Slavery

We saw above that no one except God can have an absolute property in man’s life or members. No man, then, can become the chattel of another so that he may lawfully be disposed of like a brute beast. Christian teaching has banished such an idea from Christendom at least. On the other hand, there is no difficulty in admitting that one man may make over his services to another for as long as he pleases. Theoretically, therefore, there seems no reason for saying that slavery is against the law of nature. We here understand by the term the state of perpetual subjection of one to another so that he owes that other his life service in return for board, lodging, and clothes. Practically, great abuses usually accompanied slavery, and we must allow that it is out of harmony with the spirit of the Gospel. Chiefly through the wise and gradual action of the Church, it has ceased to exist as an institution among civilized nations. However, we must not forget that penal servitude is still the just and recognized punishment for grave crime. Merely looking at the question from the point of view of the strict law of nature, we must acknowledge that a state of slavery arising from contract, or birth, or in punishment for crime, or as the result of a just war, is not in itself immoral.

If a freeman married a slave under the mistaken belief that she was free, the marriage was null and void by ecclesiastical law; if he married knowing the servile condition of the other party, the marriage was valid. To this extent the Church received the Roman legislation on the marriage of slaves, according to which they could not validly marry one that was free, and their marriages among themselves were merely at the good will of their masters. The law of the Church corrected what was inhuman in the Roman civil law, and adopted its provisions as far as they were in harmony with Christian principles. Nowadays, of course, this impediment can scarcely be of practical importance in any part of the world (Can. 1083, sec. 2, 1);

537. • Principles. I. Man has useful dominion of the goods which are intrinsic to him, namely of soul and body. Therefore he can, without injury to anyone, use them for his own utility, and for every use not prohibited by law.

Yet he does not have direct dominion of these goods. This is established from Sacred Scripture; thus Wisd. 16. 13: "You are, O Lord, who have power of life and death." - Likewise Deut. 32. 39: "I shall kill, and I shall make alive." - It is also established from natural law, as we said where treating of the fifth precept of the Decalogue, n. 389 and following.

538. • II. Man can have useful and direct dominion in external goods of fortune legitimately acquired. This is established, 1. as to useful dominion, because on the one hand these goods are of themselves apt for promoting the preservation or utility of man, and on the other hand the use of them is not opposed to divine and human right; indeed God Himself permitted at least the utility of the aforesaid goods by these words, Gen. 1. 28: "Have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the birds of the air," etc. - And Ps. 8. 8: "You have subjected all things under his feet." - It is established, 2. as to direct dominion, because the faculty of applying goods of fortune to one's own uses is restricted by no right; indeed it is expressly permitted by human right, as is clear from the various laws concerning the right of possessing, and by divine right in the words cited: "Have dominion," etc.

539. • Questions. Q. 1. Whether man has dominion of his own reputation?

Resp. Affirmatively, according to the common opinion; for even concerning reputation there belong to man the primary acts of dominion, such as to acquire it by labor, to condone restitution of it, etc. Therefore... Yet prudence requires that he not squander it without just reason, and sometimes he is bound under grave sin to preserve it carefully by reason of scandal, of removing harm to the family, etc. - St. Lig., lib. 3, n. 983. - Billuart, diss. 3, art. 2.

Q. 2. Whether man can have dominion over another man?

Resp. 1. Negatively, as to dominion of property; for that belongs to God alone, as is established from what has been said, n. 522.

Resp. 2. Affirmatively, as to useful dominion, or the works of man. The reason is that any man is master of his own work, and therefore he can alienate it for his own utility and hand it over into the dominion of another. For a master can dispose at will of the object of his dominion.

Hence 1. by natural right a man can even sell himself to another forever as to useful dominion. For if he can confer upon another the useful dominion of himself for some time, he can do the same forever, since he can yield whatever he has. 2. Per se servitude is not repugnant to the law of nature, or the state of perpetual subjection by which someone, in exchange for food, is bound to furnish all his works to another.

540. • Q. 3. From what titles can servitude be introduced?

Resp. From the four following titles: 1. From pact, or one's own renunciation. For it is not repugnant that someone renounce his liberty in order to relieve his own need, etc. - 2. From the right of war. For it is not repugnant that the victor should sometimes inflict this punishment. For sometimes he could kill captives for the security of the nation; therefore, a fortiori, reduce them to servitude. - 3. From an offense, or from just condemnation. For if a guilty person can be condemned to death, a fortiori to servitude, since deprivation of life is deservedly considered the greatest of all punishments. - 4. From birth in a state of servitude, since by law they are slaves who are born of slaves. Thus according to the law of nations, in accordance with the common opinion. - Lugo, disp. 6, n. 11 and 17.

