Sins Against Charity of God

62. What sins there are against charity of God. a. All mortal sins indeed in some way are against charity of God, because any grave sin destroys the habit of charity and is a virtual aversion from God, since it is conversion to a created thing; but some are sins which, as formal aversion from God, are directly opposed to charity of God.

b. Sins directly opposed to charity of God are committed either by omission, when the act of charity to be elicited from the special precept of charity is omitted, or by commission, if an act prohibited by the precept of charity is placed. Acts of this kind are hatred of God and sloth, concerning which there has already been discussion.¹

There is no reason for confessors to be solicitous concerning the sin of omission: for those who live as Christians do not commit it, while those who for a long time entirely neglect Christian duties, because of inadvertence, sin only materially.

¹ Cf. On Principles, n. 310.

63. On hatred of God. 1. Hatred is an act of the will by which it turns away from some object as evil. A twofold hatred is distinguished: hatred of abomination and hatred of enmity; the former is opposed to love of concupiscence, the latter to love of benevolence and friendship.

a. Hatred of abomination is that by which we turn away from something as evil to us or to ours. A twofold hatred of abomination is distinguished: hatred of abomination of a person, by which we turn away from the person himself as evil to us; and hatred of abomination of a quality, by which we turn away from a quality of the person as evil to us.

b. Hatred of enmity or malevolence is that by which we turn away from something, a person, because it is evil in itself, or by which we will evil to some person, that it may be ill with him. Thus the worst men wish and procure destruction for their enemies, even if they themselves receive no advantage from it.

2. Hatred of God is an act by which someone turns away from God apprehended as evil. Hatred of abomination of God is an act by which someone turns away from God apprehended as evil to himself or to another loved person. Hatred of enmity of God is an act by which someone wills evil to God, that it may be ill with Him, or because it is evil to Him.

Therefore he sins by hatred of enmity of God: a. who wills that God not exist or that God not be omnipotent, omniscient, just, etc.; b. who is saddened by His perfections or rejoices concerning His offense, violates the precepts of God or persecutes the works of God because this displeases God. In this way the devil wishes and, as far as he can, procures evil for God because it is evil to God, even if he knows that he perceives no advantage from it.

64. Its malice. a. Hatred of God is the gravest of all sins, because it is directly opposed to the most excellent of all virtues and therefore to the infinite goodness itself of God; and indeed hatred of enmity is graver than hatred of abomination, because the former is opposed to the internal goodness of God, which is falsely apprehended as evil, while the latter is opposed to the external goodness of God, that is, to some effect proceeding from God, which is apprehended by man as evil and contrary to himself.

In order that this sin of hatred be committed, it is required that the abomination and indignation tend into God Himself: for if the affection of aversion and indignation is not referred to God, but to adverse things without respect to God, it will not be a sin of hatred, but of impatience or of hatred toward the neighbor.

b. Hatred of God does not admit smallness of matter, but every act of hatred and every depraved affection toward God, provided it is deliberate, is mortal sin, because it is directly opposed to the highest goodness of God. But when hatred of God is joined with blasphemy, imprecation, or an act of persecution against the Church, manifestly a twofold sin is committed.

1º A special precept of loving God above all things is given, both by internal affection through true love of the heart, and also by an external work. - This is clear from the words of Christ, Matt. 22.37: You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart... this is the greatest and first commandment.

2º This precept, as affirmative, obliges to loving God above all things appreciatively, as is plain from the natural law, but not necessarily intensively, because the essence of Charity does not consist in degrees ¹. - Thus commonly.

¹ Namely, the degree of intensity, or of fervor in loving, does not fall under the precept of charity; for it suffices that God in reality be preferred to all goods, as the common opinion of the Doctors holds. Nor should what some old authors seem to hold otherwise move anyone and drive him aside; for under the name of greater intensity, or more fervent love, or greater extension, Scotus, for example, and St. Thomas, in reality understand appreciation (see Koninck, De Virtut. Theol. disp. 25. n. 2.).

