Question — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Question Second. On the Killing and Mutilation of Oneself
327. On the killing of oneself. 1. It is never licit by one's own authority directly to kill oneself, even if life has become hard for us and useless to others.
For the destruction of a thing is an act of dominion; but man does not have dominion over his own life. Therefore by the killing of oneself the supreme and exclusive dominion of God over the life of man is injured.1 Moreover, charity is injured, by which man is bound to love himself, since he inflicts the greatest evil upon himself. Finally life, even if bitter or useless to others, always retains its principal importance of meriting eternal life. Wherefore self-killing is against justice toward God and against love of oneself. Also in sacred Scripture the killing of oneself is rather often prohibited,2 and the Church punishes self-killing by deprivation of ecclesiastical burial.
a. He directly kills himself or another who posits a killing action with the intention of inflicting death upon himself or another; he indirectly kills himself or another who does not intend the killing of himself or another, but knowingly does something from which he foresees that his own or another's death will follow. In order that someone be said directly to kill himself or another, it is required that the action and intention be immediately and directly killing. But the intention is necessarily directly killing where the action immediately has only one effect and that a killing one. But if neither the action nor the intention is immediately and directly killing, or if the action alone is so but not the intention, someone is not judged directly to kill himself or another, as is clear from the deed of Samson.3
b. Therefore self-killing is not permitted, not even for escaping the gravest evil, for example, the miseries of the present life, vehement shame because of a crime committed, fear of punishment, or fear of ignominy. For temporal evils, however great, are lower than the good of life; but to choose a greater evil for escaping a lesser is against reason and against ordered love of oneself. Therefore it is not licit even for a virgin to kill herself to escape violent corruption or to preserve the good of integrity.
c. It is not licit, with certain loss of life, to throw oneself from a window into a river or to leap into the midst of flames to baptize a child; for this would be direct self-killing, because the action posited immediately tends to the killing of oneself, and only by this action posited can the child be baptized. In order that this can be done licitly, there must be at least some hope of escaping from the waves or flames.
- It is licit directly to kill oneself by divine authority; for then man leaves life with the permission of the supreme lord of life itself. The same is probably also licit by public authority: for where someone has been justly condemned to death, by natural right the judge can commit the execution of the sentence to anyone, even to the guilty person. Therefore the guilty person who must be punished by death, with the judge permitting, can licitly kill himself or execute the penalty of death upon himself.4
The deeds which are read in the lives of the saints, namely that some killed themselves either from desire of martyrdom or to preserve chastity, are explained by some through divine inspiration by which God granted them permission to kill themselves; by others rather through invincible ignorance, which indeed can be supposed more easily because from an obvious consideration of the matter it is not immediately evident that self-killing for preserving a great good is illicit.5
- From a proportionately grave cause it is licit indirectly to kill oneself. Although even indirect self-killing is of itself prohibited, nevertheless it is licit to posit an action indifferent in itself from which one's own death follows, if at least equally immediately a good effect follows, and if there is a grave cause of common or private good for positing that action. In this way the deed of Eleazar, killing the elephant by which he himself was crushed, is explained.6
a. It is licit to leap from a window with certain danger of death to escape a harder death, for example, one about to be undergone immediately in flames. It is licit to cast oneself from a high tower with certain danger of death to flee an atrocious death which a tyrant is actually about to inflict. But the same is not licit if the tyrant, otherwise about to inflict an atrocious death, demands it; for if death is not yet actually inflicted, the casting down is not an action from which each effect immediately follows, one's own death and the flight from the more atrocious death, but is self-killing which is chosen as a means to escape a greater evil.
b. It is licit for a virgin to cast herself from a very high cliff with certain loss of life, in order to free herself from the hands of an impure violator and thus preserve virginity, even if she reasonably hopes that she will not consent. Yet this is not licit unless force is morally being actually inflicted; for if force is not yet being inflicted, self-killing is chosen to avoid a grave evil, which is illicit.
c. It is licit to burn a ship or tower to submerge or destroy enemies, even if one's own death will certainly follow from it.
d. It is licit in shipwreck to yield to another a plank which one had already seized, even if the one who, yielding the plank, lowers himself into the sea, is certainly going to perish. And indeed St. Thomas calls this action of yielding the plank and handing oneself over to death for a friend an act of most perfect virtue.7
e. It is licit to present oneself to a tyrant by whom one certainly knows he will be killed, to strengthen others in faith or to save others from death, etc. For when a proportionately grave cause exists, both the obligation of preserving one's own life and the obligation of impeding another's sin cease.