541. • Q. 4. Whether the trade in Negroes is lawful?

Resp. 1. It is altogether unlawful by every right, as often as Negroes are unjustly despoiled of liberty, and are transported in bands from their own regions as cheap cattle, and are sold, as happens in their nefarious trade (Traites des Nègres). Against so monstrous a trade there have come forth various Apostolic Constitutions, namely of Paul III, Urban VIII, Benedict XIV, and lately Gregory XVI, in the Constitution In supremo apostolatus, December 3, 1839, as may be seen in the public sheet called Ami de la Religion, tom. 103, n. 3219.

Resp. 2. But if it is a matter of Black persons or others existing in legitimate servitude, it is not per se absolutely unlawful, because once servitude has been admitted as legitimate, the master has a true right in slaves, or in their works, and therefore is able to transmit it to others. I said, per se; for circumstances can stand in the way, for example, if a spouse would have to be separated from a spouse, or if civil laws forbid it, just as in reality servitude is generally interdicted in Europe.

If we study the nature of the sins thus characterized as crying to Heaven for vengeance, we find that they form a category separate and distinct from the capital sins. For whereas the latter spring from an inordinate craving of the natural appetites, and are sinful only when they involve a lack of rational self-control, the distinguishing note of the so-called peccata clamantia is violent suppression of certain natural instincts and conscious frustration of their ends and objects. In other words, besides a transgression of the moral order, they entail a violation of the laws of nature, thus provoking divine wrath in a special manner. This fact is well expressed in the phrase, "sins that cry to Heaven for vengeance."

A particularly offensive sin against the precept here under consideration is involved in the grosser forms of slavery. It is true that the treatment of slaves is usually softened by natural compassion and kindliness on the part either of the master or of public opinion, or by the precepts of religion; that the law has in some instances granted the wretched slaves a certain measure of protection, and that it is not necessary to assume that every slaveholder is a cruel tyrant. Yet the status of a slave is by its very definition not that of a person, but rather that of a brute beast or an inanimate object that is bought and sold according to the whims of its owner. Dr. Devas is undoubtedly right when he says that “slavery by its very nature encourages immorality, hinders proper family life among the slaves, gives the master an arbitrary power with which no man can be trusted, fosters the scorn of manual labor, as a degradation for the freeman, and thus is always a social evil, any incidental advantages which it may give being attainable by serfdom.”¹⁷

¹⁷ Political Economy, 3rd ed., pp. 529 sq.—Cfr. Leo XIII, Epist. ad Episc. Brasil., 5 Maii 1888; P. Allard, Art. “Slavery,” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, pp. 36 sqq.; J. J. Fox, ibid., pp. 39 sqq.; A. Ebeling, Die Sklaverei von der ältesten Zeit bis auf die Gegenwart, Paderborn 1899; J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, N.Y. 1919, p. 328.

"In modern times," writes Archbishop Simar, "the working classes live under conditions similar to those of pagan antiquity. All too frequently the laborer is degraded to the level of a mere tool for money-making, and no regard is paid to his bodily health, his social and economic welfare, and his spiritual, religious, and moral development. The evils and dangers which threaten humanity in consequence of this social injustice have their fountain-head in un-Christian views and principles, and therefore cannot be successfully and permanently abolished unless Christianity is again allowed to govern all social relations. The fundamental postulate of reform is respect for the personal dignity of every man as a man and as a Christian, for in no other soil can true charity and its concomitant spirit of self-sacrifice thrive." ¹⁸ The keynote of the famous Labor Encyclical of Leo XIII, "Rerum Novarum," is the principle that conditions of labor shall be made more human and less servile, and that the worker be placed in a condition of greater economic freedom both as regards his security against want and the conditions of his labor. The worker is to be regarded as a human agent, not as a mere tool; and as one who has the right by means of his labor to achieve a wholesome human existence, since, as the Pope says, it is only by his labor that he can preserve and develop himself. His necessity gives him the right to such conditions of labor as will enable him to achieve a thoroughly human existence. Moreover, the same necessity demands that he should claim this right; since, as Leo XIII declares, "a man cannot give up his soul to servitude." Yet that is just what he is required to do under the system now largely prevalent in modern industry.

