ARTICLE II: ON LOVE OF THE NEIGHBOR

The discussion must be: 1° on the precept of love of the neighbor in itself; 2° on works of charity to be fulfilled from it; 3° on vices opposed to charity toward the neighbor.

§ I. On The Precept Of Love Of The Neighbor In Itself.

1° Toward all in general; 2° toward enemies in particular.

278. Principles. - I. There is a precept of loving the neighbor with true and internal affection. This is established 1° from the natural law, because also in the neighbor there flourishes the same formal motive of love, namely participated goodness of God; for all men are creatures of God, created to His image and capable of the friendship of God and of eternal beatitude; therefore, just as we must love God, so also we must love the neighbor on account of God. - 2° It is established from Sacred Scripture:¹ "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." - 3° It is also established from the condemnation of the 10th proposition by Innocent XI (see p. XV).

But he who lives in a Christian manner sufficiently satisfies this precept, as to the internal act, by praying for the neighbor or by reciting the Lord's Prayer. But as to external acts, he satisfies it by succoring the necessities of the neighbor, whether temporal or spiritual, according to the rules to be established below.

II. Some order of charity must be preserved in love of the neighbor; for the objects which charity embraces are not equal; therefore neither are they to be loved equally. But this whole order is placed in this, that we assign to each lovable subject its own fitting place, with regard namely both to goods, to necessity, and to persons.

1. Account must be had of goods, for all goods are not of the same excellence. For this is their order, that the first place be held, and therefore before all things procured, by spiritual goods; the second by intrinsic natural goods, as life, health, integrity of members; the third by extrinsic natural goods, as reputation and honor; to which riches are to be added in the last place as being of an inferior order. Likewise the common good is to be preferred to the private good.

2. Account must be had of necessity, which can be diverse, whether it is spiritual or temporal. A threefold necessity is distinguished: - extreme, as when someone without the help of another cannot free himself from danger of damnation, or from death or another evil almost equal; - grave, as when someone, unless he is helped by another, can escape the danger of the soul or of the life of the body, or of another grave evil, only with very great difficulty; - common or mediocre, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this necessity, in the spiritual order, ordinary sinners are situated, who, if they wished to employ some effort, could rise again from the depraved state. But in the temporal order, beggars are generally in this necessity; for them, according to their condition, life is not held as too burdensome.

3. Account must be had of persons; for the love of diverse persons must be measured according to the diverse reason of excellence and conjunction of the person to be loved.

279. • Special rules of the order of effective charity, or of succor, from the common doctrine of Theologians, are these:

First Rule. Each one is held, absolutely speaking and in equal necessity, to love himself more than the neighbor, as to goods of the same order, according to that: well-ordered charity begins from oneself; for "no one is nearer than each one is to himself"; and this moreover is clear from the natural and invincible inclination of all. And therefore: 1) we are held to love our own soul more than the soul of the neighbor; and for this reason it will never be licit to sin either gravely or lightly in order to consult the salvation of another. Yet it will be licit for a just cause to expose oneself to a probable, not certain, danger of sinning. Thus, for example, it is licit for physicians and priests to read and handle dangerous matters; and in the extreme spiritual necessity of the neighbor, for example if otherwise an infant is certainly about to die without baptism, it will be necessary to expose oneself to it. - 2) We are regularly held to prefer our life to the life of the neighbor. I said: regularly; for a private person a) is held to expose life to certain danger for the republic, or for preserving the life of a person altogether necessary for the public good (n. 278, II, 1); b) can from the motive of virtue expose life for the life of another private person. For the order of charity in this case is not injured, since not precisely the life of the neighbor, but the good of virtue, is then preferred to our life.

Second Rule. 1° If the neighbor is in extreme spiritual necessity, he must be succored even with danger to our life; because the eternal life of the neighbor is a more excellent good than our temporal life. Hence you are bound, with danger to your life, to baptize a dying infant. Likewise if you know that someone, existing in mortal sin, is to be killed while asleep or thinking of nothing. Make exception if either a) there is not morally certain hope of saving the neighbor, whence a mother is not held to undergo danger of life so that the offspring may be baptized, when it is uncertain whether the latter will come through to baptism; or b) another is present who can and wills to succor him; or c) a graver evil is feared from it, as if he who exposes life for a brother is necessary for the common good. The reason for these exceptions is clear of itself.

2° If the necessity of the neighbor is temporal, you are not held to very difficult or almost morally impossible means, for example to spending on him an extraordinary sum of money, although you are rich; because although in a necessity of this sort charity obliges even with great inconvenience, nevertheless not with the greatest, even toward yourself.

Third Rule. If the neighbor is in grave necessity, whether spiritual or temporal, no one is held of himself to succor him with grave inconvenience; for when another absolutely can free himself from danger, charity does not seem to oblige us to come to his aid with such great difficulty, since then the neighbor cannot truly be said to be in a case of necessity, as being not ineluctable. I said: 1) of himself; for he would be held even with danger to life who was obliged to this either by reason of office, as Pastors of souls are; - or by reason of a delict, as if someone had taught heresy; - or if that grave necessity is public, because a public grave necessity is accustomed always to be joined with the extreme necessity of certain private persons. Hence if someone spreads heresy somewhere, you are held to impede him with danger to life, if you can do this efficaciously and no one else impedes him. Likewise if in persecution or hostile incursion some people lacked a priest, and otherwise were exposed to grave dangers of sinning, you are likewise held to assist them with danger to life. I said: 2) with grave inconvenience; for each one is held to assist the neighbor constituted in grave necessity with mediocre inconvenience, as the matter itself says.

Fourth Rule. If the neighbor is situated in common necessity, whether spiritual or temporal, he will indeed have to be helped, because love of neighbor demands this; but speaking of itself there cannot be present except a light obligation, for the neighbor himself can rather easily free himself from such necessity, nor is it so burdensome to him.

Fifth Rule. Finally, if a comparison is instituted among diverse persons, in equal necessity we ought to prefer blood relatives, or those joined in some other way, to strangers; because charity does not change the order of nature, but perfects it. - I said: in equal necessity; for since the obligation of succoring the neighbor does not exist except by reason of the necessity in which he is situated, it is clear that the obligation is greater where the necessity is greater. - But among those joined to us, those more closely joined are always to be preferred according to their various degrees, with regard to the necessity and the goods which are owed to such conjunction and in which it is founded. Hence in grave necessity: 1) the wife is to be preferred, because she is one flesh with the man and the principle of children; 2) children, because they are more closely joined, since they proceed from the substance of the parents; 3) parents, who after those named concur toward the fellowship of life and the increase of the republic; 4) brothers, sisters, relatives, domestics, fellow citizens, and fellow soldiers. I said: in grave necessity; for if the necessity is extreme, more probably not the good of families, but of life, must be attended to. Hence then parents are to be preferred to all because of the eminence of the principle; and indeed the father is to be preferred to the mother, as being the more noble principle; then come children, spouse, etc., as above.⁴

Note. - By accident it can happen that one is to be preferred who naturally would have to be placed after another. Thus a good mother, useful to the offspring, can be preferred to a bad father who is harmful to the offspring. Likewise a son necessary to domestic affairs can be preferred to a useless and clamorous wife. This is clear from n. 280, q. 3°, Resp. 1°.

280. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Are penitents to be interrogated about due care of the soul or body neglected?

Resp. Negatively, generally speaking. For either there is question of damage of the soul brought upon oneself through faults; and it must no more be expressed than in a sin, for example of theft, the violation of charity or obedience toward God must be expressed. Or there is question of the omission of means by which faults are guarded against; and since this obligation is not distinguished from the obligation of observing precepts, such negligence is sufficiently expressed through confession of the other sins. Lugo.² - But if there is question of damage inflicted on life or body, although the obligation of charity toward oneself would seem to have to be distinguished from the obligation which the fifth precept of the Decalogue imposes by reason of the divine dominion over our life and body, nevertheless since the causes of illnesses for the most part are not proximate and immediate, they almost never infer grave guilt, unless nevertheless the illnesses have been certainly foreseen from causes, even remote ones.

Quaer. 2° Is it against Charity to wish death for oneself because of the misfortunes of life?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if it is done from desire of a better life, or of eternal happiness, as is evident.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, if it is done from weariness of life, or from dejection of soul. Yet those do not sin who desire death when life becomes so burdensome that it is estimated harsher than death itself. - Otherwise, if it is done from any light cause whatever. Yet little women desiring death for themselves because of the smallest troubles are, for the most part, not improbably excused from mortal sin because of defect of advertence and deliberation.¹

Quaer. 3° Is it against Charity to desire temporal evil for the neighbor, or to rejoice over it, because of a good end?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if the due order of Charity is preserved, that is, if it is done because of a greater good, or because of a lesser evil. Hence this is licit: 1° because of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; 2° because of the common good, whether spiritual or temporal; 3° because of a good even of several persons, of much greater moment, for example of a family, or even of an innocent person.² - Besides, such desires can easily and usefully be changed into more perfect ones.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, when the order of charity is perverted. Hence a wife cannot desire the death of her husband because she is unjustly treated badly by him, nor the death of her daughter because she cannot marry because of deformity or poverty. This is established from the condemnation of propositions 13, 14, and 15 by Innocent XI.³ - See p. XV; cf. Vind.⁴

281. Preliminary notes. - 1) By this precept hatred is forbidden. Hatred generally is an act by which someone is badly affected toward another: and this can happen in a twofold way; namely, so that he wills evil to him, which and insofar as it is evil to him, and from displeasure with him (hatred of malevolence or of enmity); or so that he turns away from him as from an evil to himself or to a loved person (hatred of abomination). But the object of abomination is someone either by reason of himself or as simply evil (for example, as a man), and this is called hatred of abomination of nature; - or only under some respect (for example, as a sinner), while under another respect he remains lovable, and this is called hatred of abomination of quality. Bouq. de Virt. th. n. 507-509.

2. Signs of love are either common or special. Those are called common which are customarily given to others of the same state; yet they are diverse according as certain persons are bound together among themselves by a diverse reason of conjunction. Hence some are common signs, for example among brothers or among pupils of the same monastery or college; others among fellow servants or fellow students; others among fellow citizens or fellow soldiers; others finally, which man owes to any man from charity.

Special signs are those which are shown particularly to certain persons by reason of some conjunction or friendship or familiarity, which is not toward all others otherwise of the same condition. Thus not only among men bound by no other bond besides, but also among fellow members of any community or society or college, it almost happens that someone is more friendly or familiar with one than with another.

282. Principles. - I. Hatred of abomination is not absolutely evil, but can be good. The reason is that it arises from love of oneself or of another, and therefore it is evil only when that love is not ordered. Hence hatred of abomination of nature is gravely evil, and of itself also hatred of abomination of quality, if this quality is good, as if you have someone in hatred because he is pious, just, etc.; but in no way is it evil, but rather praiseworthy, if the quality is evil. This is clear also from Scripture, Ps. 118. 113 and 138. 21; Wis. 14. 9. Yet one must beware lest abomination of the quality degenerate into hatred of the person.

II. Hatred of enmity is absolutely and from its genus mortally evil; for it cannot fail to be a sin to will evil to the neighbor, which and insofar as it is evil to him, and from displeasure with him; nor can it be a light sin if the evil thus willed is grave. This is clear also from 1 John II. 11; III. 14, 15; IV. 20. Bouq. ib., n. 515, 516.

Resolutions. - I. Common signs are owed, of themselves, to enemies, because their denial would be an act of vengeance and a manifestation of hatred, which is opposed to charity, which is owed also to enemies. Hence:

1. It is not licit to exclude enemies from prayers, for example from the Lord's Prayer; indeed one would have to pray specifically for them if this one means alone were available to the offended person for extinguishing hatred.

