The Acts of Charity Toward One’s Neighbour

For the sake of completeness and order, we must first treat of prescribed acts generally, then of acts of helping one's neighbor specifically.

“10. We are not bound to love our neighbor by an internal and formal act. — 11. We can satisfy the precept of loving our neighbor through external acts alone.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI.

— 1. He sins against charity toward himself who neglects his own spiritual salvation: for the most part, however, that sin is sufficiently contained in the accusation of other sins.

2. There is no good to be obtained, or to be procured for anyone, for the sake of which it is lawful to sin, even venially: for that act, since it is repugnant to the divine good pleasure, is not eligible. Evils are not to be done so that goods may come. Cf. St. Augustine, De mendacio, c. 9, n. 15 (M. 40, 499).

Wherefore, he who would be impeded from religious life by the office of filial piety, for example, of helping parents gravely in need, cannot enter religion.

3. No one must remain in a proximate occasion of grave sin, on account of any utility or necessity of an individual neighbor or of a community, if he experiences too great a difficulty in converting that occasion into a remote one. The reason is that, as to spiritual goods, each one can or must prefer himself. Wherefore we are not compelled either to serve as soldiers or to relieve the poverty of parents with so great a spiritual loss. Yet if there should be an extreme spiritual necessity of neighbor, a very probable danger, according to the opinion of St. Alphonsus, will have to be approached or tolerated: then by right and deservedly man can trust in greater grace.

4. He does not sin who delays entrance into religion or even omits it in order to take care of a parish where he performs most useful work which another can scarcely perform; in order to relieve a less grave want of parents; in order to console their sad loneliness; in order to care for the education of brothers or blood-relatives. For a religious vocation is for the most part not preceptive; and the reasons adduced are among those which must be called honorable and acceptable to God Himself.

But what, in these and similar circumstances, is to be counseled cannot be defined by one general rule. These things chiefly come to be considered: with what innocence, with what zeal of piety and virtue will life outside religion be led? - What goods will a man obtain for himself and others in religious life itself? The apostolic life, especially among unbelievers, will be esteemed far more than the common life of many religious in our regions. What good works will he desert for religious life? What manner of acting will be of greater edification? Cf. the things which we have written on this matter in t. I, On Religious Institutes and Persons.

— To a neighbor who is placed in extreme spiritual necessity, each one must succor even with certain danger of life: provided that there is an equally certain hope of helping him, and that no graver evil threatens from it. In these circumstances the saying from St. John, epistle 1, c. 3, v. 16, is valid: "We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." Hence, if another is not present who will probably do it, we must, with danger of life, baptize or absolve a dying person who morally cannot help himself. A graver evil threatening from it can be the spiritual detriment of a flock which would be deprived of the one sacred minister by whom it is helped. Wherefore it sometimes happens that an Apostolic Vicar forbids a missionary, with too great danger to health, to go to a dying person too far distant. A graver evil can also be the hatred which it would draw upon the Church, if, for example, in a violent way someone should wish in our regions to baptize a dying infant, with the parents resisting. (As is clear, secret administration, as far as there is opportunity, will have to be procured.)

— Grave common necessity is equated with extreme necessity, whether because man, for the common good, as a part, must neglect his own life, or because in grave common necessity several will be in extreme need. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 27. Hence if in time of plague a pastor is lacking, another priest present in the place will per se not be able to desert the sick. He will be bound to remain even more with every inconvenience, if a heretical minister has begun to spread errors, so that there is danger lest the community lose the faith. The pastor himself is forbidden to desert the flock, unless he has substituted for himself someone equally suitable.

— In the grave spiritual necessity of a particular neighbor, only he who from office must care for another's salvation is bound to suffer grave inconvenience. The reason is that it chiefly falls to the neighbor himself to overcome the difficulty.

But if someone can easily succor a neighbor who is pressed by grave spiritual necessity, he has a grave obligation of bringing that help.

Example. — So many are the spiritual harms of boys and adolescents who frequent non-Catholic schools, so many are the ruins of faith and morals which are avoided by the Catholic education of youth, that a grave obligation presses the faithful of striving so that a supply of this kind of education be everywhere available. Wherefore, according to their powers, sufficient alms for this purpose are to be contributed under grave obligation; and, if necessary, even with grave inconvenience. Hence if in some place someone, by taking from goods necessary to his state, would certainly procure Catholic education for several who otherwise would frequent non-Catholic schools, and another means is lacking for averting that evil, he seems to be bound to make this largess.

— You ask why we are not bound to seek far-distant regions in order to succor unbelievers, where so many are in extreme spiritual necessity?

The reason is that the proximate opportunity of succoring is lacking to many who are ignorant of the language, customs, etc.; because the efficacy of the action is uncertain; because it pertains to the common good of the Church, and therefore of those very barbarians, that religion flourish in cultivated regions and suitable workers be able to be prepared. Hence concerning individual persons it cannot be said that they will be more useful there than here.

Since we ought to love neighbor not only with internal affection, but also in effect and external work, and since there is a special difficulty in rightly exercising charity in external work, hence we must treat specially of the external works of charity, or of the works of mercy.

587. Mercy⁴¹ can be taken in three ways, namely, a) according as it is a passion of the appetite, and then it is nothing other than compassion or sadness concerning another's misery, namely, that of another man or even of some brute animal; or b) according as it is a moral and special virtue, in which sense it can be defined: "the virtue inclining the will to due compassion for, and alleviation of, another's misery";⁴² therefore the material object of this mercy is the misery of neighbor (poverty, sin, infirmity, etc.) to be alleviated according to one's powers; c) according as it is a charitable will of alleviating another's misery, and then it is not a virtue distinct from charity, and mercy thus taken is found most perfectly in God,⁴³ who is compassionate and merciful.

Mercy according as it is a special virtue moderates compassion concerning another's misery, lest it be too great and lest it be too little. But although this mercy is a moral virtue insofar as it moderates compassion, nevertheless it is intimately joined with the theological virtue of charity, from which it is accustomed to arise as an effect. For on account of God the merciful man is accustomed to have compassion on his suffering neighbor. Accordingly St. Thomas treats of mercy in the treatise on charity.

Christian doctrine greatly commends⁴⁴ the virtue and works of charitable mercy, and wherever the Christian religion flourishes, magnificent works of mercy also are produced.

Seven corporal works of mercy and the same number of spiritual works are commonly enumerated; namely, the corporal works of mercy are: to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to receive guests, to clothe the naked, to visit the sick, to redeem captives, to bury the dead. All these indeed are commonly expressed by this mnemonic verse:

I visit, I give drink, I feed, I redeem, I cover, I gather, I bury.

The spiritual works of mercy are: to correct the sinner, to teach the ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to console the afflicted, to bear the burdensome and difficult, to forgive the offender, and to pray for all. These are contained in this verse:

Counsel, reprove, teach, console, forgive, bear, pray.

Errors concerning mercy. Although the virtue of mercy is inculcated by the natural law itself, nevertheless by many pagans, ancient and modern, it is denied or contemned. Thus Seneca himself says: "Mercy is a vice of the soul," "most familiar to every worst man." "The good will avoid mercy." "The wise man will not pity."⁴⁵ In our times F. Nietzsche, asserting a twofold morality, one of masters, the other of servants, excluded mercy from the morality of masters.⁴⁶ On the contrary Schopenhauer and Ad. Smith exaggerated mercy too much, proclaiming it the ultimate norm of morality.⁴⁷

Because of circumstances much changed in our times and in our regions, certain enumerated works of mercy now can be exercised only very rarely, e.g. to redeem captives, to bury the dead. Hence here we treat only of two works of mercy, namely, almsgiving and fraternal correction, to which all the others can be reduced.

⁴¹ German: Mitleid.

⁴² Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 30, a. 3.

⁴³ Cf. ib. 1, q. 21, a. 3.

⁴⁴ See the beautiful treatise "On the commendation of mercy," written by Guil. Peraldus, O.Pr. (Summ. virt. et vitior. I, pars 14, c. 2 [ed. Venet. 1571, p. 535 sqq.]).

⁴⁵ Cf. Weiss, Apologie III 807.

⁴⁶ Cf. Jenseits von Gut und Bose c. 9.

⁴⁷ Cf. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie I 259.

The precept of charity, as was said above (n. 470), obliges to acts both internal and external.

485. PRINCIPLES. I. The internal act is to be elicited from a supernatural motive, more often in life. For if it were not made on account of love of God, or so that we may obey the precept of Christ, there would be no place for the precept: A new commandment I give unto you, that you love one another (John 13:34). - But it is to be elicited, just as the act of charity toward God, more often in life, because both are subject to the same rules. Cf. n. 472.

But he already satisfies the precept who pours forth prayers for all, for example by reciting the Lord's prayer. Likewise, these acts of charity are well exercised on the occasion of avoiding hatred or of giving alms. And since occasions of this kind occur frequently, hence it is morally impossible that the faithful living Christianly should not abundantly satisfy this precept.

II. The obligation of eliciting external acts of charity is to be determined from various circumstances. But it is determined according to the necessity of neighbor, and our faculty of helping him. It is established from the things said at n. 483 seqq.

External acts by which another's necessity is relieved, whether from precept or from counsel, are called WORKS OF MERCY.¹

The corporal works of mercy are numbered as seven, namely: to visit the sick, to give drink to the thirsty, to feed the hungry, to redeem captives, to clothe

the naked, to gather in guests, and to bury the dead. - The spiritual works are likewise numbered as seven, namely: to give counsel to the doubtful, to correct the sinner, to teach the ignorant, to console the afflicted, to forgive injuries to the offender, to bear the troublesome and fastidious, to pray for all. Hence that twofold little verse:

I visit, give drink, feed, redeem, cover, gather, bury.

Counsel, reprove, teach, console, forgive, bear, pray.

Here we shall treat of two principal works of mercy: 1. of almsgiving strictly so called; 2. of the spiritual alms which is fraternal correction.

486. DEFINITION. Almsgiving is a work by which something is given to one in need, from compassion, on account of God. Thus defined, almsgiving is an act of mercy, commanded by charity. It can also be commanded by another virtue.

PRINCIPLES. I. There is a precept, grave of itself, of bestowing alms. It is established both from reason, which commands us to do for another what we would wish to be done for ourselves, if we were placed in the same condition; and from the words of Christ (Matt. 25:41): Depart from me, ye cursed...; for I was hungry, and ye gave me not to eat...; and from 1 John 3:17: He that hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother have need, and shall shut up his bowels from him: how doth the charity of God abide in him?

487. II. In order that the precept of almsgiving may urge, two things are required: necessity on the part of the one receiving, and superfluity of goods on the part of the one giving. The first is established from the definition itself; the second from the order of charity. For he who has only things necessary for life cannot distribute them without preferring another's life to his own. The words of the Lord Savior are consonant: That which remaineth, give alms (Luke 11:41). Cf. 2.2, q. 32, a. 1; Bouquillon, de Carit., n. 483-90.

Moreover, just as the NECESSITY of one in need is distinguished as THREEFOLD, as was said above (n. 480, 3), so also, on the part of the giver, GOODS are of three kinds: a) things necessary for life, that is, goods without which we cannot preserve our own life, or that of our people; b) goods superfluous for life, but necessary for one's state, that is, goods without which indeed we can preserve life, but cannot live in that manner which befits our state; c) finally, goods simply superfluous, that is, which are necessary neither for life nor for state. And here it must be noted that, by things necessary for the decency of state, generally are to be understood all those things which are required, not only for sustaining children and servants and guests, but also for making honorable donations, banquets, and moderate displays of magnificence (II, 31; confer Kon., n. 484).