¹⁸ Simar, Moraltheologie, 3rd ed., p. 372.—Cfr. Th. Meyer, S. J., Die christlich-ethischen Sozialprinzipien und die Arbeiterfrage, 4th ed., Freiburg i. B. 1906; Reuter-Lehmkuhl, S. J., Neoconfessarius, pp. 214 sqq.; J. Biederlack, S. J., Die soziale Frage, 7th ed., pp. 206 sqq.

595. • Quaer. 2° Can man have dominion over another man?

Resp. 1° In the negative, as to direct dominion; for that belongs to God alone, as is clear from what was said at n. 591, and men are metaphysically independent of one another; or:

Resp. 2° In the affirmative, as to useful dominion, or the works of man. The reason is that any man is owner of his own work, and therefore can alienate it and hand it over into the dominion of another. For an owner can use and abuse his own thing insofar as the character of right permits.

Hence 1° by natural right man can sell himself to another, even in perpetuity, and indeed hand himself over gratuitously as to useful dominion of himself. For if he can confer upon another useful dominion of himself for some time, he can do the same in perpetuity, since he can cede all that of which he is owner. 2° Servitude, or a perpetual state of subjection by which someone is bound to provide all his works to another for sustenance, is not of itself repugnant to the law of nature. I say: his works; for servitude in the strict sense, namely that by which slaves properly so called are counted not among persons but among things, which the master can use and abuse, can be called licit in no case.

596. Note. - Although servitude has been abrogated among us, nevertheless it is fitting that confessors receiving the Confession, especially general, of former masters or slaves know the sins to which they were more commonly liable. Wherefore in this place we briefly enumerate them. Therefore I. As to masters:

1° They sinned and are bound to restitution, if any exercised the so-called traffic in Negroes, or cooperated with it, or bought for themselves as slaves those whom they knew had been unjustly despoiled of liberty. - Against so inhuman a trade various Apostolic Constitutions have come forth, namely of Paul III, Urban VIII, Benedict XIV, and lately Gregory XVI, Constitution In supremo Apostolatus, 3 Dec. 1839. And rightly indeed. For although someone, either from pact or his own renunciation, or, as formerly, by the law of war, or from delict or from just condemnation, or from birth from a slave mother, can sometimes be bound to hand over his works to another in perpetuity,¹ nevertheless he is unjustly forced to this where none of these titles can be invoked. But in the traffic in Negroes none of these titles can be invoked; for through it free men, against their own will and without any delict on their part, are carried away from their own regions and sold. Therefore:

I said: free men; for if it is a question of Negroes or others in servitude legitimate by one of the aforesaid titles existing, of itself that commerce is not absolutely illicit, because, once servitude has been admitted as legitimate, the master has a true right in the slaves, or in their works, and therefore can transmit it. I said: of itself; for either circumstances or civil laws can stand in the way.

2° They sinned because of circumstances standing against sale:

a) Those who by selling separated spouse from spouse, or offspring from parents, without grave cause. I said: without grave cause; which would have been present, for example, if a slave had been wicked, whom the master had tried in vain to bring back to good fruit, and from whom he feared death or some other grave evil.¹

b) Those who by selling a slave, especially a Catholic, cared nothing about seeking for him a Catholic, humane, and just buyer; for it was not licit for a master to cast the care of a slave upon just anyone at hand. Yet those would be excused who had sold to anyone at hand slaves from whom they feared death for themselves or their own, unless they were immediately dismissed from the house, provided nevertheless that damage was not inflicted on an unsuspecting buyer.² Those also are to be excused, as is clear of itself, through whom it did not stand that slaves were sold to anyone at hand, as if they had been sold at auction in the distribution of an inheritance, or by authority of law for punishing crimes or for satisfying creditors.³

3° They sinned who did not supply them necessary food and clothing; who did not care for the sick; who did not endeavor to relieve with remedies the old, or those otherwise no longer fit for labor.⁴

4° Those who selected or retained overseers whom they knew imposed harsher burdens upon bondmen, or treated them more severely and cruelly;⁵ and likewise those who, carried away by anger, flogged slaves for a light cause, or ordered them to be flogged, especially with danger to limbs or life.⁶

5° Those who did not leave to slaves the liberty of entering marriage and of using its rights, although slaves would not on account of this be drawn away from providing the work owed.⁷

6° Those who did not take care that the children of their slaves be baptized.

