Suicide forbidden

327. On the killing of oneself. 1. It is never licit by one's own authority directly to kill oneself, even if life has become hard for us and useless to others.

For the destruction of a thing is an act of dominion; but man does not have dominion over his own life. Therefore by the killing of oneself the supreme and exclusive dominion of God over the life of man is injured.¹ Moreover, charity is injured, by which man is bound to love himself, since he inflicts the greatest evil upon himself. Finally life, even if bitter or useless to others, always retains its principal importance of meriting eternal life. Wherefore self-killing is against justice toward God and against love of oneself. Also in sacred Scripture the killing of oneself is rather often prohibited,² and the Church punishes self-killing by deprivation of ecclesiastical burial.

a. He directly kills himself or another who posits a killing action with the intention of inflicting death upon himself or another; he indirectly kills himself or another who does not intend the killing of himself or another, but knowingly does something from which he foresees that his own or another's death will follow. In order that someone be said directly to kill himself or another, it is required that the action and intention be immediately and directly killing. But the intention is necessarily directly killing where the action immediately has only one effect and that a killing one. But if neither the action nor the intention is immediately and directly killing, or if the action alone is so but not the intention, someone is not judged directly to kill himself or another, as is clear from the deed of Samson.³

b. Therefore self-killing is not permitted, not even for escaping the gravest evil, for example, the miseries of the present life, vehement shame because of a crime committed, fear of punishment, or fear of ignominy. For temporal evils, however great, are lower than the good of life; but to choose a greater evil for escaping a lesser is against reason and against ordered love of oneself. Therefore it is not licit even for a virgin to kill herself to escape violent corruption or to preserve the good of integrity.

c. It is not licit, with certain loss of life, to throw oneself from a window into a river or to leap into the midst of flames to baptize a child; for this would be direct self-killing, because the action posited immediately tends to the killing of oneself, and only by this action posited can the child be baptized. In order that this can be done licitly, there must be at least some hope of escaping from the waves or flames.

2. It is licit directly to kill oneself by divine authority; for then man leaves life with the permission of the supreme lord of life itself. The same is probably also licit by public authority: for where someone has been justly condemned to death, by natural right the judge can commit the execution of the sentence to anyone, even to the guilty person. Therefore the guilty person who must be punished by death, with the judge permitting, can licitly kill himself or execute the penalty of death upon himself.⁴

The deeds which are read in the lives of the saints, namely that some killed themselves either from desire of martyrdom or to preserve chastity, are explained by some through divine inspiration by which God granted them permission to kill themselves; by others rather through invincible ignorance, which indeed can be supposed more easily because from an obvious consideration of the matter it is not immediately evident that self-killing for preserving a great good is illicit.⁵

3. From a proportionately grave cause it is licit indirectly to kill oneself. Although even indirect self-killing is of itself prohibited, nevertheless it is licit to posit an action indifferent in itself from which one's own death follows, if at least equally immediately a good effect follows, and if there is a grave cause of common or private good for positing that action. In this way the deed of Eleazar, killing the elephant by which he himself was crushed, is explained.⁶

a. It is licit to leap from a window with certain danger of death to escape a harder death, for example, one about to be undergone immediately in flames. It is licit to cast oneself from a high tower with certain danger of death to flee an atrocious death which a tyrant is actually about to inflict. But the same is not licit if the tyrant, otherwise about to inflict an atrocious death, demands it; for if death is not yet actually inflicted, the casting down is not an action from which each effect immediately follows, one's own death and the flight from the more atrocious death, but is self-killing which is chosen as a means to escape a greater evil.

b. It is licit for a virgin to cast herself from a very high cliff with certain loss of life, in order to free herself from the hands of an impure violator and thus preserve virginity, even if she reasonably hopes that she will not consent. Yet this is not licit unless force is morally being actually inflicted; for if force is not yet being inflicted, self-killing is chosen to avoid a grave evil, which is illicit.

c. It is licit to burn a ship or tower to submerge or destroy enemies, even if one's own death will certainly follow from it.

d. It is licit in shipwreck to yield to another a plank which one had already seized, even if the one who, yielding the plank, lowers himself into the sea, is certainly going to perish. And indeed St. Thomas calls this action of yielding the plank and handing oneself over to death for a friend an act of most perfect virtue.⁷

e. It is licit to present oneself to a tyrant by whom one certainly knows he will be killed, to strengthen others in faith or to save others from death, etc. For when a proportionately grave cause exists, both the obligation of preserving one's own life and the obligation of impeding another's sin cease.

Note. The two principles which follow are already contained in the preceding matter; nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, it is useful to propose them explicitly.

4. From a just cause it is licit indirectly to shorten life, even by several years. Since the precept of preserving life is affirmative, which does not oblige always and in every case, from a grave cause it is licit to do or omit something from which a shortening of life or hastening of death follows. Indeed the conditions of human life are such that sometimes even a more notable shortening of life must be admitted.⁸ - A just cause either of shortening life or of exposing life to danger is moral necessity and the exercise of virtue.

a. Blacksmiths do not sin who, handling fire daily, shorten life for themselves, nor other workers, such as those blowing glass, gilding metals, etc., whose labors bring no small shortening of life.

b. One who by labors, penances, fasts, and austerities of this kind undertaken in honor of God hastens death somewhat does not sin, provided he is ruled by the rules of prudence and discretion in undertaking them.

c. One who, on the authority of a physician, can prolong life for some time by abstaining from moderate use of wine is not bound under grave obligation to abstain. - Likewise one who, on the authority of a physician, can prolong life by drinking wine or eating meats which he was not accustomed to use, is not bound under grave obligation, because in each case the shortening is slight; indeed from a motive of virtue in the latter case he can licitly abstain.

d. Those who by excessive drink or food shorten life for some time do not sin gravely against the fifth precept, provided they do not bring on a proximate danger of death or grave disease, or a notable shortening of life.

5. From a just cause it is licit to expose oneself to danger of life; indeed to remote danger from a light cause, but to proximate danger only from a grave cause. He who without cause exposes himself to remote danger of life sins lightly; he who without cause exposes himself to proximate danger of life sins gravely. The greater the danger of death which is induced from the action, the greater must be the reason on account of which it is licit to induce it.

He is said to expose himself to proximate danger of life who exposes himself to a very probable danger of death to be undergone either proximately or after some time. He is said to expose himself to remote danger of life who exposes himself to a danger of death in some way probable, either proximately or after some time. In order that someone be judged to expose himself to proximate danger of life, he must have at least some hope of escaping; he who has no hope of escaping is said not to expose life to danger, but to destroy it. A danger is called probable in some way where death follows from some action rarely or not so frequently; on the contrary it is very probable where death follows from some action frequently or for the most part.

a. It is licit to serve those infected by plague or another contagious disease; likewise to administer the sacraments with great danger of contracting the disease. - It is licit for guilty persons detained in prison to cast themselves down from a height to escape a certain sentence of death or perpetual prison, provided there is some hope of preserving life; but the same would not be licit to escape prison of only a few years, unless the danger of life which they induce by throwing themselves down were very remote.

b. Artisans do not sin who climb upon roofs of buildings and expose themselves to various dangers where the work requires it.

c. Audacious men sin gravely who from a rash wager, from vainglory, or solely for the sake of making profit, cast themselves into proximate danger of life, for example, by provoking wild beasts, exercising the art of the rope-dancer, prolonging a fast for a very long time, etc., unless from experience it is established that probable danger of life is absent, as happens in horse races.

d. He sins who, laboring under a grave fever, makes a journey or undertakes great labor without necessity.

