Sobriety

I. Notion of Sobriety. Sobriety is a moral virtue inclining man to moderate the pleasure of touch and taste in the use of intoxicating drink. It is said in the use of intoxicating drink; by these words its specific distinction from abstinence is indicated. For a special moral goodness is found in taking precaution lest the special pleasure of intoxicating drink be admitted against right reason.

II. Object of Sobriety. 1. The remote material object is constituted by intoxicating drinks; but the proximate object is the pleasures of touch and taste in the use of intoxicating drink.

2. The remote formal object is the reason of debt of preserving the mean of pleasure in the use of intoxicating drink; the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in moderating this pleasure.

III. Opposed Vices. By defect there is opposed drunkenness, by which someone uses intoxicating drink beyond the measure admitted by right reason; by excess, excessive sobriety, by which someone abstains from intoxicating drink against right reason.

Note. Concerning the virtues of abstinence and sobriety, it must be observed that in these the measure of reason must be determined from the end of foods and drinks, and of the pleasures which are joined to their use. Now this end is the preservation of the health of the body, and the suitable disposition of the mind for acting. Therefore right reason demands that in using food and drink, as an end and primarily, there be sought the preservation of the health of the body and the suitable disposition of the mind for acting; while the joined pleasures are licitly sought, but only secondarily and as a means to the end. Therefore proposition 8 was deservedly condemned by Innocent XI: "To eat and drink even to satiety for the sole sake of pleasure is not a sin, provided it does not harm health; because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its own acts."

The Parts of Temperance.—(a) The subjective parts or species of temperance are two, since there are two distinct objects of the virtue. These objects are the two delights of touch that are ruled by the virtue, namely, those associated with the nutritive and those associated with the generative function. The first subjective part of temperance includes abstemiousness as to food and sobriety as to drink; the second part includes chastity, as regards the principal sexual act (copulation), and decency or pudicity, as regards the secondary acts (kisses, touches, embraces, etc).

(b) The integral parts are also two, since there are two conditions for the perfect exercise of temperance. These conditions are the fear and avoidance of what is disgraceful (shamefacedness, reserve, or delicacy) and the love of what is honorable (virtue of propriety or refinement). Shamefacedness is a passion, but, as physical fearlessness is a disposition for moral courage, so is the fear of incurring reproach a preparation for virtue. Hence, this delicacy is a laudable passion, and is ascribed chiefly to temperance, whose opposite is chief among things disgraceful. Propriety is also assigned to temperance, because it is an attraction towards that which is spiritually good and beautiful, a habit most useful for temperance, which must subordinate the delightful to the good, the carnal to the spiritual.

(c) The potential parts of temperance are its minor or servant virtues. They resemble temperance inasmuch as their chief praise is in moderation, but they are inferior to it inasmuch as that which is moderated by them is less recalcitrant than the sexual or gustatory appetites. First among these potential parts are those whose task of moderating, while not of the greatest difficulty, is yet more than ordinarily difficult; and here we have continence, which calms a will agitated by immoderate passion, and meekness, which governs the passion of anger. Next among the potential parts are those whose task of moderating offers less or ordinary difficulty, because they keep in order matters less removed from reason. All the virtues of this second group are given the common name of modesty. They are reduced to four: humility and studiosity, which moderate the internal appetites of excellence and of learning respectively; modesty of bearing and modesty of living, which regulate respectively the external acts of the body and the external goods of food, drink, clothing, furnishings, etc.

Sobriety.—Sobriety in its strictest sense is a virtue that keeps one to the moderation of temperance in the liking for intoxicating liquors and in their use.

(a) Thus, sobriety is concerned with intoxicants, that is, with substances that produce a poisonous effect upon the nerves and brain. It is, therefore, a different virtue from abstemiousness, since it has to subdue a vice far more alluring and deleterious than gluttony. Alcohol has the same effect as a narcotic drug, for it benumbs both mind and body, sometimes to the point of insensibility, so that those who are under its influence are unable to think, speak or regulate their movements properly; but it gives a feeling of exhilaration and elevation and leaves behind it an insatiable craving, so that those who have once taken too much are very likely to repeat the act. Habitual intoxication breaks down both morals and health, and the toper goes to a disgraceful and early grave.

(b) Sobriety is concerned with liquors, that is, with beverages and medicines. But secondarily it also controls the appetite for narcotics, such as opium, chloroform, tobacco, and the desire to inhale strong liquors or vapors or gases which may produce intoxication.

Obligation to Practise Sobriety.—Sobriety should be cultivated by all, but certain ones are more bound to it than others.

(a) Thus, on account of the greater physical evils of insobriety in their regard, the virtue should be especially cultivated by the young, the old, women, and persons of sedentary life. Young people are greatly harmed by too much alcohol, because it stunts their growth and affects them more seriously in mind and body than adults. The old have not the strength to throw off the poison of too much stimulation and are accordingly more injured. Women, being more excitable than men, are more easily affected by strong drink, and hence among the ancient Romans females abstained from wine. Finally, those who lead a sedentary or indoor life do not so easily get the poison out of their systems, and they feel the evil effects more than those who live out of doors or who engage in manual work. But there is no constitution, however iron it may be, that is not conquered in the end by alcoholism.