7° Those who did not provide for the salvation of the slaves themselves; of this kind were a) those who did not take care that they learn the rudiments of Christian doctrine, and that a supply of priestly ministry for receiving the Sacraments be made available to them; b) those who omitted every precaution for preserving integrity of morals among them, not taking care, for example, lest they use promiscuous sleeping together; c) those who fostered corruption of morals by their very bad example and wicked solicitations; d) those who favored the delicts of a female slave because of the utility that would come to them from offspring.¹

597. • II. As to former slaves. They sinned 1° who neglected the work enjoined upon them, or the care of things committed to them; yet they did not violate justice, but obedience owed to the master; for the actions of a slave are not owed to the master by the law of justice, as are those of a hired man, who receives a price for them.²

2° Those who stole from the master things other than common edibles; and these are bound to restitution, if they have the means from which they may repay, and unless by their works they seem to have repaired the damage inflicted.³

3° Those who ran around at night, so that they might visit women, and this not only because of immodesty, but also because of other crimes to the danger of which they exposed themselves.⁴

4° Those who lived in concubinage, whether simple fornication, or adulterous; and this simple or double.

5° Those who, when opportunity was offered, neglected to learn the documents of the faith and to fulfill the duties of religion.⁵

166. The object of right and dominion is all things, not considered in themselves, but insofar as they bring utility and can be appropriated, and thus yield to man's own advantage, and therefore are called goods. These, comparatively to man, are divided into three species, according to the diverse mode in which they are referred to our utility:

1st. man's internal goods: of the body, such as life, health, members; and of the soul, whether natural, such as faculties and their exercise, sciences and arts, or supernatural, which have been infused by God through the mediation of human operation;

2nd. external goods of fortune, whether movable or immovable;

3rd. intermediate goods (or mixed goods) of reputation and honor, which radically are internal, founded in the excellence of man and in his faculties; formally they are external, in others who honor us and think and speak well of us.

Concerning each it is asked whether man can have right and dominion over them, namely, whether there can exist between them and man a connection or bond, which is founded either in the exigency of the person, or in the common necessity of men.

167. Principle I. Concerning internal goods it must be said:

1. Over those goods which pertain to the integrity of man and are not distinct from him, such as life and the members of the body, and the faculties of the soul, man has right by the very fact that he is man, for by that very fact there is had a bond between him and these goods; yet he does not have direct and full dominion, which belongs to God, but only useful dominion, so that he is their guardian and administrator and user.

For no one can possess himself or be lord of himself, for dominion is something essentially relative, by which one has right in something other (the foundation of dominion does not fall under dominion); but God, as the first principle and last end, is the supreme lord of us, of life and death, and therefore he commits injustice against God who deprives himself of such a good, just as also each one has the duty and right of preserving those things, because they are means given him by God so that he may reach the end.

Yet man can use those goods, for this is required that he may attain the end, so that by acting well he may have eternal life; and therefore he can make their fruits his own (namely, operations and the things which are obtained by operations) for his own utility.

2. Over goods distinct from man, such as the operations of faculties and the things which are acquired through the mediation of human operations or are given by God, man has direct and full dominion: for they are distinct from his entity and therefore can be possessed by him; but they are possessed because they have been acquired by his industry or obtained by his cooperation.

Hence he is lord a) of natural and supernatural virtues, and therefore in these he is not injured unjustly by others, unless it is done in some way against his will by employing some unjust means, such as deceiving or threatening;

b) of intellectual and bodily acts, to which therefore no other can have a title of connection or a right before a contract or some legitimate fact;

c) of bodily or intellectual labor and its fruits, provided he acts in his own name and in his own thing, not in the name of another and in another's thing.

168. Principle II. Concerning external goods it must be said:

1. Man has right to terrestrial goods according as, with attention to the laws of nature and positive laws, he has acquired them for himself by a legitimate fact: for they are destined for his use, as imperfect things for a perfect being, and can be appropriated by him (Gen. I, 26, 28; Ps. CXIII, 16; VIII, 8). And indeed he has not only useful dominion and by a transient use, because they are necessary for him for the preservation of life and thus for the due end, but also full and permanent dominion, by which in a stable and perpetual way he may possess not only fruits but also immovable things, indeed the earth itself. This is fitting to the nature of the thing and necessary from a threefold bond; for:

a) The individual man, since he is a rational being, has before brute animals this, that he himself provides for his necessities and progress and enjoys aptitude for possessing those things which serve his necessity; therefore, since he foresees necessities perpetually recurring, for relieving which terrestrial things are apt, it is conformable to natural ordination that he possess in a stable way not only those things which are consumed by use, but also immovable goods and the earth itself, which are necessary for providing for future necessities (in time of sickness, old age, want, and poverty).

