The Causes of Dispensing

185. Necessity of a cause. If a dispensation is sought, the causes of the dispensation must be alleged. These causes must be proportionate to the gravity of the law; but which causes are sufficient must be left to the prudent judgment of the one dispensing. Nevertheless they must not be so grave that of themselves they excuse from the law: for in this case there would be no need of dispensation.

It can happen that a law, on account of some impeding cause, either certainly or probably no longer obliges; not only in the first case, but also in this second case, there is no need of dispensation, since the obligation of the law ceases without dispensation. But if impeding causes stand in the way of the law which indeed of themselves do not excuse from the obligation of the law, but which nevertheless certainly or at least probably suffice for the superior to be able to dispense, there is need of dispensation.

Whether a superior, when a just cause exists, ought to dispense.

1. Dispensation, when a just cause exists, is sometimes due either from precept or from justice.

The cases in which dispensation is due are usually enumerated as these: a. if common law or a particular precept requires that dispensation be given on account of that cause; b. if it is necessary for the common good, in which case (legal) justice requires that dispensation be given; thus on account of the necessity of the Church, dispensation from interstices can be due; c. if it is necessary for the spiritual good of the petitioner, for which cause dispensation in vows can be due; d. if it is necessary for averting grave damage or public scandal; thus dispensation from the proclamations of marriage can be due.

2. Once dispensation has been denied, even if this was done unjustly, it is not lawful to act against the law. But if it has been denied by an inferior, recourse to the superior is clearly open; and if the superior also has denied it, the law must be observed, unless the difficulty of observation is so great that it excuses of itself from observing the law.

186. Distinction of causes. 1. The causes of dispensation are some internal, which arise from the difficulty of observing the law itself, as if persons are dispensed from fasting on account of weakness;¹ others external, which arise from circumstances of the person to be dispensed or of the person dispensing, or from the common good.

Some laws, as e.g. the law of integrity in confession, are so constituted that by their nature they have great difficulty; this difficulty in a particular case does not excuse from the observance of the law. Other laws, as e.g. the law of fasting, likewise by their nature have some difficulty, but not so great. But if in a particular case this difficulty is great, it is joined accidentally with the observance of the law, even if it is internal, and therefore it excuses from the observance of the law (n. 139).

a. External causes of dispensing are the dignity of the petitioner or of the superior, common or private utility, the payment of money for the utility of the Church. And certainly dispensation is customarily granted to reward the merit of some person, so that a person may be bound to the Church, to provide for the necessity or utility of a person, to show liberality or benignity on the part of the legislator, etc.

b. But if sometimes a dispensation is said to be granted without cause, this must be understood without an internal cause, or without another external cause besides the payment of money. Namely, where another external cause of dispensing seems to be lacking, for the dispensation an alms is imposed to be spent on a pious work, by which the good of the Church is promoted. In this case the utility of the Church is the cause of dispensing.

2. The causes of dispensation are some motive (final), which of themselves suffice for granting a dispensation, others impulsive, which of themselves do not suffice for granting a dispensation, but nevertheless help the motive causes, so that the dispensation may be granted more easily. Therefore if the former did not exist, the superior would not have dispensed; but if the latter did not exist, he nevertheless would have dispensed.

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus n. 195.

187. Principles. 1. He who dispenses by proper power can validly dispense even without a cause, because the obligation of the law depends altogether upon his will; but he who dispenses by vicarious power cannot validly dispense without a cause: for the superior is not judged to concede to an inferior the faculty of dispensing without a just cause (n. 181).

2. For dispensing licitly, a cause certainly or at least probably sufficient is always required. He who dispenses by proper power without cause commits the vice of acceptance of persons, and therefore does not sin gravely unless perhaps by reason of scandal or damage to others; but he who dispenses by vicarious power without cause can sin gravely in grave matter, because he abuses the power conceded to him. In doubt whether the cause suffices, not only the legislator himself but also the legislator's inferior grants the dispensation both validly and licitly; otherwise too great a burden would be imposed on the superior.

If an inferior dispensing in the law of a superior through error thinks that the cause is sufficient, the dispensation is valid: for in doubtful cases concerning the sufficiency of a cause the power of dispensing validly has been conceded, even if the cause in reality is not sufficient, lest scruples concerning the value of dispensations be able to arise. But if through error he thinks that a cause is present when in reality none is present, the dispensation is invalid.

3. In order that a dispensation be valid, it is required that at least one motive cause be true, and indeed at the time at which the dispensation is granted; for the dispensation is granted on this condition: if the prayers rest upon truth, because the superior is not judged to wish to dispense without cause, even if of himself he could do so. Nevertheless, the exaggeration of a cause otherwise true does not render the dispensation invalid.

a. It suffices that the cause be true at the time at which the dispensation is granted, even if it is not true at the time at which it is sought: for the prayers rest upon truth when the dispensation is granted. Whether it must also be true at the time at which the action is placed, for the licit placing of which the dispensation was obtained, depends both upon the law itself and upon the intention of the one dispensing, as will be clear from what is to be said below.

b. A dispensation is invalid if the cause is indeed true at the time at which it is sought, but not at the time at which the dispensation is granted, because the prayers do not rest upon truth. It makes no difference whether falsehood has crept into the petition in good or bad faith.

c. Likewise a dispensation is invalid if the cause is not true at the time at which it is sought and granted, but is true at the time at which the dispensation is communicated: for what does not subsist from the beginning is not strengthened by the passage of time.

