ARTICLE I: ON THE VICE OF DETRACTION

516. • Detraction is the unjust denigration of the reputation of an absent neighbor. But reputation is the good estimation which others have concerning our excellence, whether true or apparent.

Detraction is called simply such if the reputation of a neighbor is violated by the revelation of a true crime; but it is named calumny if violation of reputation follows from the imposition of a false crime.

Detraction can be done in various ways: 1° directly, if either a false crime is imposed, or a true one amplified, or a hidden one manifested, or a good work explained sinisterly; 2° indirectly, namely either by denying the good works of a neighbor, or diminishing them, or also sometimes by being silent when others praise, or by praising coldly. - But all these modes are, of themselves, of the same species, because all regard the same good of reputation. Yet per accidens they could add a new species, for example contumely, injury in goods of fortune, whispering (which intends the dissolution of friendship), a sin against piety, if the person from whom detraction is made is joined to the detractor by a most close bond, and this mortally, unless there is question of persons joined outside the second degree. Scav.²

517. Principles. - I. Every direct detraction, whether it is calumny, or detraction simply, is mortal from its own genus, because it is against justice; and indeed it is a graver sin than theft, because it unjustly deprives the neighbor of a greater good, as is clear from common sense and from Sacred Scripture: A good name is better than riches; and A detractor is an abomination of men.²

II. The gravity of detraction is to be taken chiefly from the gravity of the damage which the neighbor can suffer from it, and not precisely from the gravity of the defect or crime which is narrated concerning the neighbor. Hence for knowing in a particular case the gravity of detraction, one must attend to the quality 1° of the person detracting, for greater faith is given to a grave man than to a chatterer; 2° of the person harmed, because the more entire reputation and greater dignity he has, the more gravely he will take damage; 3° to the common judgment of men concerning the thing divulged, because by this very judgment, which varies according to the adjuncts of the persons to whom (n. 526. 4°) detraction is made, reputation consists.³

518. III. It is never licit to impose a false crime on another, as is clear from proposition 44 condemned by Innocent XI, p. XVI. Yet it is licit from a just cause to manifest another's hidden crime even with loss of his reputation; because sometimes the public or private good requires this, and then the right of one's neighbor to conserving reputation is broken by a more powerful right.⁴

IV. But the causes on account of which, duly under conditions, another's crime can licitly be revealed are the following: 1° the notable utility of the one revealing himself, for seeking counsel or help in a grave matter, yet with any affection toward detraction excluded; 2° the utility of the delinquent, namely for his instruction or correction, etc.; 3° public utility, as for impeding evils threatening the Republic or Religion or some Community, in which case, of itself speaking, each one is bound to reveal; 4° grave utility, even private, either of hearers, or of others, for example so that they may be freed from evils, damages, or inconveniences certainly or probably going to occur. Thus you can make a master more certain concerning the infidelity of a servant; reveal to another, who consults you about this on account of a grave business,¹ the defects of some person; indeed sometimes you will be bound to this according to the rules of charity. Thus a murderer will have to be revealed if some innocent person were accused of this crime; for the condition of the innocent is stronger.

The reason for these things is that the right in true reputation and false, or apparent and estimated reputation, differs to this extent, that the former is absolute, or to be observed by all always and everywhere, and therefore calumny is never licit (this number III); but the latter is limited, that is, it ceases when others would take grave damage from error concerning someone's excellence: - indeed it ceases even in doubt concerning the gravity of the damage, because in such doubt the innocent must be favored. Wherefore in the cases alleged neither is justice violated, since the neighbor's right is limited, nor charity, because this does not obligate with grave inconvenience.²

I said: duly, however, under conditions, namely 1° that knowledge of this sort has not been had from Sacramental Confession, which, as is clear, it is never licit to use; 2° that the damage cannot be avoided in another way; 3° that it is sufficiently proportionate to the loss of reputation; 4° that neither more nor to more persons be manifested than is necessary for averting the damage; 5° that you have not received the knowledge unjustly by force or fraud, suppose by opening letters, etc., unless nevertheless, because of changed adjuncts, it would be licit for you to seek it even in this way; which case would be if a) revelation were necessary for the common good; b) the other were held from justice to reveal the secret for repairing your damage; c) he were vexing you unjustly.²

519. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does he sin gravely who reveals one mortal sin of another?

Resp. 1° It is not always a grave sin to reveal the sin of another, even if it is manifested to several. Therefore one must attend to the adjuncts of things and persons, from which you will gather whether someone suffers grave loss of reputation from the revelation of the sin.

Resp. 2° If the sin would gravely dishonor either in itself, or relatively to the one defamed, certainly the detractor sins gravely as often as he manifests a sin of this sort, although one only, to several, because grave damage of reputation is inflicted on the neighbor.

Resp. 3° But whether it is mortal to reveal a sin of this sort to one prudent and discreet man, from whom namely there is no danger that it be manifested to others, with the spirit of harming and damage of another genus excluded, is controverted.

The first sentence, more common and more probable, says that one sins gravely, unless inadvertence or great levity excuses. The reason is, 1° because injury to reputation even before one grave person is judged grave, as is clear from rash judgment, which of itself is grave; 2° because often men bear it with more distress to be harmed before one grave person than before three or four others.