b) Indeed, as a father of a family, he must provide not only for the things necessary for his own preservation, but also for those necessary for the preservation of the species, namely, for his wife, and for his children, who are something of the father, and in whom his personality is prolonged, and who expect from the father food and cultivation by which they may become men sufficient to themselves. Whence a fortiori to man, as father of a family, there belongs the right of possessing, who must acquire for his own and transmit to them goods even immovable, especially fruitful possessions, from which he may be able to sustain the family in time of poverty, or of broken strength, or even after death.

c) Finally, man has full dominion in that which he has produced and in which he has prolonged his own personality: for it is just that the thing made should follow the cause from which it was made. Therefore, if by his own labor he has made a thing or the earth itself fruitful, or even has improved it and has as it were sealed it with the seal of his own personality, it is conformable to reason that he possess the thing itself and the earth (as being now inseparable from the labor); otherwise the fruits of labor would not come to the laborer himself, or even others would have the right of enjoying them.¹

¹ Cf. Leo XIII, Rerum novarum, and Pottier, De Iure et Iustitia.

2. Over the heavenly bodies according to their substance he does not have dominion, because, although they were founded for our utility, they are nevertheless not so subject that we can dispose of them; but according to certain effects, he has indirect dominion, which he can use for his own advantage, for example, light, from which consequently he cannot prohibit others who have a right to it.

3. Over the person of one's neighbor as such (insofar as he can bring utility) man does not have perfect dominion, since all men by nature are peers, and the human person is inviolable, which cannot be ordered to the good and end of other persons (the foundation of dominion does not fall under dominion); yet he can have useful dominion as to his works.

Whence personal servitude, or a state of subjection by which someone, in exchange for sustenance, is bound to furnish all his works to another in perpetuity, of itself (abstracting from excess of oppression and tyranny) is not repugnant to natural right, although nevertheless it is less fitting to human dignity.²

² The Scriptures do not hold servitude as illicit: for Moses did not absolutely prohibit it but moderated it (cf. Ex. XX, 17; XXI, 2; Lev. XXV, 45-46; 54-55); and in the New Law they admonish masters to treat servants kindly, indeed they exhort them to free them, but do not command this (I Cor. VII, 20-24; Eph. VI, 9; Col. IV, 1; to Philem.). Yet Christian doctrine and the Church do not favor servitude, but always tend toward expelling servitude; and under their influence it happened that among cultivated nations servitude was abolished and now by positive law is illicit.

The Scholastics admitted four titles by which servitude could be constituted not unjustly: 1) purchase-sale or donation, both that by which someone freely reduces himself into servitude, for since man can transfer dominion of his own work for a time, he can also do this in perpetuity; and that by which someone already legitimately a servant is handed over by the master to another; 2) right of war, provided the war was just, which now contradicts the modern law of nations; 3) servile birth, by force of which those who were born from servants were held as servants; nevertheless this can seem less equitable if the servitude is perpetual; 4) penalty from a delict: for if someone has deserved death, this penalty can be commuted into servitude. Moreover, forced labor to which some guilty persons are condemned seems to be a certain servitude. - Cf. Billuart, diss. 3, art. 2; and Tanquerey, Th. M., t. III, de Virtute Iustitiae, n. 133-141.

169. Principle III. Concerning the intermediate goods of reputation and honor it must be said:

Man has strict and full dominion over these goods, because he acquires and increases honor and reputation for himself, like external goods, by his own acts and by manifestation of his moral and natural qualities; - and moreover because reputation is necessary for cultivating virtue and preserving peace in society with others.

Hence, just as man can reclaim in judgment an injury of reputation and honor, so he can also condone it; - indeed the very defamation of oneself of itself is not against justice, since man has full right over his reputation; although, if it is done without sufficient reason, it can be prodigality against charity toward oneself, or scandal against charity toward one's neighbor.

Yet per accidens it can be against justice, not indeed insofar as it is defamation of oneself, but by reason of others insofar as it harms one's neighbor, namely: if the reputation of one's neighbor depends upon one's own reputation, and from one's own infamy there follows the infamy of another (for example, of a father, monk, accomplice), or if reputation is necessary to oneself for fulfilling an office of justice, as the reputation of a bishop or pastor. Whence Augustine: Our life is necessary to us, our reputation to others.