4. Not only he who dispenses without cause, but also he who seeks dispensation without cause, acts illicitly, because he induces the one dispensing to an illicit thing; nevertheless he who uses a valid dispensation illicitly sought does not sin: for he who has been validly dispensed is not bound to observe the law. In doubt whether the cause suffices, it is lawful to seek dispensation; otherwise too great a burden would be imposed on subjects, since doubts of this kind, which cannot be solved, frequently occur.

613. Declarations. 1. In order that a dispensation be valid, a just cause of dispensing is required, not only where dispensation is granted by force of vicarious power by a bishop or another delegated judge, but even where it is granted by force of proper power by the supreme pontiff, because he does not wish to dispense illicitly without cause. Therefore in all dispensations the condition is understood: if the petitions rest on truth; and the dispensation is null if there is no motive cause of dispensing, except in impediments of lesser grade.²

2. The cause must be grave and proportionate, and so much the graver as the impediment from which dispensation is sought is graver. Hence it can happen that some cause suffices indeed for obtaining dispensation from a less grave and more easily dispensable impediment, but does not suffice for obtaining it in a graver and more difficultly dispensable impediment.³

3. Besides the division of causes of dispensing which is common to all dispensations, namely into motive or final causes and impulsive causes,⁴ in this place the following division is to be noted:

a. Into dishonoring causes and honorable causes. Dishonoring causes have their origin from the delict of the petitioners or consist in their defamation; honorable causes contain neither delict nor defamation. With regard to the concession of a dispensation, dishonoring causes are graver than honorable causes.

Dishonoring causes are, e.g., a. legitimation of offspring, which supposes illicit copula; b. suspected familiarity which cannot be impeded.

b. Into canonical and non-canonical causes. Those are called canonical which from the style of the Roman curia are expressly reported as admitted for matrimonial dispensations; all others are called non-canonical, which are not expressly reported among the causes admitted from the style of the Roman curia.

It is certain that even non-canonical causes are admitted in matrimonial dispensations; indeed sometimes dispensation is granted from non-canonical causes alone.

¹ Formulae apostolicae Datariae pro matrimonialibus dispensationibus (Rome: Typographia Augustiniana, 1901). Praxis apostolicarum dispensationum super impedimentis matrimonii (Rome: Typographia Augustiniana, 1902). These booklets are of the greatest moment in this matter, because from them one learns how supplicatory petitions are to be drawn up.

² Council of Trent, sess. 24, c. 5, De ref. matr. Cn. 1054.

³ Council of Trent, ibid.

⁴ Cf. De principiis, n. 185.

614. The Canonical Causes of Dispensing are the following sixteen in number:¹

1. "Narrowness of place, whether absolute or relative (by reason of the petitioner only), namely when in the place of origin or even of domicile the kinship of the woman is so propagated that she cannot find another of equal condition, whom she may marry, except one consanguineous or related by affinity; but to leave her fatherland would be hard for her."

This cause is chiefly considered in the betrothed woman. Place can be the place where the betrothed woman was born, or where she lives or has domicile or quasi-domicile. If the place of the betrothed man is the same, or if it is different but narrow in the same way, this can be indicated in the petition in this way: narrowness of place, where the petitioners were born, or narrowness of places, where the petitioners, etc.

Place here is not understood as a parish, but as a village or town, even if in it there are several parishes, provided it is distant from other places by at least one mile (1500 meters). Therefore if a suburb is a place distinct from the city and has its own name, narrowness of place can be alleged, provided it is distant from the city by about 1500 meters.²

A place is judged narrow if it contains no more than 300 hearths or 1500 inhabitants, acatholics being deducted, but not unbelievers and impious persons.

Equal condition must be taken broadly, not only concerning state and wealth, but also concerning age, education, character, religious disposition, etc.

A woman is said to find no spouse if here and now she has no apt occasion of marrying, even if she has sought no spouse, has previously rejected one or another, could have a man from another place, or one of equal condition wishes to marry her, namely lest matrimonial liberty be too greatly restricted.

2. "The over-adult age of the woman, namely if she has already passed the twenty-fourth year of age and hitherto has not found a man of equal condition whom she can marry. But this cause does not assist a widow who desires to fly to other nuptials."

If the woman is of still greater age, it helps to express this in the supplicatory petition, so that dispensation may be obtained more easily.

Several thought that, if a dispensation is ever granted because of the over-adult age of the betrothed woman, in the verification of the cause both things had to be proved for the validity of the dispensation: that the woman is over-adult and that up to that time she has not found a man of equal condition whom she could marry. But it is enough if it is established with certainty concerning over-adult age.³

3. "Deficiency or incompetence of dowry, namely if the woman does not actually have such a dowry that she can marry, in her own place where she is staying, an outsider of equal condition who is neither consanguineous nor related by affinity. This cause urges more if the woman is wholly without dowry and a consanguineous person or one related by affinity is prepared to marry her or even conveniently to dower her entirely."