Note. The two principles which follow are already contained in the preceding matter; nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, it is useful to propose them explicitly.
- From a just cause it is licit indirectly to shorten life, even by several years. Since the precept of preserving life is affirmative, which does not oblige always and in every case, from a grave cause it is licit to do or omit something from which a shortening of life or hastening of death follows. Indeed the conditions of human life are such that sometimes even a more notable shortening of life must be admitted.8 - A just cause either of shortening life or of exposing life to danger is moral necessity and the exercise of virtue.
a. Blacksmiths do not sin who, handling fire daily, shorten life for themselves, nor other workers, such as those blowing glass, gilding metals, etc., whose labors bring no small shortening of life.
b. One who by labors, penances, fasts, and austerities of this kind undertaken in honor of God hastens death somewhat does not sin, provided he is ruled by the rules of prudence and discretion in undertaking them.
c. One who, on the authority of a physician, can prolong life for some time by abstaining from moderate use of wine is not bound under grave obligation to abstain. - Likewise one who, on the authority of a physician, can prolong life by drinking wine or eating meats which he was not accustomed to use, is not bound under grave obligation, because in each case the shortening is slight; indeed from a motive of virtue in the latter case he can licitly abstain.
d. Those who by excessive drink or food shorten life for some time do not sin gravely against the fifth precept, provided they do not bring on a proximate danger of death or grave disease, or a notable shortening of life.
- From a just cause it is licit to expose oneself to danger of life; indeed to remote danger from a light cause, but to proximate danger only from a grave cause. He who without cause exposes himself to remote danger of life sins lightly; he who without cause exposes himself to proximate danger of life sins gravely. The greater the danger of death which is induced from the action, the greater must be the reason on account of which it is licit to induce it.
He is said to expose himself to proximate danger of life who exposes himself to a very probable danger of death to be undergone either proximately or after some time. He is said to expose himself to remote danger of life who exposes himself to a danger of death in some way probable, either proximately or after some time. In order that someone be judged to expose himself to proximate danger of life, he must have at least some hope of escaping; he who has no hope of escaping is said not to expose life to danger, but to destroy it. A danger is called probable in some way where death follows from some action rarely or not so frequently; on the contrary it is very probable where death follows from some action frequently or for the most part.
a. It is licit to serve those infected by plague or another contagious disease; likewise to administer the sacraments with great danger of contracting the disease. - It is licit for guilty persons detained in prison to cast themselves down from a height to escape a certain sentence of death or perpetual prison, provided there is some hope of preserving life; but the same would not be licit to escape prison of only a few years, unless the danger of life which they induce by throwing themselves down were very remote.
b. Artisans do not sin who climb upon roofs of buildings and expose themselves to various dangers where the work requires it.
c. Audacious men sin gravely who from a rash wager, from vainglory, or solely for the sake of making profit, cast themselves into proximate danger of life, for example, by provoking wild beasts, exercising the art of the rope-dancer, prolonging a fast for a very long time, etc., unless from experience it is established that probable danger of life is absent, as happens in horse races.
d. He sins who, laboring under a grave fever, makes a journey or undertakes great labor without necessity.
1 Lugo, disp. 10, n. 21; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 5.
2 Ex. 20:13; Gen. 9:6; Deut. 32:39; Wis. 16:13 ss.; Rom. 14:7-9.
3 Judg. 16:30.
4 Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 369; Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 861 s., where also the reasons of each opinion are submitted to examination.
5 Lessius, De iustitia, l. 2, c. 9, n. 23.
6 1 Macc. 6:43 ss. Cf. Lessius, De iustit., l. 2, c. 9, n. 32; Lugo, De iustit., disp. 10, n. 55.