¹ Lugo, disp. 10, n. 21; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 5.

² Ex. 20:13; Gen. 9:6; Deut. 32:39; Wis. 16:13 ss.; Rom. 14:7-9.

³ Judg. 16:30.

⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 369; Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 861 s., where also the reasons of each opinion are submitted to examination.

⁵ Lessius, De iustitia, l. 2, c. 9, n. 23.

⁶ 1 Macc. 6:43 ss. Cf. Lessius, De iustit., l. 2, c. 9, n. 32; Lugo, De iustit., disp. 10, n. 55.

⁷ In 3, dist. 29, a. 15, ad 3.

⁸ Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 866 ss.

328. On the mutilation of oneself. Mutilation of oneself is of itself gravely illicit, unless it is necessary for preserving life itself. The reason for the first is that man, just as he is not lord of life, so also is not lord of his members, so that he can dispose of them at will. The reason for the second is that he is guardian and preserver of his body, and therefore he can cut off a part or member to preserve the whole body; for a part is ordered to the whole, and therefore must be postponed to the good of the whole.

a. Therefore it is licit, for example, to cut off for oneself a hand bound by a chain in order to escape a fire. And just as self-mutilation is licit for the preservation of life, so for the same reason it is licit to consent to the amputation of a member. - Yet in light matter, as if someone without cause cuts off for himself a little part of the ear or a joint of the little finger, grave sin is not committed.

b. Mutilations of themselves which are read as having been done by holy virgins must be explained either from divine inspiration or from good faith, as was said above concerning self-killing (n. 327, 2).

Resolutions. From another end, which does not tend to the preservation of the whole, self-mutilation does not seem licit. 1. It is not licit to castrate oneself for spiritual good, namely to avoid the sin of incontinence or to calm temptations;¹ for that end can always be obtained by other means. Moreover, mutilation of this kind renders one impotent for generating and yet does not exempt from carnal temptations.

2. Much less is it licit to mutilate oneself for procuring some profit or advantage for oneself; wherefore it is not licit for a youth to mutilate himself in order to escape the burden of military service, nor for a poor man in order to obtain greater alms.

3. Some authors admit as at least probable the opinion of those who say that castration in boys is licit so that with a sweeter voice they may sing the praises of God in church and prepare for themselves an honorable livelihood, provided this twofold condition is had: that danger of life be morally absent, and that it not be done to unwilling boys.² But if it is illicit for obtaining a notable spiritual good, much more will it be illicit for attaining a temporal good.³

The supreme pontiffs have never approved the castration of boys, nor ever said it to be licit; indeed they declared irregular those who culpably had made themselves or others eunuchs. Yet they admitted to ecclesiastical concerts eunuchs who without their own fault were made such.⁴

4. There is a surgical operation which is called by physicians, from its inventor, the physician Porro, the Porro operation. It consists in the extirpation of the uterus with the ovaries, by which a woman is rendered impotent for generating. Certainly this operation is licit for preserving life; but from another end besides the preservation of life, for example, for impeding future conception or for forestalling the necessity of Caesarean operation, it cannot be admitted.⁵

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3.

² St. Alphonsus, n. 374.

³ Cf. Lugo, De iustit. et iure, disp. 10, n. 23.

⁴ Benedict XIV, De synodo, l. 11, c. 7, n. 3.

⁵ Cf. Capellmann, Medicina pastoralis^6 (Aquisgrani: Barth, 1893), p. 26 ss.

329. Whether it is licit to wish death for oneself. - It is licit from the motive of obtaining a good which is better than life, or escaping an evil which is worse than death, because in this way neither God's dominion over man's life nor the charity owed to oneself is in any way violated.¹

a. Indeed, alpha. it is one thing to inflict death on oneself, another to wish death for oneself: for he who inflicts death on himself injures the divine right; he who wishes death for himself awaits death to be inflicted on him by God. beta. The desire of death, as of a thing indifferent, receives morality from its motive; therefore from an honest end it is licit to wish death for oneself, but from an evil end to wish it for oneself is of itself a grave sin. But neither to reason nor to charity is it repugnant to wish for oneself death which would be the beginning of greater goods or the end of greater evils; but it is repugnant to reason and to charity owed to oneself to will for oneself the gravest evil for avoiding another light evil.

b. Therefore death can licitly be desired in order to enjoy eternal beatitude, to love God more perfectly, never again to offend God, to avoid truly most grave evils, for example, long illness, troublesome vexations and snares, etc.; therefore sacred Scripture has: "Death is better than a bitter life."² But it is a grave sin to wish death for oneself on account of the ordinary troubles of life, unless this is done in the heat of anger or in some disturbance of mind without sufficient deliberation.

¹ Cf. 3 Kings 19:4.

² Ecclus. 30:17.

SUICIDE, or the killing of one’s self, when one’s own death is the direct and immediate object of the will, is forbidden by the Fifth Commandment and is grievously sinful. It is the same when death is not the direct object of the will, if some act is done of which the only immediate effect is the destruction of one’s own life; for in that case by willing the action I implicitly will the effect. And so if, out of bravado, I jumped from the top of the tower of Westminster Cathedral into the street below, I should be guilty of the grave sin of suicide, even though that was not my direct object.

The reason why suicide is unlawful is because we have not the free disposal of our own lives. God is the-author of life and death, and he has reserved the ownership of human life to himself. We cannot leave the post where he has stationed us without his authority, Moreover, a man belongs to his country, and so suicide is a crime against the commonwealth, and as such is punished. There is a controversy among divines as to whether it would be lawful for a malefactor who had been condemned to death and entrusted by public authority with the execution of the sentence against himself to take his own life. Many hold that it would be lawful, for there seems no conclusive reason why the State might not appoint a man to be his own executioner.

Suicide.—Suicide, or the killing of oneself, is, like homicide in general, of various kinds.

(a) Thus, in reference to the intention, it is voluntary or involuntary, according as it proceeds from knowledge and choice, or as it is committed without realization of what is done or without the intention to produce death. Examples of involuntary suicide are a person who is temporarily insane on account of impending calamity and drowns himself, and a person who, attempting to frighten another by pretending to hang himself, actually strangles to death. It would be a mistake to say that no person who commits suicide is free, but no doubt a large percentage of those who kill themselves are not responsible for their act.

(b) In reference to the mode, suicide is direct, if that which is done tends from its nature to the death of the person who does it (e.g., firing a pistol into one’s brain); it is indirect, if that which is done tends from its nature to another end (e.g., to struggle with a criminal who is firing a revolver). Direct suicide is committed in many ways, all of which can be reduced to positive (e.g., the eating or drinking of deadly poison) and negative (e.g., the refusal to eat or drink anything).

The difference between direct and indirect suicide is also explained as follows: (a) direct suicide is an act or omission that has but one effect, namely, death (e.g., taking deadly poison); (b) indirect suicide is an act or omission that has two effects, one of which is the peril of death. This peril of death is certain, if death always follows (e.g., jumping from the roof of a skyscraper); proximate, if death usually follows (e.g., jumping from a third- or fourth-story window); remote, if death now and then follows (e.g., jumping from a second-story window).