The notion of dowry must be understood broadly concerning goods of fortune by which the burdens of matrimony can be sustained, not only concerning dowry strictly taken, namely where the dotal system is in force.

Actually, although afterward she is to have a dowry, whether from parents who now cannot or do not wish to give it and cannot be compelled to give it, or from a blood relative who has promised part of an inheritance.

4. "Lawsuits over succession of goods, whether already arisen, or grave and imminent danger of the same. If a woman is sustaining a grave lawsuit over succession of goods of great moment, and there is no other who would take a lawsuit of this sort upon himself and pursue it at his own expense except the one who desires to marry her, dispensation is customarily granted; for it is of interest to the republic that lawsuits be extinguished. Another cause closely approaches this, namely, a dowry entangled in lawsuits, when a woman is destitute of another man by whose help she is able to recover her goods. But a cause of this sort suffices only for more remote degrees."

5. "Poverty of a widow who is burdened with numerous offspring and a man promises to support her. But sometimes by the remedy of dispensation help is given to a widow for this cause alone, that she is younger and is placed in danger of incontinence."

6. "Good of peace, under which name come not only treaties between kingdoms and princes, but also the extinction of grave enmities, quarrels, and civil hatreds. This cause is brought forward either for extinguishing grave enmities which have arisen among the blood relatives or those related by affinity of the contracting parties and which would be entirely settled by the celebration of matrimony, or when grave enmities have flourished among the blood relatives and those related by affinity of the contracting parties, and, although peace has already been entered between them, nevertheless the celebration of the matrimony would greatly conduce to the strengthening of that peace."

7. "Excessive, suspected, dangerous familiarity, as also cohabitation under the same roof, which could not easily be impeded."

Since the reason of this cause is placed in avoiding scandal, it is required that this familiarity or cohabitation under the same roof has given origin to suspicion concerning base conduct between those about to marry.⁴

8. "Copula with a consanguineous person or one related by affinity or another person laboring under an impediment, held beforehand, and pregnancy and therefore legitimation of offspring, namely that provision may be made for the good of the offspring itself and the honor of the woman, who otherwise would remain unmarried."

If incestuous copula, which is alleged as a cause of dispensation, was had not from human frailty but from hope of obtaining dispensation more easily, this circumstance no longer has to be expressed in the supplication.

9. "Infamy of the woman arising from suspicion that she has been known by her consanguineous relative or one related by affinity as excessively familiar with the same, although the suspicion is false, namely when, unless matrimony is contracted, the woman would remain gravely defamed or unmarried, or would have to marry a man of unequal condition, or grave harms would arise."

10. "Revalidation of matrimony which was contracted in good faith and publicly, with the Tridentine form observed, because its dissolution can scarcely be done without public scandal and grave harm, especially of the woman. But if the spouses entered the nuptials in bad faith, they by no means merit the favor of dispensation, as the Council of Trent disposes (sess. 24, c. 5, De reform. matrim.)."

a. Where there is question of dispensation for convalidating matrimony, it must be indicated whether the petitioners were ignorant of the impediment, whether the ignorance was of fact or law, whether they contracted in the face of the Church, whether they had copula, and this in good or bad faith, whether, after being informed concerning the impediment, they continued copula.

b. If only one party contracted matrimony in bad faith, dispensation was always granted, even in former times; but today it is granted even if each party contracted matrimony in bad faith, especially if offspring has already been born or danger of civil matrimony is imminent.

11. "Danger of mixed matrimony or of matrimony before an acatholic minister."

12. "Danger of incestuous concubinage."

13. "Danger of civil matrimony. From what has been said there follows that the probable danger that those who seek dispensation, if it is not obtained, will celebrate matrimony only civilly, as they say, is a legitimate cause of dispensing. Likewise a civil matrimony already contracted which is to be convalidated."

14. "Removal of grave scandals."

15. "Cessation of public concubinage."

16. "Excellence of merits, when someone (whether of the betrothed or of their progenitors), either by fighting against enemies of the Catholic faith, or by liberality toward the Church, or by doctrine, virtue, or in another way, has deserved well of religion."

¹ They are listed in the instruction of S. C. de Prop. Fide, May 9, 1877.

² S. C. C., July 8, 1876.

³ S. Penitentiary, April 5, 1902.

⁴ Ballerini-Palmieri VI, n. 240.

615. Non-canonical causes must be added to canonical causes, but when the latter are lacking, dispensation is sometimes granted from non-canonical causes alone in more remote degrees. Causes of this sort are:

1. On the part of the female petitioner: a. if she has been deprived of either or each parent; b. if she has arisen from illegitimate birth; c. if she is held back by illness, deformity, or another defect; d. if she has already been deflowered by another.

2. On the part of the male petitioner: a. if he is held back by illness; b. if he is a widower burdened with offspring, for whom he seeks a good mother; c. if he is in need of the assistance of this woman, e.g., for carrying on domestic work.

3. On the part of the matrimony: a. the publicized proposal of contracting; b. the suitability of the matrimony; c. the good morals of the petitioners; d. the good of the parents, if father or mother needs assistance.

