§ 1. On Almsgiving

486. DEFINITION. Almsgiving is a work by which something is given to one in need, from compassion, on account of God. Thus defined, almsgiving is an act of mercy, commanded by charity. It can also be commanded by another virtue.

PRINCIPLES. I. There is a precept, grave of itself, of bestowing alms. It is established both from reason, which commands us to do for another what we would wish to be done for ourselves, if we were placed in the same condition; and from the words of Christ (Matt. 25:41): Depart from me, ye cursed...; for I was hungry, and ye gave me not to eat...; and from 1 John 3:17: He that hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother have need, and shall shut up his bowels from him: how doth the charity of God abide in him?

487. II. In order that the precept of almsgiving may urge, two things are required: necessity on the part of the one receiving, and superfluity of goods on the part of the one giving. The first is established from the definition itself; the second from the order of charity. For he who has only things necessary for life cannot distribute them without preferring another's life to his own. The words of the Lord Savior are consonant: That which remaineth, give alms (Luke 11:41). Cf. 2.2, q. 32, a. 1; Bouquillon, de Carit., n. 483-90.

Moreover, just as the NECESSITY of one in need is distinguished as THREEFOLD, as was said above (n. 480, 3), so also, on the part of the giver, GOODS are of three kinds: a) things necessary for life, that is, goods without which we cannot preserve our own life, or that of our people; b) goods superfluous for life, but necessary for one's state, that is, goods without which indeed we can preserve life, but cannot live in that manner which befits our state; c) finally, goods simply superfluous, that is, which are necessary neither for life nor for state. And here it must be noted that, by things necessary for the decency of state, generally are to be understood all those things which are required, not only for sustaining children and servants and guests, but also for making honorable donations, banquets, and moderate displays of magnificence (II, 31; confer Kon., n. 484).

488. But in what way, according to the diversity either of necessity or of the superfluity of goods, alms is to be given, will be established by the following RULES, with the things always to be posited being posited, that is: a) that the use alone of the thing does not suffice; b) that the required means are not extraordinary, which men commonly are not accustomed to employ; c) that the common or public good of the community is not brought into danger (II, 31, resp. 3 and 4; Gen., I, 222).

RULE 1. In extreme necessity, neighbor must be helped from goods superfluous for life, even though necessary for state. The reason is clear from the order of charity (n. 483, Rule 2).

Whence no one is bound to give alms from goods necessary to himself for life, unless the poor man were such that the safety of the republic depended upon him.

RULE 2. In grave necessity, neighbor must be helped from goods superfluous for state, but with only middling inconvenience. Thus commonly; and the reason is again clear from the order of charity.

But the obligation urges under grave sin, unless it is prudently judged that another will come to his aid; for, "since in Scripture men are frequently condemned on account of neglected works of mercy, these are not to be restricted to extreme and rare necessity" (II, 31). And it seems clearly inferred from the condemnation of the twelfth proposition by Innocent XI: "Scarcely among secular persons will you find what is superfluous to state, even among kings; and thus scarcely anyone is bound to almsgiving, when he is bound only from what is superfluous to state."

RULE 3. In common or middling necessity, neighbor must be aided from goods superfluous for state, but with only light inconvenience. This also the order of charity requires. But whether under mortal sin? Many deny it with St. Antoninus; for the common misery of the poor is usually light and tolerable. But St. Alphonsus affirms, with the more common opinion (II, 32; l. El. qq. ref., n. 4), if it is a question of the poor in general, and not of some particular poor person. The principal reason is that, if the rich did not have an absolute obligation of commonly aiding beggars, they could be left by all in their necessity, and thus their necessity would become grave. Therefore, by the words of the Lord (Luke 11:41): That which remaineth, give alms, there is expressed a precept grave of itself, as the Holy Fathers commonly interpret (Sylvius, 2.2, q. 32; Bellarmine, de Bonis Oper., l. 3, c. 7).