Sinfulness of Suicide.—Voluntary and direct suicide is always a most grave sin, if committed without due authority (i.e., the command of God).

(a) It is a grave injury against the rights of God, for it usurps His authority, refuses Him the service He desires, spurns the gift He has bestowed, dishonors the image of God (Gen., ix. 6), and destroys the property of God: “Thou, O Lord, hast the power of life and death” (Wis., xvi. 13).

(b) It is an offense against society, for the community has a right to be benefited by the lives of its members, and to receive a return for the protection and assistance it affords them. Moreover, death by suicide is usually felt as a great sorrow and disgrace by the relatives of the departed, and it has a demoralizing effect on many persons of suggestible minds. The fact that the death of this or that man is not felt as a loss by a family or the State, but rather as a relief, is no argument; for if suicide were left to human decision, how many fatal mistakes would be made (see 460)! Persons valuable to society would rashly kill themselves, fearing in a mood of depression that they were worthless; others who could contribute nothing in material ways would destroy themselves and deprive their fellow-men of an example of fortitude, or at least of the opportunity of showing charity and mercy to the needy.

(c) Direct and voluntary suicide is a sin against the deepest natural inclination, for self-preservation is called the first law of nature (see 298), and also against that love of self which charity requires (see 1136 sqq.). Since charity to self is more obligatory than charity to the neighbor, suicide is a more serious sin than other forms of homicide. Nor is it excused by the desire of some good for self. The suicide does not better himself by his act, for, since he has not fulfilled his trust in this life, what can he expect in the next life? He escapes the lesser evils of physical miseries or moral temptations, but he incurs the greater evils of physical death and of moral cowardice and defeat, to say nothing of his punishment in the hereafter.

Cooperation in Suicide.—Cooperation in suicide has the guilt of unlawful homicide. (a) Thus, those who incite, advise, command, or assist another to commit suicide are guilty of moral murder. (b) Those who carry out together a suicide pact are guilty both of suicide and of moral murder.

Permission or Authorization to Commit Suicide.—(a) Divine authority could command or permit suicide, since God has the power over life and death. But whether God has ever done this is uncertain. Some argue for the affirmative from the death of Sampson, who pulled down the house upon himself saying: “Let me die with the Philistines” (Judges, xvi. 30), and of Razias who killed himself to escape ill-usage (II Mach., xiv. 37 sqq.), and from the acts of certain female martyrs who from love of God or from the desire to preserve chastity rushed to their deaths. But others think that invincible ignorance may explain these cases. The act of Sampson may also be understood as indirect suicide lawfully committed for the public good of his country.

(b) Human authority, according to some authors, could authorize a condemned malefactor really guilty of a capital crime to execute himself; for, they argue, there is little difference between opening one’s mouth to swallow poison administered by an executioner and taking it with one’s own hands, as was done by Socrates. Others deny that God has given the State the authority to order suicide, and they declare that it is both unnecessary and inhuman to force a condemned man to be his own executioner. Still others believe that the State could command self-execution, at least in necessity, but that such a punishment is so strange, cruel and unnatural that it should be avoided; for, if it is shocking to ask a father to execute his child, much more shocking would it be to ask a man to kill himself. The argument is inconclusive which says that because it is lawful to perform an act preparatory for death, but which is indifferent and would never cause death (such as opening the mouth for poison), it is also lawful to perform the act which inflicts death (such as taking the poison).

Indirect Suicide.—Indirect suicide is committed when one is the cause of an act or omission, indifferent in itself, but from which one foresees as a result that one’s life will be lost or notably shortened, This kind of “suicide” is lawful when and if the conditions for a case of double effect are present—in other words, if there is a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect (see 103 sqq.). The following reasons are considered sufficient:

(a) the public good, for the welfare of society is a greater good than the life of an individual. Eleazar is praised because he exposed himself to death in order to deliver his people (I Mach., vi. 43 sqq.). It is not sinful, then, but rather obligatory for a soldier to advance against the enemy or to blow up an enemy fortification, though it be certain that his own death will result; nor is it wrong for a pastor to go about ministering to his flock during a pestilence, though it be certain that he will fall a victim to the plague. Explorers and experimenters may also risk their lives for the advancement of science;

(b) the good of another suffices for indirect suicide, when he is in extreme spiritual need. Indeed, there may be an obligation of charity to risk one’s life for the salvation of a soul (see 1166). Hence, it is lawful to go as a missionary to a country whose climate is so trying that strangers die there after a few years;

(c) the higher good of self (i.e., the good of virtue) justifies indirect suicide, when there is an urgent reason for exercising a virtue in spite of the peril of death. Thus, for the sake of charity a shipwrecked passenger may yield his place in the life-boat to his parent, wife, friend, or neighbor; for the sake of faith, one may refuse to flee in time of persecution (see 1006), or may refuse and should refuse to take food or drink offered as a mark of idolatry; for the sake of chastity a virgin, at the peril of her life, may jump from a high window or resist the assailant, although it does not seem that this is obligatory if no internal consent will be given to the rape; for the sake of justice, a criminal in the death house who has an opportunity to escape from prison, may decide to remain and be executed, or a malefactor condemned to die by starvation may refuse to take food secretly brought him; for the sake of mortification, one may practise moderate austerities, as by fastings, watchings, scourgings, hair-shirts, etc., which sometimes shorten life, though generally they lengthen it;

(d) the preferable temporal good of self suffices, that is, one may risk the danger of death to escape another danger that is more likely to happen or more terrible. Thus, a man in a burning building may leap from a high window, even though death from the fall is almost certain, for death by burning is more terrible; a prisoner who is about to be tortured to death may make a break for liberty if he sees a chance of escape, for death is more certain if he remains. On the same principle, one may engage in hazardous but useful occupations, such as working on high buildings, or as a diver or miner, for it is better to live a shorter time with employment and the necessities of life, and to be of service to the public, than to live a longer time without these advantages. But a worker should not undertake dangerous tasks for which he is unfitted or unprepared, and the employer is bound to safeguard the lives of the workers.

The same reasons are not sufficient in all cases. (a) Thus, the greater the risk of death, the more serious the reason required. Hence, to save the money one has it might be lawful to jump from a second-story window, but not from a higher window when the fall would most likely kill one. (b) The more immediate the danger of death, the more serious the reason required. Thus, to save money one might lawfully enter a quarantined house, but the risk would not be permitted if the house were tottering in an earthquake. (c) The more notable the shortening of life, the greater the reason needed to permit it. Thus, if the practice of a certain mortification or labor reduces the expectancy of life for a few years, a lesser reason suffices than if it reduces the expectancy for ten or more years.

Indirect suicide is unlawful and has the guilt of self-murder when the reason for risking death is frivolous or insufficient or sinful.

(a) Examples of insufficient reasons are found in the cases of persons who engage in occupations or actions that are very dangerous to life or limb but of little public or private value, as when for the sake of performing a feat a man walks a tight-rope, pricks himself with pins and needles, or puts his head into a lion’s mouth. But if the performer is very skillful and has no other means of livelihood, it seems that he may exercise his art for the sake of entertainment.

(b) Examples of sinful reasons for risking death are found in persons who abbreviate their lives by over-eating, drunkenness, habitual indulgence in strong spirits, or immoderate passion of any kind; and also in those who refuse to make use of the ordinary means for the preservation of health (see 1566 sqq.) or of the ordinary remedies against disease (see 1571). It is not necessary that one be anxious to live long (see 1063), but it is obligatory to use the normal means for the preservation of life, and those who notably neglect these means are guilty of indirect suicide.

