Article — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Article III. On Sobriety and the Opposed Vice, That Is, Drunkenness

668.

668. 1. On sobriety.

Sobriety is taken in a threefold sense: 1. generally, and then it signifies moderation in any matter whatsoever; in this sense St. Paul exhorts one "to be wise unto sobriety."1273 2. It is taken more strictly for the virtue of abstinence; for those are called sober not only who drink sparingly, but also who eat sparingly. 3. Taken in its proper sense, sobriety can be defined: a virtue moderating the affection for and use of intoxicating drink.

Sobriety taken in this last manner is a special virtue, because intoxicating drink is a special impediment to reason, insofar, namely, as by its fumes it disturbs the brain. For while immoderate pleasure in another drink disturbs only the order of reason, this immoderate pleasure in intoxicating drink disturbs the very organ of reason, namely, the brain, and impedes its action.1274 Moreover, where there are customarily special temptations enticing one to act contrary to reason, there a special moral virtue must be posited for overcoming such temptations. But intoxicating drink greatly entices man to act contrary to right reason, as, alas, is evident from daily experience. Therefore, a special moral virtue must be posited for rightly moderating the affection for and use of intoxicating drink, and this virtue is sobriety.

Although sobriety is necessary for all men, nevertheless, as St. Thomas teaches,1275 it is especially necessary for youths, women, and persons constituted in some dignity. Sobriety is indeed very necessary for youths, because on account of the heat of the blood there is in them a greater propensity toward concupiscences, which must be restrained through sobriety. Sobriety is most necessary for women, because, as sorrowful experience testifies, a woman given to drunkenness falls into every disgrace and vice. Sobriety is exceedingly necessary for persons constituted in some dignity (especially ecclesiastical persons), because reason ought to flourish in them for the instruction of others. But reason is disturbed by drunkenness, and persons constituted in dignity are customarily despised by inferiors if they frequently sin against the virtue of sobriety.

1273 Rom. 12:3.

1274 Cf. Cajetan, Comm. in 2, 2, q. 149, a. 4.

1275 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 149, a. 4.

669.

669. 2. On drunkenness.

Notion. Drunkenness can be taken in two ways: in one way passively, insofar as it signifies the very defect of reason which occurs, for example, from much wine having been drunk, from which it comes about that a man is not master of his reason; and according to this, drunkenness or intoxication is a certain morbid state and rather a punishment and defect following from a preceding fault. In another way it is taken actively, insofar as drunkenness names the act by which someone falls into this defect. This act can cause drunkenness in two ways: in one way, from an excessive strength of the wine beyond the expectation of the drinker; and thus drunkenness can occur even without sin (in this manner Noah is believed to have become drunk). In another way, from an inordinate concupiscence and use of wine or of another intoxicating substance; and thus drunkenness is posited as a sin and is contained under gluttony generally taken, as a species under a genus; for gluttony generally taken is divided into feasting and drunkenness.1276 Drunkenness (insofar as it is a sin) can therefore be defined:

A voluntary excess in intoxicating drink (or substance), committed unto the violent privation of the use of reason from an inordinate concupiscence for intoxicating liquor, that is, without relation to preserving health.

It is said, 1. a voluntary excess; for no act is a sin if will is absent. Hence the sin of drunkenness is not present unless the excess and the privation of the use of reason could and ought to have been foreseen by the drinker. Moreover, it is required that an excess truly be present, that is, that the drinking be altogether contrary to right reason; hence, if there were drinking which even brought on the privation of the use of reason, but which was nevertheless undertaken according to right reason for the health of the body, the sin of drunkenness would not be constituted. This seems also to be the mind of St. Thomas when he writes: "Food and drink are to be moderated according as befits bodily health. And therefore, just as it sometimes happens that food or drink which is moderate for a healthy man is excessive for a sick man, so conversely it can also happen that what is excessive for a healthy man is moderate for a sick man. And in this manner, when someone eats or drinks much according to medical counsel in order to provoke vomiting, the food or drink is not to be considered excessive."1277

It is said, 2. in intoxicating drink or substance; for if the drink is not intoxicating, then the excess constitutes not the sin of drunkenness but of gluttony. Nevertheless, too much insistence is not to be placed upon the word drink; for those who, even by means of other substances, contrary to right reason deprive themselves of the use of reason commit the same sin, which is drunkenness.1278 Sins of this kind are the abuse of opium, against which the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith issued several statutes; likewise the abuse of morphine, which is so pernicious and which often grows into so-called morphinomania; and, in general, the abuse of all means which are called anesthetics or narcotics by physicians.