170. Division of goods and various genera. - The various species of goods are divided variously:

A. Into corporeal and incorporeal goods (biens corporels et incorporels; stoffelijke en onstoffelijke goederen). The former are those which fall under the senses, such as a house, field, clothing, furniture, money; the latter are said to be those which are not presented to the senses but are perceived by the human intellect, namely, rights of fishing, hunting, receiving fruits, inheritance, etc.: for right is held after the manner of a good about which an owner can dispose.

B. Into movable and immovable goods (biens meubles et immeubles; roerende en onroerende goederen). The former are all things which are not immovable; the latter are those which either altogether, or at least in the state in which they are, cannot physically be transferred or transfer themselves while preserving their substance (C.C., a. 516 sq.).

The distinction of itself and from the nature of the thing falls upon external corporeal things, but by civil law it is also applied to incorporeal things, which by their nature are neither movable nor immovable, yet are judged so by reason of the object to which they are applied.

Therefore, by French law,³ 1st. immovable goods are held to be: a) by their nature, such as lands, buildings, forests, or crops as long as they adhere to the soil; b) by destination, such as animals, machines, and other objects assigned to cultivating fields (objets d'exploitation) or applied in perpetuity; c) by reason of the immovable object about which they are concerned, such as the real rights of usufruct, use, servitude, and mortgage from immovable things, and every real action upon an immovable thing (a. 517 sq.).

³ On this matter the Italian Code, a. 714 sq.; Spanish, a. 333 sq.; Dutch, a. 562 sq.; Austrian, a. 291 sq.; German, a. 90 sq.

2nd. Likewise movable goods can be: a) by their nature, such as ships, wagons, animals, furniture (a. 528); b) by determination of law, such as rights concerning movable things, or of receiving rents, shares in an anonymous society, etc. (a. 529 sq.).

C. Movables according to nature are 1) consumable (verbruikbare), which are consumed by first use, either physically through destruction or loss of form and properties (as happens in paper, food, and drink), or morally when the thing is alienated and by first use is drawn away (for example, money) or changed (cloths turned into clothing); - and 2) non-consumable (onverbruikbare), which are by no means destroyed or changed by first use, such as houses, furniture, clothes, a horse, etc.

D. Movables according to relative and accidental quality are fungible and non-fungible (vervangbare of onvervangbare). The former, in payment of a debt, according to common estimation, can supply other things of the same species and stand in their place, such as generally those things which are usually counted, measured, or weighed, for example, coined money, oil, wheat, sugar, wood for burning, etc. Non-fungible things cannot be substituted for another thing, but the same identical thing must be handed over, for example, this horse which I have carefully selected, this statue, this painting, etc.

Fungible things generally are at the same time consumable, and conversely. Yet there are exceptions: thus the last barrel of wine of such a year which is promised, or gold coins which are lent as a pledge, are consumable but not fungible; - on the opposite side, if one hundred acres of fields are promised to settlers, or if a bookseller asks for a copy of a book for selling, these are fungible but not consumable.

I SUPPOSE first, that men can sell their slaves, as the Doctors commonly teach with D. Bonaventure, in 4. dist. 36. dub. 2. litt., where he says that they can sell them even in foreign lands, yet not to the prejudice of the faith, for instance to infidels, as the S. Doctor notes, 4. dist. 36. dub. 2. litterali.

I SUPPOSE secondly, that parents can sell their children in grave necessity; indeed, even themselves.

That fathers can sell their children is proved by D. Bonav. loc. cit. dub. 3. ex 2. Esdrae 5., where such a thing is narrated to have been licit in a time of famine. He notes, however, that the consent of the mother also is required.

That anyone can sell himself is proved from law; on which see Molina Tomo 1. disp. 33., Fagundez in septimum praeceptum, l. 7. cap. 12. num. 18.

Yet a married man ought not to sell himself to the prejudice of the debt he owes his wife, for he would commit an injustice, as the S. Doctor says, dub. 4.

I suppose also, from the same D. Bonaventure, in 2. dist. 44. art. 3. quaest. 1., that infidels captured in a just war can be sold. Thus the King of the Negroes was accustomed to do, and also other Christian Kings.

It is asked therefore: whether certain peoples, such as the Portuguese, may licitly travel through Angola and Guinea, and seize slaves by hunting, and carry them off into their kingdoms to be sold.

Many learned men indeed gravely condemn that hunting. So especially Mercado tract. 5. cap. 15., Caspensis Tract. 18. disp. 5. sect. 1. num. 11., who at once does not dare to condemn this trade, because many men, and most learned and most pious Prelates in the kingdom, do not condemn it; nor does Fagundez decline it, l. 7. cap. 12. num. 15., if they are received in good faith.