2. It is not licit to exclude enemies from common alms, from return greeting, from response, from the sale of exposed goods, because these are common signs of love. - Thus commonly.

3. Those sin who do not assist an enemy in necessity, or who do not prevent his grave damage, when they can do so easily.

II. Special signs of love are not owed of themselves to enemies, for example to receive them with hospitality or at a banquet, to visit the sick, to console the sorrowful. For these proceed not from debt, but from liberality. Yet I said: of themselves; for by accident sometimes they are owed, namely 1) if their omission would be scandalous, as if the enemies were Superiors, or had already previously shown such signs to oneself; 2) if grave necessity of the enemy, whether temporal or spiritual, precisely demands them and they can be shown without grave inconvenience; 3) if signs which are customarily enumerated as special, by reason of state or condition or office, are in reality common; as if someone as a physician ought to visit the sick and serve them, or as an innkeeper ought to receive travelers with table and lodging, etc.

III. Not only is an offense to be forgiven to an enemy in such a way that the desire of unjust vengeance is cast away, and common signs of love are not denied; but to one seeking pardon, and furnishing fitting satisfaction for the injury, if any intervened, certain particular signs also of special love, if any were previously accustomed to be given, generally speaking are not altogether to be refused.

Hence those sin who avoid an enemy wishing to be reconciled, especially when he notices this and is gravely affected by it, or who, when invited, refuse to go with him, unless nevertheless they are excused by fear of quarrels, or of new rancor, or by another just cause. Likewise those who refuse pardon, or do not accept suitable satisfaction, or demand a greater one than is fitting, or who bring the matter into court from hatred and vengeance.

283. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it licit to wish public punishment for an enemy, and even to seek it?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself, if every affection of vengeance is absent; but in practice this is dangerous, and easily exposed to delusion, and ordinarily illicit.¹

Quaer. 2° What order must be observed in making reconciliation?

Resp. 1° He who has offended another ought, of himself, first to employ the means toward reconciliation, as natural equity dictates. I said: of himself; for otherwise one must speak if someone is excused by a legitimate reason, as if the offense was light, or the offended person absent, or he does not care about the deprecation of fault or is not going to accept it, or satisfaction is considered to have been made to him in some other way.

2° If the offense is mutual and equal, he who first offended should first promote reconciliation; but if it is unequal, let him precede who offended more gravely. Besides, absolute rules cannot be assigned, but the circumstances must be considered. Thus, generally speaking, among equals he ought first to greet and speak who passes in the presence of another standing or sitting, or who arrives after others. Add that a more opportune time must sometimes be awaited, and ordinarily reconciliation scarcely turns out well except by means of a friend and prudent man, as Gousset aptly observes.

Quaer. 3° Is there given an obligation of greeting an enemy met on the way?

Resp. Negatively, of itself, because greeting and conversation are not common signs owed to the neighbor. Yet one must speak otherwise if adjuncts of state, condition, or other similar things require that all greet one another indiscriminately, or if there is question of a subject toward his superior.²

Quaer. 4° Ought the offender to ask pardon from the injured person?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself, unless another means or mode of reconciliation more suitable is available, for example by furnishing various offices or benefits, or unless the asking of pardon seems likely to avail nothing for placating the offended person. They make exception also if the offender is far superior to the offended person, or if the offended person is prudently judged to forgive it. But other means of placating the offended person are not lacking. - Thus commonly. - Lacroix,³ Tambur., etc.

Quaer. 5° Do parents sin who refuse to a son or daughter, although asking pardon, both conversation and sight, because of a marriage contracted by them against their reasonable will?

Resp. Distinguish. Either they refuse for a long time, and intend to refuse in perpetuity, or for a short time only. - If the former, they sin gravely, as is clear of itself. - If the latter, they do not sin in the case in which they act thus for the amendment of the son or daughter, or as a punishment of the fault, or as an example for the other children. Thus Laymann, Diana, and others apud Varceno.¹

§ II. On Works Of Mercy.

Works of mercy are some corporal, as to furnish food to the poor, to clothe the naked, etc.; - others spiritual, as to correct those sinning, to teach the ignorant, to console the sorrowful, etc. We shall speak specifically only of two: 1° of almsgiving; 2° of fraternal correction, insofar as they are referred to the precept of Charity.

284. • Principles. I. There is truly given a precept of giving alms to the needy. This is established 1° from the natural law, that is, from the general law of Charity, by which we are obliged to love the neighbor, and consequently to bring help to him in necessity (n. 278). - It is established 2° from Sacred Scripture: "Defraud not the poor man of alms";² and "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire ... for I was hungry and you gave me not to eat; I was thirsty and you gave me not to drink."³

II. Generally, from St. Thomas,⁴ something must be considered on the part of the giver, namely that what is to be spent in alms is superfluous to him; and something on the part of the recipient, namely that he suffers necessity.

III. The superfluous on the part of the giver is distinguished as twofold, namely superfluous to life and to state. Superfluous to life is called that which is not necessary for preserving your life, and the life of others whose care has been entrusted to you. Superfluous to state is that which is not necessary either so that someone, with those whose care has been entrusted to him, may live decently according to the condition of the state in which he here and now is situated, or so that he may render this condition moderately better.

IV. Necessity on the part of the recipient can be threefold, namely extreme, grave, common.

285. Rules. - I. In extreme necessity the neighbor must be succored from goods superfluous to life; but from those alone. - From things superfluous to life: since the right order of charity demands that the life of the neighbor prevail over a good of ours far inferior. - From those alone: since it does not demand that we prefer another's life to our life and that of our own, as would happen if we were to succor him from things necessary to life.

II. In grave and common necessity the neighbor must be succored from goods superfluous to state.

I say: 1° He must be succored; for the precept of almsgiving regards not only extreme necessity - which is very rare - and grave necessity - which is rarer - but also, and indeed especially, common necessity, which is frequent. Thus all.

I say: 2° from goods superfluous to state; for besides things superfluous to life there are no others from which the neighbor may be succored.

III. The quantity of alms: - a) sufficient is that by which the neighbor is sufficiently succored according to the degree of present necessity; - b) strictly prescribed in necessity, 1) whether grave or extreme, cannot be called a great sum of money (n. 279, second Rule under 2°); 2) in common necessity, according to St. Alph., a fiftieth part, or 2%, of surplus revenues. For if individual rich persons spent that quantity on the poor, it would already be sufficient for meeting common necessities.

Therefore rich persons sin who, where the poor are not supported by public stipends, always repel them harshly from themselves, and reserve all surplus things for acquiring a higher state. For otherwise so moderate an alms, which was recounted above, cannot impede an honest ascent to a higher state. - Likewise physicians, advocates, etc., sin who refuse to expend their service freely on the poor, for whom provision is not made by public authority.

286. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does the precept of almsgiving oblige under grave sin?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity. Thus all.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, according to St. Alph.,¹ also in grave necessity, and if there is question of the poor in general, and not of some particular poor man, also in common necessity. The reason is that since in Scripture men are frequently condemned because works of mercy were neglected, the grave obligation of these works is not to be restricted to extreme necessity, or a very rare one, nor to grave necessity, or a rare one. - Yet absolution is not easily to be denied to a rich man harshly repelling from himself all who are situated in common necessity, since rich persons almost always bring forward excusing reasons, which in practice the confessor will not easily be able to reject as empty.¹

Quaer. 2° To which poor persons must alms be given?

Resp. To the truly poor - yet to those asking - and without excluding strangers or non-Catholics. I say: 1) to the truly poor, but not to those unwilling to labor; for these cannot be said to be pressed by any true necessity. - I say: 2) yet to those asking; namely when they can easily ask. - I say: 3) without excluding strangers or non-Catholics, while preserving, nevertheless, the right order of Charity, and unless in some place there has obtained, for a just cause, a custom or statute of excluding poor strangers from cities, namely so that they may be fed by their own citizens.

Quaer. 3° From which goods ought or can alms be given?

Resp. 1° From one's own goods, of which someone has free administration. I say: 1) from one's own goods. Therefore not from goods liable to restitution; - not with damage to creditors; - not by children from the proper goods of parents; - not by servants from the goods of masters. - Yet tutors and curators can give from goods committed to them those moderate alms which those whose goods they administer would have to give, since they bear their person. - I say: 2) of which someone has free administration. Hence a wife cannot give extraordinary alms without the consent of the husband, unless from goods wholly her own, of which namely she has both dominion and administration and receives the fruits. Yet she can give ordinary and very common alms from domestic goods according to the custom of wives of her condition.

Resp. 2° From another's goods, when either 1) the poor person is in extreme necessity and you cannot give from your own;² or 2) the owner consents or is reasonably presumed to consent. Hence children can bestow very small things, and servants bread and similar things.

287. Definition. - Fraternal correction is an admonition by which someone, from charity, endeavors to recall another from sin. It is said: by which someone, from charity; therefore it differs from that which is made from office, which is distinguished as twofold, namely judicial, which is made by public authority and for the common good; the other paternal, which is made by a superior for the private and at the same time public good. That which is made from office obliges only those who discharge that office, namely Bishops, Pastors, Prelates of regulars, Magistrates, Parents, and those who are in their place, and it is to be made only to subjects; - but fraternal correction, like charity from which it proceeds, obliges all and toward all.

288. Principles. - I. There is given a true precept of fraternal correction. This is established 1° from the natural law of Charity, by which we are obliged to remove the evils of the neighbor. - 2° From Sacred Scripture: "Reprove thy neighbor ... lest perhaps he repeat it";¹ and "If thy brother shall sin against thee, go and rebuke him between thee and him alone. If he shall hear thee, thou shalt gain thy brother."²

II. For the strict obligation of this precept there is required: 1° that the sin of the neighbor, or the proximate danger of sinning, be certainly established. - 2° That the amendment of the neighbor be more probable than his non-amendment. - 3° That there not be another equally suitable person who is believed to be about to correct him. - 4° That the correction can be made without grave inconvenience of the one correcting. - 5° That it be judged necessary for the amendment of the delinquent, and that there is not at least probable hope that he will amend himself of his own accord. Thus commonly.³

The first is required, lest you act rashly and inflict injury on the neighbor, for example by lending your ears too easily to some rumor. - But in doubt you are not held to inquire about the sin, since this pertains only to those who are held to correction from office.⁴

The second; for the doubtful man only imprudently puts his hand to a moral action.⁵ Hence prudence for the most part counsels that correction be omitted toward those whose character is wholly unknown, lest, receiving the correction with a hostile spirit, they become worse. Make exception, nevertheless, if either 1) the one to be corrected, who is not in good faith, is situated in danger of death; or 2) there is question of a danger of perversion in faith or morals to be averted from others.

The third; for then there is not present true and absolute necessity.

The fourth; for charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience unless either the neighbor is situated in extreme spiritual necessity, or, supposing that to the obligation of charity in the one correcting there is also added an obligation of justice, as in a Prelate, Pastor, Magistrate toward subjects, in grave necessity. But parents, confessors, masters, husbands, teachers, tutors, curators, although from office (of piety, etc.), nevertheless not from justice, and therefore not with their grave detriment, are held as Prelates, Pastors, Magistrates are. L. II. 40.

The fifth; for since many bear correction with difficulty, it is to be employed only in necessity.

From these things it follows that private persons among themselves are rarely held to correction, at least under grave sin, unless they are joined familiarly among themselves; because rarely are all the required conditions found to be present; more rarely still toward Superiors because of unsuitability. - Likewise often you will not be held to correct detractors, at least under grave sin; for in this matter it is most difficult to establish that correction will be profitable; detractors corrected before others are very easily offended; there is danger lest they increase or confirm the detraction; the hearer for the most part does not know whether what is said is notorious, and in doubt there is no reason why he should condemn the detractor (unless he is a lost man); once detraction has begun, often the neighbor is better consulted if this is allowed to be completed; for if it is explained distinctly, often it is not apprehended as so grave as had been conceived at the beginning. L. IV. 979. 981. Cf. what is to be said n. 524. - I suppose that silence is not equivalent to approbation. - Scrupulous persons likewise are ordinarily excused from the office of fraternal correction.

289. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does the precept of fraternal correction oblige under grave sin?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself, if the required conditions are present, and there is question of grave matter. Hence he can sin gravely who from vain fear lest the neighbor be offended somewhat, or lest he himself suffer light detriment from it, omits correction in a grave matter, where he thinks it will more probably be profitable. - Yet he sins lightly who from faintheartedness and bashfulness considers himself less suitable for correcting. - St. Thom.,¹ - St. Alph.²

But matter in this, as in the other precepts, can be grave either from itself or because of circumstances. Thus, if in some religious Order through venial sins the vigor of discipline seems either to be dissolved or even greatly diminished, the obligation of correction can be grave. Likewise if a son or subject often steals small things, or little by little habituates himself to drinking, to dangerous play, although he does not yet sin gravely.

Quaer. 2° Does the precept of correction have place where someone sins from ignorance?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if there is question of vincible ignorance, because this does not excuse from sin.

Resp. 2° But if the ignorance is invincible, there is not so much question of fraternal correction as of warning, by which the neighbor is taught about the truth; since correction is an admonition of a brother concerning the amendment of faults. But that warning must be made if the sins are against divine law, whether natural or positive; but if against human law, it is disputed on both sides probably whether private persons are obliged to it under grave sin. Yet the affirmative opinion is the more probable and more common according to St. Alphonsus;³ for that transgression, although material and not intrinsically evil, with the certain law posited, is always evil, and therefore to be impeded through correction. But certainly it must be made by those who from office are held to teach subjects, as prelates, parents, confessors, teachers.

They generally add that, although no fruit is hoped for and the ignorance is invincible, nevertheless admonition must still be made if there is question of things necessary by necessity of means, or of those things which furnish public scandal, lest namely others think that to be licit which is not corrected.

Quaer. 3° What order must be observed in fraternal correction?

Resp. The order assigned by Christ Himself must be observed, unless circumstances suggest otherwise. - Hence 1° Correct secretly: "Rebuke him between thee and him alone." - 2° Before witnesses, if the first admonition does not suffice: "If he will not hear thee, take with thee one or two." - 3° Refer the matter to the Superior: "Tell the Church."

Sometimes that order can and must be inverted, namely: - 1° if the sin is public or soon to be made public; - 2° if it is gravely harmful to another; - 3° if secret admonition is not judged to be profitable; - 4° if it is better to manifest the matter immediately to the Superior, as it is generally better in communities living under a rule, in colleges, seminaries, etc. Nor can members or fellow residents be absolved who do not consent to a denunciation of this sort where there is question of grave damage to the community. Likewise by natural law corrupting priests, who inflict great spiritual damage on the faithful or seem likely to inflict it, must be denounced to ecclesiastical Superiors; - 5° if the delinquent has yielded his right, as happens in various religious Orders.

Quaer. 4° In what manner must fraternal correction be made?

Resp. Fraternal correction must be made with true charity also as to the manner; therefore it ought to be paternal toward inferiors, kindly among equals, and reverential toward Superiors. - Moreover, it is required that time, place, and other adjuncts be suitably chosen. Therefore he does not sin who puts the matter off to another time, when he can correct either more conveniently or equally conveniently, unless perhaps grave danger threatens from delay.

You will resolve: 1° A Superior, by force of knowledge obtained through a simple denunciation made to him as to a father, cannot proceed judicially, because the delict was not manifested to him as to a judge. L. V. 246. Not. III.

2° Those sin who refer to a superior a defect of a subject perfectly amended.¹

3° Likewise those who refer a delict to mediate superiors while passing over the immediate superior, who can correct by himself and concerning whom there is not probable suspicion that he will not discharge his office, or will not discharge it duly; for the reputation of the neighbor must be consulted.

4° Superiors are held to inquire into the sins of subjects, yet not of some certain subject, unless some peculiar reason moves them to this. - Nor ought they easily to admit spontaneous accusers, and much less immediately to give faith to them. - A grave obligation likewise falls upon them of not manifesting those by whom they were made more certain about someone's fault, if namely the fault is grave, - or, although it is light, if that manifestation, from another cause, ought to be regarded as a grave delict. - They also sin gravely if, when the common good does not demand it, they manifest to those whose counsel or help in correcting the subject they do not need a grave and occult delict of a subject brought to them.¹ But if the manifestation of the delict alone suffices for asking counsel, they sin if they also manifest the delinquent.

§ III. On Vices Opposed To Charity Toward The Neighbor.

The principal ones are hatred, envy, quarrels, scandal, and cooperation in others' sins.

We shall speak only of the two latter, since the matter has already been treated concerning the others in another place, or is to be discussed under the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

290. • By the name scandal, Greek rather than Latin, which from its primary signification denotes an obstacle or impediment placed in the way, by which occasion of stumbling and ruin is furnished to one walking ("stumbling-block or stone"), the Sacred Writers, the holy Fathers, and Theologians are accustomed to designate a spiritual obstacle placed before the neighbor in the course of the way of salvation. Hence scandal, accepted in this sense, is rightly defined with St. Thomas² as "a word or deed less right, furnishing to another an occasion of spiritual ruin." From this definition it is clear that for scandal there is required:

a) That it be a word or deed, that is, an external speech or action and known to another; for those things which are merely internal or occult cannot furnish occasion of ruin to another, since in no way are they perceived by him. But under the terms word or deed there must also be comprehended an external omission, that is, a not-said where one ought to speak, a not-done where one ought to do; for, as the Angelic Doctor notes,³ "to act and not to act, when someone ought to act, are reduced to the same genus of act; according as the sin of omission is reduced to a sin of act."

b) That it be a word or deed less right, that is, having some defect of rectitude; which can happen in two ways: 1° when the word or deed according to itself is evil, for example a blasphemous word, a lustful deed; and 2° when it carries before itself the appearance of evil, for example if from dispensation you eat meats on a fast day before persons ignorant of the dispensation. Hence for the notion of scandal it is not necessary that the word or deed be of itself a sin; but it suffices that it have the likeness of sin; "and therefore," says the Angelic Doctor,¹ "it is fittingly called less right, so that both those things which are sins according to themselves and those things which have the appearance of evil may be comprehended." But as to words or deeds which bear no appearance of evil, as being wholly right, it seems one must say: - they never constitute scandal strictly so called, although perhaps another may take occasion of sinning from them; - yet sometimes even such words or deeds can put on in some way the malice of scandal, and therefore are not undeservedly called scandal broadly so called, or scandal by accident, namely in a case in which, by command of the law of charity, even those words or deeds must be omitted precisely so that the sin of the neighbor may be guarded against.

c) That it furnish to another occasion of spiritual ruin, that is, that it expose another to probable danger of sinning, although nevertheless it is not necessary that the sin of the other actually follow; for scandal of itself is not, nor can be, an efficient cause, but only an occasion of ruin, or, as St. Thomas again says,² "nothing can be for man a sufficient cause of sin ... except his own will; and therefore the words or deeds of another man can only be an imperfect cause" (occasion) "inducing in some way to sin." - Therefore it suffices, but also is necessarily required for the essence of scandal, that it be in some way inductive to sin; and hence Busembaum rightly resolves apud St. Alph.:³ "it is not always scandal if you sin before others; but only when, with attention to the circumstances both of the person acting and of those before whom the act is done, it can probably be feared that through this act those will be drawn to sin who otherwise would not have sinned." Thus, for example, it is not scandal if someone blasphemes or curses the neighbor in the presence of persons, for whom he notices that no probable danger of sinning will arise from it, as can often happen (provided there is not question of matter of the Sixth), and especially then when the person sinning himself is a man of the lowest condition and of bad reputation, or when the persons present are very upright or very depraved. - From these things also you will understand that Dens rightly warns¹ that the opinion of the common people is false, namely that someone is scandalized when, on occasion of an improper word or deed, he is justly indignant; but then he is not scandalized when he applauds or delights in the impropriety of another; since, on the contrary, in the second case he is scandalized, not in the first. And for this reason, as Suarez notes,² scandals are often said to be committed which properly are not scandals.

291. Division Of Scandal. - Theologians commonly distinguish:

I. Active scandal and passive scandal. Active scandal is that to which the definition handed down and explained above (n. 290) belongs. Passive scandal is the spiritual ruin itself of the scandalized person, or, as it pleases certain Moralists to say, it is the very sin of the neighbor occasioned. But it is established from what was said above that active scandal can exist without passive scandal, just as, on the contrary, it will be established from what is to be said later that passive scandal can sometimes exist without active scandal, for example if there is question of Pharisaic scandal.

II. Division of active scandal. Active scandal is divided into direct (which by another name is called seduction) and indirect.

Direct scandal is when the ruin or sin of the neighbor is intended by the scandalizer. But the sin of the neighbor can be intended in two ways, namely a) precisely so that the neighbor may sin and lose his soul (which is proper to the devil, and occurs more rarely among men, unless perhaps among those given to magical arts or openly impious); or b) so that the sin of the neighbor may serve the proper pleasure of the scandalizer, as happens in the lustful, - or his proper utility, as happens in the avaricious, thieves, etc. In the first hypothesis direct scandal is called diabolical; in the other it is simply called direct.

Indirect scandal is scandal when the sin of the neighbor is not indeed intended by the scandalizer, but nevertheless is foreseen as probably going to follow from a word or deed posited by him without just cause, and therefore to be omitted lest the sin of the neighbor follow. - But when a word or deed of this sort, even if of itself right, must be considered as posited without just cause and to be omitted under the aforesaid title, will be more accurately explained below. Here you will usefully recall the doctrine on the indirect voluntary, n. 6-8.

III. Division of passive scandal. - Passive scandal is divided by St. Alph.¹ into given and accepted. Given, in the sense of the holy Author, is the sin to the committing of which someone is induced from active scandal; but accepted is the sin which is committed under the pretext of active scandal from pure malice of one's own. - Whatever given scandal is called by the holy Doctor scandal of the little ones, by reason of the weakness or infirmity by which those are considered to labor who allow themselves to be induced to sin through the word or deed of another; for scandal can scarcely fall upon the perfect and constant, according to that:² "Much peace have they that love thy law, and to them there is no scandal." Then any accepted scandal is called by St. Alph.² Pharisaic scandal, from the Pharisees, who, according to the testimony of Sacred Scripture, in order to destroy Christ feigned that they suffered scandal from His holy words; just as today false Liberals or Revolutionaries, in order to destroy the Vicar of Christ on earth, the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX, feign themselves to be scandalized by his most celebrated Syllabus.

292. Malice Of Scandal. - There is not here to be raised a question about the malice of passive scandal, which is nothing other than the very sin of the scandalized person. For it is clear of itself that such a sin has the same malice which it would have if it were committed by one not scandalized; so that the fact of having been scandalized adds to it no new species, indeed not even an aggravating circumstance; unless perhaps there is question of Pharisaic scandal, which can have a new specific malice joined to itself, for example from the fact that the words or deeds of Christ the Lord Himself are sacrilegiously employed as a pretext for sinning with impunity. - Hence in the following there will be discussion only of the malice of active scandal, concerning which let there be a twofold question.

Quaer. 1° How great a sin is active scandal?