I. Distinction of causes. The final or motive cause and the impulsive cause are distinguished. The final cause is generally said to be one which suffices by itself alone; the impulsive cause is one which alone does not suffice, but nevertheless helps toward obtaining the dispensation. Several impulsive causes sometimes constitute a sufficient cause. Special points concerning these, however, belong in the treatise on Matrimony.

II. Necessity of a just cause. 1. The legislator, his successor, and his superior dispense validly but illicitly without a just cause (can. 84, § 1). The reason for the former is that, just as law in coming to be depends on the will of the legislator, so also it depends on it in persisting. The reason for the latter is that a legislator dispensing without a just cause would present himself as an acceptor of persons and would give occasion to complaints, by exempting one without cause from a law while others were bound by it (St. Alphonsus, I, 178).

2. An inferior dispenses illicitly and invalidly without a just cause in the law of a superior (can. 84, § 1). The reason is that the legislator is not considered to have granted the faculty of dispensing unjustly.

Corollary I. A legislator who dispenses without a just cause of himself sins only venially, but an inferior sins gravely, unless smallness of matter excuses. This follows from the fact that disordered use of a power which someone possesses is of itself only lightly evil, but usurpation of a power which someone lacks, setting aside smallness of matter, is gravely illicit (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary II. If a superior errs concerning the cause, the dispensation is valid if the cause in fact exists. If it certainly does not exist, of itself it is invalid, because one dispensing who can dispense without a just cause is not presumed to have wished this; but an inferior cannot even do that (St. Alphonsus, I, 180, 181; III, 25). I said of itself, because the legislator can establish that some dispensations are always valid, as he has established concerning dispensations from lesser impediments of Matrimony (can. 1054); namely, besides the fact that in lesser impediments of this sort some cause is easily had, such a disposition conduces to order and to tranquillity of souls. Therefore in these dispensations too at least the reason of the common good is found. Finally, if it is doubted whether the cause existed, one must stand for the validity of the act (St. Alphonsus, I, 182).

III. Diverse just causes. There are customarily numbered: piety, necessity, and utility. Indeed the dignity of the petitioner, or the kindness of the superior to be shown, can also be a sufficient cause (St. Alphonsus, I, 198). Of itself a graver cause is required according as the law is graver (can. 84, § 1), and according as the damage arising to the common good from the dispensation is graver. Of course, a cause which of itself excuses from the law is not required. Besides, observe:

1. In doubt about the sufficiency of the cause, a dispensation is granted validly and licitly (can. 84, § 2), and this even by an inferior. Likewise a dispensation is licitly sought in doubt about the sufficiency of the cause (can. 84, § 2; St. Alphonsus, I, 178).

2. When a just cause is present, the superior is held to dispense as follows:

a) "If the cause is only sufficient so that the dispensation is permitted, but not owed, the superior can licitly grant it and deny it, or grant it to one and deny it to another; because although a dispensation is expedient for the good of the subject, the observance of law is expedient for the common good."

b) "But if the cause is such that it makes the dispensation owed, namely for avoiding common damage or private damage of great moment, or for common utility, or great particular utility... then the superior is held to dispense; otherwise he would sin gravely or lightly according to the matter. Yet if the dispensation is denied, even unjustly, the subject cannot act against the law, unless such a cause urges that it withdraws him from the law, that is, excuses him from it. Wherefore, if a bishop unjustly denies a dispensation from the publications before Matrimony, the Matrimony can, when a grave cause urges, be contracted without them" (St. Alphonsus, I, 179).

What if the faculty of dispensing someone is conferred upon a person, and the motive cause has ceased before the dispensation has been granted or obtained?

Response. In the case, the dispensation granted would be invalid, because the superior of himself is not considered to confer the faculty of dispensing in the case in which the motive cause has ceased. I said of himself, because the Superior can proceed otherwise, and sometimes does proceed otherwise, as will be explained in the treatise on Matrimony (St. Alphonsus, VI, 132; cf. can. 41).

251. Conditions required for dispensation. From the law of the Council of Trent,⁷¹ which thereafter was not changed, three conditions are required for legitimate dispensation: 1. a sufficient cause; 2. knowledge of that cause; 3. gratuitous concession of the dispensation.

1. Sufficient cause of dispensation. Internal and external causes, motive or final causes, and impulsive causes are usually distinguished.

Internal causes arise from the difficulty of observing the law itself in a particular case; for example, difficulty of observing the law of fasting because of grave labors.

External causes arise not from the law itself, but from the common good, for which better provision is made if in this particular case dispensation of the law is conceded. Such external causes are the dignity of the petitioner or of the superior dispensing, the payment of money for the utility of the Church. Thus, for example, because of an external cause a dispensation from some matrimonial impediment is conceded to a prince, namely because in this way the prince is bound more to the Church or because he gives a great sum of money to the poor. Such dispensations are sometimes called given "without cause," that is, without an internal cause, but not without an external cause. These external causes also are just and sufficient for obtaining dispensation. For in making laws the legislator first of all intends the common good. But it can be more useful for the common good if, although an internal cause is lacking, dispensation is conceded because of the dignity of the petitioner, than if it is refused. Therefore then the legislator or his delegate licitly concedes dispensation.