And indeed by this common doctrine is exploded both the opinion of those who were requiring a supremely intense act of love (who indeed fall into absurdity, because no act can be thought so intense that a more intense one could not be elicited with the help of God), and that of those who contend that God must be loved with a more intense affection than anything else; whence it would follow that the affection which yesterday sufficed for fulfilling the precept today no longer suffices, if perchance I am affected by a more intense zeal for some other thing, even an honorable one; and likewise that contrition which today suffices for the remission of sins tomorrow will not be sufficient, if perchance I grieve more intensely over the worst thing, for example, the death of a brother (compare Koninck l. c. n. 4. 5., and Suarez, de Charit. Disp. 6. Sect. 2. n. 2-5.).

218. Questions. - Q. 1º Are we bound always to act from the motive of Charity?

Resp. Neg., according to the things said concerning Human Acts, n. 31. Since even the acts of other virtues are good and meritorious ². This is also clear from the 8th proposition condemned by Alexander VIII.

² They are meritorious for him who is in the state of grace; otherwise they will be either salutary, if they are placed from grace, or at least naturally honorable.

Q. 2º When does the precept of Charity bind?

Resp. It obliges both per se and per accidens, just as the precept of Faith. Recall the things said above concerning the precept of Faith, n. 188. This is also clear from propositions 5 and 6 condemned by Innocent XI, of which the prior lies thus: Whether he sins mortally who would elicit an act of love of God only once in life, we do not dare to condemn. But the latter: It is probable that not even in each five-year period, rigorously speaking, does the precept of Charity toward God bind per se. The opinion of those who require an act of Charity once a month pleases St. Liguori. - Hom. apost. n. 12. But this opinion has no solid foundation ³.

³ For this opinion Cardenas and Croix alone are alleged (see St. Alph. Lib. 2. n. 8.). But Croix (Lib. 2. n. 141.) merely has these things: Since in so great a variety of opinions we do not know when and how often God must be loved, let us seize the safer things. These certainly cannot be so understood, as if Croix, from a defect of reasons for asserting any obligation, should most absurdly and contrary to first principles infer the necessity of imposing stricter obligations without any reason.

But Cardenas (Cris. 2. Disp. 6. n. 18.) discourses thus: It is very hidden and uncertain to determine the time in which this precept presses; for we only say that the precept is violated when the love of God is deferred for a long time, in the judgment of a prudent man; and an entire month seems to me a long time on account of the supreme dignity of this precept. These things plainly have no strength. For I omit that no one before fixed this term: but the reason, as is plain, which he seeks from the supreme excellence of the precept, is wholly feeble. Assuredly, if the more excellent a precept is, the greater should be the frequency of the prescribed acts, since the precept of receiving the Eucharist is more excellent than that of abstaining from meats, it would have to be concluded that we are bound to receive the Eucharist more than twice each week!

** Against this brief note, VV. (Pag. 145-149.) heap up many things through ten columns. But to what end? Namely, that they may prove that he sins mortally who omits an act of charity for a month. But has it really escaped the memory of the Most Illustrious Men that St. Alphonsus reports (Lib. 5. n. 52.) from St. Antoninus, that one must not define concerning mortal sin unless there is express authority of Sacred Scripture, or of a Canon, or of a determination of the Church, or an evident reason? And that which the same St. Alph. (Lib. 1. n. 89. al. 73.) teaches, both with Gerson: Doctors of theology ought not to be easy in asserting that some sins are mortal, where they are not most certain about the matter; and with St. Raymond: Do not be prone to judge mortal sins, where it is not clear to you through certain Scripture; and with Gabriel Biel: Nothing ought to be condemned as mortal sin concerning which there is not evident reason, or manifest authority of Scripture? Where, moreover, do we have evident reasons here, or so great a strength of authority?

1º Suarez, say VV., and Reginald prove from the dignity of so great a precept that an act of charity must be elicited more often.