(b) On account of the greater spiritual ills that result from their insobriety, the virtue of soberness is more imperative in certain individuals. Thus, there are some who do greater spiritual harm to themselves by intoxication, for example, the young, whose passions are more easily inflamed, and females, who are more readily taken advantage of; and hence St. Paul recommends sobriety to women and young men particularly (I Tim., iii. 11; Tit., ii. 6). There are also some who do greater harm to others by intoxication, such as those who should instruct others (Tit., ii. 2), or who should give good example (I Tim., iii. 2), or who are rulers over the people (Prov., xxxi. 4).

The Sins against Sobriety.—(a) The sin of excess may be called, for want of a special name, over-sobriety. It is committed by those who condemn all liking for or enjoyment of intoxicants as intrinsically evil (e.g., the Manichees, who said that wine was the gall of the devil); also by those who deny to themselves or others intoxicants when the use of them is necessary (e.g., the Encratites, who would allow only water for the Eucharist, or a fanatical teetotaler who would see a man die rather than give him a necessary dose of whisky).

(b) The sin of deficiency against sobriety is drunkenness, which is a voluntary and unjustified loss of the use of reason brought on by the consumption of too much intoxicating liquor. Drunkenness as a sin (active drunkenness), therefore, is to be distinguished from drunkenness as a condition (passive drunkenness). There is active drunkenness or the sin of drunkenness when intoxication is both voluntary and inexcusable; there is passive drunkenness or the mere state of drunkenness when one or the other of these two conditions is lacking. Usually those who sin by drunkenness seek the pleasure or forgetfulness which potations bring, but this is not essential, it seems, to the sin of inebriety; the malice of drunkenness is found not merely in the excessive pleasure, but especially in the subordination of spirit to the flesh and in the damage done to mind and body. Hence, a person who yields to the insistence of a banquet companion that he drink wine which is disgusting to him, is guilty of drunkenness if he takes too much.

The Morality of Total Abstinence.—(a) Obligation.—Per se, there is no obligation of abstaining from every or any kind of intoxicating beverage, either perpetually or temporarily, for food and drink were intended by God for the use of man and the moderate use of intoxicants, especially when the percentage of alcohol is light, is found by many to be a help to digestion, a refreshing stimulant, an excellent tonic and remedy. The example of Our Lord, who changed water into wine, who partook of wine at banquets, and who made wine one of the elements of the most sacred of rites, is proof that it is not sinful to drink strong liquors. This is also clearly taught in the Bible, which praises moderate drinking of wine (Ecclus., xxxi 36), recommends that a little be taken for a weak stomach (I Tim., v. 23), and declares that it is not what enters the mouth that defiles (Matt., xv. 2).

But, per accidens, there is an obligation of total abstinence when a greater good requires that one sacrifice intoxicants, whether the good be of self (e.g., when intoxicants are a serious danger to one’s health or morals, or when one is bound by vow or pledge to abstain from them) or of another (e.g., when the use of intoxicants gives serious scandal, Rom., xiv. 21). If the common safety is seriously imperilled through drunkenness, and obligatory abstinence can be enforced and will be the most reasonable method of correcting the evil, we can see no objection to prohibition laws. But whether these conditions exist in this or that particular place or case is a question of fact and has to be decided by impartial study.

(b) Lawfulness.—Per se, it is also permissible to abstain freely from all intoxicants, for the sake of some higher good (e.g., in order the better to apply the mind to studies, Ecclus., ii. 3), to silence calumnious tongues, to practise mortification, or to give good example. But, per accidens, it is not lawful to abstain when law (e.g., in the celebration of Mass) or necessity (e.g., a man dying from influenza who cannot be saved without whiskey) requires one to drink spirits. Examples of total abstinence are the Nazarites (Num., vi. 3), Samson (Judges, xiii. 7), Judith (Jud., xii. 2, 19), and John the Baptist (Luke, i. 15).

Licit Use of Narcotics.—There are a great many substances that produce the same effects on mind and body as intoxicating liquors, namely, the narcotic poisons, such as morphine, opium, chloroform, ether, or laughing gas. To them then will apply the principles given above in reference to strong drink. Thus, it would be a serious sin to make oneself insensible by using morphine, if there were no just reason; but it is lawful to take ether for an operation, gas when having a tooth pulled, morphine when it is ordered by a physician to relieve pain, etc. In his address of Feb. 24, 1957 to a symposium of the Italian Society of Anaesthesiology (The Pope Speaks, Summer, 1957, pp. 33 ff.) Pope Pius XII considered some special aspects of the use of drugs in the practice of analgesis. Among the questions submitted to him for consideration were the following:

1. Is there a general moral obligation to refuse analgesis and to accept physical pain in a spirit of faith? After indicating that in certain cases the acceptance of physical suffering is a matter of serious obligation, the Pope responded that there was no conflict with the spirit of faith to avoid pain by the use of narcotics. Pain can and does prevent the achievement of higher goods and interests and may licitly be avoided; obviously, too, the pain may be willingly accepted in fulfillment of the Christian duty of renunciation and of interior purification.