Motive or final causes are called those which by themselves alone suffice for obtaining dispensation. They are also customarily called canonical, because canon law admits them as sufficient.⁷²

Impulsive causes are those which indeed alone do not suffice, but nevertheless help for obtaining dispensation. The distinction of motive and impulsive causes often comes into use in matrimonial dispensations.

⁷¹ "Let all know that the most sacred canons are to be observed by all, and, so far as can be done, indiscriminately. But if an urgent and just reason and sometimes greater utility should demand that dispensation be made with some persons, this, the cause being known, and with the greatest maturity and gratuitously, is to be performed by whomever the dispensation will pertain to; and a dispensation made otherwise is to be judged subreptitious" (sess. 25, c. 18 de reform.).

⁷² Cf. below in the treatise on marriage, the canonical causes for obtaining dispensations concerning impediments, III, 871.

252. Principle. A dispensation conceded without sufficient cause is a) illicit, if it was given by the legislator himself (or his successor or superior); but it is besides b) invalid, if it was given from delegated authority.⁷³

Therefore every dispensation conceded without sufficient cause is always illicit and sometimes also invalid. The reason for the first part is that dispensation is deservedly called a "wound of the law." But just as it is not licit to inflict a wound on a man without sufficient reason, so neither is it licit to inflict a wound on the law without a proportionate cause. - Besides, just as the legislator cannot make law at his own whim, so neither ought he relax an established law without sufficient reason through dispensation. But if he acted otherwise, he would disturb the right order of society, loosen the nerve of discipline, be an accepter of persons and an unfaithful dispenser; indeed he would be rather a dissipator than a dispenser. The gravity of the sin committed by such an unfaithful dispenser is to be weighed not so much from the gravity of the law frivolously dispensed as from the detriment thereafter following either for some members of the community or for the whole community.

The reason for the second part of the stated principle is the manifest excess which is committed by the one dispensing against the will of the superior, since he is not presumed to have conceded the faculty of dispensing unless sufficient reasons are present. Therefore the delegate has exceeded the limits of the faculty obtained and consequently has dispensed not only illicitly, but also invalidly.

Gravity of the cause. The cause required for dispensing licitly is not necessarily as great as one which already of itself excuses from observance of the law. That cause suffices which, all the circumstances of the law and of the person being considered, is known to be fitting to reason, so that from the dispensation conceded both the common good is not harmed and the good of the dispensed person is increased. But which causes in individual cases are really sufficient cannot be determined by a general rule. First of all, the good and evil effects which probably will follow from the dispensation conceded must be attended to. It is never licit to concede a dispensation which would tend to the prejudice of the common good. Indeed, through dispensation the common good ought to make progress.⁷⁴ Three legitimate causes for dispensing are usually enumerated, namely: necessity, charity, utility (common or private). - If there is doubt, not indeed whether a cause exists, but whether the cause brought forward is sufficient, and that doubt persists after diligent deliberation, nevertheless the dispensation can validly and licitly be sought and conceded;⁷⁵ because otherwise many anxieties would arise, and besides, because the legislator in these circumstances is rightly presumed to concede license of dispensing. When the subject has candidly and truthfully explained to the superior all his causes for dispensing, and then has obtained the requested dispensation, now he can with safe conscience use the dispensation so obtained, unless, however, it is manifestly established that the superior dispensed frivolously without sufficient reason.

Note. Not only he who dispenses without sufficient cause commits sin, but also he who knowingly uses such a dispensation.

⁷³ Cod. iur. can. c. 84, § 1.

⁷⁴ S. theol. I-II, q. 97, a. 4 ad 1.

⁷⁵ Cod. iur. can. c. 84, § 2.

253. 2. Knowledge of the cause of dispensation. Not only must a sufficient cause really be present, but it must also be known by the one dispensing, since otherwise he would act irrationally. In the external forum, especially if there is question of dispensation from a public impediment of marriage, the mode of having this knowledge is wont to be determined accurately and is called "verification of petitions"; but in the internal forum it suffices that the one dispensing have in whatever way moral certitude concerning the existence of a sufficient cause for dispensing. Authors dispute whether this knowledge of the cause is prescribed for the validity or only for the liceity of the dispensation to be imparted. St. Alphonsus⁷⁶ calls the opinion more probable which teaches that the value of the dispensation depends not on knowledge, but on the existence of a sufficient cause. This opinion indeed is safe in practice, unless, however, from the very words of the faculty of dispensing conceded, it clearly appears that knowledge of the cause is required as a condition sine qua non.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 181.

⁷⁷ Cf. below in the treatise on marriage, III, 881.

255. Defects of dispensation. There are indeed many things⁸⁰ which can vitiate an acquired dispensation, both on the part of the one dispensing and on the part of the one dispensed, but concerning several of them discussion has already been had above. It remains to speak of two defects, namely 1. concerning error and 2. concerning fear.

⁸⁰ All defects of dispensation can be reduced to three species, namely to defect of jurisdiction, of justice (if a just cause for dispensing is lacking), and of will (if error or fear is present in the one dispensing).

