The states of original justice, of fallen nature, and of repaired nature

§ III. — The state of original justice.

This most happy state, which by antonomasia is called the state of innocence, St. Thomas elegantly describes, Opusc. II, c. 185, and he constitutes it in the perfect subjection of reason to God, of the sensitive appetite to reason, and of the body to the soul: which two latter followed from the first, as has been said. ^{1 1} So does the Angelic Doctor describe this state there: « Man in his condition was so instituted by God that the body should be entirely subject to the soul, and again among the parts of the soul the lower powers should be subjected without repugnance to reason, and the very reason of man should be subject to God. From this moreover, that the body was subject to the soul, it came about that no passion could occur in the body which would be repugnant to the dominion of the soul over the body : whence neither death nor infirmity had place in man. From the subjection truly of the lower powers to reason, there was in man entire tranquillity of mind, because human reason was disturbed by no inordinate passions. From this however, that the will of man was subject to God, man referred all things to God as to the last end : in which consisted his justice and innocence. But of these three, the last was the cause of the others. For it was not from the nature of the body, if its components be considered, that in it no dissolution or whatever passion of life repugnant had place, since it was composed of contrary elements. Similarly also it was not from the nature of the soul that even the sensible powers were subjected without repugnance to reason, since the sensible powers are naturally moved toward those things that are delectable according to sense, which often are repugnant to right reason. This therefore was from a superior power, namely of God, who as he joined the rational soul to the body, transcending all proportion of the body and bodily powers, such as are the sensible powers, so he gave to the rational soul such a power that above the condition of the body it could contain itself and the sensible powers, as befitted the rational soul. In order therefore that reason might firmly contain under itself the inferior things, it behoved that it be firmly contained under God, from whom it had the aforesaid power above the condition of nature. Man therefore was so instituted that unless his reason were withdrawn from God, neither could his body be withdrawn from the nod of the soul, nor the sensible powers from the rectitude of reason : whence his was a certain immortal and impassible life, because namely he could neither die nor suffer if he did not sin. He could sin truly, his will not yet confirmed through the attainment of the last end; and under this event he could die and suffer. And herein differs the impassibility and immortality which the first man had from that which the saints will have in the resurrection, who will never be able either to suffer or to die, their will entirely confirmed in God, as has been said above. It differed also as regards another thing, because after the resurrection men will use neither foods nor venery ; but the first man was so constituted that he had need to sustain life with foods, and it devolved upon him to give attention to generation, that the human race might be multiplied from one. » Compendium theologiae, chapter 185. — 1. 1ª p., q. 95, a. 1, o.

Hence it follows 1° that Adam, who, as theologians now commonly hold, as has been said, was created in that state, or at least, according to some, was constituted immediately after creation, had all the infused virtues, both theological and moral, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, because all these follow sanctifying grace as its properties or appurtenances.

It follows 2° that he was immune from hunger and tormenting thirst, from sadness and pains, from the alterative passions, from disease, death and concupiscence, namely from the gift of integrity following upon original justice, as has been said.

It follows 3° that in him there was the fullness of knowledge of natural and supernatural things, as much as the dignity and office of teacher and ruler of posterity required; for Adam was constituted head of the human race, not only as regards grace, but also as regards instruction and governance. Which reason not running for posterity, these would neither be born, as he himself was created, in perfect age, nor have this fullness of knowledge, but would easily acquire it.

You will ask whether this sanctifying grace of the state of innocent nature was of the same rationale and species with the sanctifying grace of this state of fallen nature.

I answer. That it was the same in species as regards substance, because the formal effect of both graces is the same, namely to constitute man pleasing to God, his adopted son, friend and heir of the heavenly kingdom; but the rationale of the form is discerned from its formal effect, since it is itself the very form communicated. It was, however, diverse as regards the mode of communicating itself to the subject, because the grace of original justice communicated to man more secondary effects, as we have explained, which now it does not communicate.

Concerning the state of fallen nature I have said many things when treating of original sin, namely that human nature was stripped by the sin of Adam of sanctifying grace, of the virtues annexed to it and of the gift of integrity, impassibility, immortality and exemption from ignorance and concupiscence; nor was it stripped only of those gratuitous gifts, but was wounded also in its naturals, and that its wounds are four, namely ignorance in the intellect, malice in the will, concupiscence in the concupiscible appetite, infirmity in the irascible. Concerning which again below.

This state is called in the Scriptures redemption and liberation, namely from the captivity of the devil and of sin; it is called resurrection and vivification, healing, reconciliation and renovation. Which expressions suppose a general ruin of human nature. This state agrees with the state of innocence in this, that both tend to the same term, namely supernatural beatitude, and that in both sanctifying grace is the principle of merit, the same as regards substance, as we have said.

But they differ by several other titles. 1° The end of the state of innocence was the manifestation of divine liberality ; but the state of repaired nature, the manifestation of mercy. 2° God was the efficient cause immediately of the state of innocence, mediately through Christ of the state of repaired nature. 3° The subject of the state of innocent nature was innocent nature, having indeed no right to the gratuitous gifts of that state, but having nothing repugnant to them ; but the subject of repaired nature is nature infected by sin, unworthy of whatever grace. Whence in the former state [nature] was only to be adorned with gratuitous gifts ; in the other first healed, then adorned. 4° The grace of the state of innocence conferred the gift of integrity, which the grace of repaired nature does not confer.

Around these states, therefore, there occur three most grave difficulties agitated in the schools with great contention : the first, whether the state of pure nature is possible ; the second, whether man in the state of fallen nature has lesser powers unto good than he would have had in the state of pure nature ; the third, whether man in the state of innocence needed efficacious grace, or grace whereby, to do good and persevere in it. These three questions we shall discuss in the three following articles. Wherefore let there be