It is said, 3. unto the violent privation of the use of reason; for the use of reason is interrupted in a natural manner through sleep. If through drink there occurs a complete violent privation of the use of reason, there is also complete drunkenness; but if the use of reason is not completely lost, then there is imperfect drunkenness. He is considered, for example, to labor under complete drunkenness who, after taking intoxicating drink, does altogether unusual and irrational things; who no longer knows how to discern between good and evil; who on the following day does not remember even notable things which he said or did under the influence of intoxicating drink. Drunkenness, however, is considered imperfect if the imagination is indeed somewhat disturbed, the tongue not so ready, the senses somewhat clouded, and the feet unsteady, but the man nevertheless still remains master of himself and does nothing irrational.

It is said, 4. from an inordinate concupiscence for intoxicating liquor, that is, without relation to preserving health. There are indeed several theologians (Billuart, Concina, Collet) who do not admit this clause, teaching that drunkenness is present even if the intoxicating drink was taken not from inordinate concupiscence but for another reason. Nevertheless, this seems alien both to the truth and to the mind of the Angelic Doctor, who in the place cited above requires for the sin of drunkenness that the excess in intoxicating drink arise from an inordinate concupiscence and use of wine.1279 Therefore, it does not seem unlawful that someone, in order to avoid an immediately impending typhoid fever, take (as is sometimes counseled by physicians) a large quantity of cognac, although he falls into drunkenness. For such a quantity of that intoxicating liquor is mere medicine, nor is any inordination present if someone for a brief time deprives himself of the use of reason in order to expel a disease;1280 otherwise, it would also be unlawful to use chloroform and other narcotic medicines before a surgical operation, which certainly no one would say. Nevertheless, it is not lawful to infer from this that the sin of drunkenness is present only when someone has taken intoxicating liquor with sensible pleasure; for it often happens that a man exceeds in intoxicating drink because of vain human fear, in order to drive away sadness, etc., without any pleasure; and nevertheless, even in these circumstances the sin of drunkenness is present. Therefore, it suffices for the sin of drunkenness that someone take intoxicating liquor to excess unto the privation of the use of reason, without bodily health demanding this. For drink was ordained by the Creator for the health of the body; consequently, man sins if he uses it otherwise, especially unto the privation of the use of reason. Therefore, it is never lawful to make oneself drunk except for preserving bodily health, because otherwise an inordination against the will of the Creator is always present. Hence those doctors (Lessius, Busembaum, Lacroix, Noldin, etc.) do not seem to teach correctly who assert that drunkenness is not evil if it is induced from any honorable motive whatsoever, "provided the harm of the temporary privation of the use of reason is sufficiently compensated by the good on account of which it is permitted and the disturbance of reason is not intended."1281 St. Augustine1282 says the contrary: "The drunken are accustomed to excuse themselves in such a way that they say: a powerful person compelled me to drink more, and at the banquet of a king I could not do otherwise. We put these things forward as excuses for excusing sins.... Even if it came to this, that it were said to you: Either you will drink, or you will die, it would be better that your sober flesh be killed than that your soul should die through drunkenness." Concina1283 inveighs with sufficiently sharp satire against those authors: "Father Busembaum placed in the definition of drunkenness that it is unlawful without a just and grave cause. On the contrary, if a just and grave cause is present, then it becomes lawful and honorable. Is a city to be betrayed? Let the traitor be made drunk. Are you to be carried off into servitude? Let the captor be made drunk. Are you unjustly detained in prison? Make the guard drunk. Are you unable to sleep? Make yourself drunk. Does he refuse to disclose a secret which he is bound to disclose? Make him drunk. These things seem like dreams."1284

1276 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 150, a. 1.

1277 Ib., a. 2 ad 3.

1278 Billuart thinks that such a sin does not properly fall under drunkenness (De temperant. diss. 3, a. 2).

1279 Cf. also S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 5 ad 1.

1280 Thus also St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 76.

1281 Noldin, De principiis n. 345 (2).

1282 Sermon 232, or more truly St. Caesarius, Sermon 245 in the appendix to the works of St. Augustine (Migne, Patr. lat. 39, 2307).

1283 De pecc. et virt. l. 4, n. 12.

1284 St. Alphonsus agrees, Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 76.

670.