488. But in what way, according to the diversity either of necessity or of the superfluity of goods, alms is to be given, will be established by the following RULES, with the things always to be posited being posited, that is: a) that the use alone of the thing does not suffice; b) that the required means are not extraordinary, which men commonly are not accustomed to employ; c) that the common or public good of the community is not brought into danger (II, 31, resp. 3 and 4; Gen., I, 222).

RULE 1. In extreme necessity, neighbor must be helped from goods superfluous for life, even though necessary for state. The reason is clear from the order of charity (n. 483, Rule 2).

Whence no one is bound to give alms from goods necessary to himself for life, unless the poor man were such that the safety of the republic depended upon him.

RULE 2. In grave necessity, neighbor must be helped from goods superfluous for state, but with only middling inconvenience. Thus commonly; and the reason is again clear from the order of charity.

But the obligation urges under grave sin, unless it is prudently judged that another will come to his aid; for, "since in Scripture men are frequently condemned on account of neglected works of mercy, these are not to be restricted to extreme and rare necessity" (II, 31). And it seems clearly inferred from the condemnation of the twelfth proposition by Innocent XI: "Scarcely among secular persons will you find what is superfluous to state, even among kings; and thus scarcely anyone is bound to almsgiving, when he is bound only from what is superfluous to state."

RULE 3. In common or middling necessity, neighbor must be aided from goods superfluous for state, but with only light inconvenience. This also the order of charity requires. But whether under mortal sin? Many deny it with St. Antoninus; for the common misery of the poor is usually light and tolerable. But St. Alphonsus affirms, with the more common opinion (II, 32; l. El. qq. ref., n. 4), if it is a question of the poor in general, and not of some particular poor person. The principal reason is that, if the rich did not have an absolute obligation of commonly aiding beggars, they could be left by all in their necessity, and thus their necessity would become grave. Therefore, by the words of the Lord (Luke 11:41): That which remaineth, give alms, there is expressed a precept grave of itself, as the Holy Fathers commonly interpret (Sylvius, 2.2, q. 32; Bellarmine, de Bonis Oper., l. 3, c. 7).

The rich are indeed not bound to distribute the whole of what is superfluous; but neither does it suffice to distribute so little, in proportion to the quantity of one's substance, that, if other rich men used the same parsimony, help would be lacking to the poor. - Commonly the rich are judged to satisfy by distributing to the common poor the fiftieth part of the revenues which remain over (or 2 gold-pieces out of 100); but not in the same proportion, if the riches greatly exceed.¹ Except beneficed persons, who are bound to distribute the whole superfluity to the poor or to pious places, as will be seen in its own place (n. 2249).

But, "if some rich and abounding person for a long time refuses all alms, with the intention of giving in a better and more suitable place and time, or to persons in greater need, or of converting it to another pious use, he does not sin, since he has a just cause for refusing. But if such a person, without reasonable cause, inhumanly repels all poor persons from himself, Laymann says that he is in a bad state." Cf. II, 32; H. Ap., IV, 19; Conf. dir., IV, 11; Istr., IV, 19.

From these things you will deduce: 1. Except in the case in which the poor are fed from public stipends, a rich man sins mortally who determines to give no alms in common necessities, or who in this is notably negligent, and accumulates all superfluities for attaining a higher state. Indeed, even in the case in which many things are assigned from public stipends for relieving the poor, the rich man does not act rightly who, by fixed intention, would wish to give nothing further. For in not a few matters the solicitude of the State fails in practice; whence such a rich man's denial would tend to the detriment of many. Nor certainly do modest alms impede anyone from ascending honorably to a higher state.

2. Physicians, advocates, etc., are bound to expend their labor for the poor gratuitously, when these are in true necessity and cannot be helped by others (2.2, q. 71, a. 1).

3. "Private men are not bound to seek out the poor. Yet if they doubt concerning someone's extreme need, they are bound to inquire into the truth" (II, 31, resp. 4, ad 1).

489. Questions. Q. 1. To which poor persons must alms be given?

Resp. It must be given to all who are truly in need, whether they are faithful or unbelievers, natives or foreigners; yet so that, other things being equal, an old man is preferred to a young man, a noble to an ignoble, an invalid to a strong person, a faithful person to an unbeliever, a Catholic to a heretic, a good man to a bad man, a native to a stranger, etc. For this is what the order of charity requires.

There is no obligation of giving alms, and sometimes it would be illicit to give it, to poor persons unwilling to work. Yet one must beware lest those be numbered among the voluntarily idle who have fallen into misery because of lack of work. Moreover, it would be more advisable to furnish work to these, from which they may live (II, 32, ad 5).

Q. 2. From which goods must, or can, alms be given?

Resp. 1. From one's own goods, of which one has free administration.

We say: from one's own. Therefore it is not licit from goods liable to restitution; nor is it licit with harm to creditors; nor is it licit for children from the goods of parents; for servants from the goods of masters. We say: of which one has free administration. Hence a wife cannot give extraordinary alms without the consent of her husband, unless from goods wholly her own, of which, namely, she has dominion and administration and receives the fruits. Yet she can give ordinary and very common alms from domestic goods, according to the custom of wives of her condition; and this even if the husband were unwilling, because custom grants her this right (II, 33; III, 540).

2. From another's goods, if either the poor man is in extreme necessity and you cannot give from your own; or the owner consents, or is reasonably presumed to consent.

Hence children can bestow small alms, and servants bread and similar things. Likewise tutors and curators can, from goods committed to them, give those modest alms which those whose goods they administer would have to give, since they bear their person (II, 33, 2, 3).

Note. 1. Let the confessor of the rich remember the words of the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:17): Charge the rich of this world... to do good, to be rich in good works, to give easily, to communicate, to lay up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on true life.

2. Yet absolution is not easily to be denied to a rich man refusing alms to common beggars: both because of the doubt and dissent of the Doctors; and because the rich, almost always, bring forward excusing reasons which, in practice, the confessor will not easily be able to reject as empty (II, 32, 3).

490. DEFINITION. Fraternal correction is a suitable admonition, given from charity to one's neighbor, for the end that he may be amended from sin, or removed from committing it (II, 34 and 39, query).

It differs both from judicial correction, which proceeds from a judge, for the chastisement of the guilty, on account of the common good; and from paternal correction, by which a Superior, without the form of judgment, rebukes the delinquent, for amending him and for taking away scandal. Concerning this latter we shall say a few things below; concerning the former elsewhere (n. 2256).

491. PRINCIPLES. I. There is a precept of fraternal correction. 1. For from the law of charity we are obliged to aid the soul of neighbor in need. 2. The evangelical law commands (Matt. 18:15): But if thy brother shall sin against thee, go, and rebuke him. It is said: against thee, that is, against thee, or before thee, or with thee knowing, as St. Augustine explains (Sermo 82, c. 7, n. 10).

This precept obliges under grave or under light sin according to the matter. Grave matter is understood as any mortal sin into which neighbor either is about to fall, or has already fallen and in which he perseveres. In practice, a private person is scarcely bound to take notice in light matter, unless he can do so most easily (II, 34, 35).

But matter in this, as in other precepts, can be GRAVE either of itself or on account of circumstances. Thus, for example, if in some religious order it is foreseen that through light violations of the rules the vigor of discipline will be relaxed, there lies upon one a grave obligation of correction, not only upon prelates and confessors, but also upon private persons (IV, 13).

492. II. The precept of correction obliges all, but Superiors more strictly. For the office of charity, of itself, extends itself to all. Yet Superiors are held more strictly, because a special care lies upon them of providing for the spiritual salvation of their subjects (II, 40).

From these things you will deduce: 1. Even inferiors are held by the obligation of admonishing Superiors; yet with modesty, discretion, and reverence, as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:1): Rebuke not an elder, but entreat him as a father. Hence children are bound to admonish parents when they notice that they retain another's goods, do not take care of their eternal salvation, etc. 2. Even sinners are held by this precept. For correction, says St. Thomas (2.2, q. 33, a. 5), pertains to someone insofar as right judgment of reason flourishes in him; but this is not destroyed by sin. Yet if he is a public sinner, ordinarily he ought to abstain from correction; for it is said (Rom. 2:21): Thou therefore that teachest another, teachest not thyself; thou that preachest that men should not steal, stealest... For the name of God through you is blasphemed among the Gentiles.

493. III. In order that the precept may urge, it is necessary that the spiritual necessity of neighbor demand it, and that there be a founded hope of amendment, without grave inconvenience threatening. Thus the Doctors commonly.

It is said, 1. That the spiritual necessity of neighbor demand it; for which three things are required: a) That it be certainly established to you concerning the sin of neighbor, or concerning his proximate danger of sinning. For charity is not rash, does not think evil; nor in doubt are you bound to inquire, unless you are a Superior, or unless it is a question of a common evil or of a most grave evil to be averted, for example homicide. b) That correction be judged necessary for the amendment of the guilty party; for if amendment is reasonably hoped for from elsewhere, or if the guilty person has already become wise again, it is clear that no obligation is given. c) That there is not another equally or more suitable person, who is believed about to correct; because then true and absolute necessity is not present.

2. That there be a founded hope of amendment: because, when the end is despaired of, there is no reason for applying the means. Hence you are not bound to correct if the correction will certainly not be profitable.

But in doubt whether it will be profitable or harmful, you are not bound; unless the one to be corrected is in danger of death, or infection of others in faith or morals is to be feared. Prudence generally counsels that correction be omitted of those whose disposition is wholly unknown, lest, receiving it with an unjust spirit, they become worse.

3. Without grave inconvenience threatening. For charity does not oblige with such inconvenience, unless the spiritual necessity of neighbor is extreme, or unless there is added an obligation of justice, as in a prelate, pastor, or magistrate toward subjects (II, 38, 39).

Hence you will resolve: 1. Private persons among themselves are rarely held to correction, at least under grave sin, unless they are familiarly joined among themselves: because rarely are all the required conditions found to be present. Still more rarely toward Superiors, because of defect of suitability. For the same reason the scrupulous also, at least ordinarily, are excused. See also n. 1202, where correction of one detracting is treated.

2. He seems to sin lightly who, from fear, pusillanimity, or shame, judges himself not to be so strictly obliged, or less suitable, for correcting his brother. - But he sins gravely who, although he can easily impede the mortal sin of neighbor, omits to do it on account of a vain fear of temporal evil (II, 37; H. Ap., IV, 21).

494. IV. That order in correction is to be preserved which Christ the Lord prescribed (Matt. 18:15). Whence 1. Let correction be made secretly: rebuke him between thee and him alone. But if this does not profit, let it be made 2. before witnesses: take with thee one or two (witnesses). 3. Let the fault

be referred to the Superior: but if he will not hear them, tell the Church. This order obliges of itself under grave sin, since it is a question of consulting the reputation of neighbor. Nor can a Superior exempt from it, because it is founded in the law of charity (II, 41).

We said of itself: for, per accidens, with previous admonition omitted, the matter CAN immediately be brought to the Superior as to a father: 1. If the sin is public, or soon to be public, because the reason for preserving the delinquent's reputation ceases. 2. If the delinquent's amendment, which is the principal end of the precept, is hoped to be able to be obtained more easily or more efficaciously: which case is more frequent in religious communities. 3. If neighbor has yielded his right, as is the case among certain religious; yet this yielding is so understood that the crime is revealed to the prelate as to a father, but not as to a judge (IV, 240, 245).

