Section — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
§ 1. On Injury Against One's Own Body
Above, n. 6, when there was discussion concerning the object of ownership, it was proved that useful ownership of his body indeed belongs to man, but not absolute ownership. For man is, as it were, the steward of God, and therefore he commits injury toward God if he abuses his body or destroys it. But strictly speaking the suicide does not commit injury against his own body, since injury is always toward another and not toward oneself. Suicide (and the same holds of every homicide) is either direct or indirect. It is called direct when it is directly both intended and follows from an action freely placed. But it is called indirect when it is not intended, but is foreseen as going to follow from an action placed, which nevertheless does not directly cause death but only induces a most grave danger of death. Therefore in direct suicide (say the same of homicide and the procuring of abortion) the end both of the work and of the worker is death to be inflicted; but in indirect suicide neither the end of the work nor the end of the worker is death.
112. Principle 1. Direct suicide, done by private authority, is always a most grave sin.
Thus all Catholics teach against the Stoics, Epicureans, and several modern non-Catholics.
Proof. The sin of suicide is most strictly prohibited by law a) divine, b) natural, c) ecclesiastical.
a) In the fifth precept of the Decalogue divine law inculcates: "You shall not kill."
b) By a threefold reason direct suicide injures natural right itself;75 for it is against charity toward oneself, violates the rights of the human community, and violates the rights of God himself. Therefore suicide first injures charity toward oneself. For each person ought to love himself, and from this love there arises the most vehement inclination of preserving oneself and resisting death. Hence suicide is something unnatural and injuring charity toward oneself. Moreover, it does injury to human society. For every man ought to be a useful member of human society. But by departing from life by his own motion, a man can now bring no utility to society. Therefore he commits injury. Finally, suicide is very injurious to God, who gave life to man and continually conserves it, and therefore is the perfect owner of every human life. Wherefore St. Paul says very well: "For none of us lives to himself, and no one dies to himself. For whether we live, we live to the Lord; or whether we die, we die to the Lord. Therefore whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's."76 But he who destroys his own life by suicide destroys the property of God and therefore inflicts grave injury upon God;77 to him alone belongs the authoritative judgment of life and death, according to that saying: "You are, O Lord, he who has power of life and death."78
c) Suicide is gravely prohibited by ecclesiastical law, which, as a penalty for so great a crime, forbids the body of a suicide to be buried in a sacred place or Mass or other liturgical suffrages to be celebrated for him.79 But these ecclesiastical penalties are not incurred a) if the suicide was committed from madness or another cause impeding the use of reason; b) if the suicide gave signs of repentance before he expired; c) if the crime was wholly occult, lest the reputation of the survivors be violated; d) if there was doubt whether death arose from suicide, or whether the suicide was committed from madness. He who attempted suicide is irregular,80 is barred from legitimate ecclesiastical acts, and incurs other penalties if he is a cleric.81
But it is said that suicide done by private authority is a most grave sin. For either from divine authority or sometimes from public authority suicide would be lawful. It is plain that God can command suicide to some man; for he himself is the supreme owner of life and death. But whether in reality God ever gave such a precept is not certainly established. For the deeds which are read in the lives of the saints (e.g., St. Apollonia, St. Pelagia, St. Sophronia) do not certainly prove that a divine precept was present. Those saints most certainly had the best intention, but through invincible ignorance they could have done something which objectively was illicit.82
But could someone kill himself by command of public authority? E.g., can someone justly condemned to death by poison or hanging himself take the poison or hang himself? This case occurred in the East, and Socrates, condemned to death, is said to have obeyed the law of the republic and himself taken poison.83 Billuart84 and St. Alphonsus85 deny (and call their opinion the more common), but it is not certainly established that this is intrinsically evil; wherefore it would be lawful for one justly condemned to death to employ this mode of dying when the supreme judge commands it. "For if the accused can open his mouth so that poison may be poured into it, so also he can draw it up with his hands, and so also he can transfix himself with a sword. For then the judge constitutes the accused as executioner of himself." Yet this is cruel and not very becoming.
Scholion. On The Principal Causes Of Suicide. In our times suicides become more frequent from day to day. The fundamental cause of this mournful experience seems to be the defect of faith creeping in more and more. For it is impossible that a man well conscious of the punishments of Gehenna (which he will certainly suffer through all eternity if with full advertence and deliberation he commits suicide) would not prefer to tolerate all the pains of this world rather than commit suicide. Hence suicides also happen much more frequently among unbelievers than among Catholics.86 Another cause of suicides is books and theaters, in which suicide is very often glorified and therefore commended. Priests should not omit to deter the people from the enormous crime of suicide.
75 St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 64, a. 5.
76 Rom. 14, 7 sq.
77 Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 64, a. 5, where also the excuses which are sometimes brought forward for suicide are refuted.
