The States of Human Nature

A fivefold distinction is made of the states of human nature: the first, the state of pure nature; the second, the state of integral nature; the third, of original justice; the fourth, of fallen nature; the fifth, of repaired nature. There might be added the state of glory and the state of damnation, but there is no question of these here, because we are now considering nature only insofar as it tends, by divine assistance, to its ultimate end. Therefore this dissertation I prefix to the treatise on Grace, because the explanation of those states contributes not a little to the knowledge of the necessity, diversity, and properties of grace, and grave difficulties are moved about them.

The state of pure nature implies precisely nature with its intrinsically constituting principles, and those things which follow from them or are owed to it. Hence:

1° Man created in a state of pure nature would be without sin, without sanctifying grace, without infused virtues and without the assists of grace of the supernatural order; because these are not owed to him from his intrinsic principles.

2° He would be subject to hunger, to tormenting thirst, to labor, to diseases, to altering passions and to death; because since the body, which is the material part of nature, is composed of contraries, which continually fight among themselves, these things follow from its intrinsic principles.

3° He would be subject to ignorance and concupiscence. To ignorance, because since the intellect is born by nature to acquire from the senses knowledge of intelligibles, it can easily deviate from the truth on account of phantasms. To concupiscence, because although the sensitive appetite is naturally subject to reason, yet it is not subject despotically, as the foot or hand is subject to the will, but only politically, as a citizen to the Prince, a wife to her husband; and thus it could rebel. ^{4 4} Contra Gentiles, c. 52.

4° The last end, or objective beatitude of man in this state would be God as natural Author, insofar as by our mode of conceiving he is distinguished from himself as supernatural Author. Formal beatitude would be perfect conjunction with him, knowing him abstractively or through his effects, and sweetly and constantly adhering to him through love.

5° To obtain this end by the observance of all the natural precepts and victory over rebellious concupiscence, there would be given in that state the assists of the natural order, sufficient to all, efficacious for some. Nor would even efficacious assists derogate from this state; for although they would not be owed to every individual of this nature, they would nevertheless be due to the species of nature, and God owes them to his providence, lest he should have created nature in vain for some end if no individual of it were to attain this end: just as to nature elevated to a supernatural end are owed the assists of the supernatural order, sufficient in all its individuals, efficacious in some predestined to this end.

The state of integral nature consists in perfect subjection of the body to the soul and of the sensitive appetite to reason; consequently it imports immunity from ignorance, concupiscence, death, and passions altering nature. Because nature is said to be integral while between its parts there is no division or defection from its perfection, while inferiors are perfectly subjected to superiors; consequently, while the body is perfectly contained under the power of the soul, so that by no alteration or corruption does it fall short of its dominion, and the sensitive appetite holds nothing repugnant to reason. But if only one or other of these subjections existed, either of the body alone to the soul, or of the sensitive appetite alone to reason, the state of integral nature would not be perfect, but its perfection only partial.

2° In that integrity of nature Adam was created: and this integrity arose in him from sanctifying grace; because, as we said from SS. Augustine and Thomas, treating of original sin, so long as the superior reason was subject to God — which subjection was held through sanctifying grace — the body was perfectly subject to the soul and the sensitive appetite to reason; yet it was distinguished from that original grace, because they were of different order; for integrity is a form perfecting nature in the natural order, not elevating it to the supernatural order, nor constituting man adopted son of God, partaker of the divine nature and heir of the heavenly kingdom : all which sanctifying grace bestowed. Whence nothing stood in the way but that God could have created man in the state of integral nature without justice or original grace; yet because these two states were united in Adam, they are often confounded by the Fathers and theologians.

§ III. — The state of original justice.

