Section — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
The state of pure nature
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The state of pure nature implies precisely nature with its intrinsically constituting principles, and those things which follow from them or are owed to it. Hence:
Status naturae purae importat praecise naturam cum suis principiis intrinsece constituentibus, et iis quae ex illis sequuntur seu ei debentur. Hinc:
1° Man created in a state of pure nature would be without sin, without sanctifying grace, without infused virtues and without the assists of grace of the supernatural order; because these are not owed to him from his intrinsic principles.
1° Homo in natura pura conditus foret sine peccato, sine gratia sanctificante, sine virtutibus infusis et sine auxiliis gratiae ordinis supernaturalis; quia haec illi non debentur ex ejus principiis intrinsecis.
2° He would be subject to hunger, to tormenting thirst, to labor, to diseases, to altering passions and to death; because since the body, which is the material part of nature, is composed of contraries, which continually fight among themselves, these things follow from its intrinsic principles.
2° Foret obnoxius fami, siti crucianti, labori, morbis, passionibus alterantibus et morti; quia cum corpus quod est pars materialis naturae, componatur ex contrariis, quae continuo inter se pugnant, haec ex ejus principiis intrinsecis sequuntur.
3° He would be subject to ignorance and concupiscence. To ignorance, because since the intellect is born by nature to acquire from the senses knowledge of intelligibles, it can easily deviate from the truth on account of phantasms. To concupiscence, because although the sensitive appetite is naturally subject to reason, yet it is not subject despotically, as the foot or hand is subject to the will, but only politically, as a citizen to the Prince, a wife to her husband; and thus it could rebel. 4 4 Contra Gentiles, c. 52.
3° Obnoxius foret ignorantiae et concupiscentiae. Ignorantiae, quia cum intellectus natus sit ex sensibus notitiam intelligibilium acquirere, facile propter phantasmata a vero deviare potest. Concupiscentiae, quia licet appetitus sensitivus subjiciatur naturaliter rationi, non subjicitur tamen despotice, sicut pes aut manus subjicitur voluntati, sed politice tantum, ut civis Principi, uxor viro, sicque posset rebellare. 4 4 Contra Gentiles, c. 52.
4° The last end, or objective beatitude of man in this state would be God as natural Author, insofar as by our mode of conceiving he is distinguished from himself as supernatural Author. Formal beatitude would be perfect conjunction with him, knowing him abstractively or through his effects, and sweetly and constantly adhering to him through love.
4° Finis ultimus, seu beatitudo objectiva hominis in hoc statu foret Deus ut Auctor naturalis, prout modo nostro concipiendi distinguitur a seipso, ut est Auctor supernaturalis. Beatitudo formalis foret perfecta conjunctio cum illo, ipsum cognoscendo abstractive seu per effectus, et suaviter ac constanter ei adhaerendo per amorem.
5° To obtain this end by the observance of all the natural precepts and victory over rebellious concupiscence, there would be given in that state the assists of the natural order, sufficient to all, efficacious for some. Nor would even efficacious assists derogate from this state; for although they would not be owed to every individual of this nature, they would nevertheless be due to the species of nature, and God owes them to his providence, lest he should have created nature in vain for some end if no individual of it were to attain this end: just as to nature elevated to a supernatural end are owed the assists of the supernatural order, sufficient in all its individuals, efficacious in some predestined to this end.
5° Ad obtinendum hunc finem per observantiam omnium praeceptorum naturalium et victoriam concupiscentiae rebellantis, darentur in eo statu auxilia ordinis naturalis, sufficientia omnibus, efficacia quibusdam. Neque ista auxilia etiam efficacia huic statui derogarent, quamvis enim cuilibet hujus naturae individuo non deberentur, forent tamen debita speciei naturae, eaque suae providentiae debet Deus, ne frustra naturam ad aliquem finem condidisset, si nullum ejus individuum hunc finem assequeretur: sicut naturae elevatae ad finem supernaturalem debentur auxilia ordinis supernaturalis, sufficientia in omnibus ejus individuis, efficacia in quibusdam ad hunc finem praedestinatis.