But the matter MUST immediately be brought to the Superior if, through this evangelical denunciation, the desired fruit is hoped for, which otherwise either could not be obtained, or only with grave inconvenience. This chiefly holds if the sin of neighbor tends to the harm of a third person or of the community, as conspiracy, heresy, corruption of youths, etc. The reason is that then a remedy is to be applied not only to him who has sinned, but also to others to whose harm the crime tends. Hence, in communities living under a rule, in colleges, seminaries, etc., if it is a question of a matter of great importance, it is generally expedient that correction be made by way of denunciation to the Superior as father.

495. Corollaries. The duties of the one denouncing, the duties of a Superior in general, and the duties of a Superior obligated by stipend are to be distinguished.

1. If it is certainly established that a brother has perfectly amended an occult sin, and from it there is no danger of relapse, or of harm to himself or another, it is not licit to denounce him to a father or prelate, unless the brother expressly consents to that denunciation (II, 42; IV, 244, 245, q. 4).

2. It is not licit to defer the delict to mediate Superiors if the immediate Superior can correct by himself, and there is no probable suspicion that this one will fail in his office; for the reputation of neighbor is to be consulted as far as can be done (II, 42, 3; IV, 247 fin.).

3. A Superior, by force of knowledge obtained through a simple denunciation made to him as father, cannot proceed judicially; because the delict was not manifested to him as judge (IV, 246).

4. Superiors are bound to watch over their subjects, sometimes to inquire into their sins, and to meet their evils even when doubtful; yet not to ask much and curiously concerning some sin in particular, unless someone has given a special sign of it. But voluntary accusers are not easily to be admitted; because they, under the appearance of the common good, often seek themselves (II, 42, 4).

5. They are bound to correct delinquents, even if a small hope of amendment shines forth, whether for avoiding every appearance of connivance, or, if the correction is public, for casting fear into the rest. Yet where no good can be hoped from correction, it will have to be omitted; for the Church tolerates many things which she in no way approves. - Thus similarly preachers are bound to rebuke public sins, by reason of the common good, even if amendment of the delinquents is not hoped for, provided fruit in the people can be hoped for sooner or later.

6. If they are stipendiaries, as Bishops, parish priests, magistrates, they are bound both from office and from justice to correct and admonish subjects, even with danger of life, in their necessity not only extreme but also grave, as is commonly taught with St. Thomas (2.2, q. 185, a. 5).

7. But others, as parents, confessors, masters, husbands, teachers, tutors, curators, are not bound with great detriment to themselves: because they are not obligated from strict justice, but only by the office of piety (II, 40; H. Ap., IV, 22).

496. Questions. Q. 1. Whether he who sins FROM IGNORANCE is to be corrected?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. If he sins from vincible ignorance, certainly he is to be corrected, because then he is in bad faith, and is not excused from sin.

2. If he offends from invincible ignorance, he is to be admonished: a) when it is a question of things necessary for salvation, or of avoiding the scandal of others. Nor is correction to be passed over, even if amendment of the delinquent can scarcely be hoped for, lest perhaps others judge that to be licit which is not corrected; b) when, even if only materially, divine law, natural or positive, is violated, and profit from the admonition can be hoped for; for knowledge and observance of a certain law is always a good most greatly to be desired. Thus commonly (Conf. dir., IV, 12).

But whether he who ignorantly transgresses a human law is to be admonished, for example concerning fasting, concerning reciting the Office, is disputed probably on both sides. Yet the affirmative opinion is more probable and more common (II, 36; l. El. qq. ref., 5); because that transgression, although material and not intrinsically evil, nevertheless, the law being posited, is still evil, and easily becomes formal, or induces a depraved habit, and therefore by admonition, if it can be done, is to be impeded. But certainly those who from office are bound to teach subjects, as prelates, confessors, teachers, ought to take notice of such a delinquent (VI, 610, Obj. 1, and 616).

Q. 2. Whether pupils are to be obligated by the confessor under grave sin to denounce occult corrupters?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. If the harm of only one or another is feared, the obligation does not seem to be urged with grave inconvenience of the one denouncing, for example if he would thence have to confess his own crime, or incur the infamy of a delator. The reason is that, since there is not extreme necessity of neighbor, charity does not oblige with so great an inconvenience.

2. If grave common harm is present, namely the corruption of several or the infamy of the house, the obligation of denunciation is to be urged in almost all cases, notwithstanding the grave inconvenience of the penitent, even if the confessor foresees that his admonition will not be profitable or that the denunciation will be without efficacy. The reason is that here the common good urges. Confer St. Alph., Regole pei Sem., § 1, n. 5; Berardi, de Recid., II, n. 273; Lehmkuhl, I, 971; Genicot, I, 221. Behold the words of the Holy Doctor: "It must be adverted that, since here it is a question of a common evil, many times they would by no means be excused from grave inconvenience or harm."

The discussion must be: 1° on the precept of love of the neighbor in itself; 2° on works of charity to be fulfilled from it; 3° on vices opposed to charity toward the neighbor.

§ I. On The Precept Of Love Of The Neighbor In Itself.

1° Toward all in general; 2° toward enemies in particular.

278. Principles. - I. There is a precept of loving the neighbor with true and internal affection. This is established 1° from the natural law, because also in the neighbor there flourishes the same formal motive of love, namely participated goodness of God; for all men are creatures of God, created to His image and capable of the friendship of God and of eternal beatitude; therefore, just as we must love God, so also we must love the neighbor on account of God. - 2° It is established from Sacred Scripture:¹ "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." - 3° It is also established from the condemnation of the 10th proposition by Innocent XI (see p. XV).

But he who lives in a Christian manner sufficiently satisfies this precept, as to the internal act, by praying for the neighbor or by reciting the Lord's Prayer. But as to external acts, he satisfies it by succoring the necessities of the neighbor, whether temporal or spiritual, according to the rules to be established below.

II. Some order of charity must be preserved in love of the neighbor; for the objects which charity embraces are not equal; therefore neither are they to be loved equally. But this whole order is placed in this, that we assign to each lovable subject its own fitting place, with regard namely both to goods, to necessity, and to persons.

1. Account must be had of goods, for all goods are not of the same excellence. For this is their order, that the first place be held, and therefore before all things procured, by spiritual goods; the second by intrinsic natural goods, as life, health, integrity of members; the third by extrinsic natural goods, as reputation and honor; to which riches are to be added in the last place as being of an inferior order. Likewise the common good is to be preferred to the private good.

2. Account must be had of necessity, which can be diverse, whether it is spiritual or temporal. A threefold necessity is distinguished: - extreme, as when someone without the help of another cannot free himself from danger of damnation, or from death or another evil almost equal; - grave, as when someone, unless he is helped by another, can escape the danger of the soul or of the life of the body, or of another grave evil, only with very great difficulty; - common or mediocre, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this necessity, in the spiritual order, ordinary sinners are situated, who, if they wished to employ some effort, could rise again from the depraved state. But in the temporal order, beggars are generally in this necessity; for them, according to their condition, life is not held as too burdensome.

3. Account must be had of persons; for the love of diverse persons must be measured according to the diverse reason of excellence and conjunction of the person to be loved.

279. • Special rules of the order of effective charity, or of succor, from the common doctrine of Theologians, are these:

First Rule. Each one is held, absolutely speaking and in equal necessity, to love himself more than the neighbor, as to goods of the same order, according to that: well-ordered charity begins from oneself; for "no one is nearer than each one is to himself"; and this moreover is clear from the natural and invincible inclination of all. And therefore: 1) we are held to love our own soul more than the soul of the neighbor; and for this reason it will never be licit to sin either gravely or lightly in order to consult the salvation of another. Yet it will be licit for a just cause to expose oneself to a probable, not certain, danger of sinning. Thus, for example, it is licit for physicians and priests to read and handle dangerous matters; and in the extreme spiritual necessity of the neighbor, for example if otherwise an infant is certainly about to die without baptism, it will be necessary to expose oneself to it. - 2) We are regularly held to prefer our life to the life of the neighbor. I said: regularly; for a private person a) is held to expose life to certain danger for the republic, or for preserving the life of a person altogether necessary for the public good (n. 278, II, 1); b) can from the motive of virtue expose life for the life of another private person. For the order of charity in this case is not injured, since not precisely the life of the neighbor, but the good of virtue, is then preferred to our life.

Second Rule. 1° If the neighbor is in extreme spiritual necessity, he must be succored even with danger to our life; because the eternal life of the neighbor is a more excellent good than our temporal life. Hence you are bound, with danger to your life, to baptize a dying infant. Likewise if you know that someone, existing in mortal sin, is to be killed while asleep or thinking of nothing. Make exception if either a) there is not morally certain hope of saving the neighbor, whence a mother is not held to undergo danger of life so that the offspring may be baptized, when it is uncertain whether the latter will come through to baptism; or b) another is present who can and wills to succor him; or c) a graver evil is feared from it, as if he who exposes life for a brother is necessary for the common good. The reason for these exceptions is clear of itself.

2° If the necessity of the neighbor is temporal, you are not held to very difficult or almost morally impossible means, for example to spending on him an extraordinary sum of money, although you are rich; because although in a necessity of this sort charity obliges even with great inconvenience, nevertheless not with the greatest, even toward yourself.

Third Rule. If the neighbor is in grave necessity, whether spiritual or temporal, no one is held of himself to succor him with grave inconvenience; for when another absolutely can free himself from danger, charity does not seem to oblige us to come to his aid with such great difficulty, since then the neighbor cannot truly be said to be in a case of necessity, as being not ineluctable. I said: 1) of himself; for he would be held even with danger to life who was obliged to this either by reason of office, as Pastors of souls are; - or by reason of a delict, as if someone had taught heresy; - or if that grave necessity is public, because a public grave necessity is accustomed always to be joined with the extreme necessity of certain private persons. Hence if someone spreads heresy somewhere, you are held to impede him with danger to life, if you can do this efficaciously and no one else impedes him. Likewise if in persecution or hostile incursion some people lacked a priest, and otherwise were exposed to grave dangers of sinning, you are likewise held to assist them with danger to life. I said: 2) with grave inconvenience; for each one is held to assist the neighbor constituted in grave necessity with mediocre inconvenience, as the matter itself says.

Fourth Rule. If the neighbor is situated in common necessity, whether spiritual or temporal, he will indeed have to be helped, because love of neighbor demands this; but speaking of itself there cannot be present except a light obligation, for the neighbor himself can rather easily free himself from such necessity, nor is it so burdensome to him.

Fifth Rule. Finally, if a comparison is instituted among diverse persons, in equal necessity we ought to prefer blood relatives, or those joined in some other way, to strangers; because charity does not change the order of nature, but perfects it. - I said: in equal necessity; for since the obligation of succoring the neighbor does not exist except by reason of the necessity in which he is situated, it is clear that the obligation is greater where the necessity is greater. - But among those joined to us, those more closely joined are always to be preferred according to their various degrees, with regard to the necessity and the goods which are owed to such conjunction and in which it is founded. Hence in grave necessity: 1) the wife is to be preferred, because she is one flesh with the man and the principle of children; 2) children, because they are more closely joined, since they proceed from the substance of the parents; 3) parents, who after those named concur toward the fellowship of life and the increase of the republic; 4) brothers, sisters, relatives, domestics, fellow citizens, and fellow soldiers. I said: in grave necessity; for if the necessity is extreme, more probably not the good of families, but of life, must be attended to. Hence then parents are to be preferred to all because of the eminence of the principle; and indeed the father is to be preferred to the mother, as being the more noble principle; then come children, spouse, etc., as above.⁴

Note. - By accident it can happen that one is to be preferred who naturally would have to be placed after another. Thus a good mother, useful to the offspring, can be preferred to a bad father who is harmful to the offspring. Likewise a son necessary to domestic affairs can be preferred to a useless and clamorous wife. This is clear from n. 280, q. 3°, Resp. 1°.

280. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Are penitents to be interrogated about due care of the soul or body neglected?

Resp. Negatively, generally speaking. For either there is question of damage of the soul brought upon oneself through faults; and it must no more be expressed than in a sin, for example of theft, the violation of charity or obedience toward God must be expressed. Or there is question of the omission of means by which faults are guarded against; and since this obligation is not distinguished from the obligation of observing precepts, such negligence is sufficiently expressed through confession of the other sins. Lugo.² - But if there is question of damage inflicted on life or body, although the obligation of charity toward oneself would seem to have to be distinguished from the obligation which the fifth precept of the Decalogue imposes by reason of the divine dominion over our life and body, nevertheless since the causes of illnesses for the most part are not proximate and immediate, they almost never infer grave guilt, unless nevertheless the illnesses have been certainly foreseen from causes, even remote ones.

Quaer. 2° Is it against Charity to wish death for oneself because of the misfortunes of life?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if it is done from desire of a better life, or of eternal happiness, as is evident.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, if it is done from weariness of life, or from dejection of soul. Yet those do not sin who desire death when life becomes so burdensome that it is estimated harsher than death itself. - Otherwise, if it is done from any light cause whatever. Yet little women desiring death for themselves because of the smallest troubles are, for the most part, not improbably excused from mortal sin because of defect of advertence and deliberation.¹

Quaer. 3° Is it against Charity to desire temporal evil for the neighbor, or to rejoice over it, because of a good end?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if the due order of Charity is preserved, that is, if it is done because of a greater good, or because of a lesser evil. Hence this is licit: 1° because of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; 2° because of the common good, whether spiritual or temporal; 3° because of a good even of several persons, of much greater moment, for example of a family, or even of an innocent person.² - Besides, such desires can easily and usefully be changed into more perfect ones.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, when the order of charity is perverted. Hence a wife cannot desire the death of her husband because she is unjustly treated badly by him, nor the death of her daughter because she cannot marry because of deformity or poverty. This is established from the condemnation of propositions 13, 14, and 15 by Innocent XI.³ - See p. XV; cf. Vind.⁴

281. Preliminary notes. - 1) By this precept hatred is forbidden. Hatred generally is an act by which someone is badly affected toward another: and this can happen in a twofold way; namely, so that he wills evil to him, which and insofar as it is evil to him, and from displeasure with him (hatred of malevolence or of enmity); or so that he turns away from him as from an evil to himself or to a loved person (hatred of abomination). But the object of abomination is someone either by reason of himself or as simply evil (for example, as a man), and this is called hatred of abomination of nature; - or only under some respect (for example, as a sinner), while under another respect he remains lovable, and this is called hatred of abomination of quality. Bouq. de Virt. th. n. 507-509.

2. Signs of love are either common or special. Those are called common which are customarily given to others of the same state; yet they are diverse according as certain persons are bound together among themselves by a diverse reason of conjunction. Hence some are common signs, for example among brothers or among pupils of the same monastery or college; others among fellow servants or fellow students; others among fellow citizens or fellow soldiers; others finally, which man owes to any man from charity.

Special signs are those which are shown particularly to certain persons by reason of some conjunction or friendship or familiarity, which is not toward all others otherwise of the same condition. Thus not only among men bound by no other bond besides, but also among fellow members of any community or society or college, it almost happens that someone is more friendly or familiar with one than with another.

282. Principles. - I. Hatred of abomination is not absolutely evil, but can be good. The reason is that it arises from love of oneself or of another, and therefore it is evil only when that love is not ordered. Hence hatred of abomination of nature is gravely evil, and of itself also hatred of abomination of quality, if this quality is good, as if you have someone in hatred because he is pious, just, etc.; but in no way is it evil, but rather praiseworthy, if the quality is evil. This is clear also from Scripture, Ps. 118. 113 and 138. 21; Wis. 14. 9. Yet one must beware lest abomination of the quality degenerate into hatred of the person.

II. Hatred of enmity is absolutely and from its genus mortally evil; for it cannot fail to be a sin to will evil to the neighbor, which and insofar as it is evil to him, and from displeasure with him; nor can it be a light sin if the evil thus willed is grave. This is clear also from 1 John II. 11; III. 14, 15; IV. 20. Bouq. ib., n. 515, 516.

Resolutions. - I. Common signs are owed, of themselves, to enemies, because their denial would be an act of vengeance and a manifestation of hatred, which is opposed to charity, which is owed also to enemies. Hence:

1. It is not licit to exclude enemies from prayers, for example from the Lord's Prayer; indeed one would have to pray specifically for them if this one means alone were available to the offended person for extinguishing hatred.

2. It is not licit to exclude enemies from common alms, from return greeting, from response, from the sale of exposed goods, because these are common signs of love. - Thus commonly.

3. Those sin who do not assist an enemy in necessity, or who do not prevent his grave damage, when they can do so easily.

II. Special signs of love are not owed of themselves to enemies, for example to receive them with hospitality or at a banquet, to visit the sick, to console the sorrowful. For these proceed not from debt, but from liberality. Yet I said: of themselves; for by accident sometimes they are owed, namely 1) if their omission would be scandalous, as if the enemies were Superiors, or had already previously shown such signs to oneself; 2) if grave necessity of the enemy, whether temporal or spiritual, precisely demands them and they can be shown without grave inconvenience; 3) if signs which are customarily enumerated as special, by reason of state or condition or office, are in reality common; as if someone as a physician ought to visit the sick and serve them, or as an innkeeper ought to receive travelers with table and lodging, etc.

III. Not only is an offense to be forgiven to an enemy in such a way that the desire of unjust vengeance is cast away, and common signs of love are not denied; but to one seeking pardon, and furnishing fitting satisfaction for the injury, if any intervened, certain particular signs also of special love, if any were previously accustomed to be given, generally speaking are not altogether to be refused.

Hence those sin who avoid an enemy wishing to be reconciled, especially when he notices this and is gravely affected by it, or who, when invited, refuse to go with him, unless nevertheless they are excused by fear of quarrels, or of new rancor, or by another just cause. Likewise those who refuse pardon, or do not accept suitable satisfaction, or demand a greater one than is fitting, or who bring the matter into court from hatred and vengeance.

283. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it licit to wish public punishment for an enemy, and even to seek it?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself, if every affection of vengeance is absent; but in practice this is dangerous, and easily exposed to delusion, and ordinarily illicit.¹

Quaer. 2° What order must be observed in making reconciliation?

Resp. 1° He who has offended another ought, of himself, first to employ the means toward reconciliation, as natural equity dictates. I said: of himself; for otherwise one must speak if someone is excused by a legitimate reason, as if the offense was light, or the offended person absent, or he does not care about the deprecation of fault or is not going to accept it, or satisfaction is considered to have been made to him in some other way.

2° If the offense is mutual and equal, he who first offended should first promote reconciliation; but if it is unequal, let him precede who offended more gravely. Besides, absolute rules cannot be assigned, but the circumstances must be considered. Thus, generally speaking, among equals he ought first to greet and speak who passes in the presence of another standing or sitting, or who arrives after others. Add that a more opportune time must sometimes be awaited, and ordinarily reconciliation scarcely turns out well except by means of a friend and prudent man, as Gousset aptly observes.

Quaer. 3° Is there given an obligation of greeting an enemy met on the way?

Resp. Negatively, of itself, because greeting and conversation are not common signs owed to the neighbor. Yet one must speak otherwise if adjuncts of state, condition, or other similar things require that all greet one another indiscriminately, or if there is question of a subject toward his superior.²

Quaer. 4° Ought the offender to ask pardon from the injured person?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself, unless another means or mode of reconciliation more suitable is available, for example by furnishing various offices or benefits, or unless the asking of pardon seems likely to avail nothing for placating the offended person. They make exception also if the offender is far superior to the offended person, or if the offended person is prudently judged to forgive it. But other means of placating the offended person are not lacking. - Thus commonly. - Lacroix,³ Tambur., etc.

Quaer. 5° Do parents sin who refuse to a son or daughter, although asking pardon, both conversation and sight, because of a marriage contracted by them against their reasonable will?

Resp. Distinguish. Either they refuse for a long time, and intend to refuse in perpetuity, or for a short time only. - If the former, they sin gravely, as is clear of itself. - If the latter, they do not sin in the case in which they act thus for the amendment of the son or daughter, or as a punishment of the fault, or as an example for the other children. Thus Laymann, Diana, and others apud Varceno.¹

§ II. On Works Of Mercy.

Works of mercy are some corporal, as to furnish food to the poor, to clothe the naked, etc.; - others spiritual, as to correct those sinning, to teach the ignorant, to console the sorrowful, etc. We shall speak specifically only of two: 1° of almsgiving; 2° of fraternal correction, insofar as they are referred to the precept of Charity.

284. • Principles. I. There is truly given a precept of giving alms to the needy. This is established 1° from the natural law, that is, from the general law of Charity, by which we are obliged to love the neighbor, and consequently to bring help to him in necessity (n. 278). - It is established 2° from Sacred Scripture: "Defraud not the poor man of alms";² and "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire ... for I was hungry and you gave me not to eat; I was thirsty and you gave me not to drink."³

II. Generally, from St. Thomas,⁴ something must be considered on the part of the giver, namely that what is to be spent in alms is superfluous to him; and something on the part of the recipient, namely that he suffers necessity.

III. The superfluous on the part of the giver is distinguished as twofold, namely superfluous to life and to state. Superfluous to life is called that which is not necessary for preserving your life, and the life of others whose care has been entrusted to you. Superfluous to state is that which is not necessary either so that someone, with those whose care has been entrusted to him, may live decently according to the condition of the state in which he here and now is situated, or so that he may render this condition moderately better.

IV. Necessity on the part of the recipient can be threefold, namely extreme, grave, common.

285. Rules. - I. In extreme necessity the neighbor must be succored from goods superfluous to life; but from those alone. - From things superfluous to life: since the right order of charity demands that the life of the neighbor prevail over a good of ours far inferior. - From those alone: since it does not demand that we prefer another's life to our life and that of our own, as would happen if we were to succor him from things necessary to life.

II. In grave and common necessity the neighbor must be succored from goods superfluous to state.

I say: 1° He must be succored; for the precept of almsgiving regards not only extreme necessity - which is very rare - and grave necessity - which is rarer - but also, and indeed especially, common necessity, which is frequent. Thus all.

I say: 2° from goods superfluous to state; for besides things superfluous to life there are no others from which the neighbor may be succored.

III. The quantity of alms: - a) sufficient is that by which the neighbor is sufficiently succored according to the degree of present necessity; - b) strictly prescribed in necessity, 1) whether grave or extreme, cannot be called a great sum of money (n. 279, second Rule under 2°); 2) in common necessity, according to St. Alph., a fiftieth part, or 2%, of surplus revenues. For if individual rich persons spent that quantity on the poor, it would already be sufficient for meeting common necessities.

