil Princes, even to the difficult, and also to those who abuse their authority. From these most pure sources, namely Scripture and Tradition, says Gregory XVI in Br. 9 Jun. 1832, we are most plainly taught that the obedience which men are bound to furnish to powers constituted by God is an absolute precept, which no one can oppose. Pius VI, Br. Pastoralis, 5 Jul. 1796; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 69, a. 4; q. 102, a. 1; q. 104, aa. 5, 6.
R. To the 2nd: It is never altogether lawful to rebel. "In this matter," says St. Liguori, "the principle of John Gerson was exceedingly pernicious, who dared to assert that a monarch can lawfully be judged by the whole nation if he rules the kingdom unjustly... a principle, I say, not only false, but most pernicious." The reason is that subjects, by the very fact that they are subjects, cannot arrogate to themselves power above the Prince, by judging and punishing him. L. H. A. Tr. 8, n. 13; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 42, a. 2; q. 60, a. 6; q. 64, a. 3; q. 69, a. 4. But it is one thing to make rebellion, or to bring violence against a legitimate prince in order to depose him; another thing to resist unjust laws and their execution. Rebellion is a kind of aggression, not defense. But if a force plainly unjust is brought, resistance is then made not to authority, but to unjust force. "And therefore, just as it is lawful to resist robbers, so it is lawful in such a case to resist bad Princes, unless perhaps because of scandal, when from this some grave disturbance would be feared," S. Th. 2. 2, q. 69, a. 4; q. 42, a. 2, or there were no hope of a good outcome, and greater public evils were to be feared. Cf. also the Letters of Leo XIII, Sapientiae christianae, 10 Jan. 1890, who, speaking of laws openly disagreeing with divine right, injurious to the Church and contrary to Religion, then says, "to resist is a duty, to obey a crime." Therefore it is lawful to oppose passive resistance to unjust laws. For one must obey God rather than men, Acts 5:29. "For this reason to cast off obedience, and by the force of the multitude to call the matter to sedition, is the crime of treason, not only against human majesty, but also against divine." Leo XIII, Enc. Letter Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1895, section Non est magni toward the end. For "whoever have the right of commanding do not receive it from elsewhere, but from that supreme Prince of all, God. There is no power except from God, Rom. 13:1... Nature itself testifies that whatever power there is anywhere proceeds from God." When this is known and persuaded, "those things are understood altogether to pertain to justice: to revere the majesty of Princes, to be subject constantly and faithfully to public power, to do nothing seditiously, to preserve the holy discipline of the city."
Leo XIII, l. c., sections Talis, Eiusmodi; Pius X, Ep. Notre charge, 25 Aug. 1910.
R. To the 3rd: It is never lawful for anyone to kill a Prince, neither for a private man nor for the multitude; for the reason is the same for him and for this. The contrary opinion of the ancients is called by St. Alphonsus, l. c., improbable, false, most false. "I ask," says the Holy Doctor, "is he a man like others? And if he is a man, he cannot be deprived of life or goods by those who do not have the right to expel him from life or goods. The doctrine of the holy Fathers is common, that it is never lawful for any private person to kill a man, however private, and however iniquitous he may be, unless he has public authority, or unless this is necessary for protecting his own life." And the very same holds whether the Prince is good or bad; whether legitimate, or an usurper of the kingdom. Prop. condemned by the Council of Constance, Sess. 15, d. 6 Jul. 1414; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 12, a. 2; q. 42, a. 2; q. 64, a. 3; q. 101, aa. 1, 3; q. 102, aa. 1, 2; q. 104, aa. 1, 2, 5; Aertnys 178; E. M.
Are the more worthy to be chosen for civil offices? - R. Affirmatively, if there is a competition; for then there is an implicit contract about choosing the more worthy. But negatively, if there is no competition. For there is no proof of such an obligation. In order that the public good be sufficiently provided for, it suffices that the unworthy be excluded and removed, and that worthy men be chosen. And not only the supreme Prince himself is held by this obligation, but also all those who, by power received from him, can choose. For they do not receive power except for choosing in the mode in which the Prince ought to choose. Therefore also in the election of deputies, no one indeed is bound to choose the more worthy, but he is bound to choose a worthy man, with the unworthy man excluded, from whom grave harm is foreseen. Sometimes, however, it is lawful even to choose an unworthy man in order to exclude another worse man, or if that unworthy man will be more helpful than harmful, or unless otherwise someone would be exposed to undergoing a most grave evil; for his cooperation in evil is only material. Lugo de Iust. et Iur. d. 33; L. 342; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 63.
707bis. Offices: Civil offices strictly are those which look to the necessities and utilities of citizens. Political offices are those which look to protecting the government itself of the whole nation.