This most happy state, which by antonomasia is called the state of innocence, St. Thomas elegantly describes, Opusc. II, c. 185, and he constitutes it in the perfect subjection of reason to God, of the sensitive appetite to reason, and of the body to the soul: which two latter followed from the first, as has been said. ^{1 1} So does the Angelic Doctor describe this state there: « Man in his condition was so instituted by God that the body should be entirely subject to the soul, and again among the parts of the soul the lower powers should be subjected without repugnance to reason, and the very reason of man should be subject to God. From this moreover, that the body was subject to the soul, it came about that no passion could occur in the body which would be repugnant to the dominion of the soul over the body : whence neither death nor infirmity had place in man. From the subjection truly of the lower powers to reason, there was in man entire tranquillity of mind, because human reason was disturbed by no inordinate passions. From this however, that the will of man was subject to God, man referred all things to God as to the last end : in which consisted his justice and innocence. But of these three, the last was the cause of the others. For it was not from the nature of the body, if its components be considered, that in it no dissolution or whatever passion of life repugnant had place, since it was composed of contrary elements. Similarly also it was not from the nature of the soul that even the sensible powers were subjected without repugnance to reason, since the sensible powers are naturally moved toward those things that are delectable according to sense, which often are repugnant to right reason. This therefore was from a superior power, namely of God, who as he joined the rational soul to the body, transcending all proportion of the body and bodily powers, such as are the sensible powers, so he gave to the rational soul such a power that above the condition of the body it could contain itself and the sensible powers, as befitted the rational soul. In order therefore that reason might firmly contain under itself the inferior things, it behoved that it be firmly contained under God, from whom it had the aforesaid power above the condition of nature. Man therefore was so instituted that unless his reason were withdrawn from God, neither could his body be withdrawn from the nod of the soul, nor the sensible powers from the rectitude of reason : whence his was a certain immortal and impassible life, because namely he could neither die nor suffer if he did not sin. He could sin truly, his will not yet confirmed through the attainment of the last end; and under this event he could die and suffer. And herein differs the impassibility and immortality which the first man had from that which the saints will have in the resurrection, who will never be able either to suffer or to die, their will entirely confirmed in God, as has been said above. It differed also as regards another thing, because after the resurrection men will use neither foods nor venery ; but the first man was so constituted that he had need to sustain life with foods, and it devolved upon him to give attention to generation, that the human race might be multiplied from one. » Compendium theologiae, chapter 185. — 1. 1ª p., q. 95, a. 1, o.

Hence it follows 1° that Adam, who, as theologians now commonly hold, as has been said, was created in that state, or at least, according to some, was constituted immediately after creation, had all the infused virtues, both theological and moral, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, because all these follow sanctifying grace as its properties or appurtenances.

It follows 2° that he was immune from hunger and tormenting thirst, from sadness and pains, from the alterative passions, from disease, death and concupiscence, namely from the gift of integrity following upon original justice, as has been said.

It follows 3° that in him there was the fullness of knowledge of natural and supernatural things, as much as the dignity and office of teacher and ruler of posterity required; for Adam was constituted head of the human race, not only as regards grace, but also as regards instruction and governance. Which reason not running for posterity, these would neither be born, as he himself was created, in perfect age, nor have this fullness of knowledge, but would easily acquire it.

You will ask whether this sanctifying grace of the state of innocent nature was of the same rationale and species with the sanctifying grace of this state of fallen nature.

I answer. That it was the same in species as regards substance, because the formal effect of both graces is the same, namely to constitute man pleasing to God, his adopted son, friend and heir of the heavenly kingdom; but the rationale of the form is discerned from its formal effect, since it is itself the very form communicated. It was, however, diverse as regards the mode of communicating itself to the subject, because the grace of original justice communicated to man more secondary effects, as we have explained, which now it does not communicate.

Concerning the state of fallen nature I have said many things when treating of original sin, namely that human nature was stripped by the sin of Adam of sanctifying grace, of the virtues annexed to it and of the gift of integrity, impassibility, immortality and exemption from ignorance and concupiscence; nor was it stripped only of those gratuitous gifts, but was wounded also in its naturals, and that its wounds are four, namely ignorance in the intellect, malice in the will, concupiscence in the concupiscible appetite, infirmity in the irascible. Concerning which again below.

This state is called in the Scriptures redemption and liberation, namely from the captivity of the devil and of sin; it is called resurrection and vivification, healing, reconciliation and renovation. Which expressions suppose a general ruin of human nature. This state agrees with the state of innocence in this, that both tend to the same term, namely supernatural beatitude, and that in both sanctifying grace is the principle of merit, the same as regards substance, as we have said.