2. Is it lawful for the dying or the sick who are in danger of death to make use of narcotics when there are medical reasons for their use? The Pope responded; “Yes—provided that no other means exist, and if, in the given circumstances, that action does not prevent the carrying out of other moral and religious duties.” The duties referred to include settling important business, making a will, or going to confession. (Should a dying man refuse first to attend to these duties and persist in asking for narcotics, the doctor can administer the drugs without rendering himself guilty of formal co-operation in the fault committed, which results, not from the narcotics but from the immoral will of the patient.) Among the conditions and circumstances laid down for the licit use of narcotics in the case in question are the following: “if the dying person has received the last Sacraments, if medical reasons clearly suggest the use of anaesthesia, if in delivering the dose the permitted amount is not exceeded, if the intensity and duration of the treatment is carefully reckoned, and finally, if the patient consents to it, then there is no objection, the use of anaesthesia is morally permissible.”

3. Can narcotics be used even if the lessening of pain probably be accompanied by a shortening of life? The Pope responded that “every form of direct euthanasia, that is, the administration of a narcotic in order to produce or hasten death, is unlawful because in that case one presumes to dispose directly of life ... If between the narcotics and the shortening of life there exists no direct causal link, imposed either by the intention of the interested parties or by the nature of things (as would be the case if the suppression of the pain could be attained only by the shortening of life), and if, on the contrary, the administration of narcotics produces two distinct effects, one, the relief of pain and the other the shortening of life, then the action is lawful. However it must be determined whether there is a reasonable proportion between these two effects and whether the advantages of the one effect compensate for the disadvantages of the other. It is important also to ask oneself whether the present state of science does not make it possible for the same result to be obtained by other means. Finally, in the use of the narcotics, one should not go beyond the limits which are actually necessary.”

What is drunkenness? - The malice of drunkenness is in the voluntary privation, by an artificial, unnatural, and violent mode through immoderate intoxicating drink, of the use of reason, not merely negatively, as in sleep, but contrarily through the disturbance of reason. "Drunkenness is a mortal sin, because according to this man willingly and knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, by which he operates according to virtue and avoids sins; and thus he sins mortally by committing himself to danger of sinning. Hence drunkenness, speaking per se, is a mortal sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 150, a. 2; 1. 2. q. 88, a. 5 ad 1; Gal. 5:21; L. 75. Drunkenness is opposed to the virtue of sobriety, whose office is to apply measure "concerning drink, not any whatsoever, but that which by its smokiness is naturally apt to disturb the head, as wine, and everything which can intoxicate." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 149, a. 1. Alcoholism pertains to drunkenness. By alcoholism is signified drunkenness produced by alcoholic drinks, abuse of alcoholic drinks, and the grave effects produced by abuse of this sort. But since these effects, gravely harmful to health, are produced gradually, it is difficult practically to define when, by this reason, the sin begins to be grave.

332 bis. Note: The promise (the pledge), which is customary in America and other regions, of abstinence from every intoxicating drink, of itself brings no obligation under grave or under light sin. For it is a certain simple purpose, and the declaration made of it, of not drinking wine and other alcoholic drinks. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that it can also be made under sin. But societies which are established for extirpating the vice of drunkenness are greatly to be praised.

What is temperance, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Temperance is the virtue which moderates concupiscence and delight of sensible goods, especially in the delights of taste and touch, of which some regard conserving the individual, others conserving the species. Insensibility and intemperance are opposed to temperance. The former consists in this, that someone flees delight so much that he therefore omits even those things which are necessary for the conservation of nature. But the latter is the sin of excessive concupiscence. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141 seqq.; Quodl. 12, a. 22.

R. To the second and third. The integral parts of temperance are shamefacedness and honorableness. Through shamefacedness someone flees shamefulness contrary to temperance. Through honorableness someone loves the beauty of temperance. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143; q. 144; q. 145.

The subjective parts of temperance are: Abstinence, which moderates delight in the use of foods and non-intoxicating drink; and gluttony is opposed to it, cf. 329. - Sobriety, which moderates delight in the use of drink able to intoxicate; and drunkenness is opposed to it, cf. 332. - Chastity, which moderates according to right reason the principal delight of coitus itself; and lust is opposed to it, cf. 325. Modesty, which moderates surrounding delights, for instance in kisses, touches, embraces, looks. Sometimes, however, one is put for the other. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 146 seqq.

The potential parts of temperance are: Continence, which contains man in the good of reason against the pleasures of touch, especially venereal pleasures; and incontinence is opposed to it, which impels toward those delights and yields to them. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 155, 156. Meekness, which moderates the passion of anger according to right reason; and anger is opposed to it by excess, cf. n. 341 seq.; by defect, lack of anger, which does not stir up anger when it is required by charity or justice, by correcting and punishing. It does not have malice diverse from that of the omitted office to be fulfilled from charity or justice. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 158. Clemency, which is proper to Superiors, inclines one to impose lesser punishments than by right he could, because of kindness toward neighbor and the decorum of a Superior. Cruelty is opposed to it by excess, which from harshness of soul exacts punishments beyond measure; but by defect, excessive lenity, which mitigates punishments beyond measure or remits them altogether. Cruelty is distinguished from savagery, according to which someone in inflicting punishments does not consider any fault of the one who is punished, but only this, that he delights in the torment of men. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 159.