7 In 3, dist. 29, a. 15, ad 3.
8 Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 866 ss.
328. On the mutilation of oneself. Mutilation of oneself is of itself gravely illicit, unless it is necessary for preserving life itself. The reason for the first is that man, just as he is not lord of life, so also is not lord of his members, so that he can dispose of them at will. The reason for the second is that he is guardian and preserver of his body, and therefore he can cut off a part or member to preserve the whole body; for a part is ordered to the whole, and therefore must be postponed to the good of the whole.
a. Therefore it is licit, for example, to cut off for oneself a hand bound by a chain in order to escape a fire. And just as self-mutilation is licit for the preservation of life, so for the same reason it is licit to consent to the amputation of a member. - Yet in light matter, as if someone without cause cuts off for himself a little part of the ear or a joint of the little finger, grave sin is not committed.
b. Mutilations of themselves which are read as having been done by holy virgins must be explained either from divine inspiration or from good faith, as was said above concerning self-killing (n. 327, 2).
Resolutions. From another end, which does not tend to the preservation of the whole, self-mutilation does not seem licit. 1. It is not licit to castrate oneself for spiritual good, namely to avoid the sin of incontinence or to calm temptations;1 for that end can always be obtained by other means. Moreover, mutilation of this kind renders one impotent for generating and yet does not exempt from carnal temptations.
Much less is it licit to mutilate oneself for procuring some profit or advantage for oneself; wherefore it is not licit for a youth to mutilate himself in order to escape the burden of military service, nor for a poor man in order to obtain greater alms.
Some authors admit as at least probable the opinion of those who say that castration in boys is licit so that with a sweeter voice they may sing the praises of God in church and prepare for themselves an honorable livelihood, provided this twofold condition is had: that danger of life be morally absent, and that it not be done to unwilling boys.2 But if it is illicit for obtaining a notable spiritual good, much more will it be illicit for attaining a temporal good.3
The supreme pontiffs have never approved the castration of boys, nor ever said it to be licit; indeed they declared irregular those who culpably had made themselves or others eunuchs. Yet they admitted to ecclesiastical concerts eunuchs who without their own fault were made such.4
- There is a surgical operation which is called by physicians, from its inventor, the physician Porro, the Porro operation. It consists in the extirpation of the uterus with the ovaries, by which a woman is rendered impotent for generating. Certainly this operation is licit for preserving life; but from another end besides the preservation of life, for example, for impeding future conception or for forestalling the necessity of Caesarean operation, it cannot be admitted.5
1 St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3.
2 St. Alphonsus, n. 374.
3 Cf. Lugo, De iustit. et iure, disp. 10, n. 23.
4 Benedict XIV, De synodo, l. 11, c. 7, n. 3.
5 Cf. Capellmann, Medicina pastoralis^6 (Aquisgrani: Barth, 1893), p. 26 ss.
329. Whether it is licit to wish death for oneself. - It is licit from the motive of obtaining a good which is better than life, or escaping an evil which is worse than death, because in this way neither God's dominion over man's life nor the charity owed to oneself is in any way violated.1
a. Indeed, alpha. it is one thing to inflict death on oneself, another to wish death for oneself: for he who inflicts death on himself injures the divine right; he who wishes death for himself awaits death to be inflicted on him by God. beta. The desire of death, as of a thing indifferent, receives morality from its motive; therefore from an honest end it is licit to wish death for oneself, but from an evil end to wish it for oneself is of itself a grave sin. But neither to reason nor to charity is it repugnant to wish for oneself death which would be the beginning of greater goods or the end of greater evils; but it is repugnant to reason and to charity owed to oneself to will for oneself the gravest evil for avoiding another light evil.
b. Therefore death can licitly be desired in order to enjoy eternal beatitude, to love God more perfectly, never again to offend God, to avoid truly most grave evils, for example, long illness, troublesome vexations and snares, etc.; therefore sacred Scripture has: "Death is better than a bitter life."2 But it is a grave sin to wish death for oneself on account of the ordinary troubles of life, unless this is done in the heat of anger or in some disturbance of mind without sufficient deliberation.
1 Cf. 3 Kings 19:4.