But they differ by several other titles. 1° The end of the state of innocence was the manifestation of divine liberality ; but the state of repaired nature, the manifestation of mercy. 2° God was the efficient cause immediately of the state of innocence, mediately through Christ of the state of repaired nature. 3° The subject of the state of innocent nature was innocent nature, having indeed no right to the gratuitous gifts of that state, but having nothing repugnant to them ; but the subject of repaired nature is nature infected by sin, unworthy of whatever grace. Whence in the former state [nature] was only to be adorned with gratuitous gifts ; in the other first healed, then adorned. 4° The grace of the state of innocence conferred the gift of integrity, which the grace of repaired nature does not confer.

Around these states, therefore, there occur three most grave difficulties agitated in the schools with great contention : the first, whether the state of pure nature is possible ; the second, whether man in the state of fallen nature has lesser powers unto good than he would have had in the state of pure nature ; the third, whether man in the state of innocence needed efficacious grace, or grace whereby, to do good and persevere in it. These three questions we shall discuss in the three following articles. Wherefore let there be

I say : It was simply possible for God to create man in the state of pure nature, namely without sin and without grace and the gift of integrity, subject to death, ignorance and concupiscence.

The whole conclusion is against Jansenius and his followers; in part against Estius, Herrera and certain other theologians, who admit indeed that God could have created man without sanctifying grace and without the gift of immortality, but not without the gift of integrity which excludes concupiscence.

It is proved 1° from Augustine, who in book III de Lib. arbit., chapter 20, disputing against the Manichees, who admitted two principles, one good, the other evil, and blamed this latter on account of the ignorance and difficulty of living well arising from the concupiscence we suffer, says in chapter 21 that, even if God were to create man subject to ignorance and concupiscence, or to difficulty in doing good, he would not therefore be to be blamed, but rather from this man would have reason to give thanks to his Creator: « For, he says in the aforesaid chapter 20, n. 56, not only is the soul, which by nature precedes every body, no mean good, but also that it has the faculty, with its Creator aiding, of cultivating itself, and can by pious effort acquire and take possession of all the virtues, through which it is freed both from tormenting difficulty and from blinding ignorance. But if this is so, ignorance and difficulty will not be to souls at their birth the punishment of sin, but an admonition to progress and the beginning of perfection. »

He repeats the same, now grown old, book I Retract., c. 9, and near death confirms it again in the book de Dono perseu., c. 11. Whence it is manifest that he never retracted this, as some pretend.

It is proved 2° from St. Thomas, in II Sentent., dist. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, where he says: « God could have from the beginning, when he created man, formed also another man out of the slime of the earth, whom he would leave in the condition of his nature, so that namely he would be mortal and passible, and feeling in his reason the combat of concupiscence: in which nothing would be derogated from human nature, because this follows from the principles of nature. Yet this defect would have had in him no character of fault or punishment, because this defect would not have been caused by will. »

It is proved 3° by reason. The state of pure nature involves no repugnance, neither on the part of man nor on the part of God. Therefore it is simply possible.

The first part of the antecedent is proved. 1° Neither sanctifying grace nor the gift of integrity are due to human nature considered in itself, but are merely gratuitous and conferred from God's liberality alone. Therefore the state of pure nature involves no repugnance with respect to those gifts on the part of man. — The antecedent is proved. First, as to grace properly so called and supernatural, it is evident both from the very name: for if it were owed, it would no longer be grace; and if of the supernatural order, then above the whole order and debt of nature; and also because by grace man becomes the adopted son of God, Galat., IV, 6, 28; but it belongs to the nature of adoption that he who is adopted be son and heir not by nature nor by any right, but by the liberal will of the adopter. As to the gift of integrity, it is proved: It is not a debt of nature considered in itself, that gift by which it would be exempted from the defects consequent upon the principles of nature itself; but rather it is more due that it be left subject to them, as is evident in the power of sinning, of which presently. But ignorance, concupiscence, passibility, mortality follow from the principles of human nature, as St. Thomas teaches, IV Contra gentes, c. 52, and as we said above in the exposition of the state of pure nature.

It is proved 2° by the same first part of the first antecedent. Man created in pure natural state would have all things that belong to him naturally, or from intrinsic principles, both in physical being and in moral being. Therefore the state of pure nature involves no repugnance on the part of man. — The antecedent is proved. In the physical order, man is constituted of body and rational soul with its properties and powers, both spiritual and sensitive; in the moral order, he requires to have free will, to know his end and the means proportioned to it, and by those means to be able to attain the end. But all these things he would have in the state of pure nature. And indeed concerning the intrinsic constituting principles and natural properties, and free will, no one denies. Of the rest it is proved. The proximate end of man, in the state of pure nature, would be honest good; his last end, God as author of nature; the means for attaining that end, morally good acts through the assists of the natural order. All these things, since they do not transcend nature, he would know, nor would the foresaid assists fail him, whereby, through morally good acts, he could attain this his last end. Therefore.