386. For dispensation there is required a will of dispensing, present or antecedent; but a presumed future will is not sufficient, which is not an absolute will, for example: if the superior knew, he would dispense. And in this way dispensation is distinguished from license: for in this case the action is not prohibited simply, but only lest it be done without the consent of the superior, for which presumed consent suffices; but when the action is absolutely prohibited and therefore evil, there is necessary at present a will which takes away the prohibition and the malice. This can be manifested 1) expressly, by words, writings, signs; or 2) tacitly from facts: a) if the superior knows that action is being taken against the law and does not contradict, although he easily can and ought, so that from the circumstances his silence cannot be explained except on the supposition of dispensation; b) if with certain knowledge he commands or concedes what cannot be done without dispensation, for example, the Pontiff knowingly gives a benefice to an irregular person, or commands meats to be eaten on a forbidden day.

387. For dispensation there is required a just cause, known and examined by mature counsel. - For a) if the dispenser dispenses according to his own will, he will be either unfaithful or imprudent: unfaithful if he does not have a just cause, for he orders to a particular good a power given unto edification on account of the common good, and thus turns it into destruction, while he disturbs the right order of society and, by committing acceptance of persons, gives occasion for complaints, exempting one while others are pressed by the law; imprudent if he is ignorant of the reason for dispensing. Moreover b) because to exempt from law him who is not to be exempted from law is acceptance of persons; c) because it is disgraceful and against natural law that a part without cause should not be conformed to the whole. Hence:

1. If a just cause is lacking, a) and it is done in the law of a superior, the dispensation is illicit as an abuse of another's power, and indeed gravely or lightly according as the law obligates under grave or under light matter, and ordinarily invalid because the superior is not judged to commit the power of dispensing without cause, which he could not concede without sin (can. 84, § 1);

b) if it is done in one's own law, the dispensation is valid because positive law does not bind without the will of the superior, but it is illicit gravely or lightly according to the degree of disturbance that follows: although it is a sin of acceptance of persons, which is grave from its genus, against distributive and legal justice, and which is apt to generate scandal and harm the common good, nevertheless more often in a particular case it will in fact be light, because ordinarily it is not very harmful; yet it is grave if notable scandal arises, or harm to the one dispensed, or a burden upon others;

c) a subject knowingly asking for dispensation without legitimate cause sins gravely or lightly, according as he induces the dispenser to grave or light sin (even if the superior is in good faith); nevertheless, by using the dispensation, if it is valid and scandal is excluded, he does not sin.

2. If only knowledge of the cause is lacking: a) if it is done in the law of a superior, the dispensation is illicit, and also invalid if the delegating superior placed examination of the cause as a condition of dispensation, or also a just cause and the cause is lacking; otherwise validity is probable;

b) if it is done in one's own law, the dispensation is valid but illicit;

c) if, diligence having been applied, it is not certain but probable that the cause suffices, the dispensation is licitly and validly granted, because in morals evidence cannot always be had, but a prudent and probable reason suffices (can. 84, § 2).

In doubt concerning the validity of a dispensation it is judged valid: one must stand for the value of the act.

388. A just cause of dispensing can be: necessity, for example, grave pain of the head or weakness from fasting; piety, for example, the service of worship for dispensing from an irregularity; or utility at least mediately redounding to the common good, whether intrinsic or extrinsic.

Intrinsic utility is preservation, difficulty, or inconvenience of observing the law united to it per accidens, for example, preservation from scruples or temptations, the difficulty of a journey in winter. Extrinsic utility is the good of the one dispensing, for example, that he show himself liberal or kind; the good of the one dispensed, for example, utility in view of good merit, the dignity of the petitioner; the common good, for example, for forestalling excessive transgressions, for increasing common gladness. Thus also the payment of money for the utility of the Church, the compensation of merits, the reconciling of peace.

1. Nevertheless the use of every cause, if the one dispensing is not the legislator, is not always permitted. Namely, one must see in what way the faculty has been delegated and within what limits it is contained.

How great a cause is required must be determined with attention to the moment of the law, the quality of the person, the circumstances of time, etc., so that, all the circumstances being considered, it appears fitting to reason. It is, namely, like a cause with a double effect: the good coming from the dispensation must compensate the evil caused by it. But the cause need not be so great that it certainly excuses of itself from the observance of the law, or probably if the superior cannot be approached, because then there is no need of dispensation, since the law has probably ceased; nor can it be minimal or just any small cause, but an intermediate cause suffices.

The cause of dispensation need not exist when the dispensation is asked for or when it is granted inchoatively (for example, mandatorily), but when it is granted definitively and effectively, or is executed (can. 41). Moreover it must remain until use is begun and during use, if it was given for an act morally divisible and revocable and the cause by its nature is temporary; whence the dispensation is given under the tacit condition that the cause continue, for example, dispensation from recitation of the hours or fasting on account of infirmity. But it need not remain if it was given for an act morally indivisible and irrevocable, and the cause by its nature is perpetual and therefore, if it ceases, it is per accidens; whence the dispensation is given absolutely, for example, dispensation from an irregularity on account of poverty is valid even if the poverty has ceased; dispensation from an impediment of marriage for legitimating offspring is valid even if, after the dispensation has been granted, the offspring dies.