Resp. Suarez (De Charit. disp. 5. Sect. 3. n. 1.) from this only deduces that it is repugnant to the dignity of so great a precept to cast back the obligation (only) to that time (of death), and (ibid. n. 4.) that he sins against this precept who for many years does not exercise this love. - But Reginald (Tr. 17. n. 98.) says that no one is obligated to an act of love, except when the exercise of it is necessary for defending the honor of God, ... or for retaining divine friendship. Where, then, is the obligation pressing in each month?

2º VV. urge that certain old authors taught that this precept obliges on each feast day; and Amort also acceded to them, asserting this obligation at least under light obligation.

Resp. Does not St. Alphonsus, with the most common body of Theologians, reject this opinion?

3º VV. note that St. Alphonsus brought forward the argument, that otherwise someone will be able with difficulty to observe the divine law (Hom. Ap. n. 12.).

Resp. When it is the only means of avoiding some grave sin, C., as Reginald also taught above. Otherwise, N. For St. Alphonsus's opinion means nothing else.

Moreover, the matter has itself thus, that Cardenas and Croix alone hold that opinion, and they confirm it by no other reasons except those alleged. Whether either that authority or those reasons suffice for asserting a grave sin of omission is to be defined from the rules of the Doctors brought forward above by St. Alphonsus: for it ought deservedly to seem grave to detain the discerning reader longer with these things.

Q. 3º Is the precept of Charity satisfied through attrition in the reception of the sacrament of Penance?

Resp. Neg., because attrition does not occur principally from love of God, but of oneself, and therefore in it the principal motive of Charity is lacking.

219. Resolves. - 1º The faithful who live piously easily satisfy the precept of Charity, because they more often elicit acts of Charity rejoicing over the divine perfections, wishing that no one offend God, that all love and worship him, and observe his commandments, praying devoutly that his name be sanctified, that his will be done, avoiding sin because it displeases him, etc.

2º Therefore the faithful ought not to be anxious about this obligation, if they apply themselves to the Christian life and retain the will of avoiding grave sins. Nevertheless they are to be persuaded that they often elicit explicit acts of Charity in life, for a greater union with God, and so that the soul may be readier to elicit similar acts easily at death ⁴.

⁴ The dying are most opportunely stirred up to eliciting and repeating acts of charity; indeed there are not lacking those who think that a grave obligation of eliciting this act then presses. But it seems one must distinguish. For if the discussion is about those for whom no other means of justification is at hand, this is most truly affirmed; but otherwise, if necessity of this kind is absent; for no solid reason appears, either intrinsic or extrinsic, why some have called the opinion concerning this obligation common or most probable (see St. Alph. Lib. 2. n. 23.).

** Here also VV. (Pag. 149-151.) contend that neither an extrinsic nor an intrinsic reason for this obligation is lacking. But it was necessary to remember what VV. often seem to forget, that probabilities do not suffice for asserting an obligation.

Therefore, as regards the extrinsic reason, first of all the Authors were not to be neglected, and indeed most grave ones, who deny this obligation either expressly or equivalently, while, in recounting either the time of the obligation or the opinions concerning it, they pass over the time of death. Of this sort are Lugo, Navarrus (the citations, which are easily found, are omitted for the sake of brevity), Sanchez, Azor, Escobar, Croix, Becanus, Fagundez, Tamburini, and with these Potestas and Voit. - Among those denying this obligation are also to be numbered those who admit it then only when charity or perfect contrition is the only present means of justification. Thus Laymann, Toletus, Henriquez, Candidus, Lessius, Turrianus, Gordonus, Fabri, Ferraris, and Elbel. - To these must be added those who say that the affirmative opinion is probable or even seems to them more probable. The reason is that he who calls an obligation probable equivalently denies that it can be imposed. But to the three Authors whom VV. report can be joined Palaus, Gobat, Catalani, Mazzotta.