Thus the first part of the first antecedent being proved, the second part flows spontaneously, namely that the state of pure nature involves no repugnance on the part of God. For if supernatural grace, the gift of integrity and immortality are not owed to human nature, God could deny these gifts to it without injury to his justice, goodness and wisdom, just as he denied, and de facto denied, to innocent Adam the gift of impeccability. Likewise, if man, in the state of pure nature, had all things that belong to him according to his intrinsic principles, both in physical being and in moral being, the order of divine justice is preserved, rendering indeed to each what is owed him by the right of his creation; the order of divine wisdom and goodness is preserved, disposing and ordering all things to their ends. Therefore.

It is proved 4° from the conclusion by several propositions condemned in Baius. The first: « The sublimation and exaltation of human nature into the fellowship of the divine nature was due to the integrity of the first condition, and therefore must be called natural, not supernatural. » This is 21. — The second: « The integrity of the first creation was not an undue exaltation of human nature, but its natural condition. » This is 26. — See besides 55, 78 and 79^{1 1} Add this one of Quesnel condemned by Clement XI: « The grace of Adam is a sequel of creation, and was due to nature sound and whole. » It is 35.

You will ask by what power God could create man in the state of pure nature: extraordinary, or ordinary?

I answer. That the solution of the question depends upon the diverse acceptation of ordinary and extraordinary power. Therefore

^{1 1} Prop. 55 : « God could not from the beginning create such a man as now is born. » Prop. 78 : « The immortality of the first man was not a gratuitous benefit, but a natural condition. » Prop. 79 : « False is the opinion of doctors, that the first man could have been created and instituted by God without natural justice. » By Urban VIII the aforesaid propositions, and others of the same author, were condemned as heretical, erroneous, suspect, rash, scandalous and offensive to pious ears, respectively. Constit. In eminenti, March 6, 1641. Already before they had been condemned by St. Pius V and Gregory XIII.

Some understand ordinary power as that by which God produces only effects proportioned to the nature of things and naturally owed to them; extraordinary power, that by which he produces miraculous effects beyond the strength and exigence of nature. According to this understanding it must be said that the state of pure nature was possible by the ordinary power of God; because in it all things are supposed to be connatural, and nothing miraculous, as we explained.

Others understand extraordinary power as that by which God can do many things which nevertheless he decreed not to do, and which consequently do not fall under the order of present providence, that is, the order which he himself established in leading things to the ends which he set before himself. They call ordinary power that by which God executes what he decreed to do; and thus St. Thomas seems to think, 1ª p., q. [25?] : « This is said of God that he can do it by ordinary power. » « But that which is attributed to divine power according as it executes the command of a just will, this is said of God that he can do by ordinary power. » According to this understanding, it must be said that God could not create man in the state of pure nature by ordinary power, but by extraordinary only; because, supposing the order which God established in things, namely the elevation of rational creature to a supernatural end from singular benevolence, this state does not fall under present providence, but remained in its possibility: provided however that in this opinion it be wholly conceded that God could fully and without any prejudice to his attributes have established another order of things, and according to that have created man in the state of pure nature.

Therefore, according to the diverse assigned acceptation of ordinary and extraordinary power, it is truly said that the state of pure nature was and was not possible by ordinary power. And thus are reconciled the contrary opinions of the Thomists.

From these things maturely weighed and well understood, you will meet many testimonies of Augustine by which the holy Doctor seems to intimate that the rational creature cannot without its own fault lack supernatural gifts; for these testimonies must be understood according to the present state and order of things, not according to another which God could have instituted.

Obj. : It is repugnant that man be created subject to concupiscence. Therefore. — The antecedent is proved. Augustine labors perpetually to prove, against Julian, that concupiscence is not a natural property and perfection of man, but an evil opposed to his nature; and against him he urges everywhere that of I John, II, 16: The concupiscence of the flesh... is not of the Father, and the Apostle, who to the Romans, VII, 8, 20, calls concupiscence sin. Therefore.