I say, 1st. For the liceity of a dispensation some cause is always required. The reason is that otherwise the superior will not be a faithful dispenser. For this reason he also sins who in such a case asks for a dispensation; for he induces the dispenser to an illicit thing, and therefore sins in the same kind of sin in asking as the legislator does in granting. - Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 97, art. 4.

I say, 2nd. But for validity no cause is required on the part of the one granting, if he dispenses in his own law or in the law of an inferior. The reason is that he who can bind can also loose; but it is otherwise if he dispenses in the law of his superior, because he is not presumed to have received the power of dispensing rashly.

I say, 3rd. For validity on the part of the petitioner, it is required that there be no essential obreption or subreption in the petition, or one which falls upon the motive cause, because the superior does not dispense except under a tacit condition, namely, if the prayers rest upon truth. Concerning pontifical matrimonial dispensations of a lesser grade, see below n. 921. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 185.

These three statements are now confirmed by canon 84:

§ 1. From an ecclesiastical law let no dispensation be made without a just and reasonable cause, having taken into account the gravity of the law from which dispensation is made; otherwise a dispensation given by an inferior is illicit and invalid.

§ 2. A dispensation, in doubt concerning the sufficiency of the cause, is licitly sought and can licitly and validly be granted (Can. 84).

Question 1. Does a superior dispensing without cause in a grave matter sin gravely?

Response. Negatively, probably of itself, as regards the legislator; because, scandal or harm to others having been set aside, grave disorder in the commonwealth will not arise from the fact that one or another person does not observe the law by dispensation. But it must be said otherwise as regards an inferior, because he is not judged delegated to dispense except for a just cause; and therefore if he acts otherwise, he gravely abuses the power granted to him, and admits a fault grave from its kind. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 178-180.

Question 2. Is it licit to ask for or grant a dispensation in doubt whether the cause suffices?

Response. Affirmatively, as to both; as is clear from the canon 84, § 2, cited just now. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 187.

You Will Resolve. 1st. A dispensation granted from a just cause to some wicked person, whom the superior reputed upright, is valid, even if, had the wickedness been known, he would not have dispensed; the reason is that uprightness is not reputed a motive cause, but merely an impulsive cause. Except unless someone was moved on account of uprightness.

2nd. A dispensation is valid, although several false causes, even causes motive of themselves, have been set forth with true and sufficient causes; because where some true motive cause is present, a sufficient foundation of dispensation is supplied.

3rd. A dispensation granted by a superior is valid, although it had already been denied by an inferior and no mention is made of this denial.

4th. A dispensation obtained for someone ignorant of it, or even unwilling, is valid when necessity demands this. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 186.

§ II. — Whether dispensation without legitimate cause is licit and valid?

I say 1°: A superior dispenses illicitly without legitimate cause in his own law or that of an inferior¹.

It is proved: because 1° he who dispenses without legitimate cause is an imprudent and unfaithful dispenser²: imprudent, because he acts rashly, without reasonable cause; unfaithful, because he intends not the common good, unto which the law was instituted, and which he ought by his office and implicit pact with the community to intend. 2° Because to exempt from the law him who is not to be exempted is respect of persons. 3° Because it is base and against natural reason that a part without cause fail of con-

^{1 2 1} Ibid. ² Ibid.

formity with the whole; which he does who dispenses without cause. 4° Finally, because power is given unto edification, and not unto destruction; whence Bernard, lib. de Consider., c. 4, n. 18, calls dispensation of this kind « a cruel dissipation. »

I say 2°: A superior dispenses validly without legitimate cause in his own law and that of an inferior.

It is proved. A law, both in coming into being and in being preserved, depends absolutely upon the will of the lawgiver; so that if, although a legitimate cause urged, he instituted it not, or abrogated without legitimate cause a law already instituted, there would be no law, nor would anyone be bound. Therefore, if he take away the obligation of the law for someone, that man is not bound.

It is confirmed. Those who are dispensed without cause from impediments of matrimony validly contract matrimony; for no one complains against the validity of such matrimony. Therefore valid is the dispensation.

[This the Council of Trent lays down concerning dispensations, session XXV, cap. 18, de reform.: « As it publicly conduces at times to relax the bond of law, that more fully, cases and necessities arising, satisfaction may be given for the common utility; so more frequently to loose the law, indulging petitioners rather by example than by a sure selection of persons and things, is nothing else than to open to each one the way for transgressing the laws. Wherefore let all know that the most sacred canons are to be observed exactly by all, and, as far as lies within their power, indiscriminately. But if an urgent and just reason, and sometimes greater utility, require that dispensation be made with some, this shall be done by whomever the dispensation shall concern, the cause known, with the greatest maturity, and gratuitously; otherwise the dispensation thus made shall be judged surreptitious. »

You will ask 1° whether a superior dispensing without cause sins mortally, and the inferior who makes use of such dispensation.