Is it suicidal to refuse a surgical operation pronounced necessary for life?

(a) If the operation is likely to be successful and there is no good reason for refusing it, it seems that one may not refuse it without the guilt of indirect suicide, although one might be excused on account of good faith.

(b) If the success of the operation is doubtful, or if there is a good reason for refusing, one who refuses is not guilty of suicide. Among the good reasons are spiritual ones (e.g., modesty, the fear of falling into blasphemy or despair under the pain are given by some writers) and temporal ones (e.g., the poverty that would be brought upon the patient’s family or the hardship that would result for the patient himself).

Canonical Penalties for Suicide.—(a) Those who attempt suicide are irregular ex delicto (Canon 985, n. 5). (b) If they die, they are not given ecclesiastical burial unless they gave signs of repentance before death (Canon 1240, n, 3), and, if they recover, they are subject to various penalties (Canon 2350, Sec. 2). (c) If it is doubtful whether a person committed suicide, or was responsible, the doubt is decided in his favor, provided no scandal is likely.

289. Historical survey. (A) Among the Jews very few examples of suicide are found, both because that crime was prohibited by God, and because the Israelites desired to be long-lived upon the earth. The cases indeed are alleged of Samson,³ Saul,⁴ Achitophel,⁵ Eleazar,⁶ Razias;⁷ but Samson and Eleazar did not properly commit suicide, but gave their life for their country, in order to rout enemies.

² St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 64, a. 5; Lugo, disp. X, n. 1-55; Lessius, lib. I, cap. 9, dub. 6; Billuart, diss. X, art. 3; St. Alphonsus, n. 366-375; Carriere, n. 833-856; Ball. P., tr. VI, n. 855-875; Tissot, De la manie du suicide, Paris, 1841; Lisle, Du suicide, Paris, 1856; Morselli, Il suicidio, Milan, 1879; Legoyt, Le suicide ancien et moderne, Paris, 1881; Masaryk, Der Selbstmord als sociale Massenerscheinung, Vienna, 1881; Westcott, Suicide, its history, litterature, etc., London, 1885; Bonomelli, Il suicidio, Milan, 1892; E. Durkheim, Le Suicide, etude de sociologie, Paris, 1897; P. Hauviller, Du suicide, unite de son etiologie, son traitement, Paris, 1899; L. Proal, Le Crime et le suicide passionnels, Paris, 1900; Gurnhill, The Morals of suicide, London, 1900.

³ Jud., XVI, 22-30.

⁴ I Reg., XXXI, 2-6.

⁵ II Reg., XVII, 23.

⁶ I Mach., VI, 43-46.

⁷ II Mach., XIV, 37-46.

(B) Among the Greeks,¹ the chief philosophers, such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, regarded self-killing as something cowardly; yet some killed themselves, whether on account of the public good, or to avoid disgrace or other private evils; such were Codrus the Athenian, Menoeceus the Theban, Cleomenes, king of Sparta, Themistocles, Isocrates. The Stoics advocated suicide as an act of virtue, by which they could at their pleasure be snatched from the bonds of life; and also the Epicureans, as a means of fleeing the bitternesses of life.

¹ Concerning the history of suicide among the Greeks and other Nations see Legoyt, op. cit., p. 7 sq.

(C) At Rome, as long as the citizens cultivated virtues and honorable and simple morals, suicide was almost unknown; especially the examples of Lucretia, Scipio of Utica, Cassius, and Brutus are cited. But as soon as wealth, luxury, and love of pleasures flourished, namely in the last times of the Republic and under the reign of the Emperors, many citizens, in order to avoid pains or a more cruel death, took away their own life.

290. (D) These morals the Christian religion corrected, by often inculcating human dignity, the value of life, patience in adversities, and trust in God. Hence, among Christians, suicides became exceedingly rare. There were indeed some who went to meet martyrdom, and also Christian virgins who, lest they lose virginity, did not hesitate to bring death upon themselves;² but the Fathers, especially St. Augustine,³ while they praised their virtue and right intention, reproved the deed itself. Likewise certain heretics, akin to the Donatists and called Circumcellions, approved suicide; these "were accustomed to kill themselves by various deaths, especially by precipices and waters and fires, and to seduce into that madness others of either sex whom they could."⁴ But for this reason they are severely censured by the Fathers.

² Thus St. Pelagia (in St. Ambrose, de Virginibus, III, 7), Domnica with her two daughters (Eusebius, Eccles. Hist., VIII, 12, in Migne, P. G. XX, 770-771), Sophronia (Eusebius, op. cit., VIII, 14, Migne, l. c. 786-787).

³ De civit. Dei, l. I, c. 26-27, in Migne, P. L. XLI, 39-40.

⁴ St. Augustine, De Haeresibus, n. 69, in Migne, XLII, 43.

291. (E) But in more recent times, as faith decreased and pagan morals gradually were reborn, not a few writers again advocated suicide, among whom were Montaigne, Montesquieu, Rousseau, who, otherwise little consistent with himself, elsewhere reproved that crime, - d'Holbach, Barbieri, J. Robeck,⁵ and generally the positivists and materialists. Therefore suicides became more frequent, especially in France and Germany.⁶ Besides, in various regions many more are committed among Protestants than among Catholics, even according to non-Catholic writers as witnesses.¹

⁵ Concerning these see Legoyt, op. cit., p. 85-99.

⁶ In France suicides are multiplied daily; - namely, in the year 1826 there were counted 1739; in 1851: 3639; in 1888: 8451; in 1897: 9156. If a comparison is made with other regions, already in the year 1888 France held the first place; for this was the proportion of suicides per 1,000,000 inhabitants: - in France: 212; in Prussia: 198; among the Belgians: 116; in Austria: 114; in England: 80; in Italy: 53. - In cities suicides are more frequent than among country people; thus per 1,000,000 inhabitants there are had at Leipzig: 450; at Paris: 400; at Berlin: 300; at Vienna: 290. Cf. M. Block, L'Europe politique et sociale, Paris, 1892, p. 459, 460, 462. - As to the causes of suicide, these things are read in M. Block, op. cit., p. 461: "Relatively to the presumed motives of suicides, the General Account gives the following averages for the period 1876-80: poverty and reverses of fortune, 698; family sorrows, 842; love, jealousy, etc., 254; drunkenness, 799; desire to withdraw oneself from judicial proceedings, 236; physical sufferings, 202; cerebral maladies, 1901; others and unknown, 627."

¹ Durkheim, op. cit., p. 149-173; Hauviller, op. cit., p. 62-65.

292. Division of the matter. Suicide is sometimes directly intended as an end or a means: then it is called direct; but sometimes it is not intended in itself, but is foreseen as probably going to follow from the action which is placed; thus a soldier about to fight for his country foresees that death will probably follow from the battle; then suicide, if it really occurs, is indirect. Hence we shall speak: 1. of direct suicide; 2. of indirect suicide; 3. by way of corollary, of mutilation of oneself, surgical operations, and care of one's own body.

293. 1. Principle: Suicide, directly and by one's own authority intended, is of itself a grave sin, injurious to God and harmful no less to the individual than to society.