Therefore rich persons sin who, where the poor are not supported by public stipends, always repel them harshly from themselves, and reserve all surplus things for acquiring a higher state. For otherwise so moderate an alms, which was recounted above, cannot impede an honest ascent to a higher state. - Likewise physicians, advocates, etc., sin who refuse to expend their service freely on the poor, for whom provision is not made by public authority.

286. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does the precept of almsgiving oblige under grave sin?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity. Thus all.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, according to St. Alph.,¹ also in grave necessity, and if there is question of the poor in general, and not of some particular poor man, also in common necessity. The reason is that since in Scripture men are frequently condemned because works of mercy were neglected, the grave obligation of these works is not to be restricted to extreme necessity, or a very rare one, nor to grave necessity, or a rare one. - Yet absolution is not easily to be denied to a rich man harshly repelling from himself all who are situated in common necessity, since rich persons almost always bring forward excusing reasons, which in practice the confessor will not easily be able to reject as empty.¹

Quaer. 2° To which poor persons must alms be given?

Resp. To the truly poor - yet to those asking - and without excluding strangers or non-Catholics. I say: 1) to the truly poor, but not to those unwilling to labor; for these cannot be said to be pressed by any true necessity. - I say: 2) yet to those asking; namely when they can easily ask. - I say: 3) without excluding strangers or non-Catholics, while preserving, nevertheless, the right order of Charity, and unless in some place there has obtained, for a just cause, a custom or statute of excluding poor strangers from cities, namely so that they may be fed by their own citizens.

Quaer. 3° From which goods ought or can alms be given?

Resp. 1° From one's own goods, of which someone has free administration. I say: 1) from one's own goods. Therefore not from goods liable to restitution; - not with damage to creditors; - not by children from the proper goods of parents; - not by servants from the goods of masters. - Yet tutors and curators can give from goods committed to them those moderate alms which those whose goods they administer would have to give, since they bear their person. - I say: 2) of which someone has free administration. Hence a wife cannot give extraordinary alms without the consent of the husband, unless from goods wholly her own, of which namely she has both dominion and administration and receives the fruits. Yet she can give ordinary and very common alms from domestic goods according to the custom of wives of her condition.

Resp. 2° From another's goods, when either 1) the poor person is in extreme necessity and you cannot give from your own;² or 2) the owner consents or is reasonably presumed to consent. Hence children can bestow very small things, and servants bread and similar things.

287. Definition. - Fraternal correction is an admonition by which someone, from charity, endeavors to recall another from sin. It is said: by which someone, from charity; therefore it differs from that which is made from office, which is distinguished as twofold, namely judicial, which is made by public authority and for the common good; the other paternal, which is made by a superior for the private and at the same time public good. That which is made from office obliges only those who discharge that office, namely Bishops, Pastors, Prelates of regulars, Magistrates, Parents, and those who are in their place, and it is to be made only to subjects; - but fraternal correction, like charity from which it proceeds, obliges all and toward all.

288. Principles. - I. There is given a true precept of fraternal correction. This is established 1° from the natural law of Charity, by which we are obliged to remove the evils of the neighbor. - 2° From Sacred Scripture: "Reprove thy neighbor ... lest perhaps he repeat it";¹ and "If thy brother shall sin against thee, go and rebuke him between thee and him alone. If he shall hear thee, thou shalt gain thy brother."²

II. For the strict obligation of this precept there is required: 1° that the sin of the neighbor, or the proximate danger of sinning, be certainly established. - 2° That the amendment of the neighbor be more probable than his non-amendment. - 3° That there not be another equally suitable person who is believed to be about to correct him. - 4° That the correction can be made without grave inconvenience of the one correcting. - 5° That it be judged necessary for the amendment of the delinquent, and that there is not at least probable hope that he will amend himself of his own accord. Thus commonly.³

The first is required, lest you act rashly and inflict injury on the neighbor, for example by lending your ears too easily to some rumor. - But in doubt you are not held to inquire about the sin, since this pertains only to those who are held to correction from office.⁴

The second; for the doubtful man only imprudently puts his hand to a moral action.⁵ Hence prudence for the most part counsels that correction be omitted toward those whose character is wholly unknown, lest, receiving the correction with a hostile spirit, they become worse. Make exception, nevertheless, if either 1) the one to be corrected, who is not in good faith, is situated in danger of death; or 2) there is question of a danger of perversion in faith or morals to be averted from others.

The third; for then there is not present true and absolute necessity.

The fourth; for charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience unless either the neighbor is situated in extreme spiritual necessity, or, supposing that to the obligation of charity in the one correcting there is also added an obligation of justice, as in a Prelate, Pastor, Magistrate toward subjects, in grave necessity. But parents, confessors, masters, husbands, teachers, tutors, curators, although from office (of piety, etc.), nevertheless not from justice, and therefore not with their grave detriment, are held as Prelates, Pastors, Magistrates are. L. II. 40.

The fifth; for since many bear correction with difficulty, it is to be employed only in necessity.

From these things it follows that private persons among themselves are rarely held to correction, at least under grave sin, unless they are joined familiarly among themselves; because rarely are all the required conditions found to be present; more rarely still toward Superiors because of unsuitability. - Likewise often you will not be held to correct detractors, at least under grave sin; for in this matter it is most difficult to establish that correction will be profitable; detractors corrected before others are very easily offended; there is danger lest they increase or confirm the detraction; the hearer for the most part does not know whether what is said is notorious, and in doubt there is no reason why he should condemn the detractor (unless he is a lost man); once detraction has begun, often the neighbor is better consulted if this is allowed to be completed; for if it is explained distinctly, often it is not apprehended as so grave as had been conceived at the beginning. L. IV. 979. 981. Cf. what is to be said n. 524. - I suppose that silence is not equivalent to approbation. - Scrupulous persons likewise are ordinarily excused from the office of fraternal correction.

289. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does the precept of fraternal correction oblige under grave sin?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself, if the required conditions are present, and there is question of grave matter. Hence he can sin gravely who from vain fear lest the neighbor be offended somewhat, or lest he himself suffer light detriment from it, omits correction in a grave matter, where he thinks it will more probably be profitable. - Yet he sins lightly who from faintheartedness and bashfulness considers himself less suitable for correcting. - St. Thom.,¹ - St. Alph.²

But matter in this, as in the other precepts, can be grave either from itself or because of circumstances. Thus, if in some religious Order through venial sins the vigor of discipline seems either to be dissolved or even greatly diminished, the obligation of correction can be grave. Likewise if a son or subject often steals small things, or little by little habituates himself to drinking, to dangerous play, although he does not yet sin gravely.

Quaer. 2° Does the precept of correction have place where someone sins from ignorance?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if there is question of vincible ignorance, because this does not excuse from sin.

Resp. 2° But if the ignorance is invincible, there is not so much question of fraternal correction as of warning, by which the neighbor is taught about the truth; since correction is an admonition of a brother concerning the amendment of faults. But that warning must be made if the sins are against divine law, whether natural or positive; but if against human law, it is disputed on both sides probably whether private persons are obliged to it under grave sin. Yet the affirmative opinion is the more probable and more common according to St. Alphonsus;³ for that transgression, although material and not intrinsically evil, with the certain law posited, is always evil, and therefore to be impeded through correction. But certainly it must be made by those who from office are held to teach subjects, as prelates, parents, confessors, teachers.

They generally add that, although no fruit is hoped for and the ignorance is invincible, nevertheless admonition must still be made if there is question of things necessary by necessity of means, or of those things which furnish public scandal, lest namely others think that to be licit which is not corrected.

Quaer. 3° What order must be observed in fraternal correction?

Resp. The order assigned by Christ Himself must be observed, unless circumstances suggest otherwise. - Hence 1° Correct secretly: "Rebuke him between thee and him alone." - 2° Before witnesses, if the first admonition does not suffice: "If he will not hear thee, take with thee one or two." - 3° Refer the matter to the Superior: "Tell the Church."

Sometimes that order can and must be inverted, namely: - 1° if the sin is public or soon to be made public; - 2° if it is gravely harmful to another; - 3° if secret admonition is not judged to be profitable; - 4° if it is better to manifest the matter immediately to the Superior, as it is generally better in communities living under a rule, in colleges, seminaries, etc. Nor can members or fellow residents be absolved who do not consent to a denunciation of this sort where there is question of grave damage to the community. Likewise by natural law corrupting priests, who inflict great spiritual damage on the faithful or seem likely to inflict it, must be denounced to ecclesiastical Superiors; - 5° if the delinquent has yielded his right, as happens in various religious Orders.

Quaer. 4° In what manner must fraternal correction be made?

Resp. Fraternal correction must be made with true charity also as to the manner; therefore it ought to be paternal toward inferiors, kindly among equals, and reverential toward Superiors. - Moreover, it is required that time, place, and other adjuncts be suitably chosen. Therefore he does not sin who puts the matter off to another time, when he can correct either more conveniently or equally conveniently, unless perhaps grave danger threatens from delay.

You will resolve: 1° A Superior, by force of knowledge obtained through a simple denunciation made to him as to a father, cannot proceed judicially, because the delict was not manifested to him as to a judge. L. V. 246. Not. III.

2° Those sin who refer to a superior a defect of a subject perfectly amended.¹

3° Likewise those who refer a delict to mediate superiors while passing over the immediate superior, who can correct by himself and concerning whom there is not probable suspicion that he will not discharge his office, or will not discharge it duly; for the reputation of the neighbor must be consulted.

4° Superiors are held to inquire into the sins of subjects, yet not of some certain subject, unless some peculiar reason moves them to this. - Nor ought they easily to admit spontaneous accusers, and much less immediately to give faith to them. - A grave obligation likewise falls upon them of not manifesting those by whom they were made more certain about someone's fault, if namely the fault is grave, - or, although it is light, if that manifestation, from another cause, ought to be regarded as a grave delict. - They also sin gravely if, when the common good does not demand it, they manifest to those whose counsel or help in correcting the subject they do not need a grave and occult delict of a subject brought to them.¹ But if the manifestation of the delict alone suffices for asking counsel, they sin if they also manifest the delinquent.

§ III. On Vices Opposed To Charity Toward The Neighbor.

The principal ones are hatred, envy, quarrels, scandal, and cooperation in others' sins.