670. Malice of drunkenness. The malice of complete and imperfect drunkenness must be distinguished.

1. Complete drunkenness (as it has just been explained) is a mortal sin of its kind. Thus holds the opinion which today is most common and certain.1285 It is proved:

a) From Sacred Scripture, which vehemently reproves drunkenness and numbers it among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of God: "Neither thieves, nor the covetous, nor drunkards ... shall possess the kingdom of God."1286

b) From St. Thomas, who has these words: "Concerning drunkenness it must be said that according to its nature it has the character of a mortal sin. For that a man without necessity render himself incapable of using reason, through which man is ordered to God and avoids many sins that occur, from the sole pleasure of wine, is expressly contrary to virtue."1287 But since the Angelic Doctor so expressly teaches that drunkenness according to its nature is a mortal sin, other places in his works in which he does not speak so expressly are to be interpreted according to the text of the Summa theologica, which is his principal and most perfect work. The places to be so interpreted are: II, dist. 24, q. 3, art. 6; De malo q. 7, art. 4 ad 1; De malo q. 2, art. 8 ad 3; cf. also Cajetan's Commentary on 2, 2, q. 150, art. 2. Certain theologians assert that St. Thomas when older changed the opinion he had previously proposed.

c) From reason. It is gravely repugnant to right reason: α) that a man knowingly and willingly deprives himself violently of the use of reason from the pleasure of wine, without the necessity of health requiring it; β) that he exposes himself to the danger of sinning; γ) that he furnishes the proximate occasion for several other evils, for example, of health, family, fortune, society, etc., as is customarily done through drunkenness; moreover, δ) drunkenness is a grave abuse of drink granted to us by the Creator solely for preserving the health of the body. For man is the steward of God and therefore cannot use things according to his own pleasure, but according to the will of God. Therefore, voluntary drunkenness is a mortal sin of its kind. Indeed, complete drunkenness, procured with full voluntariness and without regard for the utility of bodily health, seems always to be a mortal sin; and therefore we do not admit the opinion defended by Lacroix,1288 Noldin,1289 and others, who say that even complete drunkenness is not a mortal sin unless it is prolonged beyond an hour. For whenever complete drunkenness is present, its whole malice is also committed, which by no means consists solely in the inordinate and violent privation of the use of reason, as has been proved. Lightness of matter in drunkenness, therefore, is not to be weighed according to its duration, but according to the greater or lesser abuse of intoxicating drink.

2. Imperfect drunkenness is of itself only a venial sin. The reason is that such drunkenness is of itself a light inordination which does not destroy the use of reason. When a sufficient cause, even an extrinsic one, is present, for example, for driving away melancholy, at weddings and other worldly festivities, imperfect drunkenness is of itself no sin, unless scandal or another grave inconvenience nevertheless arises from it. Hence to drink unto hilarity is not indeed unlawful of itself,1290 but a cleric, a head of a household, and other persons constituted in dignity ought to avoid hilarity of this kind, since grave scandal and other grave inconveniences can easily arise from it.

Authors ask here whether there is a grave sin of drunkenness if someone takes such a quantity of intoxicating liquor that drunkenness would naturally follow from it unless it were artificially prevented, for example, through some medicine or through vomiting deliberately procured. Those who place the essence of drunkenness in the violent privation of the use of reason through intoxicating drink must answer negatively, since the privation of the use of reason is not actually present; but in this case there certainly is an enormous excess in intoxicating drink, although the privation of the use of reason does not follow accidentally. Moreover, health is customarily gravely injured and scandal given by such a manner of acting. Hence, in practice, such gluttons are scarcely excused from mortal sin.

1285 In the time of the Scholastics many authors, led by some apocryphal text of St. Augustine, thought that drunkenness of itself was not a mortal sin unless it was habitual or arose from an evil end; cf. Joseph Membres, La sobriété. Luther taught the same: "Then I would allow you a good bout of drunkenness, for drunkenness is tolerable, but habitual drunkenness by no means" (in Grisar, Luther II, 256).

1286 1 Cor. 6:10; cf. Isa. 5:11; Gal. 5:21.

1287 S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 5 ad 1; cf. 2, 2, q. 150, a. 2.

1288 In St. Alphonsus, l.c.

1289 De principiis n. 346.

1290 Noldin, l.c. n. 345.

671.

671. Corollaries. 1. From what has been said it follows that drunkenness is never lawful, nor is it lawful directly to induce another to drunkenness. For just as it is not lawful to induce someone to fornication, as being contrary to the existing natural law, so also it is not lawful to induce someone to drunkenness. Several theologians indeed1291 teach that it is lawful to induce someone even to formal drunkenness so that he may be prevented from committing a graver evil, for example, sacrilege or homicide. But this is rightly denied by others, because this is nothing other than positively persuading someone to sin. Certainly, it is lawful for a grave cause to cooperate materially in drunkenness, as was said above, I, n. 619, concerning cooperation; consequently, for a grave cause it is lawful to set intoxicating liquors before those who are foreseen to be about to make themselves drunk. In practice, the rules given concerning the indirect voluntary must then be applied, namely, when it is lawful to posit a cause from which a twofold effect follows, one good and the other evil.1292

  1. Sins committed in drunkenness are to be imputed in the manner in which they were foreseen. Thus, at least, if there is question of complete drunkenness, by which the use of reason is wholly lost; for sins perpetrated in imperfect drunkenness are imputed at least partially even if they were not foreseen, because reason is then not totally clouded. Generally speaking, sins which were committed in a first complete drunkenness are not mortal sins, since they could not have been foreseen even in a confused manner. But sins which are committed during drunkenness by those drinkers who have an evil habit of making themselves drunk commonly must be imputed, because they could and ought to have been foreseen.