It is said: by one's own authority... so that the case of one who would kill himself by divine inspiration may be excluded; - of itself, grave, because there can be some who in good faith, on account of various motives, take away their own life; but of itself the sin is mortal, on account of the motives which we now explain.

294. (A) It is a sin injurious to God;² for, from what has been said above (n. 34), perfect dominion over his own life does not belong to man, but only dependently upon God, its founder, supreme lord, and last end. Now, by taking away life from himself by his own hand, he violates God's rights: (a) since God, and indeed He alone, as supreme lord of all, has the right of disposing of human life, which He handed over to us after the manner of a deposit, and which we ought to use according to His will: for creatures essentially and according to their whole being depend upon the Creator; this indeed the Apostle intimates: "For none of us lives to himself, and no one dies to himself. For whether we live, we live to the Lord; or whether we die, we die to the Lord. Therefore whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's."¹ (b) Moreover God, insofar as He is the last end, has a strict right that we tend toward Him by the means which He has determined; now He has established according to His wisdom the term of our life and probation, and therefore we usurp His rights if by premature death of our own will we put an end to this probation.²

² This is the chief argument; the two others only confirm it.

¹ Rom., XIV, 7-8.

² Some pagans had already understood this; for Socrates (in Plato, Phaed., c. 6) says: "This seems to me, O Cebes, to be said rightly, that God indeed has care of us; but we men are one certain thing among the possessions of the gods. Would you not therefore also be angry if one of your slaves killed himself, and, if you had power, would you not affect him with some punishment?"

Therefore deservedly St. Augustine writes that self-killing is prohibited by these words, You shall not kill: "It remains that we understand of man what was said, You shall not kill: neither another, therefore, nor yourself; for he who kills himself kills nothing other than a man."³

³ De Civ. Dei, lib. I, c. 20, in Migne, P. L., XLI, 35; a little above, c. 17, p. 30-31, he had said: "For surely, if it is not licit by private power to kill a man, even a guilty one, whose killing no law permits, certainly also he who kills himself is a homicide; and he becomes so much the more guilty when he kills himself, the more innocent he was in that cause for which he thought he ought to be killed."

295. (B) Harmful to the individual himself; for he who spontaneously casts away life by that very fact takes from himself not only a present good, but every further abundance of good. (a) For life is the greatest good which we can enjoy in the present life;⁴ for it is the condition without which we cannot enjoy other goods; as long as we live, we can acquire not only external goods, but also internal goods, namely knowledge, virtue, merits; but by voluntarily deserting life, we are deprived of all these things. (b) Moreover, as long as we preserve life unharmed, even if we are oppressed by various miseries and immersed in vices, hope remains that, circumstances having changed and morals having been reformed, things may proceed prosperously for us, and that we may redeem the faults of our past life by due satisfaction and by the practice of virtues; but if suicide is perpetrated, every hope vanishes, and nothing remains except that we pay the penalty proportioned to our faults. (c) It is a law implanted in our nature that we cultivate by manly effort the faculties received from God, physical, mental, and moral; the more perfect this development is, the greater is our happiness, since by the legitimate and progressive exercise of the faculties we approach more closely our last end; but, on the other hand, if life is cut off immaturely, man withers like a dried flower, before he has attained the degree of perfection destined for him.

⁴ On the moment and value of life Olle-Laprune discusses excellently, Le prix de la vie, 3rd ed., Paris, 1896.

296. (C) Harmful to society. Every man is inserted into society as a useful member, and remains bound to it by certain bonds and duties, because he unceasingly receives many benefits from it: for he enjoys the protection of society, and by its aid he is able so to cultivate his faculties that their force is increased a hundredfold. Therefore he ought to pay the debts of charity and justice to the State; this indeed he can furnish by working, teaching, giving good example, and by other means by which the public good is promoted. Now, by departing from life by his own motion, the citizen despises all these duties, and gives scandal to those to whom he ought to have been of utility and edification. Deservedly, therefore, he is compared to a soldier who deserts the post where he ought to fight strenuously; deservedly he is held guilty of cowardice.

297. (A) First of all there are alleged the infirmities and miseries of human life, such as poverty, disease, especially incurable disease, old age, bitter pains, weariness, griefs, and other things of this kind; and from this it is inferred that death is more desirable than a life overwhelmed by so many and so great miseries.

But in this a false concept of life is presented; for we are not here upon earth in order to enjoy pleasures, but in order to cultivate virtues by the legitimate exercise of the faculties, to increase moral perfection, and to obtain a better life. Now nothing is more efficacious than tribulation for the practice of virtues; for virtue is perfected in infirmity, fortitude is strengthened in adversities,¹ patience is exercised by bearing pains bravely, merits are greatly increased; moreover, if we have sinned, an occasion offers itself for expiating faults by salutary penance. Thus the distresses of this life are rendered more tolerable; indeed they bring a certain joy, according to that word of the Apostle:² "And not only this, but we glory also in tribulations, knowing that tribulation works patience; and patience probation; and probation hope. And hope does not confound."

¹ Already Martial the poet had said: "In adverse things it is easy to despise life; he acts bravely who is able to be miserable."

² Rom., V, 3-5; cf. VIII, 18-39, where the same thing is set forth more fully.

298. (B) Others kill themselves because they cannot tolerate disgrace, since honor is life itself, and more precious.

A foolish excuse indeed! From the fact that others unjustly attack our reputation, must we punish ourselves by taking away life with a cruel hand? Nor indeed do we thus recover the good estimation of our neighbor; but, on the contrary, by living honestly and acting nobly we overcome false accusations. But if we have been guilty of some fault, reputation is recovered not by suicide, by which disgrace is increased, but by a praiseworthy life.

299. (C) Some, in order to preserve chastity, have gone to meet death, since virtue is much more precious than life.

And these indeed are subjectively worthy of excuse, on account of the right intention which they had, as St. Augustine notes; but, according to the same, this is not in itself a sufficient reason for committing suicide; for since purity is a virtue of the soul, it is not lost even when the body is oppressed, as the holy Doctor says:³ "Wherefore a woman violently oppressed without any consent, and forced by another's sin, has nothing which she may punish in herself by voluntary death: much less before this happens; lest certain homicide be admitted, while the very crime, although another's, still remains uncertain." - In reality, material integrity of the flesh is not more precious than life, since sometimes it is licitly lost, in surgical operations, in order to save life. - But what if there is present a danger of inwardly consenting? Not even in this case is it licit to kill oneself; for in so great a danger grace will not be lacking for resisting lust, provided it is earnestly sought: "But God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, but will make also with temptation an outcome, that you may be able to bear it."⁴ Therefore nothing remains except that one must fight strenuously; and what is said of this temptation must be said of others: it is licit for no one, in order to overcome any temptations whatever, to kill himself; for evils are not to be done that goods may come.

³ De Civit. Dei, l. I, c. 18, in Migne, XLI, 31-32.

⁴ I Cor., X, 13.

300. (D) Not a few contend that they lead a useless life, indeed one burdensome to others, or even harmful, insofar as they give scandal, so that by killing themselves they promote the good of their neighbor or of society.

But that these motives are not sufficient is already clear from what has been said. (a) If someone leads a useless life, nothing prevents him by praying, working, and helping others by works of charity from bringing many benefits both to himself and to others;¹ for this is the law of Providence: that, while we do good to others, we contribute most greatly to our own happiness. (b) But if we impose burdens upon others, because of disease, old age, etc., by that very fact we offer them an occasion of exercising patience and acquiring merits; on the other hand, by bravely tolerating our infirmities, we are unto edification for them: "Bear one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfill the law of Christ."² (c) But if we have harmed society or our neighbor, the duty lies upon us of repairing scandal by honesty and sanctity of life; by no means, however, do we have the right of taking away our life, since this rather gives new scandal.