Modesty, by which someone moderates his internal and external motions and the arrangement of his things, by a measure fitting to him. Hence under modesty the following four virtues are numbered. Humility, which moderates the motions of the soul toward lofty things, and inclines us to profess our lowliness by internal and external signs. To humility is opposed by excess pride, cf. n. 321 seq.; and by defect excessive abjection of self, which inclines to immoderate self-abjection. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 160 seqq. Studiousness, which moderates the zeal of knowing according to the dictate of right reason. To it by excess is opposed curiosity, by which someone is impelled to applying superfluous diligence of knowing, from affection for knowledge alone. But by defect negligence is opposed to it, by which someone omits to acquire owed knowledge. Curiosity and negligence per se are light, per accidens grave, for instance if the former impels you to extort a secret from another, the latter incites a confessor to omit the study of Moral Theology. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 166 seqq.

Modesty of manners, which moderates the external gestures and motions of the body according to the norm of reason, so that namely they agree with the person, both in himself and considered with all circumstances of things. To modesty of manners is opposed by excess petulance, by which a foreign mode is assumed, not agreeing with one's own condition, or an overly common mode is shown; but by defect rusticity of manners, which does not preserve a fitting mode. Each is per se light. A species of modesty of manners is eutrapelia, which imposes due mode on games and places. By excess and by defect one can also sin in play, by scurrility and excessive austerity. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 168. Modesty of dress moderates the arrangement of external things according to the prescription of reason. For it is fitting that in human society each one wear clothing convenient to his own condition. Likewise by excess and by defect one can sin in this matter, which per se is only light. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 169.

The end of the precept is charity, through which we are induced to loving God and neighbor. Among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery seems especially to be opposed to love of neighbor, and therefore it is chiefly prohibited by the precepts of the Decalogue not only in deed, but also in heart, the sixth and ninth. - But virtues annexed to the virtue of temperance, as to their effects, can likewise rightly regard charity toward God and neighbor; as, for example, from anger, which is opposed to meekness, someone proceeds to blaspheming God, or to killing a man. And thus a precept is also present concerning these virtues, implicitly in the Decalogue, explicitly in other places of Scripture. As to the integral parts of temperance, shamefacedness and honorableness, cf. 1 Cor. 14:40; 1 Tim. 2:9. As to the subjective parts, abstinence, sobriety, chastity, cf. Num. 6:3; 1 Pet. 5:8; Col. 3:5. As to the potential parts, continence, clemency, meekness, modesty, humility, cf. Ecclus. 10:31; 30:24; Col. 3:12; 2 Tim. 2:24. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 170. Therefore the various precepts of the Decalogue contain precepts of moral virtues. But in the first precept, I am the Lord thy God, the precepts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, are also presuppositively and implicitly contained.

668. 1. On sobriety.

Sobriety is taken in a threefold sense: 1. generally, and then it signifies moderation in any matter whatsoever; in this sense St. Paul exhorts one "to be wise unto sobriety."¹²⁷³ 2. It is taken more strictly for the virtue of abstinence; for those are called sober not only who drink sparingly, but also who eat sparingly. 3. Taken in its proper sense, sobriety can be defined: a virtue moderating the affection for and use of intoxicating drink.

Sobriety taken in this last manner is a special virtue, because intoxicating drink is a special impediment to reason, insofar, namely, as by its fumes it disturbs the brain. For while immoderate pleasure in another drink disturbs only the order of reason, this immoderate pleasure in intoxicating drink disturbs the very organ of reason, namely, the brain, and impedes its action.¹²⁷⁴ Moreover, where there are customarily special temptations enticing one to act contrary to reason, there a special moral virtue must be posited for overcoming such temptations. But intoxicating drink greatly entices man to act contrary to right reason, as, alas, is evident from daily experience. Therefore, a special moral virtue must be posited for rightly moderating the affection for and use of intoxicating drink, and this virtue is sobriety.

Although sobriety is necessary for all men, nevertheless, as St. Thomas teaches,¹²⁷⁵ it is especially necessary for youths, women, and persons constituted in some dignity. Sobriety is indeed very necessary for youths, because on account of the heat of the blood there is in them a greater propensity toward concupiscences, which must be restrained through sobriety. Sobriety is most necessary for women, because, as sorrowful experience testifies, a woman given to drunkenness falls into every disgrace and vice. Sobriety is exceedingly necessary for persons constituted in some dignity (especially ecclesiastical persons), because reason ought to flourish in them for the instruction of others. But reason is disturbed by drunkenness, and persons constituted in dignity are customarily despised by inferiors if they frequently sin against the virtue of sobriety.

¹²⁷³ Rom. 12:3.

¹²⁷⁴ Cf. Cajetan, Comm. in 2, 2, q. 149, a. 4.

¹²⁷⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 149, a. 4.

669. 2. On drunkenness.

Notion. Drunkenness can be taken in two ways: in one way passively, insofar as it signifies the very defect of reason which occurs, for example, from much wine having been drunk, from which it comes about that a man is not master of his reason; and according to this, drunkenness or intoxication is a certain morbid state and rather a punishment and defect following from a preceding fault. In another way it is taken actively, insofar as drunkenness names the act by which someone falls into this defect. This act can cause drunkenness in two ways: in one way, from an excessive strength of the wine beyond the expectation of the drinker; and thus drunkenness can occur even without sin (in this manner Noah is believed to have become drunk). In another way, from an inordinate concupiscence and use of wine or of another intoxicating substance; and thus drunkenness is posited as a sin and is contained under gluttony generally taken, as a species under a genus; for gluttony generally taken is divided into feasting and drunkenness.¹²⁷⁶ Drunkenness (insofar as it is a sin) can therefore be defined:

A voluntary excess in intoxicating drink (or substance), committed unto the violent privation of the use of reason from an inordinate concupiscence for intoxicating liquor, that is, without relation to preserving health.