Resp. 1° Active scandal is a mortal sin from its genus, since it is gravely opposed to the negative precept of charity: namely, do not harm your neighbor, and much more, do not induce him into sin, which is the gravest of all the damages that can be inflicted on the neighbor. But the guilt of active scandal is the graver:

a) The more the spiritual ruin of the neighbor is intended; and thus, for example, direct scandal is graver than indirect.

b) The more efficaciously active scandal flows into the ruin of the neighbor; and thus, for example, bad example given by clerics and priests regularly tends more efficaciously into the ruin of others than bad example given by laymen.

c) The graver the spiritual damage of the neighbor which is caused through scandal; and under this reason no scandals are more detestable than those by which innocent souls of tender children are corrupted.

Resp. 2° Yet from a threefold head active scandal can be only a venial sin, namely:

a) From defect of sufficient deliberation, as if someone from negligence lightly culpable does not notice the occasion of mortal sin which is furnished to another by his word or deed.

b) From the lightness of the influence which the scandal exercises upon the grave ruin of the neighbor, as if in speaking or acting you commit some light indiscretion, which regularly, unless a special circumstance intervenes, indeed is accustomed to move the neighbor somewhat, but not so much that it could reasonably have been feared that he would fall from it into mortal sin, into which by accident he has fallen.

c) From smallness of matter, namely if to another there is furnished an occasion of committing only venial sin (which nevertheless is not to him a likely occasion of further grave ruin). And this is true even if that occasion of venial sin is furnished through a word or deed according to itself mortally evil; for the malice of active scandal is not to be measured from the malice of the word or deed which furnishes occasion of sin to another, but from the malice of the sin itself for which occasion is furnished; and hence it can happen that some word or deed according to itself is mortal sin and only venial in the reason of scandal; or the contrary, that some word or deed according to itself is venial and mortal in the reason of scandal. Thus, for example, he who inflicts a grave wound on a neighbor whom he knows will only become lightly angry sins mortally by reason of the injury and venially by reason of scandal; on the contrary, he who strikes a light slap on a neighbor whom he knows is to be moved from it to blasphemies sins venially by reason of the injury and mortally by reason of scandal.

293. • Quaer. 2° What kind of sin (that is, of what species) is active scandal?

Resp. Active scandal has at least a twofold specific malice, one against charity and another against that virtue to the injuring of which the neighbor is induced. And this is generally admitted by theologians concerning direct scandal; but concerning indirect scandal they dissent somewhat. Cardinal de Lugo and others fewer in number think that through indirect scandal one indeed sins against charity, but not against another virtue; so that he who indirectly scandalized another would of himself satisfy by saying in Confession: I gave grave scandal to the neighbor, without declaring in what matter. Yet much more common is the opposite opinion, to which St. Alph.¹ wholly subscribes: namely, that through scandal, even indirect, one sins not only against charity but besides against that virtue to the injuring of which the neighbor is induced, so that he who scandalized another either directly or indirectly must declare in Confession in what matter, for example of chastity, justice, etc. The solid reasons of this opinion are:

1° Because the case of indirect scandal seems to be one of the cases to which the axiom must be applied: the evil effect (the sin of the neighbor) foreseen from the cause (in scandal) communicates its malice to the cause itself (the scandal itself).

2° Because any virtue of precept seems to demand from us both that we not injure it ourselves and that we not be either directly or indirectly the cause or occasion why it is injured by others.

We have said: Scandal has at least a twofold malice; for often still more malices, whether in species or in number, it can contain, namely because of the proper sin which is committed by the scandalizer whenever he scandalizes another through a word or deed according to itself already evil, for example through blasphemy, detraction, theft, etc.; - or because of the quality of the person scandalizing, as if scandal is furnished to children by parents, or to parishioners by their pastors; for these are held not only from charity, but also from office, to guard against the ruin of their subjects; - or because of the quality of the scandalized person, as if someone induces a married person or a person bound by a vow of chastity to shameful acts; - or even because of the number of those scandalized, for more probably there are as many sins of scandal as there are persons scandalized.

Note. - The resolution just given concerning the at least twofold malice of active scandal, according to St. Alphonsus,¹ also obtains in the case in which someone furnishes to another the occasion of executing by work a sin for which the other was already prepared and determined, so that for example one seeking fornication from a prostitute prepared for fornicating sins not only against the virtue of chastity, but also against charity. The reason, very powerful to him, is this: that although such a prostitute is in the actual will of sinning, nevertheless by completing that particular sin of fornication in work she certainly brings upon herself a gravely greater ruin; and therefore he who cooperates with her toward consummating this sin in work thereby cooperates toward her gravely greater ruin. But to cooperate toward another's gravely greater ruin is without doubt gravely opposed to charity.

294. Conclusions. - A penitent who is guilty of the mortal sin of scandal must explain in Confession:

1° The very word or deed by which he scandalized another, if namely that word or deed according to itself already is a mortal sin, as blasphemy, grave detraction, perfect drunkenness, etc.

2° The species of grave sin for which he furnished occasion to the neighbor, for example that he furnished to the neighbor an occasion of committing a mortal sin of drunkenness, blasphemy, luxury, theft, etc. And this not only if the scandal was direct, but also, from the much more common opinion proved above n. 293, if it was only indirect; so that this simple accusation never suffices of itself: I gave grave scandal to another, but it must always be added in what species of grave sin.

3° The number of persons whom he induced to grave sin, or foresaw could probably have been induced. "He who sows scandals before others," says Dionysius Carth.,¹ "is worthy of so many and such condemnations as from how many and what sort he is seen." But if a certain number cannot be morally determined, as generally happens, then it suffices to assign a probable number.

4° The quality of himself (for example, that he is a father of a family, teacher, pastor, etc.), and the quality of the scandalized person (for example, that the person is married, related by blood, bound by a vow of chastity, etc.), whenever a quality of this sort is a circumstance changing the species in a grave matter.

But it is asked: In sins against chastity which have an accomplice, for example in the sin of fornication, must it be expressed who first solicited? Or, as others propose this question: must the circumstance of induction to fornication and similar things be explained in Confession?

Resp. Sufficiently probably it is not of itself necessary that in Confession of sins of this sort it be explained who first solicited; because one consenting to the solicitation, by this consent itself, is also guilty of grave scandal, and consequently contracts malices specifically the same as those which the one first soliciting contracts, namely grave malice against chastity and against charity. Therefore it can only be said that the first one soliciting sins more gravely, or that the circumstance of solicitation is only a circumstance aggravating in the same species, which does not pertain to the necessary matter of confession. Cf. St. Alph.²

295. • Confessors regularly ought of themselves to judge especially the following to be guilty of mortal fault of scandal:

1° Those who have a detestable habit of blaspheming, in the presence of persons of any kind, especially younger persons.

2° Those who compose, spread, or publicly sing impure songs or poems.

3° Those who institute and prolong, whether in clear words or in equivocal words (yet sufficiently understood by the hearers), lascivious conversations. See n. 492, II.

4° Those who write or publish depraved books or other perverse writings.

5° Those who sell the aforesaid irreligious or immoral publications indiscriminately to any person, or rent them for reading; or those who in libraries established for lending books expose to the use of all works which commonly ought to be considered as poisoned cups to be removed from the lips of the faithful.

6° Those who introduce into schools a pernicious method of teaching or dangerous little books.

7° Those who hand over to boys or girls books perhaps good in themselves, but treating matter the knowledge of which is reputed of itself an occasion of offense to them, according to their natural innocence and sensibility. Who, for example, would doubt that anatomical and surgical books cannot be handed into the hands of children without scandal!

8° Authors, Actors, and Actresses of Comedies in which neither religion, nor virtue, nor the sanctity of marriage is spared; or of theatrical dances (ballet-dances), in which, by reason of the dress of the dancers, by reason of the obscene manner of the dances, or of lascivious gesticulation, the greatest foulness appears, as often happens in those which are made under the name gallop, polka, waltz. - It is certain, says St. Alphonsus,¹ speaking of immodest spectacles, that those representing or composing notably impure comedies are in no way free from grave sin of scandal; nor can gain, however great, excuse them. - But whether and to what extent the spectators of such comedies (who ordinarily stain themselves with several internal sins) are also guilty of grave scandal must be resolved from the principles to be established later concerning cooperation. Authors of dances which are called "round dances" are commonly guilty of grave scandal, as manifestly follows from that grave admonition which is contained in the Pastoral Letters which the Fathers of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore² gave in the vernacular tongue to the clergy and people committed to them: "We consider it to be our duty to warn our people against ... those fashionable dances, which, as at present carried on, are revolting to every feeling of delicacy and propriety, and are fraught with the greatest danger to morals." Cooperation in these dances is treated below. - As to the modern gatherings of boys and girls which are held under the name children's balls, I indeed would not wish to precipitate a judgment, although, relying on testimonies not to be despised, I would almost dare sometimes to compare them to a whirlwind destroying the rising roses of innocence.¹ Therefore let parents see to it that they do not cause one of these little ones to be scandalized! - But concerning those gatherings of diverse sex which are called masked balls, there is scarcely need to say a word; since no one fails to understand that by their character they are for the most part full of danger and scandalous. Those festivities also are often to be called scandalous which are commonly called "Pic-Nics," "Excursions," "Fairs," "in which" (these are the words of the Fathers of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore in the same pastoral letters²), "as too often conducted, the name of charity is made to cover up a multitude of sins." Wherefore the Fathers proceed: "We forbid all Catholics from having anything to do with them, except when managed in accordance with the regulations of the Ordinary, and under the immediate supervision of their respective Pastors."

9° Painters, Sculptors, and Photographers who, eagerly seizing upon the thesis too much sung today: le chaste c'est le nu ("nakedness is chastity"), exhibit statues or images truly obscene and commonly incentive to lust, for example images in which those parts of the body appear naked (I do not say of an infant, but of an older person), which modesty everywhere among peoples demands to be veiled, and which therefore are called shameful parts. Indeed, generally speaking, we concede that artificial things often move less than natural ones, and therefore that grave scandal can more easily be given through natural nakedness than through artificial; but with the common body of Theologians we altogether deny that the nakedness, although artificial, of the aforesaid parts moves so little that it can be excused from grave scandal. What we have said here about painters, etc., "I think the same," says St. Alph.,¹ "must be said about those who retain such images at home" (Gousset² adds: in museums or gardens) "exposed to the sight of all." And at this time we affirm the same especially of those who circulate wholly immodest photographic cards, especially those which are to be viewed by means of a stereoscope. - Note, however, that in the preceding there is not question of the case in which something obscene must be painted, for example for the assistance of anatomical and obstetrical science.

10° Fabricators of female adornment or dress (milliners, hair-dressers), who in their shops show to the eyes of passers-by samples so adorned and dressed that they are gravely offensive, by which namely women are represented in a manner wholly immodest and greatly provocative to lasciviousness.

11° Women or girls adorning themselves in such a way, as often happens in solemn dinners and evening gatherings (soirées). But here one must distinguish between adornment that of itself greatly excites to lasciviousness - such as enormous uncovering of the breasts or their translucent covering is judged to be - and adornment indeed immodest, but not of itself so lascivious, as perhaps is, for example, the uncovering of those parts more modest. Those assuming adornment of the first kind are not to be excused from grave sin of scandal. But those assuming adornment of the second kind are also not excused from mortal scandal if they introduce the use of such clothing where it is not in force; but if they follow a custom already introduced, certainly not in the least to be praised, indeed severely to be rebuked, yet they are not of themselves to be condemned of mortal sin, provided they intend nothing evil. For customary things, provided they are not altogether lascivious of themselves, are not accustomed to move passion so notably.