¹ This J. J. Rousseau, who elsewhere favors suicide, explains eloquently: "Suicide is a furtive and shameful death; it is a theft committed against the human race. Before leaving it, give back to it what it has done for you. - But I am attached to nothing, I am useless to the world. - Philosopher of a day! do you not know that you could not take a step upon the earth without finding some duty to fulfill, and that every man is useful to humanity by the sole fact that he exists? Senseless youth! if there remains at the bottom of your heart the least sentiment of virtue, come, that I may teach you to love life. Each time that you are tempted to go out of it, say to yourself: 'let me do one more good action before dying,' then go seek some indigent person to aid, some unfortunate person to console, some oppressed person to defend." (Nouvelle Heloise, III, letter 22.)

² Galat. VI, 2.

301. A point to be noted for practice. Since some are led to suicide by a certain auto-suggestion, by the force of which, by frequently thinking about their own miseries, they gradually persuade themselves that there is no other means of extricating themselves from these difficulties except to perpetrate suicide, it is of the greatest moment to turn their mind away from this continual thought, by suggesting to them some work of charity, or another occupation by which they may more easily overcome weariness of life.

112. Principle 1. Direct suicide, done by private authority, is always a most grave sin.

Thus all Catholics teach against the Stoics, Epicureans, and several modern non-Catholics.

Proof. The sin of suicide is most strictly prohibited by law a) divine, b) natural, c) ecclesiastical.

a) In the fifth precept of the Decalogue divine law inculcates: "You shall not kill."

b) By a threefold reason direct suicide injures natural right itself;⁷⁵ for it is against charity toward oneself, violates the rights of the human community, and violates the rights of God himself. Therefore suicide first injures charity toward oneself. For each person ought to love himself, and from this love there arises the most vehement inclination of preserving oneself and resisting death. Hence suicide is something unnatural and injuring charity toward oneself. Moreover, it does injury to human society. For every man ought to be a useful member of human society. But by departing from life by his own motion, a man can now bring no utility to society. Therefore he commits injury. Finally, suicide is very injurious to God, who gave life to man and continually conserves it, and therefore is the perfect owner of every human life. Wherefore St. Paul says very well: "For none of us lives to himself, and no one dies to himself. For whether we live, we live to the Lord; or whether we die, we die to the Lord. Therefore whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's."⁷⁶ But he who destroys his own life by suicide destroys the property of God and therefore inflicts grave injury upon God;⁷⁷ to him alone belongs the authoritative judgment of life and death, according to that saying: "You are, O Lord, he who has power of life and death."⁷⁸

c) Suicide is gravely prohibited by ecclesiastical law, which, as a penalty for so great a crime, forbids the body of a suicide to be buried in a sacred place or Mass or other liturgical suffrages to be celebrated for him.⁷⁹ But these ecclesiastical penalties are not incurred a) if the suicide was committed from madness or another cause impeding the use of reason; b) if the suicide gave signs of repentance before he expired; c) if the crime was wholly occult, lest the reputation of the survivors be violated; d) if there was doubt whether death arose from suicide, or whether the suicide was committed from madness. He who attempted suicide is irregular,⁸⁰ is barred from legitimate ecclesiastical acts, and incurs other penalties if he is a cleric.⁸¹

But it is said that suicide done by private authority is a most grave sin. For either from divine authority or sometimes from public authority suicide would be lawful. It is plain that God can command suicide to some man; for he himself is the supreme owner of life and death. But whether in reality God ever gave such a precept is not certainly established. For the deeds which are read in the lives of the saints (e.g., St. Apollonia, St. Pelagia, St. Sophronia) do not certainly prove that a divine precept was present. Those saints most certainly had the best intention, but through invincible ignorance they could have done something which objectively was illicit.⁸²

But could someone kill himself by command of public authority? E.g., can someone justly condemned to death by poison or hanging himself take the poison or hang himself? This case occurred in the East, and Socrates, condemned to death, is said to have obeyed the law of the republic and himself taken poison.⁸³ Billuart⁸⁴ and St. Alphonsus⁸⁵ deny (and call their opinion the more common), but it is not certainly established that this is intrinsically evil; wherefore it would be lawful for one justly condemned to death to employ this mode of dying when the supreme judge commands it. "For if the accused can open his mouth so that poison may be poured into it, so also he can draw it up with his hands, and so also he can transfix himself with a sword. For then the judge constitutes the accused as executioner of himself." Yet this is cruel and not very becoming.

Scholion. On The Principal Causes Of Suicide. In our times suicides become more frequent from day to day. The fundamental cause of this mournful experience seems to be the defect of faith creeping in more and more. For it is impossible that a man well conscious of the punishments of Gehenna (which he will certainly suffer through all eternity if with full advertence and deliberation he commits suicide) would not prefer to tolerate all the pains of this world rather than commit suicide. Hence suicides also happen much more frequently among unbelievers than among Catholics.⁸⁶ Another cause of suicides is books and theaters, in which suicide is very often glorified and therefore commended. Priests should not omit to deter the people from the enormous crime of suicide.

⁷⁵ St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 64, a. 5.

⁷⁶ Rom. 14, 7 sq.

⁷⁷ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 64, a. 5, where also the excuses which are sometimes brought forward for suicide are refuted.

⁷⁸ Wis. 16, 13.

⁷⁹ Rit. Rom. tit. 6, c. 2, n. 3. Code of Canon Law c. 1240, 3.

⁸⁰ Code of Canon Law c. 985, 4.

⁸¹ L. c. 2350, § 2.

⁸² Cf. Lessius l. 2, c. 9, n. 23, cited by Noldin, De praeceptis n. 327.

⁸³ Cf. Plato, Phaedo (LVII): τι χρή ποιεῖν.

⁸⁴ De iust. diss. 14, a. 4, dico 4.

⁸⁵ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 369.

⁸⁶ Paulsen rightly says: "Suicide is, as a rule, the unbeautiful end of an unbeautiful life" (System der Ethik II, 120).

S. Th. II-II, q. 64, a. 5.

349. The killing of oneself is an action or omission apt to cause death; one kind is direct, another indirect. Direct is that which is intended in itself as an end or means, whether explicitly or implicitly, as when an action or omission can tend immediately to no other end; indirect is that which is not intended in itself, but is foreseen as likely to follow from some action or omission: thus a soldier about to fight foresees that death will probably follow from battle. Certainly one thing is to kill oneself or to inflict death on oneself; another is only to expose oneself to death or to its danger, or to do something else with danger of death, which, namely, can draw death along with itself. Now that indirect killing of oneself is licit, certain conditions being given and from a proportionately grave cause, there is no one who doubts; but there also have been those who have tried to legitimate direct killing of oneself or suicide itself properly so called, not only among the Greek philosophers, especially Stoics or Epicureans, considering it as an act of virtue, or as a means of fleeing the bitternesses of life, but also among more recent men, especially among positivists and materialists. From this it has happened that, faith decreasing, suicide has grown stronger day by day, the more so because in books and theaters its apology is undertaken. Catholic doctrine contradicts this.