It is said, 1. a voluntary excess; for no act is a sin if will is absent. Hence the sin of drunkenness is not present unless the excess and the privation of the use of reason could and ought to have been foreseen by the drinker. Moreover, it is required that an excess truly be present, that is, that the drinking be altogether contrary to right reason; hence, if there were drinking which even brought on the privation of the use of reason, but which was nevertheless undertaken according to right reason for the health of the body, the sin of drunkenness would not be constituted. This seems also to be the mind of St. Thomas when he writes: "Food and drink are to be moderated according as befits bodily health. And therefore, just as it sometimes happens that food or drink which is moderate for a healthy man is excessive for a sick man, so conversely it can also happen that what is excessive for a healthy man is moderate for a sick man. And in this manner, when someone eats or drinks much according to medical counsel in order to provoke vomiting, the food or drink is not to be considered excessive."¹²⁷⁷

It is said, 2. in intoxicating drink or substance; for if the drink is not intoxicating, then the excess constitutes not the sin of drunkenness but of gluttony. Nevertheless, too much insistence is not to be placed upon the word drink; for those who, even by means of other substances, contrary to right reason deprive themselves of the use of reason commit the same sin, which is drunkenness.¹²⁷⁸ Sins of this kind are the abuse of opium, against which the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith issued several statutes; likewise the abuse of morphine, which is so pernicious and which often grows into so-called morphinomania; and, in general, the abuse of all means which are called anesthetics or narcotics by physicians.

It is said, 3. unto the violent privation of the use of reason; for the use of reason is interrupted in a natural manner through sleep. If through drink there occurs a complete violent privation of the use of reason, there is also complete drunkenness; but if the use of reason is not completely lost, then there is imperfect drunkenness. He is considered, for example, to labor under complete drunkenness who, after taking intoxicating drink, does altogether unusual and irrational things; who no longer knows how to discern between good and evil; who on the following day does not remember even notable things which he said or did under the influence of intoxicating drink. Drunkenness, however, is considered imperfect if the imagination is indeed somewhat disturbed, the tongue not so ready, the senses somewhat clouded, and the feet unsteady, but the man nevertheless still remains master of himself and does nothing irrational.

It is said, 4. from an inordinate concupiscence for intoxicating liquor, that is, without relation to preserving health. There are indeed several theologians (Billuart, Concina, Collet) who do not admit this clause, teaching that drunkenness is present even if the intoxicating drink was taken not from inordinate concupiscence but for another reason. Nevertheless, this seems alien both to the truth and to the mind of the Angelic Doctor, who in the place cited above requires for the sin of drunkenness that the excess in intoxicating drink arise from an inordinate concupiscence and use of wine.¹²⁷⁹ Therefore, it does not seem unlawful that someone, in order to avoid an immediately impending typhoid fever, take (as is sometimes counseled by physicians) a large quantity of cognac, although he falls into drunkenness. For such a quantity of that intoxicating liquor is mere medicine, nor is any inordination present if someone for a brief time deprives himself of the use of reason in order to expel a disease;¹²⁸⁰ otherwise, it would also be unlawful to use chloroform and other narcotic medicines before a surgical operation, which certainly no one would say. Nevertheless, it is not lawful to infer from this that the sin of drunkenness is present only when someone has taken intoxicating liquor with sensible pleasure; for it often happens that a man exceeds in intoxicating drink because of vain human fear, in order to drive away sadness, etc., without any pleasure; and nevertheless, even in these circumstances the sin of drunkenness is present. Therefore, it suffices for the sin of drunkenness that someone take intoxicating liquor to excess unto the privation of the use of reason, without bodily health demanding this. For drink was ordained by the Creator for the health of the body; consequently, man sins if he uses it otherwise, especially unto the privation of the use of reason. Therefore, it is never lawful to make oneself drunk except for preserving bodily health, because otherwise an inordination against the will of the Creator is always present. Hence those doctors (Lessius, Busembaum, Lacroix, Noldin, etc.) do not seem to teach correctly who assert that drunkenness is not evil if it is induced from any honorable motive whatsoever, "provided the harm of the temporary privation of the use of reason is sufficiently compensated by the good on account of which it is permitted and the disturbance of reason is not intended."¹²⁸¹ St. Augustine¹²⁸² says the contrary: "The drunken are accustomed to excuse themselves in such a way that they say: a powerful person compelled me to drink more, and at the banquet of a king I could not do otherwise. We put these things forward as excuses for excusing sins.... Even if it came to this, that it were said to you: Either you will drink, or you will die, it would be better that your sober flesh be killed than that your soul should die through drunkenness." Concina¹²⁸³ inveighs with sufficiently sharp satire against those authors: "Father Busembaum placed in the definition of drunkenness that it is unlawful without a just and grave cause. On the contrary, if a just and grave cause is present, then it becomes lawful and honorable. Is a city to be betrayed? Let the traitor be made drunk. Are you to be carried off into servitude? Let the captor be made drunk. Are you unjustly detained in prison? Make the guard drunk. Are you unable to sleep? Make yourself drunk. Does he refuse to disclose a secret which he is bound to disclose? Make him drunk. These things seem like dreams."¹²⁸⁴

¹²⁷⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 150, a. 1.

