Question Three: On the Object of Right and Dominion

166. The object of right and dominion is all things, not considered in themselves, but insofar as they bring utility and can be appropriated, and thus yield to man's own advantage, and therefore are called goods. These, comparatively to man, are divided into three species, according to the diverse mode in which they are referred to our utility:

1st. man's internal goods: of the body, such as life, health, members; and of the soul, whether natural, such as faculties and their exercise, sciences and arts, or supernatural, which have been infused by God through the mediation of human operation;

2nd. external goods of fortune, whether movable or immovable;

3rd. intermediate goods (or mixed goods) of reputation and honor, which radically are internal, founded in the excellence of man and in his faculties; formally they are external, in others who honor us and think and speak well of us.

Concerning each it is asked whether man can have right and dominion over them, namely, whether there can exist between them and man a connection or bond, which is founded either in the exigency of the person, or in the common necessity of men.

167. Principle I. Concerning internal goods it must be said:

1. Over those goods which pertain to the integrity of man and are not distinct from him, such as life and the members of the body, and the faculties of the soul, man has right by the very fact that he is man, for by that very fact there is had a bond between him and these goods; yet he does not have direct and full dominion, which belongs to God, but only useful dominion, so that he is their guardian and administrator and user.

For no one can possess himself or be lord of himself, for dominion is something essentially relative, by which one has right in something other (the foundation of dominion does not fall under dominion); but God, as the first principle and last end, is the supreme lord of us, of life and death, and therefore he commits injustice against God who deprives himself of such a good, just as also each one has the duty and right of preserving those things, because they are means given him by God so that he may reach the end.

Yet man can use those goods, for this is required that he may attain the end, so that by acting well he may have eternal life; and therefore he can make their fruits his own (namely, operations and the things which are obtained by operations) for his own utility.

2. Over goods distinct from man, such as the operations of faculties and the things which are acquired through the mediation of human operations or are given by God, man has direct and full dominion: for they are distinct from his entity and therefore can be possessed by him; but they are possessed because they have been acquired by his industry or obtained by his cooperation.

Hence he is lord a) of natural and supernatural virtues, and therefore in these he is not injured unjustly by others, unless it is done in some way against his will by employing some unjust means, such as deceiving or threatening;

b) of intellectual and bodily acts, to which therefore no other can have a title of connection or a right before a contract or some legitimate fact;

c) of bodily or intellectual labor and its fruits, provided he acts in his own name and in his own thing, not in the name of another and in another's thing.

168. Principle II. Concerning external goods it must be said:

1. Man has right to terrestrial goods according as, with attention to the laws of nature and positive laws, he has acquired them for himself by a legitimate fact: for they are destined for his use, as imperfect things for a perfect being, and can be appropriated by him (Gen. I, 26, 28; Ps. CXIII, 16; VIII, 8). And indeed he has not only useful dominion and by a transient use, because they are necessary for him for the preservation of life and thus for the due end, but also full and permanent dominion, by which in a stable and perpetual way he may possess not only fruits but also immovable things, indeed the earth itself. This is fitting to the nature of the thing and necessary from a threefold bond; for:

a) The individual man, since he is a rational being, has before brute animals this, that he himself provides for his necessities and progress and enjoys aptitude for possessing those things which serve his necessity; therefore, since he foresees necessities perpetually recurring, for relieving which terrestrial things are apt, it is conformable to natural ordination that he possess in a stable way not only those things which are consumed by use, but also immovable goods and the earth itself, which are necessary for providing for future necessities (in time of sickness, old age, want, and poverty).

b) Indeed, as a father of a family, he must provide not only for the things necessary for his own preservation, but also for those necessary for the preservation of the species, namely, for his wife, and for his children, who are something of the father, and in whom his personality is prolonged, and who expect from the father food and cultivation by which they may become men sufficient to themselves. Whence a fortiori to man, as father of a family, there belongs the right of possessing, who must acquire for his own and transmit to them goods even immovable, especially fruitful possessions, from which he may be able to sustain the family in time of poverty, or of broken strength, or even after death.

c) Finally, man has full dominion in that which he has produced and in which he has prolonged his own personality: for it is just that the thing made should follow the cause from which it was made. Therefore, if by his own labor he has made a thing or the earth itself fruitful, or even has improved it and has as it were sealed it with the seal of his own personality, it is conformable to reason that he possess the thing itself and the earth (as being now inseparable from the labor); otherwise the fruits of labor would not come to the laborer himself, or even others would have the right of enjoying them.¹

¹ Cf. Leo XIII, Rerum novarum, and Pottier, De Iure et Iustitia.

2. Over the heavenly bodies according to their substance he does not have dominion, because, although they were founded for our utility, they are nevertheless not so subject that we can dispose of them; but according to certain effects, he has indirect dominion, which he can use for his own advantage, for example, light, from which consequently he cannot prohibit others who have a right to it.

3. Over the person of one's neighbor as such (insofar as he can bring utility) man does not have perfect dominion, since all men by nature are peers, and the human person is inviolable, which cannot be ordered to the good and end of other persons (the foundation of dominion does not fall under dominion); yet he can have useful dominion as to his works.