We shall speak only of the two latter, since the matter has already been treated concerning the others in another place, or is to be discussed under the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

290. • By the name scandal, Greek rather than Latin, which from its primary signification denotes an obstacle or impediment placed in the way, by which occasion of stumbling and ruin is furnished to one walking ("stumbling-block or stone"), the Sacred Writers, the holy Fathers, and Theologians are accustomed to designate a spiritual obstacle placed before the neighbor in the course of the way of salvation. Hence scandal, accepted in this sense, is rightly defined with St. Thomas² as "a word or deed less right, furnishing to another an occasion of spiritual ruin." From this definition it is clear that for scandal there is required:

a) That it be a word or deed, that is, an external speech or action and known to another; for those things which are merely internal or occult cannot furnish occasion of ruin to another, since in no way are they perceived by him. But under the terms word or deed there must also be comprehended an external omission, that is, a not-said where one ought to speak, a not-done where one ought to do; for, as the Angelic Doctor notes,³ "to act and not to act, when someone ought to act, are reduced to the same genus of act; according as the sin of omission is reduced to a sin of act."

b) That it be a word or deed less right, that is, having some defect of rectitude; which can happen in two ways: 1° when the word or deed according to itself is evil, for example a blasphemous word, a lustful deed; and 2° when it carries before itself the appearance of evil, for example if from dispensation you eat meats on a fast day before persons ignorant of the dispensation. Hence for the notion of scandal it is not necessary that the word or deed be of itself a sin; but it suffices that it have the likeness of sin; "and therefore," says the Angelic Doctor,¹ "it is fittingly called less right, so that both those things which are sins according to themselves and those things which have the appearance of evil may be comprehended." But as to words or deeds which bear no appearance of evil, as being wholly right, it seems one must say: - they never constitute scandal strictly so called, although perhaps another may take occasion of sinning from them; - yet sometimes even such words or deeds can put on in some way the malice of scandal, and therefore are not undeservedly called scandal broadly so called, or scandal by accident, namely in a case in which, by command of the law of charity, even those words or deeds must be omitted precisely so that the sin of the neighbor may be guarded against.

c) That it furnish to another occasion of spiritual ruin, that is, that it expose another to probable danger of sinning, although nevertheless it is not necessary that the sin of the other actually follow; for scandal of itself is not, nor can be, an efficient cause, but only an occasion of ruin, or, as St. Thomas again says,² "nothing can be for man a sufficient cause of sin ... except his own will; and therefore the words or deeds of another man can only be an imperfect cause" (occasion) "inducing in some way to sin." - Therefore it suffices, but also is necessarily required for the essence of scandal, that it be in some way inductive to sin; and hence Busembaum rightly resolves apud St. Alph.:³ "it is not always scandal if you sin before others; but only when, with attention to the circumstances both of the person acting and of those before whom the act is done, it can probably be feared that through this act those will be drawn to sin who otherwise would not have sinned." Thus, for example, it is not scandal if someone blasphemes or curses the neighbor in the presence of persons, for whom he notices that no probable danger of sinning will arise from it, as can often happen (provided there is not question of matter of the Sixth), and especially then when the person sinning himself is a man of the lowest condition and of bad reputation, or when the persons present are very upright or very depraved. - From these things also you will understand that Dens rightly warns¹ that the opinion of the common people is false, namely that someone is scandalized when, on occasion of an improper word or deed, he is justly indignant; but then he is not scandalized when he applauds or delights in the impropriety of another; since, on the contrary, in the second case he is scandalized, not in the first. And for this reason, as Suarez notes,² scandals are often said to be committed which properly are not scandals.

291. Division Of Scandal. - Theologians commonly distinguish:

I. Active scandal and passive scandal. Active scandal is that to which the definition handed down and explained above (n. 290) belongs. Passive scandal is the spiritual ruin itself of the scandalized person, or, as it pleases certain Moralists to say, it is the very sin of the neighbor occasioned. But it is established from what was said above that active scandal can exist without passive scandal, just as, on the contrary, it will be established from what is to be said later that passive scandal can sometimes exist without active scandal, for example if there is question of Pharisaic scandal.

II. Division of active scandal. Active scandal is divided into direct (which by another name is called seduction) and indirect.

Direct scandal is when the ruin or sin of the neighbor is intended by the scandalizer. But the sin of the neighbor can be intended in two ways, namely a) precisely so that the neighbor may sin and lose his soul (which is proper to the devil, and occurs more rarely among men, unless perhaps among those given to magical arts or openly impious); or b) so that the sin of the neighbor may serve the proper pleasure of the scandalizer, as happens in the lustful, - or his proper utility, as happens in the avaricious, thieves, etc. In the first hypothesis direct scandal is called diabolical; in the other it is simply called direct.

Indirect scandal is scandal when the sin of the neighbor is not indeed intended by the scandalizer, but nevertheless is foreseen as probably going to follow from a word or deed posited by him without just cause, and therefore to be omitted lest the sin of the neighbor follow. - But when a word or deed of this sort, even if of itself right, must be considered as posited without just cause and to be omitted under the aforesaid title, will be more accurately explained below. Here you will usefully recall the doctrine on the indirect voluntary, n. 6-8.

III. Division of passive scandal. - Passive scandal is divided by St. Alph.¹ into given and accepted. Given, in the sense of the holy Author, is the sin to the committing of which someone is induced from active scandal; but accepted is the sin which is committed under the pretext of active scandal from pure malice of one's own. - Whatever given scandal is called by the holy Doctor scandal of the little ones, by reason of the weakness or infirmity by which those are considered to labor who allow themselves to be induced to sin through the word or deed of another; for scandal can scarcely fall upon the perfect and constant, according to that:² "Much peace have they that love thy law, and to them there is no scandal." Then any accepted scandal is called by St. Alph.² Pharisaic scandal, from the Pharisees, who, according to the testimony of Sacred Scripture, in order to destroy Christ feigned that they suffered scandal from His holy words; just as today false Liberals or Revolutionaries, in order to destroy the Vicar of Christ on earth, the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX, feign themselves to be scandalized by his most celebrated Syllabus.

292. Malice Of Scandal. - There is not here to be raised a question about the malice of passive scandal, which is nothing other than the very sin of the scandalized person. For it is clear of itself that such a sin has the same malice which it would have if it were committed by one not scandalized; so that the fact of having been scandalized adds to it no new species, indeed not even an aggravating circumstance; unless perhaps there is question of Pharisaic scandal, which can have a new specific malice joined to itself, for example from the fact that the words or deeds of Christ the Lord Himself are sacrilegiously employed as a pretext for sinning with impunity. - Hence in the following there will be discussion only of the malice of active scandal, concerning which let there be a twofold question.

Quaer. 1° How great a sin is active scandal?

Resp. 1° Active scandal is a mortal sin from its genus, since it is gravely opposed to the negative precept of charity: namely, do not harm your neighbor, and much more, do not induce him into sin, which is the gravest of all the damages that can be inflicted on the neighbor. But the guilt of active scandal is the graver:

a) The more the spiritual ruin of the neighbor is intended; and thus, for example, direct scandal is graver than indirect.

b) The more efficaciously active scandal flows into the ruin of the neighbor; and thus, for example, bad example given by clerics and priests regularly tends more efficaciously into the ruin of others than bad example given by laymen.

c) The graver the spiritual damage of the neighbor which is caused through scandal; and under this reason no scandals are more detestable than those by which innocent souls of tender children are corrupted.

Resp. 2° Yet from a threefold head active scandal can be only a venial sin, namely:

a) From defect of sufficient deliberation, as if someone from negligence lightly culpable does not notice the occasion of mortal sin which is furnished to another by his word or deed.

b) From the lightness of the influence which the scandal exercises upon the grave ruin of the neighbor, as if in speaking or acting you commit some light indiscretion, which regularly, unless a special circumstance intervenes, indeed is accustomed to move the neighbor somewhat, but not so much that it could reasonably have been feared that he would fall from it into mortal sin, into which by accident he has fallen.

c) From smallness of matter, namely if to another there is furnished an occasion of committing only venial sin (which nevertheless is not to him a likely occasion of further grave ruin). And this is true even if that occasion of venial sin is furnished through a word or deed according to itself mortally evil; for the malice of active scandal is not to be measured from the malice of the word or deed which furnishes occasion of sin to another, but from the malice of the sin itself for which occasion is furnished; and hence it can happen that some word or deed according to itself is mortal sin and only venial in the reason of scandal; or the contrary, that some word or deed according to itself is venial and mortal in the reason of scandal. Thus, for example, he who inflicts a grave wound on a neighbor whom he knows will only become lightly angry sins mortally by reason of the injury and venially by reason of scandal; on the contrary, he who strikes a light slap on a neighbor whom he knows is to be moved from it to blasphemies sins venially by reason of the injury and mortally by reason of scandal.

293. • Quaer. 2° What kind of sin (that is, of what species) is active scandal?

Resp. Active scandal has at least a twofold specific malice, one against charity and another against that virtue to the injuring of which the neighbor is induced. And this is generally admitted by theologians concerning direct scandal; but concerning indirect scandal they dissent somewhat. Cardinal de Lugo and others fewer in number think that through indirect scandal one indeed sins against charity, but not against another virtue; so that he who indirectly scandalized another would of himself satisfy by saying in Confession: I gave grave scandal to the neighbor, without declaring in what matter. Yet much more common is the opposite opinion, to which St. Alph.¹ wholly subscribes: namely, that through scandal, even indirect, one sins not only against charity but besides against that virtue to the injuring of which the neighbor is induced, so that he who scandalized another either directly or indirectly must declare in Confession in what matter, for example of chastity, justice, etc. The solid reasons of this opinion are:

1° Because the case of indirect scandal seems to be one of the cases to which the axiom must be applied: the evil effect (the sin of the neighbor) foreseen from the cause (in scandal) communicates its malice to the cause itself (the scandal itself).

2° Because any virtue of precept seems to demand from us both that we not injure it ourselves and that we not be either directly or indirectly the cause or occasion why it is injured by others.

We have said: Scandal has at least a twofold malice; for often still more malices, whether in species or in number, it can contain, namely because of the proper sin which is committed by the scandalizer whenever he scandalizes another through a word or deed according to itself already evil, for example through blasphemy, detraction, theft, etc.; - or because of the quality of the person scandalizing, as if scandal is furnished to children by parents, or to parishioners by their pastors; for these are held not only from charity, but also from office, to guard against the ruin of their subjects; - or because of the quality of the scandalized person, as if someone induces a married person or a person bound by a vow of chastity to shameful acts; - or even because of the number of those scandalized, for more probably there are as many sins of scandal as there are persons scandalized.

Note. - The resolution just given concerning the at least twofold malice of active scandal, according to St. Alphonsus,¹ also obtains in the case in which someone furnishes to another the occasion of executing by work a sin for which the other was already prepared and determined, so that for example one seeking fornication from a prostitute prepared for fornicating sins not only against the virtue of chastity, but also against charity. The reason, very powerful to him, is this: that although such a prostitute is in the actual will of sinning, nevertheless by completing that particular sin of fornication in work she certainly brings upon herself a gravely greater ruin; and therefore he who cooperates with her toward consummating this sin in work thereby cooperates toward her gravely greater ruin. But to cooperate toward another's gravely greater ruin is without doubt gravely opposed to charity.

294. Conclusions. - A penitent who is guilty of the mortal sin of scandal must explain in Confession:

1° The very word or deed by which he scandalized another, if namely that word or deed according to itself already is a mortal sin, as blasphemy, grave detraction, perfect drunkenness, etc.

2° The species of grave sin for which he furnished occasion to the neighbor, for example that he furnished to the neighbor an occasion of committing a mortal sin of drunkenness, blasphemy, luxury, theft, etc. And this not only if the scandal was direct, but also, from the much more common opinion proved above n. 293, if it was only indirect; so that this simple accusation never suffices of itself: I gave grave scandal to another, but it must always be added in what species of grave sin.

3° The number of persons whom he induced to grave sin, or foresaw could probably have been induced. "He who sows scandals before others," says Dionysius Carth.,¹ "is worthy of so many and such condemnations as from how many and what sort he is seen." But if a certain number cannot be morally determined, as generally happens, then it suffices to assign a probable number.

4° The quality of himself (for example, that he is a father of a family, teacher, pastor, etc.), and the quality of the scandalized person (for example, that the person is married, related by blood, bound by a vow of chastity, etc.), whenever a quality of this sort is a circumstance changing the species in a grave matter.