¹²⁷⁷ Ib., a. 2 ad 3.

¹²⁷⁸ Billuart thinks that such a sin does not properly fall under drunkenness (De temperant. diss. 3, a. 2).

¹²⁷⁹ Cf. also S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 5 ad 1.

¹²⁸⁰ Thus also St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 76.

¹²⁸¹ Noldin, De principiis n. 345 (2).

¹²⁸² Sermon 232, or more truly St. Caesarius, Sermon 245 in the appendix to the works of St. Augustine (Migne, Patr. lat. 39, 2307).

¹²⁸³ De pecc. et virt. l. 4, n. 12.

¹²⁸⁴ St. Alphonsus agrees, Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 76.

670. Malice of drunkenness. The malice of complete and imperfect drunkenness must be distinguished.

1. Complete drunkenness (as it has just been explained) is a mortal sin of its kind. Thus holds the opinion which today is most common and certain.¹²⁸⁵ It is proved:

a) From Sacred Scripture, which vehemently reproves drunkenness and numbers it among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of God: "Neither thieves, nor the covetous, nor drunkards ... shall possess the kingdom of God."¹²⁸⁶

b) From St. Thomas, who has these words: "Concerning drunkenness it must be said that according to its nature it has the character of a mortal sin. For that a man without necessity render himself incapable of using reason, through which man is ordered to God and avoids many sins that occur, from the sole pleasure of wine, is expressly contrary to virtue."¹²⁸⁷ But since the Angelic Doctor so expressly teaches that drunkenness according to its nature is a mortal sin, other places in his works in which he does not speak so expressly are to be interpreted according to the text of the Summa theologica, which is his principal and most perfect work. The places to be so interpreted are: II, dist. 24, q. 3, art. 6; De malo q. 7, art. 4 ad 1; De malo q. 2, art. 8 ad 3; cf. also Cajetan's Commentary on 2, 2, q. 150, art. 2. Certain theologians assert that St. Thomas when older changed the opinion he had previously proposed.

c) From reason. It is gravely repugnant to right reason: α) that a man knowingly and willingly deprives himself violently of the use of reason from the pleasure of wine, without the necessity of health requiring it; β) that he exposes himself to the danger of sinning; γ) that he furnishes the proximate occasion for several other evils, for example, of health, family, fortune, society, etc., as is customarily done through drunkenness; moreover, δ) drunkenness is a grave abuse of drink granted to us by the Creator solely for preserving the health of the body. For man is the steward of God and therefore cannot use things according to his own pleasure, but according to the will of God. Therefore, voluntary drunkenness is a mortal sin of its kind. Indeed, complete drunkenness, procured with full voluntariness and without regard for the utility of bodily health, seems always to be a mortal sin; and therefore we do not admit the opinion defended by Lacroix,¹²⁸⁸ Noldin,¹²⁸⁹ and others, who say that even complete drunkenness is not a mortal sin unless it is prolonged beyond an hour. For whenever complete drunkenness is present, its whole malice is also committed, which by no means consists solely in the inordinate and violent privation of the use of reason, as has been proved. Lightness of matter in drunkenness, therefore, is not to be weighed according to its duration, but according to the greater or lesser abuse of intoxicating drink.

2. Imperfect drunkenness is of itself only a venial sin. The reason is that such drunkenness is of itself a light inordination which does not destroy the use of reason. When a sufficient cause, even an extrinsic one, is present, for example, for driving away melancholy, at weddings and other worldly festivities, imperfect drunkenness is of itself no sin, unless scandal or another grave inconvenience nevertheless arises from it. Hence to drink unto hilarity is not indeed unlawful of itself,¹²⁹⁰ but a cleric, a head of a household, and other persons constituted in dignity ought to avoid hilarity of this kind, since grave scandal and other grave inconveniences can easily arise from it.

Authors ask here whether there is a grave sin of drunkenness if someone takes such a quantity of intoxicating liquor that drunkenness would naturally follow from it unless it were artificially prevented, for example, through some medicine or through vomiting deliberately procured. Those who place the essence of drunkenness in the violent privation of the use of reason through intoxicating drink must answer negatively, since the privation of the use of reason is not actually present; but in this case there certainly is an enormous excess in intoxicating drink, although the privation of the use of reason does not follow accidentally. Moreover, health is customarily gravely injured and scandal given by such a manner of acting. Hence, in practice, such gluttons are scarcely excused from mortal sin.

¹²⁸⁵ In the time of the Scholastics many authors, led by some apocryphal text of St. Augustine, thought that drunkenness of itself was not a mortal sin unless it was habitual or arose from an evil end; cf. Joseph Membres, La sobriété. Luther taught the same: "Then I would allow you a good bout of drunkenness, for drunkenness is tolerable, but habitual drunkenness by no means" (in Grisar, Luther II, 256).

¹²⁸⁶ 1 Cor. 6:10; cf. Isa. 5:11; Gal. 5:21.

¹²⁸⁷ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 5 ad 1; cf. 2, 2, q. 150, a. 2.