Next let us inspect the foundations of that obligation. 1º Suarez, and with him Koninck, Widgant, Cardenas, and Catalani, require charity on account of doubt about the value of the Sacrament with attrition alone, or about attrition itself, whether it has been duly elicited. - Resp. This reason proves too much. For if any such doubt had force, on account of it no less would the danger of frustrating the Sacraments by sacrilegious injury have to be guarded against. Therefore an obligation of charity or of perfect contrition would have to be enjoined under grave sin upon one approaching Confession, of premising an act; a doctrine which no one will easily admit. Moreover, since you can doubt equally, indeed more, about the certainty of contrition or charity than about certain attrition, because the former is judged more difficult, you would have to repeat it not once only, but again and again, and yet the doubt and at the same time the obligation of repeating would not cease. Finally, you would be bound to contrition not from the precept of charity, but from the precept of penance.

2º Others, for example, Bonacina, Valentia, Reginald, Giribaldi, etc., require an act of charity by which a man may fortify himself against temptations. - Resp. The same thing can be said about the use of holy water, about the sign of the Cross, about the invocation of the Blessed Virgin, and about any other means suitable for this. Do we therefore bind under grave obligation to employ all these things? This alone, therefore, can be laid down: an act of charity, and any other means, must be employed under grave obligation when it is the only means of avoiding grave fault. But then the omission does not violate the precept of charity, but brings in one and the same guilt as the sin into which someone falls on account of that omission.

3º Others, such as Cardenas, Holzmann, Reuter, Babenstuber, Antoine (whom Charmes and Collet transcribe), Viva, etc., argue thence, that since a man is then in such a state that he ought to be joined to his ultimate end, then especially it is fitting, suitable, useful, more convenient, more opportune that he dispose himself to this by the exercise of the principal virtues and of charity. And to this certain authors with Marchant and Sporer refer that saying of the Gospel: Let your loins be girt, and burning lamps in your hands. - Resp. Many other things are fitting, suitable, convenient, useful, opportune; but not the reason of fittingness, nor of convenience, nor of utility, nor of opportunity, but the reason of necessity from which one cannot withdraw himself, can induce a grave obligation. But whoever, adorned with sanctifying grace, is a friend of God, indeed also a son, has his loins sufficiently girt and bears a lamp lit.

4º Finally some with Cardenas argue thus: the doctrine that it suffices to have elicited an act of charity once in life has been condemned: therefore it must be elicited at death. - Resp. Both that sophism and the preceding weakest arguments are those on account of which Sanchez wrote concerning this opinion of obligation (Dec. Lib. 2. C. 35. n. 9.): Azor rejects this by the best right. And Tamburini (Dec. Lib. 2. C. 3. n. 4.): To posit this obligation, which certainly does not rest on a solid foundation, is nothing else than to inject scruples. And concerning the same matter Lugo says (de Poenit. Disp. 7. n. 276.): Therefore the Confessor ought not to cast snares upon the penitent in an uncertain matter.

3º He satisfies the precept of Charity who, stained with grave sin and destitute of the supply of a Confessor, elicits an act of perfect contrition, even if this act would be necessary for another reason, for example, for celebrating Mass. The reason is that the precept of Charity can well be fulfilled at the same time with another precept, and in circumstances of this kind there has place what we said above, that the precept of Charity sometimes obliges per accidens. - Elbel, etc.

755. Besides sins of omission, which can easily be understood from what has now been said, there are sins of commission against charity toward God. All mortal sins indeed are in some way against charity, since they destroy it. But there are two which are directly and especially opposed to charity: sloth, or sadness concerning spiritual goods, concerning which above, n. 562; and hatred of God, concerning which it remains to speak.

756. Concerning hatred of God. (A) Hatred in general is an act by which someone turns away from another. It can be twofold: (a) when we turn away from something as evil for us or for our own, there is had that hatred which is called hatred of abomination; this is directly opposed to love of concupiscence; for just as we desire something good for us, so we abominate whatever is evil for us. (b) If we will evil to some person, insofar as it is evil for him, there is had hatred of enmity or malevolence, which is directly opposed to love of friendship or benevolence.

Now hatred of God can be committed in this twofold way: for sometimes men turn away from God and are indignant with Him because He has forbidden such an action, or inflicts punishments upon sinners, or sends adversities:⁴ this is hatred of abomination. - But sometimes they will evil to God, namely with hatred of enmity; for example, they are saddened that He is omniscient, or omnipotent, or just; they wish that God did not exist, or that He were not omnipotent; they strive to diminish His external glory, by persecuting the Church and oppressing the just.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 34, a. 1.