To me, however, this hunting and trading must altogether be condemned, even if (as they relate) the Sobae have houses of slaves, in the manner of cattle, for trading; for since they are free, and no title is had over their lives, I do not see by what reason they can be sold. For the excuse of leading them to the faith is rotten, as I showed, Tract. de fide, disp. 2. quaest. 3. et seq. Moreover, similar subjections, which the S. Doctor calls captivity in speculo animae, cap. 1., he cries out, after the middle of the way, are mortal.

I speak of captives taken in a just war; for of those bought it is clear that they cannot flee.

The first opinion is that slaves captured in a just war, such as Moors or Turks, can flee, provided they go to their own homeland, not that they wander through places where they are slaves. So teach Petrus Nauar. l. 3. de restit. cap. 1. num. 200., Sà v. bellum, num. 7., Lessius l. 1. l. 2. cap. 15. dub. 15. num. 24., Azor. Tomo 2. l. 2. cap. 24. quaestio 3., Couar. l. 1. var. cap. 2. num. 10. et in Regulam Peccatum, §. 11. p. 2., Bannes 2. 2. quaest. 40. art. 1., Angles in flor. in 4. quaest. de dominio, art. 2. concl. 5., Sotus l. 4. de Iust. quaest. 2. art. 2. concl. 3., Gregorius Lopes l. 23. tit. 29. p. 3., Alens. 3. p. quaest. 48. membr. 2. art. 3., Fagundez l. 7. cap. 1. num. 21., after D. Bonaventure in the places to be cited.

The negative opinion is upheld by Molina T. 1. disp. 37., Nauar. Man. cap. 7. num. 63., Glossa C. Ius gentium, dist. 1., Fortun. Leg. manumiss. col. 2., D. Anton. 5. p. tit. 3. cap. 6. §. 4., Turrecrem. in C. Ius gentium, disp. 1., Sylvest. v. servus, quaest. 3. dict. 2.

But it seems to be proved first from the S. Doctor, 2. dist. 44. art. 3. quaest. 1., because captivity in war was introduced by the law of nations, and is just, sanctioned by laws. Therefore those fleeing steal themselves from their masters, Leg. 1. Cod. de servis fugitivis, et Leg. 2. C. eodem titulo; it is established there that a slave caught in flight is to be punished by mutilation of the foot; but so grave a penalty would not be imposed except for mortal sin. The laws of the Code, moreover, are more recent, and of Christian Emperors. Wherefore one must stand by those, not by others of the Digest.

It is confirmed from cap. 1. et 2. si quis servum, dist. 17. quaest. 9., where it is said that they sin mortally, and are bound to restitution, who aid and encourage slaves to flee.

But the response of Fagundez is frivolous: that the Codes speak of slaves wandering through the kingdoms where they are slaves, not of those returning to their own; in which they have a right; for they are slaves, yet in such a way that, if they can, they are able to flee.

These things are indeed said gratuitously, because in the Codes this distinction is not found, nor does it accomplish anything; for the question asks whether they are absolutely subject to masters; and if it is so, whether they are seized so as to return to their own, or so as to wander, contributes nothing to diminishing the damage; just as the same damage would be done by one who stole my purse, whether he carried it off to Spain or squandered the coins here.

I add that in our case there is less damage or inconvenience if slaves wander through Christian regions, where they can easily be converted to the faith, than if they return to their own Mohammedans or Idolaters.

Indeed, the affirmative opinion is evidently proved by D. Bonav. in 4. dist. 36. quaest. 1. fundamento 3. et quaest. 2. ad 2. When two unequal rights concur, the right of the higher order precedes; but liberty is of the Law of Nature; the servitude of War is of the law of nations, which is inferior: therefore. This reason caused the statute in the Institutes de rerum divisione, §. item ea, to be made in these words: Free men are brought into our servitude, who, however, if they escape our power and have returned to their own, receive their pristine state. And the same is had in the Institutes: Quibus modis ius patriae potest. solvatur, §. si ab hostibus. And in Leg. Nihil interest, ff. de captivis, et postliminio reversis, there: It makes no difference when a captive has returned, whether he was let go, or escaped the power of the enemy by force or by stratagem.

This also was enacted in Leg. 25. tit. 14. part. 7. in the kingdom of Castile, there: If a Moorish slave flee into Mauritania, and there set foot in safety, we will that he remain free, even if he afterwards return to the Christians.