1291 Busembaum, Lessius, Sanchez, Diana, Gobat, St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 77), Göpfert (Moraltheol. II, n. 208), etc.

1292 Cf. above, I, n. 57.

672.

672. On the use of morphine, opium, cocaine, chloroform, ether, and other narcotic remedies.

The older authors do not speak of these things, since they were unknown at that time; but in our times these remedies are in daily use. All these remedies taken in a large quantity are deadly; indeed, sometimes even when employed moderately and according to the requirements of the art they cause sudden death. According to a modern statistical review, in every 3,000 instances in which chloroform was employed by physicians, death occurred once.1293 Therefore, some danger to life, although not so proximate, is always joined with the use of medicines of this kind. There is added that such use, even moderate, if it endures for a longer time, gravely harms bodily health and provokes a most vehement craving for morphine, etc., which is called morphinomania and by other names by physicians, and which can be overcome with much greater difficulty than even an inveterate habit of drunkenness. From all these things it is evident that the use of remedies of this kind is dangerous and is to be avoided unless necessity demands otherwise. And this is all the more so because all these narcotic remedies interrupt the use of reason for a time. Hence it is a grave sin to use these remedies without a grave cause. Their use, however, seems lawful in the following cases, provided nevertheless that they are always employed according to the rules of the medical art:

  1. In greater surgical operations, so that, namely, the sick person may yield himself without resistance to the hands of the surgeon and may not feel the bitter pains.

  2. For alleviating pains even if they are not so atrocious, at least if there is question of a very brief narcosis, such as that which is caused by means of weaker narcotics, for example, Lachgas [laughing gas], laughing gas, gaz hilarant [laughing gas]; or if there is question of an imperfect narcosis in which the use of reason is not wholly taken away. Such imperfect narcoses seem lawful in the extraction of a tooth and even in ordinary childbirth.1294 Moralists do not agree whether in the article of death it is lawful to administer narcotic remedies to a dying person so that he may not feel pain so vehemently, or for procuring so-called euthanasia (εὖ, θάνατος [well, death]). It is certainly better if this is not done, since by patiently tolerating those pains the dying person may alleviate the punishments of sins and of purgatory; but if the pains are excessively atrocious, and especially if there is a founded fear that after receiving the sacraments the dying person may sin by sins of impatience and murmuring against God, there is no reason why the physician cannot administer soporific remedies, provided they do not shorten life.1295

1293 Cf. Capellmann-Bergmann, Pastoralmedizin, 19th ed., 84.

1294 Cf. ib., 47.

1295 Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, 893; Marc, Inst. mor. I, 761.

673.

673. Scholion. On remedies against alcoholism. In our days alcoholism, that is, the vice of indulging too much in intoxicating liquors, spreads widely in almost all regions, and most grave evils arise from it. It is scarcely possible to enumerate all the evils which are customarily produced by alcoholism. Excellent men have written entire books concerning the close relation between alcoholism and criminality.1296 Every priest is bound, according to his ability, to commend and spread remedies against the pernicious evil of alcoholism. The first and best remedy is good instruction concerning these evils, and indeed instruction to be given not only frequently from the pulpit in church, but especially also to youths in schools and colleges. The second and efficacious remedy is the good example both of parents and especially of priests. A pastor would speak altogether in vain against alcoholism if he himself were a drinker or indulged too much in wine. The third remedy consists in those Catholic associations of temperance or abstinence which in our times have happily been established in all regions. Let priests not only refrain from holding these associations in little account, but also prudently foster them. Already innumerable men and women addicted to drunkenness have been cured of their vices by the aid of these societies. Finally, the diligent exercise of the Christian religion, which inculcates temperance and mortification, furnishes an efficacious remedy. But if all these remedies are either despised by the drunken or have produced no effect, then care must be taken that such persons be received into some hospital designated for curing alcoholics. This last remedy is almost always necessary for those who are addicted to morphinism. For experience establishes that morphine addicts of this kind have lost all resistance of the will.

1296 Cf. Hugo Hoppe, Alkohol und Kriminalität, Wiesbaden, 1906; C. Wright, Influence of Intemperance upon Crime, Boston, 1889.