That such hatred exists, even in our days, is clear from history and experience. In the Sacred Letters there are mentioned many times enemies of God, who hate God and Christ;⁵ but today there are those who would wish the very name of God to be utterly erased, and therefore teach the young atheism, or monism, or positivism, who proclaim that God is evil, and bitterly blaspheme against Him or curse Him.⁶

⁵ Num. 10:35; Deut. 32:41; Ps. 73:23; John 15:24.

⁶ Thus, in a Masonic convention held in the year 1903, F. Delpech exclaimed: "The gods are dying: the peoples, at last disabused, are constrained to recognize, by the light of certain facts, that the gods, no more Christ than Buddha and Mohammed, have kept the promises made to the human races by the priests." (Apud P. Nourrisson, Les Jacobins, p. 253). In the periodical La Raison, Feb. 28, 1904, E. D., a pedagogue, wrote these things: "Let us make a policy of true apaches; let us crush the infamous thing" (Correspondant, June 25, 1904, p. 1027). And these among many things!

757. (B) Hatred of God is an intrinsically evil sin, and indeed of itself the gravest of all, because it is directly opposed to the most perfect virtue, namely charity, and does injury to the infinite goodness of God. It does not admit smallness of matter, and therefore, provided that it is deliberate, it is a mortal sin of its whole kind.

If the two species distinguished above are compared with one another, the sin of enmity is graver than the sin of abomination, because the former is opposed to the internal goodness of God, while the latter is opposed to an external manifestation of the same.

564. Every mortal sin is generally opposed to charity toward God, since it destroys friendship with God and consequently charity; but specially there are opposed to charity, by way of commission, two vices: hatred of God and acedia;⁸¹ and by way of omission: omission of a due act of charity. Concerning omission of the act of charity enough has already been said in the preceding article. It remains to speak about hatred of God and acedia.

⁸¹ Older authors, speaking of vices against charity, were accustomed to bring forward at the same time vices against charity both toward God, toward oneself, and toward neighbor. Thus, e.g., William Peraldus, O.P., in his excellent treatise Summa virtutum ac vitiorum, writes: "There seem to be opposed to charity excessive love of ourselves, vain love of the world, hatred of neighbor, and generally a damnable offense of God" (t. I [ed. Venice 1771], p. 276, de carit. c. 17).

Besides sins of omission against the affirmative precept of divine charity, there are three sins which are opposed to the same charity, namely: inordinate love of a creature; hatred of God; sloth. Concerning sloth we have already spoken in the treatise on Sins (n. 372).

474. PRINCIPLES. I. Every inordinate love of a creature, passing into act, is a mortal sin. Thus Sporer (tr. 2, c. 5, sect. 4, § 4) with the common opinion.

It is said: 1. inordinate, that is, by which a creature is preferred to God; 2. passing into act; otherwise actual sin cannot be given. It is established from the things said concerning the obligation of loving God appreciatively above all things, and from the words of the Lord (Matt. 10:37): He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me. Whence here lightness of matter cannot be imagined.

It must be noted: 1. Inordinate love of a creature is sometimes a special sin, sometimes not: a) It is a special sin when someone knowingly and willingly loves a creature so inordinately that on account of it, by actual consent thereafter elicited, he is prepared to transgress any precept whatsoever and mortally offend God. It is, I say, a special sin against charity, because it is repugnant to no precept in particular. b) But it is not a special sin against charity if someone from inordinate love transgresses some precept, for example of justice; but it is the same in number with the transgression of this precept: because charity is always wounded in every grave sin.

2. Such love is the cause of all sins, even of hatred of God itself. St. Thomas explains this nearly thus (2.2, q. 34, a. 1 and 6): "First, man is inordinately occupied and captured by love of himself or of some creature, or wishes it to be well with himself in such a creature. Then, because often it cannot be well with him thus unless he transgresses the law of God, therefore from love of this creature he consents to sin. Further, because he experiences God as a severe legislator and avenger of sin, the impious sinner proceeds to formal hatred of God."