350. Thesis I. Direct killing of oneself, intended in itself and by one's own authority, is a sin of itself grave from the whole genus, as being harmful not only to the individual, but also to society, and injurious to God.

It is said: a) by one's own authority, so that the case may be excluded both of him who, with God inspiring him, would kill himself, which certainly is licit, and of him who would do this because of a crime committed, with public authority commanding it, which we would not dare to condemn as certainly illicit;

b) grave of itself, because per accidens it can happen that someone in good faith judges there to be certain motives on account of which it would be licit to take away his own life;

c) from the whole genus, as being...: for by its nature it is always grave on account of a threefold motive, because it is harmful not only to the suicide himself, but also to society, and moreover injurious to the right of God. Under the first aspect it is not against justice but against charity toward oneself, under the second directly against legal justice, under the third against commutative justice.

But it is most strictly prohibited not only by natural law, but also by divine and ecclesiastical law.

It is proved directly: 1) It is against the natural law.

a) For it is harmful to the individual. Life is the greatest temporal good and the condition of all other goods, not only natural but also supernatural: the condition of merit for eternal life, the condition of progress in charity, the condition of penitence, the condition of progress and evolution in the moral and spiritual life; whence he who kills himself acts against love of self and against the natural inclination by which every being tends to the conservation of itself.

b) It is also harmful to society, which does not have dominion over our life but custody of it for its own utility. A part belongs to the whole, and every part, that which it is, is of the whole; but every man is part of society, into which he is inserted as a useful member, and thus that which he is, is of society; therefore he who kills himself deprives society of this utility of himself, while it is unwilling, and thus inflicts injury upon it.

c) Finally and especially it injures the right of God. For God is the author and therefore the owner of our life and body, and He has reserved this dominion to Himself, and has conceded to us only the use, after the manner of a deposit, according to His will, with the burden of guarding and preserving life. Therefore life is a certain good divinely given and subject to the power and judgment of God. Whence he who kills himself injures the right of God.

2. It is against divine law, which a) explicitly decrees: You shall not kill, which is to be understood not only of the killing of one's neighbor but also of the killing of oneself, since man ought to love his neighbor as himself. Whence Augustine, book I De Civ. Dei, c. 20: "It remains that we understand of man that which was said: You shall not kill. Not another, therefore not yourself. For he who kills himself kills nothing other than a man"; b) it also indicates the foundation of the precept, Deut. XXXII, 39: I will kill and I will make alive; and Wis. XVI, 13: You are, O Lord, who have power of life and death; hence c) it concludes: because as to life and death we are under the dominion of God, we must live and die for the Lord, according to that of the Apostle, Rom. XIV, 7-8: "For none of us lives to himself, and no one dies to himself. For whether we live, we live to the Lord; whether we die, we die to the Lord. Therefore whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's."

3. It is against ecclesiastical law, according to which suicides are deprived of sacred burial and liturgical suffrages (can. 1240, 3°); yet these penalties are not incurred if sufficient use of reason was lacking in them or perhaps was lacking, if they gave signs of repentance, if there is doubt whether death arose from suicide, if the crime was entirely hidden, lest the reputation of survivors be violated. But those who have attempted suicide are irregular from delict (can. 985, 5°), are barred from legitimate ecclesiastical acts, and incur other penalties if they are clerics (can. 2350, § 2).

351. There is no assignable cause on account of which it is licit to kill oneself, but all the excuses which are brought forward are vain pretexts.

For a) the misery of this present life does not hold: the happiness for which we are destined is to be obtained only in the future life, for which the misery of the present age provides an occasion of greater merit or penitence; and it would be irrational, in order to avoid lesser miseries, to inflict on oneself the greatest, namely death. Nor b) intolerable disgrace to be undergone: killing is not a suitable means of recovering reputation or honor, and because of evil unjustly inflicted by another, it is not fitting to inflict a greater punishment on oneself. Nor c) virtue, especially chastity, to be preserved: the integrity of the flesh surely is not a good proportioned to death; but the integrity of the soul can be provided for otherwise, since, as temptation increases, resistance from the grace of God can increase. Besides, evils are not to be done so that goods may come about. Nor d) a useless life or one burdensome to others to be ended: everyone can be useful to others by laboring, helping, building up by good examples, or praying; but if he has been harmful to a private person or to society, he ought by the honesty of life to repair scandals or injustices.

These things St. Thomas already refuted in his own time, q. 64, a. 5, ad 3: "Man is constituted master of himself through free will; and therefore man can licitly dispose concerning himself as to those things which pertain to this life, which is ruled by man's free will. But the passage from this life to another happier one is not subject to man's free will, but to divine power; and therefore 1) it is not licit for man to kill himself, so that he may pass to a happier life. 2) Similarly also not so that he may escape any miseries of the present life, because the ultimate and most terrible of the evils of this life is death... And therefore to inflict death on oneself in order to escape other miseries of this life is to assume a greater evil for the avoidance of a lesser evil. 3) Similarly also it is not licit to kill oneself because of some sin committed, both because in this he harms himself most of all, because he takes away from himself the necessary time of penitence, and also because it is not licit to kill a malefactor except through the judgment of public power. 4) Similarly also it is not licit for a woman to kill herself lest she be corrupted by another, because she ought not to commit in herself the greatest crime, which is the killing of herself, in order to avoid the lesser crime of another: for it is not a crime of a woman violated by violence if consent is not present... But it is established that fornication or adultery is a lesser sin than homicide, and especially homicide of oneself, which is most grave, because it harms oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love; it is also most dangerous, because no time remains that it may be expiated through penitence. 5) Similarly also it is not licit for anyone to kill himself because of fear lest he consent to sin, because evils are not to be done so that goods may come, or so that evils may be avoided, especially lesser and less certain evils; for it is uncertain whether someone in the future will consent to sin: for God is able to free man from sin in whatever temptation supervenes."

From these things again the Catholic thesis is indirectly confirmed.

I Say. It is never licit for anyone directly to kill himself; but sometimes it is licit to concur indirectly in the killing of oneself. The reason of the first is both because, from the natural law, man does not have direct dominion over his body, but only useful dominion and administration, since he received it from God and will be held to render it back to Him when He asks it back; and because man is essentially a servant in relation to God, but the condition of a servant necessarily requires that it not be in his own power to determine the time of serving. But the reason of the second is that to concur indirectly in the killing of oneself is the same as to place an action from which, beyond the intention, one's own death follows. But this must sometimes be licit, namely when the required conditions are verified, concerning which it was said in the tract on human acts, n. 8. Therefore. ... Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 64, art. 5. - Lugo, de just. et jur., disp. 10, nn. 9 and 17.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. It is not licit to mutilate oneself unless it is necessary for the preservation of the whole body, because man is not the lord of his members, but only their guardian, and whatever man is, it is wholly God's. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 373.

2nd. Likewise it is not licit to mutilate oneself for a spiritual good, or for avoiding any sin whatsoever. For as St. Thomas says: "Spiritual health can always be provided for otherwise than by the cutting off of a member, because sin is subject to the will. And therefore in no case is it licit to cut off a member on account of avoiding any sin whatsoever." Add that mutilation of this kind renders someone impotent for generating, yet does not exempt him from carnal temptations. But St. Alphonsus does not reject as improbable the opinion of those who say that mutilation of this kind is licit for the preservation of the voice, provided the moral danger of life is absent and it is not done to unwilling boys. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 65, art. 1. - St. Alphonsus, n. 374. - Baller., notes (a) and (b), p. 373.