The second sentence, sufficiently probable, denies. The reason is that since reputation consists in the common estimation of men, he is not judged absolutely defamed who has lost his good name among one or another only.¹

520. • Quaer. 2° Does he commit sins diverse in number who detracts from someone in several matters, or affects him with diverse contumelies, or detracts from one man before several?

Resp. See what was said in n. 227, questions 1° and 2°.

Quaer. 3° Can a public crime be revealed to those ignorant of it, who dwell in the place where it is already public?

Resp. In the affirmative, because this seems neither to be against justice nor against charity, whether it is public by publicity of law, or by publicity of fact.²

521. • Quaer. 4° Can a crime public in one place be revealed in another place where it is unknown?

Resp. 1° In the affirmative, more probably of itself, at least without grave sin, if there is question of a nearby place, or of a place where it is easily and shortly to be made public, and no grave damage follows for the one defamed from the anticipation. The reason is that reputation to be lost shortly and necessarily is of no estimation, or certainly not of great estimation, and morally speaking is already cast away.³

Resp. 2° If there is question of places to which the divulgation is not going to come, or not except after a long time, one must distinguish:

1° As regards notoriety of law: 1° It is not against justice, because the judge, when he publicly condemns someone, intends to despoil the guilty man of reputation, so that he may be everywhere an example to the rest. Thus commonly. - 2° Nor more probably is it against charity, at least gravely, because it greatly contributes to the common good that the sentence be divulged everywhere, so that the penalty may be more efficacious, and the guilty man may be known also by inhabitants of a remote region, who could have to conduct business with him. - Thus more commonly,¹ with Lugo, Salmant.

2° As regards notoriety of fact, it is controverted among theologians.

The first sentence, very probable, says that it is not of itself illicit, because neither is there sin against justice, nor against charity, at least gravely, provided there is question of crimes which render a man pernicious. The reason is that it conduces to the public good that criminal men be known, so that all can guard against them.² (Q) p. 480.

The second sentence, on the contrary, says that it is a sin both against justice and against charity: 1° against justice indeed, because one defamed in one place has not lost the right to reputation in another remote place, where the reputation of the crime is not shortly going to arrive: therefore he does injury to him who defames him there; 2° against charity, because the one defaming harms his neighbor in a grave matter, or in reputation, which elsewhere he continues to possess without injury. - Billuart, Antoine.

522. • Quaer. 5° When can a crime or fact be called public or notorious?

Resp. 1° It is called altogether public or famous when it has become known to the greater part of the community, or city, town, village, etc.

Resp. 2° It is called simply public or notorious when it has become known to so many persons that it cannot be concealed by any evasion, and morally it is impossible that it not come to the knowledge of the community. But it is very difficult to determine the knowledge of how many persons is required for a crime to be judged public. Theologians have assigned various rules according to the various number of persons who compose the community. According to the more common sentence a crime can be called public if fifteen know from a community of one hundred persons; or twenty from at least three diverse families in a community of a thousand persons; or forty dispersed in a town of five thousand persons.³

But, as Billuart rightly says,¹ in practice this matter is remitted to the judgment of a prudent man, who, with the number of the community, the talkativeness of men, and other circumstances attended to, judges whether it is possible that the matter remain secret. - St. Alphonsus also warns² that a delict made public in one monastery cannot be called absolutely public, and therefore cannot be manifested elsewhere, not even in another monastery of the same Order, although it had frequent communication with it.

523. • Quaer. 6° Can a delict formerly public, but now hidden, be made public without grave fault, at least against charity?

Resp. In the negative, unless there is question of a delict formerly public by notoriety of law, or one pertaining to history.³

Quaer. 7° Does he sin gravely who only reports the grave sins of another as heard from others, for example if he says: It is reported, they narrate, I have heard such or such about that man?

Resp. 1° He sins gravely against charity and justice if he reports in such a way that others are more probably and deservedly going to believe it, for example if he asserts that he has heard the things which he narrates from a person worthy of faith, because then he furnishes a sufficient cause of believing the evil; otherwise, if probably faith is not given to the things said, because no infamy will arise from it. But he will much more easily sin gravely by reporting, even as a mere doubt, the enormous sin of another, for example heresy, sodomy, etc.

Resp. 2° He sins gravely against charity if he reports what has been heard before those who will probably believe it from levity or malice of their own; because each one is bound under grave sin from charity to take away the occasion of another's damage, when he easily can. Yet he does not seem to sin against justice, because he is not the efficacious cause of the damage.⁴ - Billuart,⁵ and others commonly.

524. • Quaer. 8° In what way does one hearing detraction sin?

Resp. 1° He certainly sins gravely against justice who efficaciously - for example, by exciting, praising, questioning - induces another to detract. (a) p. 480.

Resp. 2° He sins gravely against charity who rejoices in grave detraction done by another, because he rejoices in the grave damage of his neighbor. Except if he rejoiced only in the hearing of a new or curious thing, but not in the detraction itself.