475. II. Formal hatred of God is a special sin, and indeed the gravest of all. The reason for the first is that any hatred of God whatsoever turns away from God as troublesome to itself; whence it is opposed to the charity of God, and directly and formally destroys it. The reason for the second is that the gravity of fault consists in aversion from God. But that aversion is stronger and greater in hatred of God, in which it is per se and directly, than in other sins, in which it is indirectly and per accidens (2.2, q. 34, a. 2; St. Alph., V, 60).

Note. 1. We said: formal hatred, because in every sin by which divine friendship is dissolved there is found some hatred of God, but virtual and interpretative, by which a special fault is not constituted.

2. This formal hatred of God is twofold: one of abomination (opposed to love of concupiscence), by which someone hates God insofar as he experiences or apprehends him as contrary to himself; the other of enmity (opposed to benevolence and friendship), by which someone hates God in himself and according to himself, willing evil to him, insofar as it is evil to him. So great a malice is present in this latter hatred that a greater cannot be conceived. Yet hatred of enmity itself and hatred of abomination, with respect to God, do not differ in species; because although hatred of abomination of itself arises from desperation, nevertheless the will cannot come all the way to hatred of God unless God is attacked in himself, by hatred of enmity (II, 20, 24; Lehmkuhl, I, 434).

3. From hatred of God can proceed blasphemies, execrations, curses, sacrileges, persecutions against the Church, etc. Such hatred adds a species to these sins, as is plain (Sporer, tr. 2, c. 5, sect. 4).

276. • 1° There is a special precept of loving God above all things both by internal affection, through true love of the heart, and also by external work. - This is established from the words of Christ:² Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart ... this is the greatest and first commandment.

2° This precept, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges to loving God above all things appreciatively, that is, in such a way that in reality He is preferred to all goods, as is clear from the natural law; but not necessarily intensively, that is, by a more intense sensitive affection than anything else, because the essence of charity does not consist in degrees.

277. Questions. - Quaer. 1° When does the precept of charity urge?

Resp. 1° Of itself: a) at the beginning of the use of reason, or when man has obtained sufficient knowledge of the infinitely good God; b) most probably in the article of death, because then not merely the safe way, that is, attrition with the Sacrament of Penance, but the safest way also is to be chosen; c) several times in life. But how often in life, there is not one opinion of all. The opinion of Cardenas is more pleasing to St. Alphonsus,³ who teaches that he can with difficulty be excused from mortal sin who defers an act of charity beyond a month; this opinion he thinks must altogether be persuaded as very salutary, since in reality a man can with difficulty live long in a Christian manner, by observing the divine commandments, unless he frequently cherishes and nourishes love toward God; but he will not be able to nourish and cherish it except through acts of charity. Yet Croix notes that all meritorious works exercised from the intention of pleasing God are true acts of love, as almsgiving is. Likewise it suffices if such acts are elicited for fulfilling other precepts, as for confessing; since the precept is fulfilled in exercise, although there is no advertence to it.¹ Indeed as often as those words are uttered from the heart in the Lord's Prayer: hallowed be Thy name; Thy will be done, acts of perfect charity are sufficiently elicited. Therefore timorous faithful ought in no way to be anxious as to the fulfillment of this precept.²

Resp. 2° By accident: a) if there is danger of falling into mortal sin unless an act of charity is elicited, or grave temptation cannot otherwise be overcome; for he who is held to the end is also obliged to the necessary means; - b) when the precept of contrition urges, as if it is necessary for a priest to celebrate when he does not have a supply of a confessor and is conscious to himself of grave sin; for charity is included in the act of perfect contrition.

Quaer. 2° Is the precept of charity satisfied through attrition in the reception of the Sacrament of Penance?

Resp. Negatively, because attrition does not occur principally from love of God, but of oneself, and therefore in it the principal motive of charity is lacking.

To the joy of charity itself concerning the divine good, acedia is opposed; to joy concerning the good of neighbor, envy is opposed.