But it is asked: In sins against chastity which have an accomplice, for example in the sin of fornication, must it be expressed who first solicited? Or, as others propose this question: must the circumstance of induction to fornication and similar things be explained in Confession?

Resp. Sufficiently probably it is not of itself necessary that in Confession of sins of this sort it be explained who first solicited; because one consenting to the solicitation, by this consent itself, is also guilty of grave scandal, and consequently contracts malices specifically the same as those which the one first soliciting contracts, namely grave malice against chastity and against charity. Therefore it can only be said that the first one soliciting sins more gravely, or that the circumstance of solicitation is only a circumstance aggravating in the same species, which does not pertain to the necessary matter of confession. Cf. St. Alph.²

295. • Confessors regularly ought of themselves to judge especially the following to be guilty of mortal fault of scandal:

1° Those who have a detestable habit of blaspheming, in the presence of persons of any kind, especially younger persons.

2° Those who compose, spread, or publicly sing impure songs or poems.

3° Those who institute and prolong, whether in clear words or in equivocal words (yet sufficiently understood by the hearers), lascivious conversations. See n. 492, II.

4° Those who write or publish depraved books or other perverse writings.

5° Those who sell the aforesaid irreligious or immoral publications indiscriminately to any person, or rent them for reading; or those who in libraries established for lending books expose to the use of all works which commonly ought to be considered as poisoned cups to be removed from the lips of the faithful.

6° Those who introduce into schools a pernicious method of teaching or dangerous little books.

7° Those who hand over to boys or girls books perhaps good in themselves, but treating matter the knowledge of which is reputed of itself an occasion of offense to them, according to their natural innocence and sensibility. Who, for example, would doubt that anatomical and surgical books cannot be handed into the hands of children without scandal!

8° Authors, Actors, and Actresses of Comedies in which neither religion, nor virtue, nor the sanctity of marriage is spared; or of theatrical dances (ballet-dances), in which, by reason of the dress of the dancers, by reason of the obscene manner of the dances, or of lascivious gesticulation, the greatest foulness appears, as often happens in those which are made under the name gallop, polka, waltz. - It is certain, says St. Alphonsus,¹ speaking of immodest spectacles, that those representing or composing notably impure comedies are in no way free from grave sin of scandal; nor can gain, however great, excuse them. - But whether and to what extent the spectators of such comedies (who ordinarily stain themselves with several internal sins) are also guilty of grave scandal must be resolved from the principles to be established later concerning cooperation. Authors of dances which are called "round dances" are commonly guilty of grave scandal, as manifestly follows from that grave admonition which is contained in the Pastoral Letters which the Fathers of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore² gave in the vernacular tongue to the clergy and people committed to them: "We consider it to be our duty to warn our people against ... those fashionable dances, which, as at present carried on, are revolting to every feeling of delicacy and propriety, and are fraught with the greatest danger to morals." Cooperation in these dances is treated below. - As to the modern gatherings of boys and girls which are held under the name children's balls, I indeed would not wish to precipitate a judgment, although, relying on testimonies not to be despised, I would almost dare sometimes to compare them to a whirlwind destroying the rising roses of innocence.¹ Therefore let parents see to it that they do not cause one of these little ones to be scandalized! - But concerning those gatherings of diverse sex which are called masked balls, there is scarcely need to say a word; since no one fails to understand that by their character they are for the most part full of danger and scandalous. Those festivities also are often to be called scandalous which are commonly called "Pic-Nics," "Excursions," "Fairs," "in which" (these are the words of the Fathers of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore in the same pastoral letters²), "as too often conducted, the name of charity is made to cover up a multitude of sins." Wherefore the Fathers proceed: "We forbid all Catholics from having anything to do with them, except when managed in accordance with the regulations of the Ordinary, and under the immediate supervision of their respective Pastors."

9° Painters, Sculptors, and Photographers who, eagerly seizing upon the thesis too much sung today: le chaste c'est le nu ("nakedness is chastity"), exhibit statues or images truly obscene and commonly incentive to lust, for example images in which those parts of the body appear naked (I do not say of an infant, but of an older person), which modesty everywhere among peoples demands to be veiled, and which therefore are called shameful parts. Indeed, generally speaking, we concede that artificial things often move less than natural ones, and therefore that grave scandal can more easily be given through natural nakedness than through artificial; but with the common body of Theologians we altogether deny that the nakedness, although artificial, of the aforesaid parts moves so little that it can be excused from grave scandal. What we have said here about painters, etc., "I think the same," says St. Alph.,¹ "must be said about those who retain such images at home" (Gousset² adds: in museums or gardens) "exposed to the sight of all." And at this time we affirm the same especially of those who circulate wholly immodest photographic cards, especially those which are to be viewed by means of a stereoscope. - Note, however, that in the preceding there is not question of the case in which something obscene must be painted, for example for the assistance of anatomical and obstetrical science.

10° Fabricators of female adornment or dress (milliners, hair-dressers), who in their shops show to the eyes of passers-by samples so adorned and dressed that they are gravely offensive, by which namely women are represented in a manner wholly immodest and greatly provocative to lasciviousness.

11° Women or girls adorning themselves in such a way, as often happens in solemn dinners and evening gatherings (soirées). But here one must distinguish between adornment that of itself greatly excites to lasciviousness - such as enormous uncovering of the breasts or their translucent covering is judged to be - and adornment indeed immodest, but not of itself so lascivious, as perhaps is, for example, the uncovering of those parts more modest. Those assuming adornment of the first kind are not to be excused from grave sin of scandal. But those assuming adornment of the second kind are also not excused from mortal scandal if they introduce the use of such clothing where it is not in force; but if they follow a custom already introduced, certainly not in the least to be praised, indeed severely to be rebuked, yet they are not of themselves to be condemned of mortal sin, provided they intend nothing evil. For customary things, provided they are not altogether lascivious of themselves, are not accustomed to move passion so notably.

To be noted. - What we have observed in the last place about custom once introduced as to clothing not altogether lascivious, seems in some measure to have to be said also as to other matters, not simply obscene, for example as to comedies or equestrian games (circus), not notably impure. Hence I would indeed strive to dissuade from those comedies, etc., and, if it could be done, to root them out; but I would not dare in these provinces, where there is in force no special prohibition or Ecclesiastical censure concerning this matter, as elsewhere there is, to teach publicly that actors and actresses in those equestrian games also or comedies, which are made in a manner not to be praised, yet usual and not irreligious or gravely impure, are of themselves guilty of mortal scandal, and therefore unworthy of the Sacraments unless they abandon their office. Therefore let the pastor and confessor judge concerning individual cases, with account taken of the nature of the representations, of the usage of the places where they are made, and of the persons commonly attending; and regularly let him disapprove their office, but not condemn it as mortal unless this is sufficiently established. - We say the same a fortiori of simple lay spectators of such representations. Meanwhile we carefully warn here that in the preceding we have treated only of grave scandal to others; for if a question is instituted about the proximate occasion in which perhaps the actors themselves, etc., or spectators are situated, it will often happen that abstinence from their office or their attendance, which cannot be imposed upon the same under grave fault by title of grave scandal, nevertheless must be imposed under grave fault by title of their own proximate occasion; concerning which n. 1444, Resp. 2°, 3), will speak more broadly.

12° Finally, we still generally assign as guilty of scandal of themselves: a) clerics who, by retaining at home a person suspected by the people, furnish occasion for sins of detraction, calumny, and contempt of the clerical state; cf. Counc. Trent;¹ and the same must be said of a husband as to a maid-servant suspected by his wife not without reason; b) married women who, by admitting their handsome lovers to familiar conversations, are an offense to their husbands and to others, as experience teaches; c) parents who permit to their daughters conversations in the evening and in hidden places with betrothed men and lovers; and the same must be said of superiors as to servants and other domestics.

296. Preliminary note. - 1° We are not treating here of omitting direct active scandal, the malice of which is of itself manifest to anyone; but only of those things which are to be omitted under the fault of indirect active scandal, the description of which see above n. 291.

2° Mindful of the Apostolic word:¹ "giving no offense to any man," and at the same time of the exhortation of the divine Master Himself:² "Let them alone; they are blind"; Moralists commonly resolve: it is never licit to give the neighbor scandal, even indirect; but sometimes it can be licit simply to permit that the neighbor, beyond our intention, take scandal. But when someone morally must be judged, whether in a strict or in a certain broader sense, to give scandal; and when he can be judged licitly to permit the taking of scandal: this depends totally on this: whether by the law of charity he is held or not held to omit some word or deed precisely so that the ruin of the neighbor may be avoided. In the first hypothesis namely, he must be judged, in whatever sense finally, to give scandal; in the second hypothesis he can be judged licitly to permit the scandal of the neighbor. Hence of itself there arises the general question proposed in the title of this Section, the solution of which we now approach by parts, by positing four special questions, of which the first will regard things less right, the second indifferent things, the third spiritual goods, the fourth temporal goods.

297. First Question. - Must things less right always be omitted by the law of charity because of passive scandal of the neighbor foreseen from them?

Resp. Affirmatively, without any exception, if the things less right are already evil of themselves; indeed, speaking of itself, affirmatively also if they carry before themselves only the appearance of evil, as is established from the words of the Apostle:³ "from all appearance of evil refrain yourselves." Cf. 1 Corinthians,⁴ where the Apostle thus addresses those who reclined in an idol's temple (which was not evil of itself, yet had the appearance of evil for the weak): "Take heed lest perhaps this liberty of yours become an offense to the weak." To this also pertains the very well-known heroic example of the venerable old man Eleazar.⁵

We have said: speaking of itself; for by accident it can be licit to do before others what bears the appearance of evil, namely if you have a legitimate reason of necessity or great utility, and at the same time you take care that, as far as lies in you, you remove the occasion of ruin by teaching, for example, those present (unless from circumstances they already sufficiently recognize it) that you can act licitly, that you can licitly eat meats on a fast day because you are excused from the precept of fasting because of a dispensation, etc. For where after these things scandal still arises or persists, it is generally rightly considered as purely accepted scandal, which from the law of charity (apart from the gravest or extreme necessity of the neighbor) we are not held to avoid with grave inconvenience of our own; unless perhaps at the same time there was question of such damage, for example of a community, of faith, or of religion, that it would have to be guarded against before one's own private damage.

298. Second Question. - From the law of charity must indifferent things be omitted from which the neighbor is thought to be about to accept scandal?

Resp. Affirmatively, as often as they can be omitted without notable inconvenience; because from charity we are held to impede the ruin of the neighbor when we easily can, for example by abstaining from an action not very useful, or by deferring it, or by explaining our manner of acting, etc. But on the contrary, negatively, as often as they cannot be omitted without such inconvenience; because then charity ceases to oblige. Here, however, one ought to notice with St. Alph.¹ that, other things being equal, a greater inconvenience is required the graver or the more certain the sin of the neighbor which is feared, or the more numerous are those to be scandalized; likewise a greater one is required so that scandal of the little ones may licitly be permitted than Pharisaic scandal, which for the most part, when a reasonable cause stands, is to be cared about little, unless perhaps fruit is hoped for from some easy delay, or unless the evil to be feared from it is far more notable than the good which will be obtained through our indifferent works. Besides, this still deserves to be noted: scandal of the little ones, persisting after admonition made to the little ones, can easily be equated to Pharisaic scandal.