To be noted. - What we have observed in the last place about custom once introduced as to clothing not altogether lascivious, seems in some measure to have to be said also as to other matters, not simply obscene, for example as to comedies or equestrian games (circus), not notably impure. Hence I would indeed strive to dissuade from those comedies, etc., and, if it could be done, to root them out; but I would not dare in these provinces, where there is in force no special prohibition or Ecclesiastical censure concerning this matter, as elsewhere there is, to teach publicly that actors and actresses in those equestrian games also or comedies, which are made in a manner not to be praised, yet usual and not irreligious or gravely impure, are of themselves guilty of mortal scandal, and therefore unworthy of the Sacraments unless they abandon their office. Therefore let the pastor and confessor judge concerning individual cases, with account taken of the nature of the representations, of the usage of the places where they are made, and of the persons commonly attending; and regularly let him disapprove their office, but not condemn it as mortal unless this is sufficiently established. - We say the same a fortiori of simple lay spectators of such representations. Meanwhile we carefully warn here that in the preceding we have treated only of grave scandal to others; for if a question is instituted about the proximate occasion in which perhaps the actors themselves, etc., or spectators are situated, it will often happen that abstinence from their office or their attendance, which cannot be imposed upon the same under grave fault by title of grave scandal, nevertheless must be imposed under grave fault by title of their own proximate occasion; concerning which n. 1444, Resp. 2°, 3), will speak more broadly.

12° Finally, we still generally assign as guilty of scandal of themselves: a) clerics who, by retaining at home a person suspected by the people, furnish occasion for sins of detraction, calumny, and contempt of the clerical state; cf. Counc. Trent;¹ and the same must be said of a husband as to a maid-servant suspected by his wife not without reason; b) married women who, by admitting their handsome lovers to familiar conversations, are an offense to their husbands and to others, as experience teaches; c) parents who permit to their daughters conversations in the evening and in hidden places with betrothed men and lovers; and the same must be said of superiors as to servants and other domestics.

296. Preliminary note. - 1° We are not treating here of omitting direct active scandal, the malice of which is of itself manifest to anyone; but only of those things which are to be omitted under the fault of indirect active scandal, the description of which see above n. 291.

2° Mindful of the Apostolic word:¹ "giving no offense to any man," and at the same time of the exhortation of the divine Master Himself:² "Let them alone; they are blind"; Moralists commonly resolve: it is never licit to give the neighbor scandal, even indirect; but sometimes it can be licit simply to permit that the neighbor, beyond our intention, take scandal. But when someone morally must be judged, whether in a strict or in a certain broader sense, to give scandal; and when he can be judged licitly to permit the taking of scandal: this depends totally on this: whether by the law of charity he is held or not held to omit some word or deed precisely so that the ruin of the neighbor may be avoided. In the first hypothesis namely, he must be judged, in whatever sense finally, to give scandal; in the second hypothesis he can be judged licitly to permit the scandal of the neighbor. Hence of itself there arises the general question proposed in the title of this Section, the solution of which we now approach by parts, by positing four special questions, of which the first will regard things less right, the second indifferent things, the third spiritual goods, the fourth temporal goods.

297. First Question. - Must things less right always be omitted by the law of charity because of passive scandal of the neighbor foreseen from them?

Resp. Affirmatively, without any exception, if the things less right are already evil of themselves; indeed, speaking of itself, affirmatively also if they carry before themselves only the appearance of evil, as is established from the words of the Apostle:³ "from all appearance of evil refrain yourselves." Cf. 1 Corinthians,⁴ where the Apostle thus addresses those who reclined in an idol's temple (which was not evil of itself, yet had the appearance of evil for the weak): "Take heed lest perhaps this liberty of yours become an offense to the weak." To this also pertains the very well-known heroic example of the venerable old man Eleazar.⁵

We have said: speaking of itself; for by accident it can be licit to do before others what bears the appearance of evil, namely if you have a legitimate reason of necessity or great utility, and at the same time you take care that, as far as lies in you, you remove the occasion of ruin by teaching, for example, those present (unless from circumstances they already sufficiently recognize it) that you can act licitly, that you can licitly eat meats on a fast day because you are excused from the precept of fasting because of a dispensation, etc. For where after these things scandal still arises or persists, it is generally rightly considered as purely accepted scandal, which from the law of charity (apart from the gravest or extreme necessity of the neighbor) we are not held to avoid with grave inconvenience of our own; unless perhaps at the same time there was question of such damage, for example of a community, of faith, or of religion, that it would have to be guarded against before one's own private damage.

298. Second Question. - From the law of charity must indifferent things be omitted from which the neighbor is thought to be about to accept scandal?

Resp. Affirmatively, as often as they can be omitted without notable inconvenience; because from charity we are held to impede the ruin of the neighbor when we easily can, for example by abstaining from an action not very useful, or by deferring it, or by explaining our manner of acting, etc. But on the contrary, negatively, as often as they cannot be omitted without such inconvenience; because then charity ceases to oblige. Here, however, one ought to notice with St. Alph.¹ that, other things being equal, a greater inconvenience is required the graver or the more certain the sin of the neighbor which is feared, or the more numerous are those to be scandalized; likewise a greater one is required so that scandal of the little ones may licitly be permitted than Pharisaic scandal, which for the most part, when a reasonable cause stands, is to be cared about little, unless perhaps fruit is hoped for from some easy delay, or unless the evil to be feared from it is far more notable than the good which will be obtained through our indifferent works. Besides, this still deserves to be noted: scandal of the little ones, persisting after admonition made to the little ones, can easily be equated to Pharisaic scandal.

From the given response, by way of example, it will be licit to resolve: Therefore a woman is not held to put aside decent adornment (which she assumes because it is fitting to her state, or to please her husband, or that she may find a spouse) because of the scandal of some indeterminate man; for this is to be reputed too grave for her. But if a woman foresees that some determinate man will fall from it into mortal sin, then for one or another time, if it could be done conveniently, she ought to lessen her adornment or abstain from the sight of such a man, but not for a long time, since this again would be too difficult. But if a woman of this sort, although she does not intend the ruin of such a man, nevertheless led by mere vanity, presents herself to his sight on purpose, she could not be excused from grave sin of scandal, just as she also would not be excused if she were to seek some place which she would not approach unless she knew that a shameful lover was there. Cf. St. Alph.¹ The following resolution, which occurs apud several Authors, can also be referred to this place: A woman or girl is held, when she knows certainly that some man sins gravely when she sits in his sight in church, to choose another place, if she conveniently can. - But from these resolutions, proposed by way of example, it will be licit to judge prudently about other similar cases, with account taken of the response given above.

299. Third Question. - To avoid the scandal of the neighbor, must spiritual goods sometimes be omitted by the law of charity?

Resp. Works good of themselves (under which are understood also omissions good of themselves) are either of counsel or of precept:

a) As to good works which are of mere counsel, the same thing must be established, preserving proportion, which we established in the preceding question about omitting indifferent works.

b) As to good works of precept one must say: they are never to be omitted because of scandal, whether Pharisaic or of the little ones, as often as they are absolutely necessary to salvation, as reception of Baptism before death, - or as often as they are prescribed from the law of nature, here and now urging, and not ceasing because of changed circumstances; for evils are not to be done, even venial ones, that good things may come. But where there is question of works prescribed from positive law alone, especially human law, for example of hearing Mass on Sunday, this distinction must be made: such works generally must not be omitted because of Pharisaic scandal; but whether they sometimes must be omitted because of scandal of the little ones is a question controverted among Authors, concerning which see St. Alph.² The opinion which seems practically able to be safely counseled holds: such works can more advisably and licitly be omitted because of scandal of the little ones, at least sometimes, but regularly they need not necessarily be omitted. - Therefore the confessor in the cases here supposed should proceed by persuading. See L. IV. 331.

300. Fourth Question. - Are temporal goods to be abandoned to avoid scandal?

Resp. Either there is question of temporal goods proper to us, or of another's goods committed to our care:

a) If the former: indeed they can licitly be abandoned, but ordinarily speaking they need not necessarily be abandoned to avoid scandal; for the law of charity does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. Hence you are not held, for example, to pay more than is equitable to some laborer, even if you foresee that he, notwithstanding your admonition about the justice of the payment, is going to blaspheme; because that inconvenience, although light in itself, can occur often, and thus in the whole complex becomes grave. Similarly also a Pastor of himself is not held to remit the stole fees owed to him, although the parishioner, sufficiently conscious of his obligation, breaks forth into various slanders, etc.; for from this a grave inconvenience would happen not only to the pastor himself, but also to his successors.

b) If the latter: they cannot even licitly be abandoned, unless from the consent of the owner, at least reasonably presumed. Cf. St. Alph.,¹ where special warnings are also given to Prelates about ecclesiastical goods committed to their administration.

301. • From the same law of charity by which we are prohibited from giving scandal to another, we are also commanded to remove or repair scandal once given, in the best way in which it can be done. But for this it is required that the scandalizer, having henceforth omitted the active scandal once given, should besides, as far as he morally can, try to remove its further evil influence, if namely such influence is still reasonably to be feared, as often happens where there is question, for example, of the scandal of a Superior toward subjects, or of scandal given to another through an evil command, an unjust counsel, the spread of a perverse book, and similar things. But by what ways a further effect of this sort can and must be removed, and therefore scandal repaired, must altogether be judged from the circumstances of the diverse cases, and generally it is established rather easily, provided especially that attention is paid to the special character of the scandal given and its publicity, and to the quality of the person scandalizing and the person scandalized.

Thus, for example, he who gave scandal to others through unjust counsels still efficacious will have to render them inefficacious, as far as he can, through diligent revocation, to be made known to the same persons either by himself or by another. A father of a family who scandalized the domestics ordinarily, for repairing the scandal (if it is still judged efficacious), will have to be obliged to manifest to those same domestics his displeasure over his bad example, and to exhort them paternally not to follow it in the future. A bad Author who through heretical, immoral, or defamatory writings incited others to sinning will be held, as far as he can, to retract these through new writings. A concubinarian, usurer, or other sinner of this kind who gave public scandal will also have to be constrained to its public reparation, for example that publicly, having first abandoned his wicked commerce or business, he approach the Sacraments with devotion.

As to other ordinary scandals, we think one must say: more commonly, for such scandals a special reparation, at least under grave sin, cannot be imposed; both because often they scarcely have any persisting efficacy, and also because, although they remain efficacious, often nevertheless morally they cannot be repaired otherwise with fruit (and no one is held to what is useless) except by that general reparation which is contained in the very cessation from scandal, in the furnishing of good example, in prayer for the scandalized person, and similar things. With prudence as guide, judge in this matter, and impose an obligation on no one unless it is sufficiently established.

Note. - To the reparation of scandal there also pertains the obligation of procuring that the scandalized person be recalled to penance or true conversion. Nevertheless this obligation generally of itself does not seem to urge under mortal sin, except in the case in which the scandalized person, because of ignorance or some other cause, does not have in his power the means of penance; for if he has them and does not wish to use them, then he must impute his impenitence to his own malice and not to another. Thus Scavini.¹

302. • Cooperation differs from scandal, as it is an influence into the will of another, in that it is a concurrence toward the evil action of another principally acting. It is said: principally acting. For the cooperation about which the discussion is here is not to be confounded with immediate participation; because those thus participating in the evil action of another, for example of theft, homicide, etc., are equally principal authors of the same guilt, and for this reason are called by Theologians concurring causes. But such concurrence, or cooperation, can be furnished in nine ways, contained in the following little verse, and to be explained more broadly in the Treatise on Justice:

Command, counsel, consent, flatterer, recourse,
Participant, silent one, one not preventing, one not manifesting.