¹²⁸⁸ In St. Alphonsus, l.c.

¹²⁸⁹ De principiis n. 346.

¹²⁹⁰ Noldin, l.c. n. 345.

671. Corollaries. 1. From what has been said it follows that drunkenness is never lawful, nor is it lawful directly to induce another to drunkenness. For just as it is not lawful to induce someone to fornication, as being contrary to the existing natural law, so also it is not lawful to induce someone to drunkenness. Several theologians indeed¹²⁹¹ teach that it is lawful to induce someone even to formal drunkenness so that he may be prevented from committing a graver evil, for example, sacrilege or homicide. But this is rightly denied by others, because this is nothing other than positively persuading someone to sin. Certainly, it is lawful for a grave cause to cooperate materially in drunkenness, as was said above, I, n. 619, concerning cooperation; consequently, for a grave cause it is lawful to set intoxicating liquors before those who are foreseen to be about to make themselves drunk. In practice, the rules given concerning the indirect voluntary must then be applied, namely, when it is lawful to posit a cause from which a twofold effect follows, one good and the other evil.¹²⁹²

2. Sins committed in drunkenness are to be imputed in the manner in which they were foreseen. Thus, at least, if there is question of complete drunkenness, by which the use of reason is wholly lost; for sins perpetrated in imperfect drunkenness are imputed at least partially even if they were not foreseen, because reason is then not totally clouded. Generally speaking, sins which were committed in a first complete drunkenness are not mortal sins, since they could not have been foreseen even in a confused manner. But sins which are committed during drunkenness by those drinkers who have an evil habit of making themselves drunk commonly must be imputed, because they could and ought to have been foreseen.

¹²⁹¹ Busembaum, Lessius, Sanchez, Diana, Gobat, St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 77), Göpfert (Moraltheol. II, n. 208), etc.

¹²⁹² Cf. above, I, n. 57.

672. On the use of morphine, opium, cocaine, chloroform, ether, and other narcotic remedies.

The older authors do not speak of these things, since they were unknown at that time; but in our times these remedies are in daily use. All these remedies taken in a large quantity are deadly; indeed, sometimes even when employed moderately and according to the requirements of the art they cause sudden death. According to a modern statistical review, in every 3,000 instances in which chloroform was employed by physicians, death occurred once.¹²⁹³ Therefore, some danger to life, although not so proximate, is always joined with the use of medicines of this kind. There is added that such use, even moderate, if it endures for a longer time, gravely harms bodily health and provokes a most vehement craving for morphine, etc., which is called morphinomania and by other names by physicians, and which can be overcome with much greater difficulty than even an inveterate habit of drunkenness. From all these things it is evident that the use of remedies of this kind is dangerous and is to be avoided unless necessity demands otherwise. And this is all the more so because all these narcotic remedies interrupt the use of reason for a time. Hence it is a grave sin to use these remedies without a grave cause. Their use, however, seems lawful in the following cases, provided nevertheless that they are always employed according to the rules of the medical art:

1. In greater surgical operations, so that, namely, the sick person may yield himself without resistance to the hands of the surgeon and may not feel the bitter pains.

2. For alleviating pains even if they are not so atrocious, at least if there is question of a very brief narcosis, such as that which is caused by means of weaker narcotics, for example, Lachgas [laughing gas], laughing gas, gaz hilarant [laughing gas]; or if there is question of an imperfect narcosis in which the use of reason is not wholly taken away. Such imperfect narcoses seem lawful in the extraction of a tooth and even in ordinary childbirth.¹²⁹⁴ Moralists do not agree whether in the article of death it is lawful to administer narcotic remedies to a dying person so that he may not feel pain so vehemently, or for procuring so-called euthanasia (εὖ, θάνατος [well, death]). It is certainly better if this is not done, since by patiently tolerating those pains the dying person may alleviate the punishments of sins and of purgatory; but if the pains are excessively atrocious, and especially if there is a founded fear that after receiving the sacraments the dying person may sin by sins of impatience and murmuring against God, there is no reason why the physician cannot administer soporific remedies, provided they do not shorten life.¹²⁹⁵

¹²⁹³ Cf. Capellmann-Bergmann, Pastoralmedizin, 19th ed., 84.

¹²⁹⁴ Cf. ib., 47.

¹²⁹⁵ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, 893; Marc, Inst. mor. I, 761.

673. Scholion. On remedies against alcoholism. In our days alcoholism, that is, the vice of indulging too much in intoxicating liquors, spreads widely in almost all regions, and most grave evils arise from it. It is scarcely possible to enumerate all the evils which are customarily produced by alcoholism. Excellent men have written entire books concerning the close relation between alcoholism and criminality.¹²⁹⁶ Every priest is bound, according to his ability, to commend and spread remedies against the pernicious evil of alcoholism. The first and best remedy is good instruction concerning these evils, and indeed instruction to be given not only frequently from the pulpit in church, but especially also to youths in schools and colleges. The second and efficacious remedy is the good example both of parents and especially of priests. A pastor would speak altogether in vain against alcoholism if he himself were a drinker or indulged too much in wine. The third remedy consists in those Catholic associations of temperance or abstinence which in our times have happily been established in all regions. Let priests not only refrain from holding these associations in little account, but also prudently foster them. Already innumerable men and women addicted to drunkenness have been cured of their vices by the aid of these societies. Finally, the diligent exercise of the Christian religion, which inculcates temperance and mortification, furnishes an efficacious remedy. But if all these remedies are either despised by the drunken or have produced no effect, then care must be taken that such persons be received into some hospital designated for curing alcoholics. This last remedy is almost always necessary for those who are addicted to morphinism. For experience establishes that morphine addicts of this kind have lost all resistance of the will.