Whence personal servitude, or a state of subjection by which someone, in exchange for sustenance, is bound to furnish all his works to another in perpetuity, of itself (abstracting from excess of oppression and tyranny) is not repugnant to natural right, although nevertheless it is less fitting to human dignity.²

² The Scriptures do not hold servitude as illicit: for Moses did not absolutely prohibit it but moderated it (cf. Ex. XX, 17; XXI, 2; Lev. XXV, 45-46; 54-55); and in the New Law they admonish masters to treat servants kindly, indeed they exhort them to free them, but do not command this (I Cor. VII, 20-24; Eph. VI, 9; Col. IV, 1; to Philem.). Yet Christian doctrine and the Church do not favor servitude, but always tend toward expelling servitude; and under their influence it happened that among cultivated nations servitude was abolished and now by positive law is illicit.

The Scholastics admitted four titles by which servitude could be constituted not unjustly: 1) purchase-sale or donation, both that by which someone freely reduces himself into servitude, for since man can transfer dominion of his own work for a time, he can also do this in perpetuity; and that by which someone already legitimately a servant is handed over by the master to another; 2) right of war, provided the war was just, which now contradicts the modern law of nations; 3) servile birth, by force of which those who were born from servants were held as servants; nevertheless this can seem less equitable if the servitude is perpetual; 4) penalty from a delict: for if someone has deserved death, this penalty can be commuted into servitude. Moreover, forced labor to which some guilty persons are condemned seems to be a certain servitude. - Cf. Billuart, diss. 3, art. 2; and Tanquerey, Th. M., t. III, de Virtute Iustitiae, n. 133-141.

169. Principle III. Concerning the intermediate goods of reputation and honor it must be said:

Man has strict and full dominion over these goods, because he acquires and increases honor and reputation for himself, like external goods, by his own acts and by manifestation of his moral and natural qualities; - and moreover because reputation is necessary for cultivating virtue and preserving peace in society with others.

Hence, just as man can reclaim in judgment an injury of reputation and honor, so he can also condone it; - indeed the very defamation of oneself of itself is not against justice, since man has full right over his reputation; although, if it is done without sufficient reason, it can be prodigality against charity toward oneself, or scandal against charity toward one's neighbor.

Yet per accidens it can be against justice, not indeed insofar as it is defamation of oneself, but by reason of others insofar as it harms one's neighbor, namely: if the reputation of one's neighbor depends upon one's own reputation, and from one's own infamy there follows the infamy of another (for example, of a father, monk, accomplice), or if reputation is necessary to oneself for fulfilling an office of justice, as the reputation of a bishop or pastor. Whence Augustine: Our life is necessary to us, our reputation to others.

170. Division of goods and various genera. - The various species of goods are divided variously:

A. Into corporeal and incorporeal goods (biens corporels et incorporels; stoffelijke en onstoffelijke goederen). The former are those which fall under the senses, such as a house, field, clothing, furniture, money; the latter are said to be those which are not presented to the senses but are perceived by the human intellect, namely, rights of fishing, hunting, receiving fruits, inheritance, etc.: for right is held after the manner of a good about which an owner can dispose.

B. Into movable and immovable goods (biens meubles et immeubles; roerende en onroerende goederen). The former are all things which are not immovable; the latter are those which either altogether, or at least in the state in which they are, cannot physically be transferred or transfer themselves while preserving their substance (C.C., a. 516 sq.).

The distinction of itself and from the nature of the thing falls upon external corporeal things, but by civil law it is also applied to incorporeal things, which by their nature are neither movable nor immovable, yet are judged so by reason of the object to which they are applied.

Therefore, by French law,³ 1st. immovable goods are held to be: a) by their nature, such as lands, buildings, forests, or crops as long as they adhere to the soil; b) by destination, such as animals, machines, and other objects assigned to cultivating fields (objets d'exploitation) or applied in perpetuity; c) by reason of the immovable object about which they are concerned, such as the real rights of usufruct, use, servitude, and mortgage from immovable things, and every real action upon an immovable thing (a. 517 sq.).

³ On this matter the Italian Code, a. 714 sq.; Spanish, a. 333 sq.; Dutch, a. 562 sq.; Austrian, a. 291 sq.; German, a. 90 sq.

2nd. Likewise movable goods can be: a) by their nature, such as ships, wagons, animals, furniture (a. 528); b) by determination of law, such as rights concerning movable things, or of receiving rents, shares in an anonymous society, etc. (a. 529 sq.).

C. Movables according to nature are 1) consumable (verbruikbare), which are consumed by first use, either physically through destruction or loss of form and properties (as happens in paper, food, and drink), or morally when the thing is alienated and by first use is drawn away (for example, money) or changed (cloths turned into clothing); - and 2) non-consumable (onverbruikbare), which are by no means destroyed or changed by first use, such as houses, furniture, clothes, a horse, etc.

D. Movables according to relative and accidental quality are fungible and non-fungible (vervangbare of onvervangbare). The former, in payment of a debt, according to common estimation, can supply other things of the same species and stand in their place, such as generally those things which are usually counted, measured, or weighed, for example, coined money, oil, wheat, sugar, wood for burning, etc. Non-fungible things cannot be substituted for another thing, but the same identical thing must be handed over, for example, this horse which I have carefully selected, this statue, this painting, etc.

Fungible things generally are at the same time consumable, and conversely. Yet there are exceptions: thus the last barrel of wine of such a year which is promised, or gold coins which are lent as a pledge, are consumable but not fungible; - on the opposite side, if one hundred acres of fields are promised to settlers, or if a bookseller asks for a copy of a book for selling, these are fungible but not consumable.