3rd. It is never licit to macerate the body for shortening life, nor, even with such an end excluded, gravely to ruin health by immoderate and altogether indiscreet penances. Nevertheless, from virtue, it is licit to use penances ordinarily grave with a certain shortening of life; because, from the common opinion of the Doctors, for the sake of merit or the mortification of depraved nature some loss of longer life can be despised. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 371; and Hom. Ap., n. 2.

§ D. Thom. quaest. 64. art 5.

The killer of himself is proclaimed unjust by D. Bonaventura in 3. dist. 37. dub. 5. litt. and D. Thom. here; all follow them, as Farinac. reports, Tom. 4. quaest. 128., Fagundez in quintum praeceptum decal. cap. 11.

It is PROVED by the Saintly Doctors from the fifth precept, Non occides, by which precept every unjust killing of a man is prohibited; but none is more unjust than against oneself; because, as D. Bonavent. says, in 3. dist. 29. quaest. 3., Fundamento I., Qui sibi nequam est, cui alii bonus erit? Ecclesiastici 14.

But the UNHAPPY man who kills himself, that he may obtain rest, is destined to eternal punishments without rest, as the Seraphic Doctor says, in 3. dist. 28. dub. 2.; indeed he is deprived of the rest of burial, as was defined in the Council of Braga, cap. 34., and it is related in cap. Placuit, dist. 23. quaest. 5.: Placuit, ut qui sibi ipsis, aut per ferrum, aut per venenum, aut per praecipitium, aut suspendium, aut quolibet modo, violentam inferunt mortem, nulla pro eis in oblatione commemoratio fiat; neque cum Psalmis ad sepulturam cadavera eorum deducantur.

I ADD, however; for this punishment to be incurred it is required that he involve himself in full judgment; For if he does it in a frenzy, indeed pious Mother Church has compassion on him. But if there is doubt, he is not to be deprived of Ecclesiastical Sepulture, but is to be conducted with lesser ceremony; for instance with one or two Priests accompanying. So very many, whom Farinac. follows, loco cit. num. 16.

By civil law, the one who kills himself, or attempts to kill himself, even if death does not follow, is infamous, Lex si aliquid, § finali, ff. de poenis, and Lex, omne delictum, §. si se vulnerauerit, ff. de re militari, where it speaks of honorary soldiers.

The Doctors commonly assert, with D. Bonaventure, that the one who kills himself sins mortally against Justice toward God, and toward the Republic, of which he is a member; and against Charity toward himself, as the Saintly Doctor teaches in the places to be cited and alleged, D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 64. art. 5. ad 1., Sotus L. 4. de Iust. quaest. 2. art. 3., Couar. lib. 4. var. cap. 2., Sayrus lib. 7. cap. 17., Petrus Navar. lib. 2. de restitut. cap. 3. num. 54., Fagundez in quintum Praeceptum decalogi, L. 5. cap. 11. num. 5.

It is not, however, properly against justice toward the Republic, because it is not perfectly mistress of his own life, as Fagundez notes, cont. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 62. Tract. de dominio vitae, concl. 1., but against God, the supreme Lord, as Plato argues in Phaedone.

There arises a new question, which Lessius first hinted at, Tom. 1. de Iust. Lib. 2. cap. 9. dub. 6. num. 32., and Fagundez discusses, num. 6.: whether the Commander of a fleet of Miopari, when otherwise he cannot escape the hands of the Barbarians, can licitly send fire into the sulphurous powder and set the ship ablaze, not in order to kill himself and others, but lest that ship come into the hands of the enemy, lest they become more insolent and stronger because of it.

The FIRST opinion is affirmative, which Lessius follows, and Fagundez applauds: others subscribe, who allege that the defenders of the fatherland, unable otherwise to sustain death, can undertake some deed, even if they are to be killed because of it. So Victoria relect. de homicid. ad ult., Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 62. tract. 1. de dominio vitae, concl. 1. quaest. 64. art. 1., Valentia Tom. 3. disput. 5. quaest. 8. puncto 2., Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 65.; and they cite the examples of Samson, Iudv 16., of Eleazar primo, Machab. 9., of Raziz 2. Machab. 14., and of other Heroes.

The SECOND opinion is negative. So D. Thom. in the place cited, whom they commonly follow, who in the deed of Samson take refuge in a singular impulse of God. So D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 32. art. 2. quaest. 1.

It is PROVED by the Saintly Doctor in the chapter on the sixth precept of the Decalogue from the divine precept: Non occides. But what they say, that this does not intend one to kill oneself, is frivolous; For he efficiently brings about his own death, by sending in a cause naturally efficacious.

To the example of Samson D. Bonaventure answers that he did it, moved by God, who is the lord of life; for Scripture says: Irruit super eum spiritus Domini, as Tostatus observes, in 16. Iudic. quaest. 54., citing D. Augustine primo, de civit. Dei, cap. 20., and he says the same in lib. contra secundam epistolam Gaudensii.

But that he could have done it without the impulse of God, as Sayrus Lib. 7. cap. 9. num. 9., Lessius loco cit., Caietanus Iud. 16., Lopez cap. 65. Instruct. say, is not proved; otherwise God would have sent in His Spirit in vain.

I say the SAME of Eleazar, whom D. Ambrose praises, Lib. primo, offic. cap. 40.

I assert entirely the SAME of Razia, who stabbed himself and threw himself headlong from a height, lest he fall into the power of the Barbarians. For so Scripture says: Eligens nobiliter potius mori, quam subditus fieri peccatoribus. But the Greek text is rendered thus: Generose volens mori potius, quam peccatoribus subditum fieri, et propria nobilitate indigne contumeliam pati.

Wherefore the Holy Spirit praises him for this. Nor do some rightly say that he is so related; but that, deceived by the opinion of his own nobility, he mortally sinned; among whom is also D. Thom. in the place cited, ad 5., and others in Fagundez num. 8., for Scripture acknowledges this act as generous. Therefore Lyra defends him on the text, and Victoria at the end.

Without doubt, D. Augustine teaches that this is not licit, primo de civitate, cap. 25. et 27., and D. Bonavent. ad 12. Ioan., where with the same D. Augustine, tract. 51. in Ioannem, he condemns the Donatists, who killed themselves in detestation of sin, and on this account gloried that they would soon be redeemed with the crown of Martyrdom.

Nor is this licit in order to avoid rape. For so the most valiant Lucia said: Si me feceris violari, castitas duplicabitur ad coronam. Therefore S. Bonavent. describes her as most valiant in sermonibus. On the contrary, D. Augustine, 1. de civitate, cap. 19., reproves the Roman Lucretia as pusillanimous, because she killed herself lest she succumb to the adultery of the violating Tarquin. Yet Bassaeus says that she, and others, can be excused on account of invincible ignorance; and the deed of S. Apollonia is excused by many, and he brings forward many in Diana part. 6. tract. 7. Resol. 47. But that one is justified by the Church.

But he praises rather allowing oneself to be killed by one willing to violate, in order to decline the danger of consent; for we are held to allow life rather to be snatched away than to sin against God, as the Saintly Doctor argues in the place cited: Qui amat animam suam, perdet eam, et qui perdiderit animam suam propter me, inveniet eam, And it is the common opinion