In the first six ways concurrence is furnished positively, that is, by positing an action influencing the sin of another; in the last three ways concurrence is made negatively, that is, by omitting an act by which another's sin can and must be impeded (or, to use an expression too celebrated today, by not intervening). - Yet do not wonder if in the following there seems to be discussion almost exclusively of the positive ways of cooperating; for the negative ways, morally and with proportion preserved, are reduced to the positive according to that saying of the Angelic Doctor, already related before: "to act and not to act, when someone ought to act, are reduced to the same genus of act; according as the sin of omission is reduced to a sin of act." - Besides, concerning negative cooperation, as much as is needed, there will be special discussion in the Treatise on Justice, n. 773 sqq.

303. • In the present treatment a twofold cooperation must be carefully distinguished: namely formal and material.

Formal cooperation is that which truly concurs toward the very evil will of another, namely by consenting to it, or by intending the sin; and this happens a) when to another, whether by word or deed, assistance is furnished which from its own nature is determined to evil; and b) when to another, whether by word or deed, assistance is furnished which at least from the intention of the cooperator is determined to evil, that is, is posited for this end, that another may be helped in sinning. - Hence formal cooperation always supposes in the cooperator some consent into the sin of another, if not by reason of the end which the cooperator expressly intends (the end of the agent), then at least by reason of the work furnished, which from its character tends into evil (the end of the work).

Material cooperation is that which concurs only toward the evil action of another; and this through assistance at least indifferent of itself, which namely neither from its character (from the end of the work), nor from the intention of the cooperator (from the end of the agent), is determined to evil; but is determined to evil only by the principal agent. Practically, cooperation of this sort for the most part consists in the furnishing of some matter, occasion, or means indifferent of itself, which another can use without sin, although, from his own malice, beyond the intention of the cooperator, he is in reality going to abuse them for sinning. Hence material cooperation does not of itself flow into the very evil will of another, nor does it include of itself any consent in his sin, as formal cooperation does; and therefore I would have thought that generally it can rightly be said: cooperation in the sins of others is formal or material according as, with attention to the end of the agent who concurs, and to the end of the work by which he concurs, the cooperation does, or does not, of itself involve some consent in the sin of the one principally acting. Cf. Vind.¹

304. Principle. - It is never licit to cooperate formally in another's sin. For formal cooperation is always intrinsically evil, or, as St. Alph.² says, cannot be without sin; since, besides the fact that it truly is the moral cause of another's sin, by that very fact it contains in itself some approbation of another's sin, or at least implicit consent. But any formal cooperation has at least a twofold malice, namely one against charity, and another against that virtue toward whose violation it cooperates. Let the things handed down before concerning the malice of scandal n. 293 be applied here.

Wherefore it is never licit for anyone to excite another, whether by command, counsel, prayers, or flatteries, to doing something which on the part of the very act is evil, and therefore cannot be done by another without sin, for example to invite a priest, notary, or judge to something contrary to his office; nor will it ever be licit to indicate to another, prepared to sin, the opportunity, utility, delectability, etc., of the delict. For such cooperations are openly formal, as exciting or strengthening the very evil will of another. Likewise, it will in no way be licit to furnish to one wishing to sin services which from their character are nothing but means of sin as such; of which sort would be, for example, the service of a servant seeking a concubine for his master, or writing in place of a concubinarian master, or carrying letters - I do not say letters only signifying courtesy,¹ but amorous and impure ones; for such service from its nature fosters impure love and an evil will, nor is it by nature apt to produce any other effect of itself. In doubt letters are to be held as impure, when there is certainty about the impure love.²

305. • Quaer. 1° Is it licit to counsel a lesser evil in order to avoid a greater?

Resp. Some deny that this is licit; because, as it seems to them, to counsel even a lesser evil is in reality to counsel evil; but to counsel evil is always illicit. But several others with St. Alphonsus are of the opinion that it is more probably licit to counsel the lesser evil in order toward the same person, in the case in which the other is already certainly determined to execute a greater evil; because, as St. Alph. rightly observes, one counseling, in such a case, the lesser evil does not properly counsel evil, but good, namely the choice of the lesser evil before the greater evil. Hence to a man already determined to kill another, I will licitly be able to counsel that he rather steal something from him, rather strike him, or make himself drunk. - We have said: in order toward the same person; for it would not be licit to counsel a lesser evil in order toward another person in particular; for example, to one wishing to do evil to Titius, I will not licitly be able to counsel that he do a lesser evil to Caius; for then the one counseling would be the sole and whole cause of the damage of a third party. Make exception, however, if in the case Caius is held from charity to suffer this lesser evil in order to impede the extreme necessity of Titius. L. III. 57. L. IV. 566. § fin.

Quaer. 2° Is it sometimes licit purposely to offer to another an occasion of sin?

Resp. The affirmative opinion seems sufficiently probable, provided this is done from a right end and a just cause. Thus, for example, it would be licit deliberately to place money on a table before a suspected servant, so that he, having been caught in the delict of theft, could be corrected or impeded from new delicts. For in such a case there is not present a true induction to sin, or formal cooperation; but by positing a work indifferent of itself from a right end, the sin of another is merely permitted because of a just cause. In other words: in the case there is present only material cooperation, which is furnished from a right end and a just cause, and therefore is altogether licit, as will be clear from what now follows.

306. • Apart from the case in which there would be given a special obligation to impede the sin of the neighbor, concerning which case it will be said below, concerning the morality of material cooperation it will be licit to establish thus:

Principles. - I. It is licit to cooperate materially in another's sin, provided these two conditions are verified:

a) That the cooperation truly is only material, that is, consists in assistance good according to itself or at least indifferent, and posited without a depraved intention.

b) That there exists a just cause of necessity or utility rendering that cooperation honorable.

The reason for this Principle is: because, as St. Alph.¹ notes, when you furnish an action good or indifferent of itself, and another wishes to abuse it for sinning, you indeed are not held because of this abuse to abstain from your action, except from charity. But if there exists a just cause for not abstaining from your action, charity does not oblige. Therefore, by positing your indifferent action with a just cause, you do not sin; but you simply and licitly permit the sin of another, which then morally can in no way be judged to proceed from your action, but solely from the malice of him who abuses your action. Let the things noted above in n. 296 sqq. be recalled here, concerning those things which must be omitted to avoid the ruin of the neighbor. To these is added the common sense of men, even of those who think piously and Christianly. And indeed, unless the principle just handed down were true, no Christian could exercise any art or profession; all commerce among men would be removed, and an unbearable yoke would be imposed upon mortals.

II. It is illicit to cooperate in another's sin, even only materially, whenever a just cause of cooperation is lacking. - The reason is: because such cooperation directly conflicts with the precept of charity, by which we are held, if we conveniently can, not to promote the sin of another, but to impede it; and moreover such cooperation of itself is judged to include consent, at least indirect, in another's sin, so that it is deservedly equated with formal cooperation, and consequently contracts at least a twofold malice: one against charity, the other against the virtue which is injured by the neighbor. See again n. 293, where the malice of scandal is treated.

307. • But it is asked: What cause is just and sufficient for cooperating materially licitly?

Resp. Generally speaking, a just and sufficient cause is such necessity or utility as is reasonably judged to compensate the evil effect (that is, one harmful to the neighbor) of the cooperation; or, as St. Alph.¹ says, one which is proportionate 1) to the gravity of the sin of the other and 2) to the proximity of the concurrence which is furnished toward the execution of the sin. But precisely how great a necessity or utility of this sort must be in any concrete case cannot be determined by one rule; but it is left to be determined by the judgment of prudent persons, whom, nevertheless, in passing judgment about this matter it is necessary carefully to consider:

That a graver cause of necessity or utility is required:

a) The graver the sin is toward which one materially concurs; for in order that there be proportion between two things, the more one increases, the more the other also ought to increase. Thus, for example, a greater necessity will certainly be needed so that it may be licit materially to cooperate in homicide than in theft.

b) The more probable it is that the other, if you do not cooperate, will not sin. Thus, for example, a graver cause is required so that you licitly minister matter of sinning to another, if, with you not ministering it, the sin could scarcely be committed, than if, with you not ministering, the sin would nevertheless easily be committed, for example because others will not be lacking who are going to minister the matter.

c) The more proximately the cooperation touches the sin; and thus, for example, a greater reason is demanded so that you licitly make for another an instrument of sinning than that you licitly sell to him the material for making the instrument.

d) The less right the cooperator has for acting; and thus, for example, greater utility is required so that you licitly seek a sacrament from a bad foreign priest than from your own bad pastor.

e) The more the sin toward which one concurs is pernicious to a third party; and hence a graver cause of cooperating is required when the sin of another is against justice, to the damage of a third party, than if it is against another virtue. Likewise graver if the scandal of a third party is foreseen from the sin of another, than if such scandal is not to be feared.

308. To be noted. - When approaching the question about the morality of material cooperation, we previously excepted, n. 306, the case in which there would be given a special obligation to impede the sin of another. Hence, lest the solution of this question remain incomplete, it will help now to indicate briefly: 1° when this case is present, and 2° for what reason we previously excepted this case.

To the first. This case is present as often as someone is obliged not only from the precept of charity, as any other person is, but besides (and therefore more strictly) by force of his office, or by force of a special law more severely prohibiting this or that action, to ward off the evil which could be assisted by his cooperation. Parents, for example, are specially held by force of their office to ward off the sins of children; pastors, the sins of parishioners; civil magistrates, sins harmful to society or citizens, etc. Thus also merchants sometimes are held by special law not to sell certain dangerous weapons, poisonous potions, etc.

To the second. The aforesaid case was excepted, however, not for this reason, that material cooperation in the hypothesis of such a special obligation is indicated always and absolutely illicit; but only for this reason, that you may notice that the morality of material cooperation in that case cannot be judged solely according to the common rules of cooperation, considered only insofar as it conflicts with charity. For it is certain that, for the liceity of material cooperation, in the aforesaid hypothesis, a greater cause of necessity is required than for the liceity of cooperation in the hypothesis in which the cooperator is held to impede another's sin from charity alone. Where there is a twofold obligation, there it is necessary that the excusing cause be morally twofold. Hence it can happen that it is licit for a private person to concur materially, for example, in theft, and it is not licit for public ministers, parents of the thief, etc.; and this again is left to be judged by the judgment of prudent persons, according to the condition of the circumstances.

Conclusion From The Three Preceding Sections.

The theory of cooperation therefore, having been explained, is reduced to those things which follow.

1° Cooperation, properly speaking, is not to be confounded with scandal, nor with immediate participation.

2° Formal cooperation is not synonymous with illicit cooperation, since all formal cooperation is indeed illicit, but not conversely.

3° The illicitness of cooperation can arise from a threefold head, namely both a) from the object, b) from the end, and c) from the precept of charity, unless a sufficient reason excuses from this; but liceity arises only from an integral cause, that is, from the concurrence of three conditions, which are: 1) an object good or at least indifferent; 2) an honest end; 3) a just and proportionate cause.

But the whole theory of cooperation is contained under three heads, for the same number of principles on which it rests, and these are: 1) the distinction between acts objectively good or indifferent, and acts intrinsically evil; 2) the distinction between the end of the work and the end of the agent; 3) the axiom that charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience.

309. • In moral matters, and especially in those which concern cooperation, one thing is the office of science, another the office of prudence. To science indeed pertains this: to establish general principles, for example, formal cooperation consists in this ... and is always illicit; material cooperation consists in this ... and is licit because of a just cause, etc. But to prudence especially it pertains to judge whether and to what extent those principles are to be applied to particular cases, and cases scarcely ever entirely equal, for example whether this cooperation, in this concrete case, is to be called formal or material, and, if material, whether here and now a just cause of cooperation is present or not. Wherefore, for deciding various cases of cooperation, the science of moral principles does not suffice; but besides there is required moral prudence or dexterity, by which we may be able to consider individual cases with a right practical eye, as they say, and to subject them to the principles of science. But for acquiring this prudence or dexterity, the exercise seems most useful which, with certain concrete cases proposed, indicates by what reason those cases have been judged and solved by more distinguished Casuists; and therefore we shall now institute such an exercise, yet with one admonition still premised, namely, that practical moral resolutions of this sort often cannot be determined after the manner of a mathematical decision, but only after the manner of a decision more or less morally definite according to commonly occurring things. Nor will this seem strange if you notice how great the variety often is among cases, even those similar at first appearance, and a variety involved in darkness; and besides how limited our prudence often is, how uncertain our providence!