From the given response, by way of example, it will be licit to resolve: Therefore a woman is not held to put aside decent adornment (which she assumes because it is fitting to her state, or to please her husband, or that she may find a spouse) because of the scandal of some indeterminate man; for this is to be reputed too grave for her. But if a woman foresees that some determinate man will fall from it into mortal sin, then for one or another time, if it could be done conveniently, she ought to lessen her adornment or abstain from the sight of such a man, but not for a long time, since this again would be too difficult. But if a woman of this sort, although she does not intend the ruin of such a man, nevertheless led by mere vanity, presents herself to his sight on purpose, she could not be excused from grave sin of scandal, just as she also would not be excused if she were to seek some place which she would not approach unless she knew that a shameful lover was there. Cf. St. Alph.¹ The following resolution, which occurs apud several Authors, can also be referred to this place: A woman or girl is held, when she knows certainly that some man sins gravely when she sits in his sight in church, to choose another place, if she conveniently can. - But from these resolutions, proposed by way of example, it will be licit to judge prudently about other similar cases, with account taken of the response given above.

299. Third Question. - To avoid the scandal of the neighbor, must spiritual goods sometimes be omitted by the law of charity?

Resp. Works good of themselves (under which are understood also omissions good of themselves) are either of counsel or of precept:

a) As to good works which are of mere counsel, the same thing must be established, preserving proportion, which we established in the preceding question about omitting indifferent works.

b) As to good works of precept one must say: they are never to be omitted because of scandal, whether Pharisaic or of the little ones, as often as they are absolutely necessary to salvation, as reception of Baptism before death, - or as often as they are prescribed from the law of nature, here and now urging, and not ceasing because of changed circumstances; for evils are not to be done, even venial ones, that good things may come. But where there is question of works prescribed from positive law alone, especially human law, for example of hearing Mass on Sunday, this distinction must be made: such works generally must not be omitted because of Pharisaic scandal; but whether they sometimes must be omitted because of scandal of the little ones is a question controverted among Authors, concerning which see St. Alph.² The opinion which seems practically able to be safely counseled holds: such works can more advisably and licitly be omitted because of scandal of the little ones, at least sometimes, but regularly they need not necessarily be omitted. - Therefore the confessor in the cases here supposed should proceed by persuading. See L. IV. 331.

300. Fourth Question. - Are temporal goods to be abandoned to avoid scandal?

Resp. Either there is question of temporal goods proper to us, or of another's goods committed to our care:

a) If the former: indeed they can licitly be abandoned, but ordinarily speaking they need not necessarily be abandoned to avoid scandal; for the law of charity does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. Hence you are not held, for example, to pay more than is equitable to some laborer, even if you foresee that he, notwithstanding your admonition about the justice of the payment, is going to blaspheme; because that inconvenience, although light in itself, can occur often, and thus in the whole complex becomes grave. Similarly also a Pastor of himself is not held to remit the stole fees owed to him, although the parishioner, sufficiently conscious of his obligation, breaks forth into various slanders, etc.; for from this a grave inconvenience would happen not only to the pastor himself, but also to his successors.

b) If the latter: they cannot even licitly be abandoned, unless from the consent of the owner, at least reasonably presumed. Cf. St. Alph.,¹ where special warnings are also given to Prelates about ecclesiastical goods committed to their administration.

301. • From the same law of charity by which we are prohibited from giving scandal to another, we are also commanded to remove or repair scandal once given, in the best way in which it can be done. But for this it is required that the scandalizer, having henceforth omitted the active scandal once given, should besides, as far as he morally can, try to remove its further evil influence, if namely such influence is still reasonably to be feared, as often happens where there is question, for example, of the scandal of a Superior toward subjects, or of scandal given to another through an evil command, an unjust counsel, the spread of a perverse book, and similar things. But by what ways a further effect of this sort can and must be removed, and therefore scandal repaired, must altogether be judged from the circumstances of the diverse cases, and generally it is established rather easily, provided especially that attention is paid to the special character of the scandal given and its publicity, and to the quality of the person scandalizing and the person scandalized.

Thus, for example, he who gave scandal to others through unjust counsels still efficacious will have to render them inefficacious, as far as he can, through diligent revocation, to be made known to the same persons either by himself or by another. A father of a family who scandalized the domestics ordinarily, for repairing the scandal (if it is still judged efficacious), will have to be obliged to manifest to those same domestics his displeasure over his bad example, and to exhort them paternally not to follow it in the future. A bad Author who through heretical, immoral, or defamatory writings incited others to sinning will be held, as far as he can, to retract these through new writings. A concubinarian, usurer, or other sinner of this kind who gave public scandal will also have to be constrained to its public reparation, for example that publicly, having first abandoned his wicked commerce or business, he approach the Sacraments with devotion.

As to other ordinary scandals, we think one must say: more commonly, for such scandals a special reparation, at least under grave sin, cannot be imposed; both because often they scarcely have any persisting efficacy, and also because, although they remain efficacious, often nevertheless morally they cannot be repaired otherwise with fruit (and no one is held to what is useless) except by that general reparation which is contained in the very cessation from scandal, in the furnishing of good example, in prayer for the scandalized person, and similar things. With prudence as guide, judge in this matter, and impose an obligation on no one unless it is sufficiently established.

Note. - To the reparation of scandal there also pertains the obligation of procuring that the scandalized person be recalled to penance or true conversion. Nevertheless this obligation generally of itself does not seem to urge under mortal sin, except in the case in which the scandalized person, because of ignorance or some other cause, does not have in his power the means of penance; for if he has them and does not wish to use them, then he must impute his impenitence to his own malice and not to another. Thus Scavini.¹

302. • Cooperation differs from scandal, as it is an influence into the will of another, in that it is a concurrence toward the evil action of another principally acting. It is said: principally acting. For the cooperation about which the discussion is here is not to be confounded with immediate participation; because those thus participating in the evil action of another, for example of theft, homicide, etc., are equally principal authors of the same guilt, and for this reason are called by Theologians concurring causes. But such concurrence, or cooperation, can be furnished in nine ways, contained in the following little verse, and to be explained more broadly in the Treatise on Justice:

Command, counsel, consent, flatterer, recourse,
Participant, silent one, one not preventing, one not manifesting.

In the first six ways concurrence is furnished positively, that is, by positing an action influencing the sin of another; in the last three ways concurrence is made negatively, that is, by omitting an act by which another's sin can and must be impeded (or, to use an expression too celebrated today, by not intervening). - Yet do not wonder if in the following there seems to be discussion almost exclusively of the positive ways of cooperating; for the negative ways, morally and with proportion preserved, are reduced to the positive according to that saying of the Angelic Doctor, already related before: "to act and not to act, when someone ought to act, are reduced to the same genus of act; according as the sin of omission is reduced to a sin of act." - Besides, concerning negative cooperation, as much as is needed, there will be special discussion in the Treatise on Justice, n. 773 sqq.

303. • In the present treatment a twofold cooperation must be carefully distinguished: namely formal and material.

Formal cooperation is that which truly concurs toward the very evil will of another, namely by consenting to it, or by intending the sin; and this happens a) when to another, whether by word or deed, assistance is furnished which from its own nature is determined to evil; and b) when to another, whether by word or deed, assistance is furnished which at least from the intention of the cooperator is determined to evil, that is, is posited for this end, that another may be helped in sinning. - Hence formal cooperation always supposes in the cooperator some consent into the sin of another, if not by reason of the end which the cooperator expressly intends (the end of the agent), then at least by reason of the work furnished, which from its character tends into evil (the end of the work).

Material cooperation is that which concurs only toward the evil action of another; and this through assistance at least indifferent of itself, which namely neither from its character (from the end of the work), nor from the intention of the cooperator (from the end of the agent), is determined to evil; but is determined to evil only by the principal agent. Practically, cooperation of this sort for the most part consists in the furnishing of some matter, occasion, or means indifferent of itself, which another can use without sin, although, from his own malice, beyond the intention of the cooperator, he is in reality going to abuse them for sinning. Hence material cooperation does not of itself flow into the very evil will of another, nor does it include of itself any consent in his sin, as formal cooperation does; and therefore I would have thought that generally it can rightly be said: cooperation in the sins of others is formal or material according as, with attention to the end of the agent who concurs, and to the end of the work by which he concurs, the cooperation does, or does not, of itself involve some consent in the sin of the one principally acting. Cf. Vind.¹

This theological question occasionally gains new interest. St. ALPHONSUS gives the brief answer (I, VI, n. 100): “Concerning those who die from charity in the service of plague victims, the Roman Martyrology says on February 28: ‘Whom religious faith has been accustomed to venerate as martyrs.’ And twelve academies, thirteen cardinals, and more than three hundred authors, against Hurtado and others, hold that they are true martyrs.” Thus St. Alphonsus. The learned P. Gobat, S.J., died 1679, speaks in his work on Moral Theology (Tom. 1, Tract VI, Casus V) of the plague which in the year 1611 fearfully devastated the city and environs of Constance, and of the zeal with which the Jesuits upon this occasion devoted their services to the plague-stricken.

There he refers to a work, termed a “Golden Book,” in which, as he sets forth, is proved on many authoritative and reasonable grounds that all victims of Christian charity, Victimae Charitiatis, as he calls them, who perish in the voluntary spiritual or corporal care of the plague stricken, are Christian martyrs, if not in the strictest, yet in the real and true sense of the word, “martyrs, not indeed in the most rigorous sense, but nevertheless in the true and proper sense.” The Congregation of the Index had, so GOBAT informs us, permitted the publication of this work with the qualification: provided it were added that these matters had been argued by him only as probable. In connection with this opinion GOBAT then puts the question whether such martyrdom in the service of plague-stricken secures the privilege accorded to the bloody martyrdom according to a probable opinion—to which is opposed one likewise probable, the privilege, that it, similar to the Baptism with water of adults, effects justification cum sola attritione, without perfect contrition, “facere ex attrito contritum.”

After contemplating the question the author does not venture to answer it affirmatively. Practically this question is not of importance, as such a sacrifice for charity’s sake without an act of perfect contrition is hardly conceivable.

Of more recent theologians Dr. Oswald, in his treatise upon Baptism, says: “The violent death suffered for Christ’s sake, constitutes the idea of martyrdom; for, whatever some theologians may observe to the contrary, the death of a priest incurred by spiritual care of plague-stricken suffices not for the glorious title of a Christian martyr.”

Very wisely St. ALPHONSUS prefaces his answer to our question with the velut martyres of the Roman Martyrology, in order to adjudge on the one hand a very special merit to the heroic sacrifice of life in works of charity to the plague-stricken, without on the other hand granting them the full title of martyrdom. In this sense our question has also been answered by St. CHARLES BORROMEO, and his Christian contemporaries, during the plague then raging in Milan. J. P. Giussano, the saint’s biographer, contemporary, private secretary and faithful assistant, relates, in the fourth book of the saintly cardinal’s life, of priests who at that time cared for the spiritual needs of the plague-stricken: “Many of these priests fell victims to the plague, in particular some Jesuits and Barnabites, and ten Capuchins, all of whom may be compared to those holy priests and deacons, who, in the reign of the Emperor Valerian, in Rome, met death in caring for the plague-stricken, and concerning whom the Roman Martyrology, under date of February 28, speaks as follows: ‘At Rome, the commemoration of the holy Priests, Deacons, and very many others who, in the time of the Emperor Valerian, when a most savage plague was raging, most willingly met death while ministering to those suffering from the disease, whom the religious faith of the pious has been accustomed to venerate as martyrs.’ ”

P. JOHANN SCHWIENBACHER, C.SS.R.