Question One: On Sobriety in Itself

S. Th. II-II, q. 149.

981. Sobriety (soberheid) is named from preserving bria, that is, measure. In general it signifies any moderation whatsoever (Rom. 12:3); less broadly it is taken for every moderation of temperance (Wis. 8:7; Tit. 2:12; 1 Tim. 2:9), especially of abstinence; in the strictest sense, for the moderation of intoxicating drink (Eccli. 31:32), in which it is best and most difficult to preserve measure, "because measured use contributes much, and immoderate excess harms much, because by its fumes it disturbs the head and impedes the use of reason even more than excess of food." Therefore sobriety is a virtue moderating the affection for and use of intoxicating drink.

It is a virtue, because it renders man perfect: for it is best to preserve measure in that in which it is most difficult to preserve it. It is one virtue, because it has one object: the pleasures of intoxicating drink to be moderated. It is a special virtue: for where there is a special impediment of reason, there it is necessary that there be a special virtue to remove it. But intoxicating drink is a special impediment of the use of reason, because of man's greater proneness toward intoxicating drink, and because of the graver harms which excess in such drink brings with it, insofar as it disturbs the brain by its fumes.

982. Sobriety is distinguished from abstinence. - The object is different: to preserve measure in drink as delightful in itself, and to preserve measure in drink delightful from a fume disturbing the use of reason.

Namely, it belongs to one account that the delightful is from this, that because of its fume it is intoxicating and impedes the good of reason; it belongs to another account that the delightful impedes the good of reason from its mere immoderation. For from immoderation the rectitude of reason is first taken away, and if it is vehement, consequently also the use of reason; hence in these matters to impede the use of reason belongs to the same vice as immoderation. But another passion first and directly tends to impede the use of reason, and from this first has that it is inordinate; hence in these matters to impede the use of reason is one vice, and immoderation of the passion in itself another, just as one virtue preserves the use of reason, and another moderates the passion in itself. Cf. Cajetan and Ill. Waffelaert, on a. 2.

983. The use of wine or of another intoxicating drink is not per se and totally illicit (1 Tim. 5:23; Eccli. 31:36), for no food or drink considered in itself is illicit (Mt. 15:11). But it can be illicit accidentally: a) from the condition of the one drinking, who is easily harmed by wine, or because he is obligated by a special vow not to drink wine; b) from the mode of drinking, namely because he exceeds measure; c) from the side of others who are scandalized.

984. To whom sobriety especially belongs. - Although sobriety belongs to all, because all must flee disturbance of mind, yet for a particular reason it belongs especially to some:

a) because of a greater necessity for restraining: 1) to adolescents (Tit. 2:6), because on account of their ardor there is in them a greater proneness to concupiscences, which must be restrained by virtue; 2) to women (1 Tim. 3:11), because they are more easily disturbed, and in them there is not sufficient strength of mind for resisting concupiscences;

b) because of a greater necessity for their operation: 3) to old men (Tit. 2:2), because in them reason ought to flourish for the instruction of others; 4) to those who preside over others (Prov. 31:4), because they ought to rule the people by wisdom, especially if they preside in spiritual matters, because with devout mind they ought to apply themselves to spiritual offices (1 Tim. 3:2).