For the solution of this and several other objections on the part of concupiscence, it must be observed that concupiscence can be taken two ways, either in act first, for the concupiscible power itself, or in act second, for the motion of that power toward sensible good. Moreover each again can be considered two ways: 1° simply and in itself, or materially, inasmuch as it is precisely an inclination to sensible good; 2° formally and with something added, insofar as it is an inclination to sensible good together with disorder and repugnance to right reason. Taken in the former way, it is a natural faculty and legitimate inclination to good proportioned to the body, and it is from God and by his intention in the creation of man. Taken in the latter way, it is a vicious inclination, which is properly called concupiscence and lust. It is not from God, nor by his intention, but a defect following upon the nature of man by reason of matter and subject, like passibility, mortality and other natural defects. For since man, as we already observed, consists of a twofold appetite, namely sensitive and rational, and each is borne toward its object, the sensitive to sensible good, the rational to honest good, and the sensitive is subjected to the rational not despotically but only politically, it often happens that sensible good desired is contrary to reason, and that the sensitive appetite, from a certain temperament of body, is borne more ardently toward its object. Hence arises the combat between them, which on the part of the sensitive appetite is lust and vicious concupiscence. These things premised,

I answer. I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I deny the consequence. For from this that concupiscence is evil, it follows that it is not from God positively and by his intention, but it does not follow that it is not a defect consequent upon the nature of man, from the condition of matter, apart from God's intention. Thus sin is an evil far worse than concupiscence, and yet man is created subject to sin, because the power of sinning is a defect consequent upon the nature of man from the condition of matter, since namely he is made from nothing.

POOR human nature is in a permanent state of moral bankruptcy. It is incapable of meeting its obligations. It sees the good but it cannot perform it, it constantly does what its conscience condemns. Experience and revelation alike compel us to acknowledge this. But while the Catholic humbly acknowledges his own weakness and sinfulness, yet he knows that through the grace of Christ he can overcome sin. Luther, on the contrary, not only glories in his infirmity, like St. Paul, but boasts of his sinfulness.¹ He holds that human nature is so thoroughly corrupted by the Fall that it is incapable of doing anything good. Sin

¹ J. Verres, "Luther: An Historical Portrait," p. 128.

has become part of its very essence. This natural corruption remains even in the just; it is only by faith that they lay hold of the merits of Christ, and thereby the justice of Christ covers all their sinfulness as with a cloak. Because of their faith, God imputes to them the merits of Christ and turns His eyes away from the innate sinfulness of their hearts. The just accept the freely offered love of God in Christ Jesus, and this is what is called His grace. Luther rejected the Catholic doctrine about grace, and taught that it was nothing more than the freely offered favor of God. Non-Catholics have commonly followed this teaching. The Council of Trent solemnly anathematized it.

"If any one shall say that men are justified either by the mere imputation of the righteousness of Christ, or by the mere forgiveness of sins to the exclusion of grace and charity, which is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, and inheres in them; or even that grace by which we are justified is only the favor of God; let him be anathema."¹ Christ He has restored human nature to more than its pristine glory. Let us in merest outline and in non-technical language try to summarize the Catholic doctrine on grace.

The Catechism of the Council of Trent explains this canon in the following terms:

"But grace, as the Council of Trent has decreed, is not only that whereby sins are forgiven, but is also a divine quality inherent in the soul, and, as it were, a certain splendor and light that effaces all the stains of our souls and renders the souls themselves brighter and more beautiful. This is clearly inferred from the sacred Scriptures."²

The Catholic Church is quite conscious of the frailty of poor human nature. She knows that if left to itself it cannot hope to escape moral ruin, but she teaches that God never intended to leave human nature to itself. In its first creation He remedied its natural weakness by the gift of His grace, and after the Fall through the grace of

¹ Sess. vi. c. 11.

² Loc. cit. pt. ii. c. 2, n. 49.

While instructing the Samaritan woman at the well of Jacob, Our Lord gives her the first notions about the doctrine of grace.

"If thou didst know the gift of God," He said, "and who He is that saith to thee: Give Me to drink: thou perhaps wouldst have asked of Him, and He would have given thee living water.... He that shall drink of the water that I will give him shall not thirst forever. But the water that I will give him shall become in him a fountain of water, springing up into life everlasting."¹