78 Wis. 16, 13.
79 Rit. Rom. tit. 6, c. 2, n. 3. Code of Canon Law c. 1240, 3.
80 Code of Canon Law c. 985, 4.
81 L. c. 2350, § 2.
82 Cf. Lessius l. 2, c. 9, n. 23, cited by Noldin, De praeceptis n. 327.
83 Cf. Plato, Phaedo (LVII): τι χρή ποιεῖν.
84 De iust. diss. 14, a. 4, dico 4.
85 Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 369.
86 Paulsen rightly says: "Suicide is, as a rule, the unbeautiful end of an unbeautiful life" (System der Ethik II, 120).
113. Principle 2. Indirect suicide is not licit unless a proportionately grave cause is present.
It is explained. An action indirectly causing death is not intrinsically evil, and therefore, when a proportionately grave cause comes in, it is licit in the same way in which an indirectly voluntary evil is permitted. But what is a proportionately grave cause must be prudently estimated in individual cases. The nearer and more certainly the action is going to induce death, the greater the cause required. Among causes permitting indirect suicide are enumerated the public good and the spiritual good. For it is certain that a man can and ought to expose his life to the greatest danger if the public good demands this. Thus soldiers with evident danger of life ought to fight in battle; pastors ought to administer the sacraments, even if on account of a raging epidemic they expose themselves to mortal contagion. The spiritual good also, and notably the good of virtue, is an excusing cause. Hence missionaries laudably set out into foreign and unhealthy regions with manifest danger of death; religious sisters can serve the sick laboring under plague. If the danger of death is not so proximate, even a lighter cause can excuse. Hence it is lawful, e.g., for workers to blow glass, to gild metals, to work in sulfur mines, etc., with danger of notably shortening life. Nevertheless he always sins who from a futile reason exposes or abbreviates his life, e.g., men who from vainglory fight in a duel, some tightrope walkers, those prolonging a fast for a very long time (for the sake of mere experiment or wager). Likewise those who hasten death for themselves by gluttony, by immoderate passions, by morphinism; those who undertake altogether unusual labors without sufficient reason; those who refuse to take even ordinary remedies for preserving or recovering health.87
87 Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 10, a. 3.
114. Authors raise two questions here: 1. Is it lawful to kill oneself in order to avoid a certain and harsher death? St. Alphonsus responds:88 "Directly to kill oneself is never lawful ... it is lawful to kill oneself indirectly: for instance, if someone throws himself out through a window in order to escape a fire; especially if there is some hope of escaping death. Thus teach Busenbaum, Lugo with Lessius, Continuator Tournely, and Sporer. And Elbel permits this even to accused persons detained in prison, for escaping a certain sentence of death, or even perpetual prison." Whatever may be the case concerning this indirect killing, which seems to be licit, since there it is not a question of death itself to be inflicted upon oneself, but rather of exposing oneself to the greatest danger of death, nevertheless the opinion defended by Elbel does not seem able to be sustained, unless it is a question only of undergoing the danger of death, but not of certain death itself. Otherwise those suicides which happen rather often, which evildoers condemned to perpetual labor in prisons commit, would also be licit. And indeed no one will sanely say this. For the rest, from the very words of Elbel it appears that he speaks only of danger of death. For he says: "Even in these circumstances they [soldiers] do not intend to kill themselves, but only by flight to seek liberation from the squalor of perpetual prison, which to many seems, not without merit, more intolerable than death itself; therefore if death follows from such flight besides their intention, they must by no means be judged to have intended it, but rather to have held themselves permissively in order to it."89
88 Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 367.
89 De homicid. n. 16, ed. Bierbaum.
115. 2. Can a virgin choose death rather than her own violation? a) It is certain that a virgin cannot directly kill herself in order to avoid violation, e.g., by transfixing her heart with a sword. It is also the express opinion of St. Thomas,90 saying: "Similarly, it is also not lawful for a woman to kill herself, lest she be corrupted by another; because she ought not to commit in herself the greatest crime, which is the killing of herself, in order to avoid the lesser crime of another; for it is not the crime of a woman violated by force, if consent is absent, because the body is not stained except from consent of the mind, as Lucia said." Hence the things which are had in the Decree of Gratian91 from St. Jerome,92 "In persecutions it is not lawful to perish by one's own hand, apart from where chastity is endangered, but to submit the neck to the one striking," are either to be piously explained or to be abandoned. Then b) it is also certain that a virgin in that case can flee with evident danger of death, e.g., by throwing herself from a high window; but c) it is not certain whether a virgin ought rather to allow herself to be killed than violated, e.g., when the aggressor threatens her with death unless she permits intercourse. Several authors affirm,93 because, since the woman can impede intercourse, if she rests induced by fear, then her cooperation becomes truly moral and voluntary. Other theologians94 deny, provided that the virgin bears herself merely passively and the danger of consent is absent. The reason is that in that case the violation is something merely physical; and just as a virgin can, for recovering health, permit physical violation through a surgical operation, so at least on account of the most eminent danger of death she can permit that violation through extorted intercourse. Certainly in the second case the virgin provides material and proximate cooperation in the sin of the aggressor, and therefore a much greater cause is required than in the case of a surgical operation; but nevertheless that aggressor is already in heart guilty of deflowering before the external work perpetrated, and besides he would become guilty of both internal and external homicide if the virgin did not bear herself permissively. Therefore the merely passive permission of the virgin helps rather than harms the soul of the aggressor. St. Augustine95 also seems to favor this opinion.