I answer, to the first, with the Angelic Doctor, here a. 4, c.: « If without reason, out of mere will, he [the superior] grant license, he will be neither faithful in dispensing nor prudent: unfaithful indeed, if he have not intention toward the common good; imprudent, however, if he know not the reason of dispensing. » And ibid., ad 1: « When dispensation is made with anyone that he keep not the common law, it ought not to be done to the prejudice of the common good, but with the intention that it profit the common good. » Therefore, although the lawgiver be lord of his own law, he seems to sin if he dispense without cause, because he thus weakens the law and provides not sufficiently for the common good. Some say he sins mortally if the matter be grave. Others teach better that then the sin is none other than venial, scandal or grave damage of anyone being set aside; for the disorder does not appear as grave of itself. S. Lig., lib. I, n. 178.

I answer, to the second. The Salmanticenses, de Legib., cap. 5, punct. 6, § 3, n. 76, with Suarez and others, cited by S. Ligorius, lib. I, n. 178, teach commonly that one using such dispensation does not sin gravely, and to themselves also it seems probable that the sin is not even venial. This is to be understood if scandal be absent, nor damage thence accrue to anyone.

You will ask 2° whether it be licit to seek or to grant a dispensation when it is doubted whether the cause be sufficient.

I answer. 1° It is licit to seek, because it pertains not to subjects to judge of the sufficiency of the cause, but they are bound only to expose the matter sincerely to the superior.

I answer. 2° It is licit to grant, because otherwise an intolerable burden would be imposed upon superiors; for since matters are often ambiguous, superiors would be distressed by scruples and anxieties, and if then they were held to take refuge in the safer side, there would be danger lest they fall into excessive severity.]

I say 3°: An inferior neither licitly nor validly dispenses without legitimate cause in the law of a superior; because the superior is not held to grant the faculty of dispensing except for legitimate cause. Nor can the inferior do more in this matter than has been granted to him by the superior. Therefore.

Whence, if the Pope dispensed without sufficient cause in a vow or oath, which are of divine law, or a bishop in the law of a Pontiff or of councils, there would be no dispensation; unless perchance he thought the cause sufficient in good faith, since it is foundedly presumed that so the superior wills, to avoid grave scruples and continual anxieties.

[You will ask 1° whether a dispensation obtained by force or fear is valid.

I answer. Affirmatively, provided these three things stand: 1° that a cause of dispensing exist; 2° that the will of dispensing have not been wanting in the superior; 3° that no cause of nullity be present from elsewhere. So S. Ligor., lib. I, n. 184, and many cited by him.]

You will ask 2° what are the legitimate causes of dispensing.

I answer. Generally speaking, three are commonly assigned: piety, utility, especially of the common good, or such as redounds to the common good, and necessity; which ought not to be so great that it of itself takes away the obligation of the law, otherwise there would be need not of dispensation but of interpretation only.

IX. Question III. What are the legitimate causes for granting dispensation? Response: Before I assign the causes individually, I will preface a few general points, which authors commonly note must be observed in dispensation. The first is that it be lawful according to equity; the second, that it be fitting according to honorableness; and the third, that it be expedient according to utility. This too must be held as a universal and certain principle: namely, that the graver the vow, the graver a cause it requires for dispensation — such that there be a fitting proportion between the vow which is to be relaxed, and the cause of such relaxation. Vows of chastity, of religious life, of the threefold pilgrimage, of perpetual fasting, of disbursing vast alms, are most grave vows: therefore they require a grave cause for dispensation. Lesser, and more frequent, vows — such as wearing the habit of some Saint, visiting his image, undertaking a visit to some such sanctuary, and the like — since they are of lesser weight, a lesser cause too suffices for obtaining dispensation. The reason is evident: in vows of the former kind, the matter consecrated to God by vow yields greater worship. Now there is no foundation for presuming that God wishes to remit the payment of a grave tribute, when no urgent reason is present which would counsel such indulgence. Hence it is that common practice holds that an absolute dispensation is most rarely granted in the aforesaid vows; but almost all teach that commutation, or dispensation, is to be granted only integrally, and that it is not always to be inferred, that the Church, or the Pontiffs themselves, ought to intermix the power of commuting or dispensing whenever some evident cause of dispensing occurs. For the power in the Church of dispensing is never to be diminished morally; nay, an evident and just legitimate cause is always, as commonly required, to occur, so that a full and absolute dispensation may be granted... . Nor is absolute moral certainty always required in moral matters; and this can often not be had, but it suffices that the cause probably exist. It suffices, then, that the cause, all things having been seriously inspected, be recognized as expedient for the common good, and for the honest utility of the one vowing, so that the vow be relaxed.

XXX. Question XXIII. What are legitimate causes of dispensation? Answer. Three things must be noted: 1. what is lawful according to equity; 2. what is fitting according to honesty; 3. what is expedient according to utility. The graver the vow, the graver the causes required for dispensation, so that there be a fitting proportion between the vow to be relaxed and the cause of relaxation. Hence it is that in the aforesaid five vows dispensations are rarely granted, but the supreme Pontiffs themselves are wont to mix in something of commutation. Nor is it to be inferred from this that a dispensation is never to be granted; but only that it is to be granted when a legitimate cause occurs. Nor is an evident cause always required, since in moral matters it can often not be had. It suffices that a likely cause appear solid, so that, all things seriously weighed, it be judged expedient, both to the common good and to the honest advantage of the one vowing, that the vow be relaxed.