310. a) Toward violation of the law of abstinence. - It is not licit of itself for innkeepers on a prohibited day to serve meats on their own initiative, that is, to guests not asking for this; because it would be true cooperation in another's sin without a just cause. But it seems licit, at least in those places where such usage is in force (today almost universal), that innkeepers serve meats to travelers or generally to those who frequent their inns, provided they themselves ask for meats, and their request is not made in contempt of Religion. Indeed those innkeepers in whose inn a common table (table d'hote) is customarily prepared, at which guests arriving in a body sit and eat, or who await travelers arriving by public carriages or by railway at a determined hour, taught by experience that many are going to ask for meats or broth from meats, can licitly have such foods ready, to be placed before those asking, or even set a table with licit and illicit foods, offer them, mark them on the bill, so that each may choose what has pleased him. The reason is: both because among so many there can be not a few who have a reason excusing them from the law of abstinence, and it would be too great an inconvenience indeed if individuals had to be interrogated about the proper causes for eating meats; and because in the present state of things it is impossible, at least in many places, to exercise the office of innkeeper otherwise. - As regards those who have a few boarders with them, with a price accepted by individual weeks (boarding-housekeepers), these ought not easily, on a forbidden day, to place meats before those boarders, even asking for them, at least if they are Catholics; for since the law of abstinence can more easily be observed in a private house than in a public inn, hence also in a private house a just reason of cooperating in the violation of the same law occurs with more difficulty. Yet they are more easily excused when they place before them other foods besides meats, morning and evening on days of fast; for they can have an excuse from the rigor of the fast because of grave labor or health not firm; therefore the matter is safely permitted to the consciences of individuals. - Thus Kenrick.¹

b) Toward drunkenness. Innkeepers are held to deny wine or other strong liquors to a man whom they have certainly known to be about to become drunk, unless they have a grave reason for acting otherwise. But they are judged to have a grave reason of this sort when from denial graver evils are to be feared, for example blasphemies or grave quarrels; or also when from denial any grave proper damage is to be feared, for example if otherwise they would be notably harmed by diminution of guests. Cf. St. Alph.²

c) Toward luxury. Innkeepers are guilty of very grave sin and unworthy of absolution who furnish secret rooms for lust; or who conduct at their place dances or dances altogether impure and lascivious, concerning which there has been discussion before n. 295 under 8°.

d) Toward harmful reading. Owners of taverns (saloons, taverns, hotels) cannot expose for reading those newspapers which evidently and ordinarily are opposed to Religion or morals, even if guests cease to flow to them on that account. Yet commonly there is present a sufficient reason for admitting those newspapers which treat of merely political matters. Nor do they seem held to reject some newspaper because sometimes it contains something less right by reason of Faith, provided that generally it is not opposed to Religion.

e) Toward violation of the Lord's Day. It is asked namely: What about innkeepers selling drinks on Sundays in this region?

Resp. 1° They are to be excused, at least from mortal sin, who sell them to one or another person who is not going to abuse them, whether they drink those things when buying in their house, or even in the tavern itself; for neither does the civil law, prohibiting entrance to taverns on Sundays in most States, bind the conscience so far.

Resp. 2° The Second Plenary Council of Baltimore¹ warns pastors of souls that they "keep away from the Sacraments innkeepers who foster the excesses of drinkers, especially on Sundays." But they scarcely fail to foster them who, giving hidden entrance to their tavern, detain drinking Catholics there for a long time during the time of Masses, or allow them to remain.

311. • a) Toward violation of the law of abstinence. It is not licit for servants to prepare and serve meats to a Catholic master on a forbidden day from the sole reason of servitude; but only because of notable detriment. Cf. St. Alph.,² where it is observed that servants, in doubt, can presume that the master has a cause excusing from the law of abstinence.

We have said: to a Catholic master; for if there is question of heretical masters, I would have thought one must say for these regions that here regularly there is present a sufficient reason for not disturbing servants who minister to the same prohibited foods.

b) Toward lust. Here we distinguish three kinds of services, namely: services which of themselves are determined to foulness; services indifferent of themselves which nevertheless concur proximately; - and services indifferent of themselves which concur only remotely toward the foulness of the master.

Services of the first kind are excused by no reason, since they constitute true formal cooperation (see above n. 304). And therefore servants are never allowed, by letters written in their own name, or by words, to invite a woman to commit crime with the master; nor does it ever seem licit for them to accompany the master to a place of foulness, if the master is rendered more courageous from this very accompaniment. - Likewise, according to St. Alph.,¹ it is never licit for a servant to carry amorous letters (n. 304) to the concubine of the master, or to carry little gifts and food to a prostitute; because this service also seems to the holy Doctor to be of itself determined to evil, and therefore formal cooperation.

Services of the second kind cannot be excused from the sole reason of servitude, but only from another cause added, which is either very grave or grave according to the exigency of diverse cases. Wherefore, from the mind of St. Alph.,² the sole reason of servitude does not suffice; but besides there is required at least fear of grave damage, so that a servant can licitly accompany a master (who is here supposed not to be rendered more courageous from the accompaniment) to a place of foulness, and await him returning; or so that he can licitly bring a concubine (who is here supposed not to be invited by the servant) by carriage to the house of the concubinarian master. Indeed, a very grave cause, and namely fear of death, would be required so that a servant could licitly help a master by carrying a ladder, or by putting his shoulders beneath, or by violently opening the door, when the master wishes to ascend to ravish a virgin. Thus St. Alph.,³ where there is also found a scandalous proposition pertaining to this, condemned by Innocent XI, the 51st (see p. XVII).

Services of the third kind will be able to be excused for one and another time from the sole reason of servitude. And hence, for example, it will be licit for a servant, in the customary manner, to open the common door to a concubine, if, with him not opening it, there is another who will open. Cf. St. Alph.⁴ But there will scarcely be need to observe that a servant of this sort, if many times he is compelled to such services, must be earnestly warned that he leave the service.

Quaer. What about public drivers conveying others for payment to a brothel?

Resp. The question seems to have to be resolved according to those things which we said about servants furnishing services of the second kind. Wherefore they will be able to be excused, provided 1) a cause, at least grave, is present, that is, founded fear of grave damage, for example lest, if he refuses, he be dismissed by his master ("employer") and not easily find another; 2) he does not display his service for leading anyone more securely or more secretly, or as one ignorant where the brothel is.

312. Toward the abuse of material which they make and sell. - Since evil is not to be presumed without reason, hence it seems altogether licit that workers and merchants, by the sole title of commerce, make and sell their wares to any buyer, provided 1° these wares are indifferent things, which can easily have a good use, although perhaps many in general abuse them, for example strong liquors, ale, playing cards, paints, etc.; and provided 2° in the very purchase or circumstances the evil intention of the buyer does not appear.

I say: 1° provided these wares are indifferent things; for it is clear of itself that the making and sale of those things is illicit which of themselves are determined to evil and have no good use, for example the making and sale of an idol for pagans, a theatrical garment manifestly impure, female adornment of itself obscene, etc. To this also pertains the resolution apud St. Alph.,¹ about the sale of poison (which from its nature principally tends to an evil effect), namely: it is not licit to sell poisons except to those who are thought to be going to use them well, for example for the making of colors or of medicine. Hence the sale of poison which serves only for the killing of a man is simply evil. -

I say: 2° provided that in the very purchase or circumstances the evil intention of the buyer does not appear; for if such evil intention in the buyer appears in reality, the very making and sale of merchandise, even indifferent, would be proximate cooperation, which does not seem excused unless perhaps a grave and proportionate cause of cooperation occurs. And thus, for example, it will not be licit to sell ornaments to a girl who is going to abuse them, unless otherwise the seller would suffer a notable inconvenience.¹

313. A. Toward the sacred rites of heretics. I understand heretics in this place in the broader sense, that is, even the non-baptized, as Quakers and very many others in these provinces, who glory in the Christian name while professing several errors against the doctrine of faith.

Principle I. - To concur in the sacred rites of heretics is plainly illicit as often as concurrence of this sort can deservedly be judged of itself to contain true communication in sacred things, or at least tacit approbation of the same. Hence that illicit concurrence has place especially in these cases:

1. If someone in the temples of heretics were to discharge the office of organist, sacristan, singer, or even, although not discharging these offices, in their religious assemblies only once or twice were to play organs or other musical instruments, move the bellows, sing metrical hymns, or compose them to be sung, answer the minister, or, which is in the likeness of invitation, ring the bell for the sermon.² For these involve either communication in their sacred rites or formal cooperation in them. - It is said: in their religious assemblies; for in their temples, apart from every occasion of worship, and for profane ends, to play organs or other musical instruments, or to sing metrical hymns which have nothing contrary to the faith, or to compose them to be sung, cannot of itself be called illicit. - I said: for profane ends; for these things would be illicit if the money to be collected from them were to be spent for Protestant uses.

As regards the ringing of the bell, Kenrick³ observes that a Catholic who has charge of a court or public hall, in which, according to the custom of this region, leave is given to ministers of any religion to preach, is excused if he simply permits the bell to be rung for any of the sectarians, since it is not in his power to impede this.

2. "Those who contribute money," or merchandise, food, etc., to amusements (fairs, etc.), "so that the money to be collected from them" may pass "into Protestant uses, favor false worship"; likewise those who "give as a gift a piece of land on which" Protestant temples "are to be erected," or "who rent buildings to them for the sake of worship. But those do not sin who sell land, making no agreement about its use, although they know that on it buildings of sects are to be erected; for scarcely could they without grave ill will add the condition that they not be erected, and otherwise they could not impede their erection in the vicinity."¹

But those who contribute money, merchandise, or similar things which are requested for Protestant uses, not indeed so that they may pass into those uses, but so that they may guard themselves from grave damage thence to arise, because, if they refuse these things, their shops are to be deserted by Protestants, I do not dare to condemn, since this cooperation does not seem formal; otherwise the Sacred Penitentiary, having been asked whether it is licit for Catholics to contribute money for building a heretical temple, could not have responded (C. 1822): "Affirmatively." It added indeed: "but only for freeing themselves and their temples from that inconvenient and scandalous simultaneity with Protestants" [n. 1329, q. 3° under 4)]; but by this addition the Sacred Penitentiary perhaps wished only to warn the faithful that in this precise case (for about this alone it was asked), nothing else renders the cooperation licit than that very cause of removing simultaneity. - Nevertheless, apart from good faith, those are not free from fault who contribute something into Protestant uses because Protestants otherwise will contribute nothing in collections, etc., whose proceeds pass into Catholic uses; for the cause is manifestly insufficient.

3. The Response about not calling a minister to non-Catholic sick persons, related on p. XLIX, was given with the addition: "according to what has been set forth, it is not licit." Hence the editor of the work "Casus conscientiae, etc. Auctore P. Gury S. J.," 1st ed. in Germany, p. 62, col. 2, concludes that the rule does not simply exclude exceptions because of circumstances, and that in particular cases the Ordinaries of places are to be consulted. But of itself it is clear:

Resp. The Sacred Congregation does not include the case in which from denial greater evils would threaten, as the despair of the sick man, clamors against the Church, blasphemies, scandal of others, etc. - Yet from the Response it must be inferred:

a) It is not licit for a physician to propose to a sick person in danger, or to his relatives, that they call the minister of the sect. Yet he ought to warn the sick man of the danger in which he is situated.¹

b) It is not licit to invite a minister to perform his rites at the funeral of your deceased Protestant relative; but Catholics whose Protestant parents have died are to be excused if they commit the care of the funeral to relatives, although they foresee that they are going to call a minister; for they can scarcely avoid this without very grave offense, and besides they hold themselves passively.