90 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 64, a. 5 ad 3.
92 Comm. in Jonah l. 1, n. 402 (Migne, Patr. lat. 25, 1129).
93 Lugo, Salmanticenses, Azor, Bonacina, etc., cited by St. Alphonsus, l. c. n. 368.
94 Navarrus, Toletus, Soto, Schindler.
95 De civ. Dei l. 1, c. 18.
116. On Self-Mutilation. By almost the same right by which suicide is prohibited, mutilation of oneself is also prohibited. For just as man does not have full ownership of his life, so neither can he dispose concerning his members except for the uses determined by God. But because the parts are for the sake of the whole, it is lawful to cut off a member if this is necessary for saving the whole bodily life. Thus all theologians teach with St. Thomas.96 Therefore it is lawful to submit oneself to surgical operations when they are truly useful or necessary for preserving health. Moreover, it is lawful to cut off a bound hand, if this is necessary for taking flight and thus for escaping death.97 But for other ends mutilation cannot be done licitly, because God never, either explicitly or implicitly, conceded such a right to men. Hence it is not lawful for an adolescent to mutilate himself in order to escape military service, nor for a poor man in order to obtain greater alms, nor to do emasculation or castration for preserving chastity, as Origen is narrated to have done.98 Hence deservedly the Church has established the penalty of irregularity against those who have castrated themselves or have otherwise mutilated themselves or others.99
On Artificial Sterilization. In former times castration of boys came into use for preserving a boyish voice. This castration indeed was held licit by some authors, if danger of life was absent and it was not done to boys unwilling.100 There is no leisure to refute this opinion and practice, today deservedly obsolete. In our times the so-called artificial sterilization rages more and more from day to day; it can very easily be obtained not only by vasectomy but also by Roentgen rays (X-rays); but it is usually employed for recovering health, for avoiding generation, and for other ends. But since this sterilization is true bodily mutilation (of the ovaries or testicles), it is not morally licit unless for curing diseased organs and for obtaining the health of the whole body. Therefore it is not lawful to employ it, e.g., for preventing the generation of numerous offspring, for preventing a man altogether depraved from transmitting his very bad habits into offspring by generating.101
96 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 65, a. 1.
97 Several authors (Lugo, Lessius, Molina, Salmanticenses, Billuart, Lehmkuhl, Marc, Aertnys) more probably think that someone can mutilate himself in order to avoid death unjustly threatened by a tyrant. Wherefore if, e.g., a husband says to an adulterer caught in the act: either castrate yourself or I shall kill you, the adulterer could castrate himself in order to avoid the death threatened by the husband. I am unable to grasp how that opinion is probable, since such mutilation is manifest and proximate cooperation in the sin of another.
98 Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 65, a. 1 ad 3.
99 Code of Canon Law c. 985, 5.
100 Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 374.
101 Pius XI, encyclical Casti connubii, Dec. 31, 1930 (Act. Ap. Sed. XXII, 230), and S. C. S. Off., Mar. 21, 1931 (Act. Ap. Sed. XXIII, 118).
117. Scholion. The desire of death can be something 1. licit; 2. illicit; 3. imperfect. This desire is licit if it arises from a good motive, namely because someone desires to be joined with God, to be no longer able to sin, etc. In this sense St. Paul teaches that it is much better to have the desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ than to remain in the flesh.102 But it is illicit if it arises from a wicked motive, e.g., if someone with rebellion against the divine will wishes death for himself, if someone from impatience now no longer wishes to tolerate this life. Rarely, however, is this desire of death gravely illicit, because often it is not so voluntary and serious. Finally, the desire of death is something morally imperfect if someone so abhors some earthly evil, for example grave illness, incarceration, a very hard state of life, etc., that he prefers bodily death rather than to sustain that evil. Although such a desire is not gravely sinful, because already in Sacred Scripture it is said: "Death is better than a bitter life,"103 nevertheless it is something imperfect and a venial sin, because by patiently tolerating such very grave evils of earthly life a man will have a precious reward in heaven, which he loses by desiring death.
There are some men who, even in the ordinary distresses of this life, often exclaim: Would that I were dead! Would that I were in the tomb! etc. Exclamations of this kind certainly are to be avoided and are objectively illicit, but often they are semi-deliberate acts and not seriously willed; hence they are either no sin or a venial sin.
102 Cf. Phil. 1, 23-24.
103 Eccli. 30, 17.