The rich are indeed not bound to distribute the whole of what is superfluous; but neither does it suffice to distribute so little, in proportion to the quantity of one's substance, that, if other rich men used the same parsimony, help would be lacking to the poor. - Commonly the rich are judged to satisfy by distributing to the common poor the fiftieth part of the revenues which remain over (or 2 gold-pieces out of 100); but not in the same proportion, if the riches greatly exceed.¹ Except beneficed persons, who are bound to distribute the whole superfluity to the poor or to pious places, as will be seen in its own place (n. 2249).

But, "if some rich and abounding person for a long time refuses all alms, with the intention of giving in a better and more suitable place and time, or to persons in greater need, or of converting it to another pious use, he does not sin, since he has a just cause for refusing. But if such a person, without reasonable cause, inhumanly repels all poor persons from himself, Laymann says that he is in a bad state." Cf. II, 32; H. Ap., IV, 19; Conf. dir., IV, 11; Istr., IV, 19.

From these things you will deduce: 1. Except in the case in which the poor are fed from public stipends, a rich man sins mortally who determines to give no alms in common necessities, or who in this is notably negligent, and accumulates all superfluities for attaining a higher state. Indeed, even in the case in which many things are assigned from public stipends for relieving the poor, the rich man does not act rightly who, by fixed intention, would wish to give nothing further. For in not a few matters the solicitude of the State fails in practice; whence such a rich man's denial would tend to the detriment of many. Nor certainly do modest alms impede anyone from ascending honorably to a higher state.

2. Physicians, advocates, etc., are bound to expend their labor for the poor gratuitously, when these are in true necessity and cannot be helped by others (2.2, q. 71, a. 1).

3. "Private men are not bound to seek out the poor. Yet if they doubt concerning someone's extreme need, they are bound to inquire into the truth" (II, 31, resp. 4, ad 1).

489. Questions. Q. 1. To which poor persons must alms be given?

Resp. It must be given to all who are truly in need, whether they are faithful or unbelievers, natives or foreigners; yet so that, other things being equal, an old man is preferred to a young man, a noble to an ignoble, an invalid to a strong person, a faithful person to an unbeliever, a Catholic to a heretic, a good man to a bad man, a native to a stranger, etc. For this is what the order of charity requires.

There is no obligation of giving alms, and sometimes it would be illicit to give it, to poor persons unwilling to work. Yet one must beware lest those be numbered among the voluntarily idle who have fallen into misery because of lack of work. Moreover, it would be more advisable to furnish work to these, from which they may live (II, 32, ad 5).

Q. 2. From which goods must, or can, alms be given?

Resp. 1. From one's own goods, of which one has free administration.

We say: from one's own. Therefore it is not licit from goods liable to restitution; nor is it licit with harm to creditors; nor is it licit for children from the goods of parents; for servants from the goods of masters. We say: of which one has free administration. Hence a wife cannot give extraordinary alms without the consent of her husband, unless from goods wholly her own, of which, namely, she has dominion and administration and receives the fruits. Yet she can give ordinary and very common alms from domestic goods, according to the custom of wives of her condition; and this even if the husband were unwilling, because custom grants her this right (II, 33; III, 540).

2. From another's goods, if either the poor man is in extreme necessity and you cannot give from your own; or the owner consents, or is reasonably presumed to consent.

Hence children can bestow small alms, and servants bread and similar things. Likewise tutors and curators can, from goods committed to them, give those modest alms which those whose goods they administer would have to give, since they bear their person (II, 33, 2, 3).

Note. 1. Let the confessor of the rich remember the words of the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:17): Charge the rich of this world... to do good, to be rich in good works, to give easily, to communicate, to lay up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on true life.

2. Yet absolution is not easily to be denied to a rich man refusing alms to common beggars: both because of the doubt and dissent of the Doctors; and because the rich, almost always, bring forward excusing reasons which, in practice, the confessor will not easily be able to reject as empty (II, 32, 3).