Resp. 3° A Superior sins against charity if he does not impede detraction insofar as he conveniently can, even if he does not rejoice in it; because the special obligation is incumbent on him of correcting the detractor, or of meeting the damage of the defamed subject. But the Superior does not sin against justice, either of the detractor or of the defamed; for neither is this one bound from justice concerning the temporal good of a subject, nor that one concerning the temporal good of one not a subject. But a Bishop and pastor are bound from justice to correct a subject detracting, as one sinning.¹

Resp. 4° A private person for the most part is excused either altogether, or at least from grave sin, if he does not impede detraction, whether from shame, or from fear, or even from negligence, even if he conveniently can, provided he does not rejoice in it, and no other damage besides infamy accedes. The reason is that in this matter it often cannot be clear that correction will be profitable; indeed it is often dangerous, and it can deservedly be feared that detraction will rather be increased or prolonged. Yet he will not be free from some fault if he can easily apply efficacious correction.²

But those are excused even from venial sin who, when they notice detraction, depart, turn the conversation to other things, or avert the face and show themselves sad according to that saying: A sad face dissipates the detracting tongue.³

525. • Quaer. 9° Is it licit to defame oneself?

Resp. In the affirmative, of itself, if it is done with right intention, scandal and the damage of others being excluded. The reason is that it is not against justice, since each one is master of his own reputation; nor against charity, because this does not obligate one to conserve external goods except insofar as one's own salvation or that of a neighbor requires it.

But per accidens you will sin, and even gravely, if your reputation is necessary for your office, or if from this damage of life could arise for you, or of infamy for others.⁴

526. You will resolve. - 1° It is a grave sin to detract even from the dead in a grave matter; for they are not despoiled of the right to reputation, although they have departed from the living. Hence historiographers can sin gravely by branding a mark of ignominy upon the memory of the dead without sufficient cause, by manifesting hidden things, exaggerating known things, and not reporting penance done.¹

2° It can be lethal to reveal so many things, although not individually grave, concerning someone constituted in conspicuous dignity, that his reputation is notably harmed. Yet the faithful scarcely attend to the grave malice.

3° It is mortal if you say that someone is an adulterer, although you have probable indications concerning this; because you bring grave harm to his reputation. Indeed the same must be held, even if you said it was probable that he is such.

4° It is grave to say concerning a priest that he has committed a duel, that he is a lover of girls, and other things of this sort. But often it is not lethal to assert this concerning a soldier, or even concerning a young man of mediocre reputation; nor to say concerning a girl that she is talkative, proud, etc.²

5° It is not grave detraction to speak badly concerning someone indeterminate, for example, that in such a place there are many wicked, drunken, immodest persons; because grave injury is done to no one. Likewise, it is not grave to report some crime concerning someone whom the hearers do not know, nor ever will recognize, even if he is named: indeed this of itself is free from all fault, because there is no estimation of one unknown.

6° Yet it is lethal, at least commonly speaking, to detract gravely from some Monastery, although no Religious is named, for example, if it is said that in it an evil life is led, that a grave sin has been committed. The reason is that the Religious of the same Community are so joined among themselves that before outsiders they are judged as though responsible in common one for another. Hence the whole Community is wont to be stained before the imprudent and simple.³

527. • 7° It is not mortal to say concerning a public drunkard that he has become drunk on this day, even if he did it secretly; indeed sometimes no sin is present, if someone has lost every reputation as regards something, for example if you say concerning a prostitute that she has fornicated. Nor is it mortal to dishonor one infamous in one crime concerning another crime closely related, for example, if you say concerning an adulterer that he has sent love letters, or concerning a drunken man that he has quarreled with his wife; because such revelation is not a new infamy, or at least not grave. Yet to defame someone concerning a disparate and unconnected crime can be mortal, because he who is dishonorable in one genus of vice has not therefore lost the right of reputation as regards the rest.¹

8° He does not sin, at least gravely, who, only for the sake of solace, with intention of detracting excluded, narrates to some friend an injury done to him by another, even if from this some infamy comes to the author. Hence servants revealing injuries inflicted on them by masters, wives by husbands, children by a father, Religious by a Prelate, etc., are probably excused, at least from mortal sin; because the author of the injury cannot be reasonably unwilling, and demand so difficult a thing, that the one harmed lack solace or necessary counsel. Yet one must take care lest it be said to more persons, and lest the person be named more openly than is necessary for counsel or solace.²

9° Unless someone is to be affected by grave damage (as, for example, can happen from the revelation of illegitimate birth by which one is deprived of desired nuptials), or by great sorrow, it is slight to uncover the natural defects of the soul or body of another, for example his stupidity, or certain dispositions to more common vices, for example that someone is proud, avaricious, irascible; for the former are not moral, and neither the former nor the latter are judged gravely defaming.³

10° It is not licit in general to reveal another's hidden crime by at the same time narrating the penance done, because some sinister opinion always remains.

11° Of itself it is grave to name a person directly, but only to indicate his defects indirectly (by saying, for example, I know many things about him, but charity forbids me to disclose them), if such things are apt to cast in grave suspicion. (b) p. 480.