It is confirmed, for one condemned to perpetual imprisonment, or to the galleys, even if justly, can nevertheless flee. Each opinion is probable, but this one is more strongly proved because of the reasons adduced.

To the objections it is answered that the law of nations has detracted something from the law of nature, and it is restored if the occasion offers itself in necessity, as I said even of the properties of things, but more truly of liberty, which is positively of the law of nature, as I said in the Tractatu de Legibus, disp. 4. quaestione 2.

To the penalty of mutilation I would say first that it is comminatory, and never commanded to be executed. But many laws threaten, lest greater liberty be usurped by all than is fitting, for instance lest those take flight who have sold themselves, and renounced their natural right; and of these also the chapter si quis servum speaks, but not of those made slaves in war.

As regards Christian slaves captured in war on the side that is just, they can flee. So Petrus Nauar. l. 3. de restit. cap. 1. num. 11. Indeed they are bound to flee from the gentiles when there is danger to the faith, as I deduce from D. Bonav. in 4. dist. 36. dub. 2. litt. The reason of the Seraphic Doctor is evident, as Fagundez brings it forward, cap. 12. num. 27.: because we are bound to provide more for the salvation of the soul than for any other thing whatever.

Yet I ADD that war is always just for Christians against the Saracens and Turks, since they have tyrannically occupied the provinces of the Christians, as Couar. observed in Reg. Peccatum, 2. part. §. 11. num. 6. Fagundez, in the place cited, after D. Bonavent. expositione in Threnos, et serm. 16. Haexaëmeronis: a Christian captured by another Christian waging war justly can licitly flee, as D. Bonavent. teaches, in 4. dist. 36. quaest. 2. ad 2., Petrus Navar. Lib. 3. de restit. cap. 1. num. 211., Fagundez num. 28.; nor is he even a slave; for although by law he could be made a slave, yet by legitimate custom among Christians, that they not be legitimately subjected to servitude, it is not licit, as Molina also teaches, Tract. de iust. disput. 33. §. primus est.

The S. Doctor proves this, 4. dist. 36. quaest. 1. fundamento 1.: In Christ Jesus there is no slave, Galat. 3. And by Canon Law, Christians cannot be reduced to the servitude of slaves.

EVIL is the report of the Portuguese among the nations, as merchants of slaves; Yet already the Kings of Portugal have tried to regulate by laws whatever crime they perceived in this purchase of slaves, and they sail far and wide to the most remote islands for this kind of trade. The titles honouring this ill-willed commerce are widely reported by Molina Tom. 1. tract. 2. disp. 34. who long dwelt in Portugal, and by Fagundez, a Portuguese, lib. 2. Contractuum.

THE FIRST is a just war, which Christian Kings wage, either provoked, or for another cause. Especially there are certain nations hostile to the Christian name, which devour strangers, and kill merchants. Such are the inhabitants of Monomotapa, Cafraria, Angola, and other nations.

BY A SIMILAR title the western, Brazilian nations, most wild and man-eating, are bought and reduced to servitude.

THE East Indies likewise, of Calicut, and more truly the most savage of Aceh, of Sumatra, the Javanese, the Japanese also once friends of the Christians, now so grown fierce against us that they rage, that Japan is called the land of Martyrs.

OTHERS indeed have been made slaves by right, either from wars in Guinea, Manicongo, in Africa, in India, in Ceilan, or in the Empire of the Sinas, from birth; for very many sell themselves, that they may there espouse handmaids, and beget free servants. See Fagundez cap. 3. and the following.

220. We know from history that at the dawn of Christianity nearly half the human race was in a state of slavery. In the mildest meaning of the term, a slave is a human being bound for life to work for his master without other remuneration than his support, possessing no rights except those that are inalienable. Inalienable rights are such as are intimately connected with the attainment of our last end. They are the rights to life, limbs, health, surroundings favorable to morality, and in general all those aids to eternal happiness of which a man cannot justly deprive himself, since by so doing he would infringe God's rights to his service. Slavery thus limited may, perhaps, in certain special circumstances, contain no violation of strict right, and, therefore, no injustice; yet, it ever has been an evil, usually far greater than squalid poverty; and it has occasioned countless abuses of the most deplorable kind. Hence, the Church has always labored — and with unfailing success — to mitigate and finally to suppress it. To the general satisfaction, slavery has disappeared from all Christian lands. There is no reason, therefore, for treating the subject further.