¹²⁹⁶ Cf. Hugo Hoppe, Alkohol und Kriminalität, Wiesbaden, 1906; C. Wright, Influence of Intemperance upon Crime, Boston, 1889.

S. Th. II-II, q. 149.

981. Sobriety (soberheid) is named from preserving bria, that is, measure. In general it signifies any moderation whatsoever (Rom. 12:3); less broadly it is taken for every moderation of temperance (Wis. 8:7; Tit. 2:12; 1 Tim. 2:9), especially of abstinence; in the strictest sense, for the moderation of intoxicating drink (Eccli. 31:32), in which it is best and most difficult to preserve measure, "because measured use contributes much, and immoderate excess harms much, because by its fumes it disturbs the head and impedes the use of reason even more than excess of food." Therefore sobriety is a virtue moderating the affection for and use of intoxicating drink.

It is a virtue, because it renders man perfect: for it is best to preserve measure in that in which it is most difficult to preserve it. It is one virtue, because it has one object: the pleasures of intoxicating drink to be moderated. It is a special virtue: for where there is a special impediment of reason, there it is necessary that there be a special virtue to remove it. But intoxicating drink is a special impediment of the use of reason, because of man's greater proneness toward intoxicating drink, and because of the graver harms which excess in such drink brings with it, insofar as it disturbs the brain by its fumes.

982. Sobriety is distinguished from abstinence. - The object is different: to preserve measure in drink as delightful in itself, and to preserve measure in drink delightful from a fume disturbing the use of reason.

Namely, it belongs to one account that the delightful is from this, that because of its fume it is intoxicating and impedes the good of reason; it belongs to another account that the delightful impedes the good of reason from its mere immoderation. For from immoderation the rectitude of reason is first taken away, and if it is vehement, consequently also the use of reason; hence in these matters to impede the use of reason belongs to the same vice as immoderation. But another passion first and directly tends to impede the use of reason, and from this first has that it is inordinate; hence in these matters to impede the use of reason is one vice, and immoderation of the passion in itself another, just as one virtue preserves the use of reason, and another moderates the passion in itself. Cf. Cajetan and Ill. Waffelaert, on a. 2.

983. The use of wine or of another intoxicating drink is not per se and totally illicit (1 Tim. 5:23; Eccli. 31:36), for no food or drink considered in itself is illicit (Mt. 15:11). But it can be illicit accidentally: a) from the condition of the one drinking, who is easily harmed by wine, or because he is obligated by a special vow not to drink wine; b) from the mode of drinking, namely because he exceeds measure; c) from the side of others who are scandalized.

984. To whom sobriety especially belongs. - Although sobriety belongs to all, because all must flee disturbance of mind, yet for a particular reason it belongs especially to some:

a) because of a greater necessity for restraining: 1) to adolescents (Tit. 2:6), because on account of their ardor there is in them a greater proneness to concupiscences, which must be restrained by virtue; 2) to women (1 Tim. 3:11), because they are more easily disturbed, and in them there is not sufficient strength of mind for resisting concupiscences;

b) because of a greater necessity for their operation: 3) to old men (Tit. 2:2), because in them reason ought to flourish for the instruction of others; 4) to those who preside over others (Prov. 31:4), because they ought to rule the people by wisdom, especially if they preside in spiritual matters, because with devout mind they ought to apply themselves to spiritual offices (1 Tim. 3:2).

Sobriety is akin to abstinence: the latter exercises moderation in foods; the former in drinks. Concerning this, Ecclesiasticus 31: Wine was created for joy among men, in sobriety, etc.

That this is a special virtue is proved, because it has a special difficulty in removing an impediment contrary to reason. Such is sobriety, which labors in temperance with regard to wine, which disturbs reason. On which the Holy Doctor in the Diaeta, tit. 3. de Consiliis Euang. cap. 4.

I assert secondly, that the drinking of wine is not of itself illicit. Thus against certain ancient heretics, St. Thomas quaest. 194. art. 3. citing St. Jerome lib. 1. cont. Iouinian. as is also related in Can. Ab exordio, dist. 35.

It is proved from Ecclesiasticus 31: Wine was created from the beginning for joy, and not for drunkenness. Wine moderately drunk is the exultation of the soul and heart. The same is granted in 1 Timothy 5. But that many evils arise from wine by accident is clear from Ecclesiasticus 31. See St. Bonaventure, serm. 2. Dominica prima post Epiphaniam.

I assert thirdly, that sobriety is necessary for the young, and for women because of their proneness to pleasures; but for the old, and for honored persons, that they preserve the rigor of reason. Thus St. Thomas, quaest. 149. art. 4. This the Apostle teaches in 1 Timoth. 3. Titus 2.

Hence among the Romans there was a law that women should not drink wine, as St. Bonaventure notes, serm. 2. de S. Antonio Paduano, as Valerius Maximus relates, lib. 2. cap. 1.