314. Principle II. - It does not seem absolutely illicit to concur in the sacred rites of heretics in a manner so remote and in such circumstances of things that this concurrence is not held by public opinion as communication in their sacred rites or as approbation of them. Collect. p. 533. n. 1105 under 1. 2. - Hence:

1° In our parts, where heretics live intermixed with Catholics, from the opinion of St. Alph.¹ and Collect. p. 523, n. 1089 ad 1, it will be licit for workers, for the sake of pay, to restore or even build the temples of heretics, provided this is not demanded in hatred or contempt of the Catholic Religion; for on the one hand that restoration or building in these places is in no way esteemed as communication in their sacred rites or as approbation of them, and on the other hand it only remotely concurs toward false worship, sometimes to be exercised in such a temple. But whether what we here resolve for workers can of itself also be applied to architects is a question which it is licit for us to remit to the judgment of more prudent persons. Indeed we think that they too are not to be condemned in this region, although perhaps not undeservedly these words of the Apostle² would be repeated to them: "What shall I say to you? Do I praise you? In this I praise you not." Thus Van Egeren.

What I say about the temples of heretics cannot be applied to the temples of false deities. Namely, Father Philippus de Carboneano³ relates that by decrees of the Sacred Inquisition in the years 1626 and 1669 it was defined that in no way is it licit for Catholics, nor can it be permitted or tolerated by any cause or motive, that they lend work to building, restoring, or sweeping temples which are dedicated to false deities or authors of false sects, or to cleaning their walls and pavements. Make exception where these things are not held as protestative acts of worship (Collect. p. 528. n. 1097). Yet to open and close the doors of temples, even of heretics, is not licit.

2° Those are not judged to sin here who contribute money or work for the relief of the poor, the sick, and orphans in buildings which are governed by Protestants; but care must be taken lest this turn to the detriment of faith, through the unjust zeal of the sects for perverting Catholics who are admitted in those buildings.¹

3° Whether it is licit for Catholics, for the use of heretics, to make, sell, and set up organs, a pulpit, communion table, chalice, is a graver question. I am of the opinion that this concurrence commonly is not received as communication in sacred rites or as approbation of them, and therefore that the condition posited in Principle II is preserved.

4° The question is still graver whether it is licit to make, sell, and procure altars and sacerdotal vestments for Ritualists. I indeed know that some very learned Bishop of Holland did not condemn a Catholic selling sacerdotal vestments to Jansenists; but between these and those there intervenes this difference: that Ritualists, since they are not true priests, by celebrating their sacred rites both commit idolatry themselves, and are the cause that it is committed by others. Cooperation moreover seems to be formal, since Ritualists cannot use those things well; and, even given that it is only material, a sufficient cause for licitly cooperating in so great a crime as idolatry scarcely seems able to be given in the case.

315. • B. Toward the printing or dissemination or propagation of heretical books, written expressly for attacking and weakening the Catholic Faith.

Here we distinguish a twofold class of workers laboring in a print shop. For some are more proximate cooperators, among whom we count those who set the type, who place the paper upon the type, who press the press, who direct the printing, and who correct the printed sheets so that they may come forth corrected; and likewise those who, according to the custom of this region, report to the editors of newspapers about heretical sermons. - But others are more remote cooperators, such as those are judged to be who prepare ink or paper, arrange books already printed, or exercise other ministries pertaining only remotely to the printing, of which sort, if I am not mistaken, several now occur especially in those print shops where the work of printing is carried out by the movements of elaborate machines.

But as books written expressly for attacking the Catholic Faith are to be held: 1° Bibles of the sects. 2° The Book of Common Prayer. 3° Hymnals of Sectarians (Hymn-books). 4° Confessions of faith published by the sects. 5° Any other books or pamphlets of sectarians written for defending heresy, among which also sermons. 6° Journals and newspapers which evidently and ordinarily are opposed to religion. These things having been premised:

316. • 1° We think cooperators of the first class, especially those who set type or direct the printing, cannot be excused, unless perhaps in the case of very grave detriment otherwise to be undergone, with contempt of Religion nevertheless excluded, and only for a brief time; for example if the son of a heretical printer is converted to the Catholic Faith, and he cannot desert his father so quickly without very grave detriment to himself. Thus at least Laymann¹ thinks, alleging this reason of his opinion, not to be despised: to set in type a heretical writing of itself is not absolutely evil, if it is done merely materially and without a depraved end; nor does ecclesiastical law, generally prohibiting this severely, seem to oblige in so great a necessity.

I say: especially those who set type, etc.; for I would have thought it licit for a grave cause that workers in a print shop, where books of every kind, and among others also books of the aforesaid sort, come forth, simply place paper upon the type or press the press, not knowing what is the argument of the work to be printed. Cf. Kenrick.²

2° Cooperators of the second class, according to several, as Gury³ testifies, will be able to be excused from a grave cause; provided nevertheless (I would add) that they do not labor in a print shop principally erected for evil. For Catholics cannot, as Kenrick¹ carefully warns, for any reason be occupied about Protestant print shops which are expressly opposed to the Catholic Religion.

3° Cooperators, whether of the first or of the second class, in the printing of books which are not comprehended under those of which n. 315 treats, but incidentally contain errors, seem today in our regions to be excused, provided nevertheless there is not question of books expressly obscene (concerning which the question is not here), nor can those workers easily find a printer who prints only harmless books. For on the one hand those books are prohibited by those Rules of the Index which in this region scarcely oblige universally, either because they cannot be observed, or because they were never received or observed; but on the other hand, if cooperation of this sort for a just cause were not licit, Catholics in these provinces could scarcely furnish their work in print shops; for Catholic or wholly harmless ones are very few. I add that by the common opinion, even of the timorous, cooperators are generally not condemned thus.

317. • As to cooperation toward the dissemination or propagation of heretical books, these things seem to have to be established.

a) It is not licit indiscriminately to sell to all, expose for sale, give as a gift, lend, or procure the books of which n. 315 treats.

b) The sole reason of servitude seems to excuse those who are occupied about sending newspapers to those who have subscribed their name to them; for public postmen also are thus excused.

c) He who subscribes his name to a depraved newspaper so that he may propagate it cooperates formally; - otherwise materially, yet, unless he has a sufficient cause, illicitly cooperates with it.

318. • Toward the unjust occupation of their country. If a foreign enemy, with the legitimate Prince expelled, has unjustly occupied the country, citizens will licitly be able to remain under the unjust invader and, with him compelling, to pay tributes or furnish other services indifferent of themselves, which nevertheless do not pass into the greater oppression of the Prince, but, on the contrary, from his presumed consent are done for preventing graver damages and dangers, for example confiscation of goods, expulsion from the country, etc.

Similarly Officials licitly retain their offices with the intention of impeding a greater evil and of more easily restoring the legitimate government. But if perhaps they were compelled to exact unjust tributes, they could generally reasonably presume that the prince and citizens willingly consent that they exact them, namely by this title: lest something worse happen, for example lest, with his own officials dismissed because of refusal, worse ones be substituted by the enemies. See Laymann,¹ Sporer,² and n. 466, q. 2°; likewise n. 1717. S. Alphon. L. PP. 714.

319. • To furnish something which they will not furnish without sin. The solution of this difficulty depends on the distinction between works which of themselves, that is, on the part of the act itself, are sinful, and works according to themselves indifferent, which will become sinful from the mere choice of the agent. Namely, it is illicit to invite another to the furnishing of a work already evil of itself, because such invitation would be true formal cooperation, as was said before n. 304. But, supposing a just cause, it will be licit to invite another to furnish a work which from his mere malice will become evil. Hence from a grave cause you will licitly seek:

a) An oath from one going to perjure himself.³ b) A loan from a usurer.⁴ c) The administration of a Sacrament from a sacrilegious priest, especially a pastor.⁵ d) The dissolution of a spell from a magician who, knowing the licit mode of dissolution, nevertheless is going to use an illicit one.⁶ e) The rendering of the debt, licit on the part of the act, from a spouse going to sin because of his or her own pleasure.⁷ But these cases and several others pertaining here will be more accurately weighed in the course of Moral Theology in the place proper to each matter.

320. • 1. It is not licit to cooperate in immodest dances, as is clear of itself, whether by music, or by renting halls or rooms. Yet the reason of grave damage will excuse a musician who does not produce sounds of this sort, which uniquely pertain to an immodest manner of dancing; for in this case those dances are immodest from the malice of the dancers alone. Thus, with a better opinion preserved, I think.

2. "In cities in which, for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, it is permitted" for prostitutes "to live, it is licit to rent a house to them, especially if other tenants are lacking, unless nevertheless the prostitutes gravely harm honest neighbors, or because of the location" of the dwelling "give greater occasion to sins."¹ *

It is asked. Does this resolution of St. Alphonsus also hold for this region, where universally, with one or another city excepted, brothel houses are prohibited by law?

I am of the opinion that one must respond affirmatively if there is question of cities in which that law is customarily neglected with impunity, or in which houses of this sort are tolerated. For it is the same thing, at least practically, as if they were permitted. Kenrick also seems to think thus.²

3. Those who in Newspapers or in a sheet posted in taverns, public inns, or elsewhere, announce or carry things to be announced which by their nature tend to the detriment of Faith or morals, as, for example, a heretical sermon or speech to be held, books per se harmful, immodest dances, impure spectacles, if they knowingly do this, seem unable to be excused from formal cooperation. But as to harmful books, I would distinguish between those which are expressly obscene, and heretical ones; for the latter, that is, heretical ones, as practice bears, will be able to be announced in those periodicals which are written for this end, that learned persons may know what works are daily published.

4. Concerning those cooperating in injustice, this will be treated in the Treatise on Right and Justice, n. 759 sqq.

321. • 1° In doubt counsel is to be sought, if there is question of a grave and public matter and time permits. And so let the faithful approach priests; these, Bishops; but Bishops, all thinking the same thing, should prescribe a norm in timely fashion, even seeking a Pontifical oracle if there is need.

2° In judging the liceity or illicitness of material cooperation, or, as St. Alphonsus speaks, H. A. Tr. IV. 32, "for judging when a cause is just and proportionate, above all let it be observed for a rule what Doctors say, because, since this depends on the estimation of prudent persons" (such as Doctors are judged to be), "the more common opinion in this matter will also be the more probable."

3° If, with diligence applied, doubt remains, liberty is not to be favored if the reason of scandal stands in the way, or also, what sometimes is more to be feared, danger of perversion, of formal sin, etc.

4° Often in this matter good faith will excuse. **

• To this belongs the question of renting a house or part of a house to persons going to lead a libidinous life in it, for example concubinarians. This question, if it is restricted to cooperation alone, seems to have to be resolved, with proportion preserved, in the same way as that concerning prostitutes. I say: if it is restricted to cooperation alone; for the reason of scandal, especially in the country, will easily be able to render the renting illicit.

** A distinction must also be made between cooperation, although only material, in an action by which the common good, whether of the Church or of the State, is put in danger in its very being, and in an action by which only the useful things of the Church or of the State are affected by damage. The former is licit for no cause, since no cause can be thought proportionate to so great an evil, namely of a whole people or of human society (Example n. 137, p. 62, col. 2, § Dari, at the beginning). But the latter, for a proportionate cause, will be able to be licit (Example n. 773. III).